Emmet v. Rickert

MOTZ, Judge. The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) is statutorily required to suspend the driver’s license and vehicle registrations of certain judgment debtors, if properly requested to do so by a judgment creditor. The question presented by this case is whether this statute is applicable when the ⁹⁵ cause of action giving rise to the judgment involves not a motor vehicle accident but, instead, is based on breach of a contract for improper repair of a motor vehicle. We hold that it is not; MVA’s suspension authority applies exclusively to unpaid judgments in actions involving motor vehicle accidents.

(i) In 1984, appellant, Robert T. Emmet (“Emmet”), sued Rufus J.L. Beebe in the District Court for Anne Arundel County for Beebe’s breach of contract to repair Emmet’s road tractor. On December 13, 1984, judgment was entered in Emmet’s favor. Over the next five years, Emmet was unsuccessful in his attempts to collect the $9,900 judgment from Beebe. On November 30, 1989, Emmet requested that MVA, pursuant to Md.Transp.Code Ann. § 17-204 (1987 Repl.

Vol.), 1 suspend Beebe’s driver’s license and the registration of all vehicles owned by Beebe. As required by § 17-202, Emmet submitted a certified copy of the judgment and a document entitled “Certificate of the Facts Relative to Judgment” to MVA. Emmet crossed out the portion of the certificate of facts which asked for the date of the accident and, in the space provided, wrote “Re: contract action arising out of maintenance & repair of motor vehicle.” On January 3, 1990, an MVA official notified Emmet that MVA would not take action on his case, explaining that “We can only take suspension action on judgments that were as a result of motor vehicle accident damages.” On March 7, 1990, Emmet filed a complaint for Writ of Mandamus to compel appellee, W. Marshall Rickert, the Administrator of MVA, to enforce § 17-201 and § 17-204 “by suspending the vehicle registration and driver’s license” of Beebe. Both Emmet and MVA moved for summary judgment and on January 28, 1991, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel ⁹⁶ County (Cawood, J.) granted MVA’s motion.

The trial court held that MVA does not have the authority to suspend a person’s license or registration on the basis of judgments resulting from a failure to make repairs on a vehicle. (ii) The essence of Emmet’s argument is that MVA’s statutory duty to suspend the driver’s licenses and car registrations of judgment debtors, which is set forth in § 17-201, et seq., is not confined to judgment debtors in actions involving motor vehicle accidents. He heavily relies upon the “plain language” of § 17-204 and § 17-201. Section 17-204 provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on receipt of a certified copy of a judgment and a certificate of facts, the Administration shall suspend: (1) The license to drive of the judgment debtor; and (2) The registration of all vehicles owned by the judgment debtor and registered in this State.

Section 17-201 defines “judgment” as follows: In this subtitle, “judgment” means any final judgment resulting from: (1) A cause of action for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use on any highway or other property open to the public of any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this State; or (2) A cause of action on an agreement of settlement for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use on any highway or other property open to the public of any vehicle of a type required to be registered in this State. (emphasis added.) Emmet points out that this definition “nowhere ... mention[s] the occurrence of an accident as a requirement for inclusion on the word, judgment.” He maintains the legislature has “specified at least two categories [of judgments] in which a[n] accident might not have happened: ownership and maintenance.” Thus, he argues the plain meaning of the statute requires the conclusion ⁹⁷ that, at his request, MVA must suspend the license and registration of a mechanic who has improperly maintained, i.e., repaired, Emmet’s car and failed to pay the resulting judgment. 2 The difficulty with Emmet’s argument is that the “ ‘meaning of the plainest language’ ” is controlled by the context in which it appears; even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, a court is not “ ‘precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal’ ” of the law. Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 604 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990) (quoting Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 92 , 548 A.2d 837 (1988)). Therefore, in attempting to glean legislative intent from the words of the statute, a court should read statutory words in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.

See Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126 (1989). Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that when the literal words of a statute result in a construction clearly not contemplated by the legislature, the literal meaning should not be adopted. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Accordingly, we turn to the context and legislative history of § 17-201.

(iii) Subtitle 2 of Title 17 of the Transportation Article is the “Nonpayment of Judgments” portion of a statute, titled “Vehicle Laws — Required Security.” Title 17 is the mechanism for insuring that the necessary financial responsibility is demonstrated by persons who wish to drive or own vehicles in this state. Subtitle 2 specifically relates to the ⁹⁸ consequences of nonpayment of certain judgments by the drivers and owners of vehicles. Section 17-201 defines “judgment” for the exclusive purpose of Subtitle 2. Because § 17-201 is solely a definitional statute, it cannot stand alone; its context is particularly important.

That context, Subtitle 2, is comprised of nine sections. Some of these sections contain specific language indicating their applicability only to judgments resulting from motor vehicle accidents. For example, in § 17-206(b)(2), there is an exception to a suspension if the insurer for the vehicles goes into insolvency, reorganization or liquidation after “the accident involving the owner or driver.” Similarly, § 17-208(b) provides: A payment made in settlement or any claim because of bodily injury, death, or property damage arising from the accident shall be credited in reduction of the payment required by subsection (a)(1) of this section. (emphasis added.) The reference to “the accident,” as opposed to “an accident,” in both of these statutes is an indication that the legislature intended that only unsatisfied judgments resulting from accidents would fall within the ambit of these statutes.

Because these statutes are in the same subtitle as § 17-201, this would seem to suggest that such an interpretation was the legislative intent with regard to § 17-201. On the other hand, as Emmet points out, this language in § 17-206(b)(2) and § 17-208(b) also demonstrates that when the legislature intended to confine judgment to one arising from “the accident,” it was perfectly capable of doing that. Its failure to do so in § 17-201 may suggest that it did not intend to so limit “judgment” in that statute. Another provision of Subtitle 2, § 17-205, however, indicates that this is not the case.

Section 17-205 identifies an exception to MVA’s authority to suspend a judgment debtor’s license and registration. Specifically, § 17-205 states: ⁹⁹ The Administration may not suspend a license or registration under this subtitle if the judgment arose out of an accident caused by a vehicle that, at the time of the accident: (1) Was owned or leased by the United States; this State, or any political subdivision of this State; and (2) Was operated with the permission of its owner or lessee. Two interpretations of this language, which speaks solely in the context of accidents but which is expressly applicable to the entire subtitle, are possible: (1) § 17-205 totally excludes governmental entities from MVA suspension authority, or (2) § 17-205 excludes governmental entities from MVA suspension authority when judgments arise from accidents but not in any other situation. If Emmet’s interpretation of § 17-201 is accepted, then § 17-205 must be read in the second manner, i.e., to exclude MVA suspension authority only in cases involving accidents and not in any others.

If, however, § 17-201 itself is construed to apply solely to judgments arising out of accidents, then § 17-205’s exclusion is total, i.e., government entities are never subject to MVA’s suspension authority. There seems to be no reason for providing a government entity exclusion for judgments resulting from accidents and not providing it for other judgments. That is, the policy considerations which led the General Assembly to exclude governmental entities from the suspension authority of MVA would seem to apply with equal force to judgments resulting from accidents and other judgments. Accordingly, we believe consideration of the context of § 17-201 suggests