Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies

Ernest and Maryann Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Companies, LLC, No. 6, September Term, 2022. Opinion by Hotten, J. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – REAL PROPERTY – MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. ARTICLE § 14-117 – ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEFERRED WATER AND SEWER CHARGES Section 14-117(a)(3)(i) of the Real Property Article of the Maryland Code provides that a seller of residential real property in Prince George’s County must provide the purchaser certain disclosures in the initial contract of sale, including the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable.

Section 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) limits a seller to a schedule of charges for the amortized water and sewer costs to a charge period no longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale. Petitioners purchased property in Charles County from Respondent, whereby Respondent prescribed a thirty-year amortization period for the property’s water and sewer assessments. Petitioners challenged the duration of the amortization period under § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii). The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), when viewed in context of the entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s County.

The Court, therefore, analyzed the legislative history to confirm our plain text interpretation. The Court concluded that the legislative history of § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) confirms our plain language interpretation. The legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for the amortization provision to only apply to Prince George’s County. As such, the Court held that the Court of Special Appeals correctly interpreted § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), and the circuit court correctly dismissed the action.

Circuit Court for Charles County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Case No.: C-08-CV-20-000406 Argued: September 8, 2022 OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2022 __________________________________ ERNEST AND MARYANN ELSBERRY v. STANLEY MARTIN COMPANIES, LLC __________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Eaves, Getty, Joseph M., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: December 1, 2022 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2022-12-01 16:09-05:00 Gregory Hilton, Clerk Md. Code Ann., Real Property (“Real Prop.”) § 14-117(a)(3)(i) requires a seller of residential real property in Prince George’s County to provide the purchaser with certain disclosures in the initial contract of sale, including the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable. Deferred water and sewer assessments are usually provided in the form of a declaration and recorded in the applicable county’s land records. Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3); Joseph N. Schaller & Shannon D. Sentman, Private Water & Sewer Assessment Companies, Md. Bar J. 36, 37 (2006). The declaration, in turn, reimburses the seller for the costs related to the construction and installation of the water and sewer systems.

Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3); Sullivan v. Caruso Builder Belle Oak, LLC, 251 Md. App. 304 , 310, 253 A.3d 1142 , 1145 (2021); Schaller & Sentman, supra, at 37. While Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) permits the seller to establish amortized water and sewer costs, the seller cannot impose upon the purchaser a repayment period for a duration longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale. Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). We are asked to determine whether the twenty-year deferred water and sewer assessment amortization limit, pursuant to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), applies to the entire state or exclusively to properties located within Prince George’s County.

The present dispute arose over the purchase of residential real property in Charles County, Maryland. According to the real estate purchase agreement, the purchased property was subject to a declaration, which prescribed, at the discretion of the seller, a thirty-year collection period for the property’s water and sewer assessments. The purchasers filed suit, alleging that the seller violated Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) by imposing an amortized water and sewer charge longer than twenty years after the initial date of sale of the property. The seller moved to dismiss, asserting that Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to real property located in Prince George’s County.

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Charles County granted the seller’s motion to dismiss. The purchasers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, No. 172 Sept. Term, 2021, 2022 WL 94616 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 10, 2022).

The Court of Special Appeals declined to extend the geographic application of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) beyond Prince George’s County. Id. at ⁶. We granted certiorari on May 9, 2022, Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 478 Md. 510 , 275 A.3d 345 (2022), to address the following questions presented, which we have rephrased as follows:1 1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by determining that the “Prince George’s County—Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[,]” codified in part at Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii), is limited to residential real property located in Prince George’s County? 1 This Court has discretion to rephrase questions presented.

See, e.g., Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 64 , 94 A.3d 23, 29 (2014). The original questions as presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari are as follows: [1.] Whether a court may rely on legislative history unrelated to the specific statutory text at issue to override the consumer protections granted in the plain language and tabulation of [Real Prop.] §14- 117(a)(3), an unambiguous remedial statute? [2.] Whether the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland violated Article III, Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution by using the title of the bill “Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014” to contradict the plain language of [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)? 2 2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by consulting the legislative history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to help ascertain whether the intent of the General Assembly was to limit the effect of the statutory provision to residential real property located in Prince George’s County? 3. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by considering whether its plain text interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would violate the “one subject rule” for bill titles pursuant to Art. III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution?

We answer these questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Relevant Facts On April 5, 2019, Petitioners, Ernest and Maryann Elsberry (the “Elsberrys”) entered into a New Home Sales Contract (the “Purchase Agreement”) with Respondent Stanley Martin Companies, LLC2 (“Stanley Martin”) for the purchase of residential real property and construction of a new home in Charles County (the “Property”). According to the Purchase Agreement, the Property was subject to a Declaration of Deferred Water and Sewer Charges (the “Declaration”) which required the Elsberrys to pay Stanley Martin annual installments in the amount of $550 for thirty years, subject to a six percent interest rate, to reimburse Stanley Martin for the construction and installation of water and sewer systems. The Declaration was recorded in the Land Records of Charles County, and serves 2 The Purchase Agreement identifies SM Hamilton, LLC as the “Seller” and Stanley Martin Companies, LLC as the “Builder[.]” SM Hamilton, LLC merged into Stanley Martin after the purchase of the Property. 3 as a lien on the Property.

Stanley Martin conveyed the Property to the Elsberrys on May 9, 2019, and the Elsberrys made a prorated initial payment pursuant to the Declaration. On September 17, 2020, the Elsberrys filed suit in the Circuit Court for Charles County, alleging, inter alia,3 that Stanley Martin’s Declaration violated Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period of thirty years following the date of the initial sale of the Property.4 According to the Elsberrys, Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies to all counties in Maryland—not just Prince George’s County—and prohibits the amortization of water and sewer charges for more than twenty years; therefore, Stanley Martin’s Declaration violates this provision. On October 5, 2020, Stanley Martin filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to property located in Prince George’s County. 3 The Elsberrys brought four causes of action against Stanley Martin, including unjust enrichment (count one), violation of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act (count two), breach of contract (count three), and violation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) (count four). Since the Elsberrys do not challenge the dismissal of claims one through three, we limit our focus to count four. 4 Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) provides that: (i) In Prince George’s County, a contract for the initial sale of residential real property for which there are deferred private water and sewer assessments recorded by a covenant or declaration deferring costs for water and sewer improvements for which the purchaser may be liable shall contain a disclosure . . . .

(ii) A person or entity establishing water and sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property may not amortize costs that are passed on to a purchaser by imposing a deferred water and sewer charge for a period longer than 20 years after the date of the initial sale. (Emphasis added). 4 Stanley Martin maintained that the Elsberrys’ claim is predicated on a misreading of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), thereby “attempt[ing] to extend [its] reach [] beyond Prince George’s County to manufacture a claim in Charles County that was never intended by the legislature . . . .” Accordingly, since the Property is in Charles County, Stanley Martin contended that the Elsberrys’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Legal Proceedings A. Circuit Court Proceedings The Circuit Court for Charles County held a hearing on Stanley Martin’s motion to dismiss on February 23, 2021. Following the hearing, the circuit court agreed with Stanley Martin and granted the motion.

Upon review of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3), the court “noticed that the subsection little i, 14-117.A.3.i, directly states, in Prince George’s County . . . and then goes on to list items that have to be contained in the disclosure statement.” (Emphasis added). The court also recognized that “[t]he placement of the small Paragraph [(ii)] under small Paragraph [(i)], leads to the conclusion that this was intended . . . to be provided to residents of Prince George’s County only.” (Emphasis added). “Furthermore, . . . the title of the bills specifically state, in the first reading and the second reading, that the bills . . . applied to Prince George’s County only.” (Emphasis added). Upon review of “this bill, and looking that it applies to Prince George’s County in the title and in the purpose of the bill, it is hard to see how any legislator reviewing this would automatically assume that it applies to all counties.” (Emphasis added). 5 Ultimately, the circuit court “believe[d] the legislative history supports the interpretation of the Court [], based upon its plain reading of the statute, that [Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)] is directly related to [Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i)], and relates to Prince George’s County.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, on March 3, 2021, the court granted Stanley Martin’s motion, dismissing the Elsberrys’ claim.

On April 2, 2021, the Elsberrys timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. B. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals On January 10, 2022, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unreported opinion. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616 . The intermediate court concluded that the General Assembly intended Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply to properties only located within Prince George’s County—not statewide.

Id. at ⁷. The Court of Special Appeals began by examining the plain language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3). Id. at ³. The court observed that subparagraph (i) contains the introductory phrase, “In Prince George’s County[,]” which plainly limits its application to Prince George’s County.

Id. The court recognized that “[s]ubparagraph (ii)’s geographical reach, however, is less obvious[]” because “[s]ubparagraph (ii), unlike subparagraph (i), does not mention Prince George’s County.” Id. “It is, however, placed within a paragraph that otherwise relates only to Prince George’s County – a construction not otherwise used in [Real Prop.] § 14-117.” Id. After noting the ambiguity surrounding the geographical 6 scope of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), the Court of Special Appeals turned to the legislative history to determine the intent of the General Assembly.5 Id. The Court of Special Appeals determined that the legislative history of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) also demonstrated its geographical limitation to Prince George’s County.

Id. at ⁴. The court examined several sources to ascertain legislative intent, including, but not limited to, “the context of the bill, including the title and function paragraphs, the amendments to the legislation, as well as . . . the bill request form[.]” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court observed that “the title of an act is relevant to ascertainment of its intent and purpose[.]” Id.

(citation omitted). Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) was introduced to the General Assembly as House Bill 1043 (“HB 1043”). Id. HB 1043 was enacted in May 2014 as Chapter 441, entitled “Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014[.]” Id.

The court concluded that HB 1043’s purpose paragraph “generally relat[es] 5 At oral argument, the Elsberrys argued that the Court of Special Appeals never made an express finding that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was ambiguous, and therefore, erroneously used legislative history analysis to contravene the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. We disagree with the Elsberrys’ strict reading of the opinion and find at least two instances where the court decided Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was ambiguous. First, the court rejected the Elsberrys’ contention that the subparagraph was unambiguous. Elsberry, 2022 WL 94616 , at ³ (“Even if [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3) is not ambiguous, . . . we ‘do not read statutory language in a vacuum[.]’”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Second, the court provided in a footnote that “[w]hile we agree that [certain subsections of Real Prop § 14-117] add to the ambiguity of [Real Prop.] § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii), we are not persuaded that they indicate legislative intent for [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply beyond Prince George’s County.” Id. at ⁵ n.7 (emphasis added). The intermediate court could not have determined other subsections of Real Prop. § 14- 117 add to the ambiguity of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) without initially finding the subparagraph to be ambiguous. 7 to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County[,]” and did not mention other counties. Id. HB 1043 was introduced to the General Assembly less than three months after the Legislative Task Force to Study Rates and Charges in the Washington Suburban Sanitary District (the “Task Force”) submitted a report that specifically recommended limiting amortized water and sewer costs to twenty years in Prince George’s County (the “Task Force Report”).

Id. at ⁵. The Elsberrys observed “that the language in [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) originated in [Real Prop.] § 14-117.1[,]” a statute limited to existing property in Prince George’s County. Id. The Court of Special Appeals, nonetheless, was unpersuaded by the Elsberrys’ argument that the relocation of statutory text from Real Prop. § 14-117.1 to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) during the bill amendment process demonstrated an intent for the provision to apply beyond Prince George’s County.

Id. at ⁵–6. According to the court, both Real Prop. § 14-117.1 and Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) apply only to Prince George’s County, consistent with its interpretation of the statutory text and legislative history. Id. at ⁶. Finally, the Court of Special Appeals observed that adopting the Elsberrys’ interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) would lead to absurd, unreasonable, and unconstitutional results.

Id. Extending the geographical reach of Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) beyond Prince George’s County to all counties “would render the title of [HB 1043] – ‘Prince George’s County – Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014’ – unconstitutionally misleading” because the statute would encompass a broader scope than expressed by its title. Id. (citing Md. Const. art.

III, § 29) 8 (“[E]very law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title[.]”). Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was limited to Prince George’s County and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Id. at ⁷. The Elsberrys filed a petition of certiorari, which we granted on May 9, 2022.

Elsberry, 478 Md. at 510 , 275 A.3d at 345 . The Contentions of the Parties A. The Elsberrys The Elsberrys outlined three arguments on appeal: (1) the plain language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies statewide, (2) an analysis of the legislative history is not required, but if used, is inconclusive at best, and (3) HB 1043’s title is not unconstitutionally misleading. First, the Elsberrys contend that the plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) unambiguously prohibits amortization of water and sewer costs through deferred payments for a period longer than twenty years. While the Elsberrys admit that Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(i) pertains exclusively to Prince George’s County, the Elsberrys assert that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) pertains to “real property located in any county, including, but not limited to, Prince George’s County.” According to the Elsberrys, the overall statutory scheme of Real Prop. § 14-117 and Real Prop. § 14-117.1 supports this notion.

Specifically, the Elsberrys note that the General Assembly chose to geographically limit the application of certain provisions throughout Real Prop. § 14-117 “to a certain county or to certain counties.” The omission of a geographic limitation in Real Prop. § 14- 9 117(a)(3)(ii) suggests, according to the Elsberrys, that the General Assembly intended for it to apply to all counties in Maryland. The Elsberrys insist that this Court’s “only role” is to determine what the General Assembly “actually said[]” and not what the General Assembly “meant to say[.]” The Elsberrys reiterate that “this Court has never interpreted a law to mean something contrary to the plain language unless . . . enforcing the plain language would lead to an absurd result.” To the Elsberrys, holding otherwise “is tantamount to inserting words into the statute in order to make the statute express an intention that was not evidenced in its original form.” According to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin’s interpretation of Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) would require this Court to impermissibly stretch the meaning of the statute’s plain text and add verbiage not included by the General Assembly. Such an action, the Elsberrys assert, would encroach upon the legislature. Instead, the Elsberrys insist Real Prop. § 14-117 is “clearly remedial” and must be “construed liberally” to prevent private developers from imposing “excessively long” water and sewer assessments on property owners.6 Thus, the Elsberrys contend that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation [of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)] is the literal interpretation,” which they have advanced.

Next, the Elsberrys argue that this Court need not consult the legislative history, but should we decide to do so, the legislative history neither confirms nor contradicts the 6 But see The Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502 , 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (“Although remedial statutes are . . . to be given a liberal construction, the predominant goal of the Court is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent . . . by considering the language used by the Legislature and giving that language a plain and common sense meaning.”). 10 unambiguous language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). The Elsberrys assert that “[t]he statutory text does not include [HB 1043]’s title[;]” therefore, this Court may not use the title as an aide to interpret the statutory text. (Emphasis added). During oral argument, the Elsberrys contended that the short title constitutes part of the legislative history, so it should not have been considered as part of the Court of Special Appeals’ plain text analysis.

If this Court reaches the legislative history, the Elsberrys argue that the short title (which the Elsberrys concede begins with “Prince George’s County”) is not dispositive, but rather is “one of three components that make up the entire title of a bill[.]” The Elsberrys also note that the changes made to HB 1043 between the First Reading and the Second Reading indicate that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) applies statewide. For example, the removal of the language “in the county” (indicating Prince George’s County) from the purpose paragraph, supports this interpretation. The Elsberrys maintain this removal “reflects the fact that the General Assembly moved the Twenty-Year Provision from [Real Prop.] § 14- 117.1 (where it only applied ‘in the county’) to [Real Prop.] § 14-117 (where it is not limited to any particular county).” Assuming, arguendo, that this Court considers HB 1043’s legislative history, the Elsberrys request that the entire legislative history, not selective portions, be examined. According to the Elsberrys, the Court of Special Appeals erroneously “elevated” certain portions of legislative history over the plain language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), which this Court has never sanctioned “unless the legislative history clearly contradicted the plain text . . . and this Court also determined that the General Assembly made a patent 11 drafting error[]” that would lead to an absurd result.

The Elsberrys maintain that neither occurred in the case at bar, so the plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) should prevail. The Elsberrys also criticize Stanley Martin’s and the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on the Task Force Report. Specifically, the Elsberrys argue that the General Assembly was not bound by the Task Force’s thirteen recommendations or its geographic representation. Rather, the Elsberrys assert that the General Assembly intended the statute to protect property owners “in all counties from the excessively long amortization periods that private developers impose throughout the state.” The removal of the words “Prince George’s County” from the Second Reading of HB 1043, the Elsberrys explain, further supports the General Assembly’s intent to apply Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) statewide.

Lastly, the Elsberrys assert that construing Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) to apply statewide would not render the title of HB 1043 constitutionally misleading. According to the Elsberrys, HB 1043’s entire title includes an accurate reference to Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) and “provides sufficient notice that [it] is not limited to Prince George’s County.” The Elsberrys direct us to HB 1043’s short title, purpose paragraph, and function paragraphs. Upon review, the Elsberrys maintain that the General Assembly intentionally limited certain portions of the entire title to Prince George’s County, but notably did not limit the twenty-year provision in the Second Reading. For example, in the First Reading of the purpose paragraph, HB 1043 states: “prohibiting a person in the county that is incurring certain water and sewer costs from amortizing costs passed on to a purchaser for more than a certain period of time[.]” (Emphasis added).

The Second Reading of the purpose paragraph states: “prohibiting a person or entity establishing certain water and 12 sewer costs for the initial sale of residential real property from amortizing certain costs for more than a certain period of time[.]” According to the Elsberrys, the omission of the words “in the county” from the purpose paragraph, which constitutes one part of HB 1043’s title, demonstrates that the General Assembly did not intend for the provision to be geographically limited to Prince George’s County. Therefore, the Elsberrys request this Court to reverse the Court of Special Appeals. B. Stanley Martin Stanley Martin outlines three arguments in response: (1) Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3)(ii) is not unambiguous, (2) HB 1043’s legislative history demonstrates that the twenty-year deferred water and sewer charge limitation applies exclusively to Prince George’s County, and (3) the overall statutory scheme bolsters its position. First, Stanley Martin asserts that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) is not unambiguous.

Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3) starts with “In Prince George’s County” and references no other county. Stanley Martin argues that “[f]rom this fact alone, one could infer that [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3) applies in its entirety only to Prince George’s County.” Real Prop. § 14- 117(a)(3) is divided into two subsections, (i) and (ii), both of which relate to deferred water and sewer charges on real property. Therefore, Stanley Martin contends it is “logical” for romanette (ii) to also apply only to Prince George’s County. In contrast, the Elsberrys argue that the phrase “In Prince George’s County” only applies to romanette (i), and the twenty-year deferred water and sewer limitation under romanette (ii) extends statewide.

With more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, Stanley Martin contends this Court “can and should use legislative history” to determine the meaning of the statute. 13 Next, according to Stanley Martin, the legislative history demonstrates that the twenty-year deferred water and sewer charge limitation applies exclusively to Prince George’s County. Stanley Martin refers this Court to the Task Force Report. The Task Force studied private developers’ deferred water and sewer rates in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. Relying upon its findings, the Task Force compiled thirteen recommendations and, accordingly, submitted them to the General Assembly.

Recommendation 7, for example, “[r]equire[d] a contract for the sale of new residential real property in Prince George’s County to contain a disclosure statement regarding the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the purchaser may become liable.” (Emphasis added). Likewise, as Stanley Martin identifies, Recommendation 9 proposed “[p]rohibit[ing] a person from amortizing for more than 20 years from the date of the initial sale the deferred water and sewer costs that are passed onto a purchaser. (Single-family residential property in Prince George’s County improved by four or fewer single-family units).” (Emphasis added). Stanley Martin notes that this recommendation is almost identical to Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii).

This indicates to Stanley Martin that “[t]he General Assembly relied on the Task Force’s recommendations when framing and reviewing HB 1043.” Stanley Martin maintains that the short title and text of HB 1043 further confirms that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) only applies to Prince George’s County. As previously mentioned, HB 1043’s short title is “Prince George’s County—Deferred Water and Sewer Charges Homeowner Disclosure Act of 2014 PG 413-14[.]” HB 1043’s short title, Stanley Martin argues, is persuasive evidence of the General Assembly’s intent. Specifically, 14 Stanley Martin notes that HB 1043’s short title never changed between its First and Second Reading, and the enrolled law, Chapter 441, maintains the same title as the original bill. Stanley Martin also directs this Court to the Department of Legislative Services’ Legislative Drafting Manual, which provides that “[i]f a bill relates to only one or two counties, their names should appear first, with a word or two about the subject matter after the dash.” Legislative Drafting Manual 2015, DEP’T OF LEGIS.

SERVS., at 36 (2014) [“Legislative Drafting Manual”], https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/021000/021150/u nrestricted/20151315e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/B86D-LWQL. “HB 1043’s title begins with ‘Prince George’s County,’ followed by a dash and a few words about the bill’s purpose.” Therefore, Stanley Martin asserts that, in line with the Legislative Drafting Manual, HB 1043’s short title reflects “clear intent by the General Assembly for the bill to apply only to Prince George’s County.” HB 1043’s local bill number “PG 413-14” also indicates that the Prince George’s County legislative delegation “has charge of the bill[.]” Additionally, Stanley Martin claims that HB 1043’s purpose paragraph further underlines its intent to limit application to Prince George’s County. The purpose paragraph references either “Prince George’s County” or “in the county” several times, including the final phrase that the bill “generally relat[es] to deferred water and sewer charges in Prince George’s County.” (Emphasis omitted). Contrary to the Elsberrys, Stanley Martin argues there is nothing in the purpose paragraph, nor in the entirety of HB 1043’s file, that evidences the General Assembly’s intent to extend HB 1043 to any other county besides Prince George’s County. Between the First and Second Reading, the phrase “in the 15 county” was removed from the clause pertaining to the deferred water and sewer costs limit, but this omission, Stanley Martin argues, does not signify that the bill is no longer limited to Prince George’s County.

Rather, it was part of a general revision to track the proposed statutory language. Stanley Martin contends that the changes between HB 1043’s First and Second Reading provide additional evidence that the General Assembly intended for HB 1043 to apply only to Prince George’s County. As previously discussed, the disputed language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) originally resided within Real Prop. § 14-117.1. Real Prop. § 14-117.1 pertains to single-family residential property within Prince George’s County.

In the Second Reading of HB 1043, the Prince George’s County delegation moved the salient provision to its current location, Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). In short, Stanley Martin observes that the disputed language moved from a statutory section that exclusively pertains to Prince George’s County to another section that also only references Prince George’s County. To Stanley Martin, there is no indication that the Prince George’s County delegation, or any other county delegation, wished to expand the scope of the provision beyond Prince George’s County. Finally, Stanley Martin argues that the overall statutory scheme of Real Prop. § 14- 117 further supports its interpretation.

Contrary to the Elsberrys’ position, and as demonstrated in other subsections of the statute, Stanley Martin asserts that “the mere absence of county-specific language in [Real Prop.] § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) is not reflective of any legislative intent to expand the geographical reach of the statute.” In Stanley Martin’s opinion, the Court of Special Appeals’ “holistic approach” properly considered the entire 16 context of the bill—including the bill itself, the title, function paragraphs, and legislative amendments—in its analysis. Therefore, Stanley Martin asks this Court to affirm the Court of Special Appeals. DISCUSSION Standard of Review This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Davis v. Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC, 457 Md. 275, 284 , 177 A.3d 709, 714 (2018); Lamson v. Montgomery Cnty., 460 Md. 349, 360 , 190 A.3d 316, 323 (2018).

Whether the circuit court was legally correct in dismissing the Elsberrys’ complaint turns on a question of statutory interpretation. Sullivan, 251 Md. App. at 317, 253 A.3d at 1149. “Where questions of law and statutory interpretation are presented, this Court reviews them de novo . . . .” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 373 , 250 A.3d 197, 207 (2021) (citations omitted). We first conduct a statutory analysis of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii).

Id. at 376, 250 A.3d at 209 ; Sullivan, 251 Md. App. at 317, 253 A.3d at 1149. Analysis A. The plain text of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii), when viewed in context of the entire statutory scheme, indicates that the twenty-year amortization limit on deferred water and sewage costs only applies to Prince George’s County. Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii). Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 478 Md. 588, 601 , 275 A.3d 390, 397 (2022). “[W]e start with the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation—to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376 , 250 A.3d at 209 (citing 75-80 Properties, LLC v. 17 RALE, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 623 , 236 A.3d 545, 559 (2020)); Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 , 987 A.2d 18, 28 (2010) (citations omitted). “To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 , 987 A.2d at 28 (citations omitted).

This Court has stated that “[t]he ‘meaning of the plainest language’ is controlled by the context in which it appears.” Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) (quoting Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ins. Comm’r of State of Md., 293 Md. 629, 642 , 446 A.2d 1140, 1147 (1982)). This Court need not resort to other rules of statutory construction when the plain language of the statute unambiguously communicates the intent of the General Assembly.

Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 , 987 A.2d at 28–29 (citations omitted). Consideration of the plain meaning of the statutory language does not entail a bare, isolated, or literal reading of the statutory language. See id. at 275–76, 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). This Court construes the statute “‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376 , 250 A.3d at 209 (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26, 63 A.3d 582, 589 (2013)).

Still, this Court will neither “add nor delete language . . . to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain . . . language . . . .” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 , 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). Nor does this Court construe statutory language “with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 388 , 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) (“We 18 cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the [General Assembly] apparently deliberately left out.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, [i]t is important . . . to keep in mind that the meaning of the plainest language in a statute may be controlled by the context, and if the language is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the Court may seek the legislative intention by considering the facts of contemporary history, the prior state of the law, and the particular evil, abuse, or defect which the statute was designed to correct and the remedy which was intended.

Dep’t of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611 , 95 A.2d 306, 309 (1953). Therefore, our case law demonstrates that the plainest language does not mean limiting its construction of a particular statutory provision to its bare text alone. As this Court explained in Lockshin, “[w]e . . . do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 , 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the [General Assembly] in enacting the statute.” Id. at 276 , 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). “We presume that [the General Assembly] intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the