Emerick v. Coakley
Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented upon this appeal is, whether the assignment by the appellant and her husband to the appellees, of a policy of insurance on her husband’s life, obtained for her sole and separate use, is valid. Its validity is questioned upon several grounds, and first, because it was not understood by the appellant, and was without consideration. We have carefully examined and considered the evidence contained in the record, and wo think that it clearly shows 190 ' that the firm of Ross & Emerick, of which William H. Emerick, the husband of the appellant, was a member, was indebted to the appellees, and that in order to obtain an extension of time for payment, he proposed to them to give his individual notes for the payment thereof, to be secured by an assignment of the life policy.
This offer was accepted by the appellees; the notes were given, the assignment was prepared and fully explained to the appellant, who thereupon freely and voluntarily executed it, and in view of these facts, it cannot be said that she did not fully understand the nature and effect of her act. An agreement to forbear, for a time, proceedings at law or in equity to enforce a well founded claim is a valid consideration for a promise. 1 Parsons on Gont., 365, (5th eel, 440.) Nor is it material that the party making-the promise, in consideration of such forbearance, should have a direct interest in the suit to be forborne, or be directly benefitted by the delay; for the benefit to the defendant will be supposed to extend to him, and it would be enough to make the consideration, valid that the creditor is injured by the delay. 1 Pars, on Gont., 368, (5th ed., 443.) The forbearance of the appellees, and the granting to William H. Emerick an extension of time for payment of the debt, constitute a good and valid consideration for the assignment, and it must be supported unless there is some statute or principle of law which forbids it. That a wife may assign or incumber her separate property for her husband’s debt, is fully established by the. decisions of this Court in the cases of Tiernan vs. Poor, 1 G. & J., 216; Brundige, et al., vs. Poor, 2 G. & J., 1 ; Price vs. Bigham, 7 H. & J., 296 ; Berrett vs. Oliver, 7 G. & J., 191 . But it is said that an assignment of a life-policy is not authorized by sections 8 and 9 of Article 45 of the Code, inásmuch as those sections are, in their nature and character, enabling, and do not expressly authorize the wife to assign the policy.
It is true that the wife was not, before the enact 191 ing of those sections, authorized to insure the husband’s life; yet, those sections must be construed with the other sections of the same Article, as well as with reference to the decisions of this Court in regard to the rights of married women to, and disposition of, their separate property. By section 11 of Article 45, they are empowered to dispose of their separate property, botli real and persona], by conveyance, in which their husbands join; and, therefore, it v'as not necessary, in sections 8 and 9, to again give the power of disposition, which they already possessed, with respect to all their property of every description, under section 11. In the case of The New York Life Insurance Co. vs. Flack, 3 Md., 341 — 354, this Court has said, that a life-policy is like any other chose in action, assignable by the person in whose favor the contract is made. See also Harrison vs. McConkey, 1 Md. Chan.
Dec., 34; Mutual Protection Ins. Co. vs. Hamilton, 5 Sneed’s Rep., 269. It has also been held by this Court, that a married woman may act as a féme sole with reference to her separate property, and that the right to dispose of it accompanies the ownership, unless she is restrained from so doing by the express language of the instrument under which she holds. Cooke vs. Husbands, 11 Md., 503 , 504 — 507; Koontz vs. Nabb., 16 Md., 549 ; Michael vs. Baker, 12 Md., 169 ; Chew vs. Beall, 13 Md., 360 .
So far from an assignment being prohibited by the terms of this policy, the amount of the insurance is made payable to her and her assigns,
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