Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

HARRELL, Judge. This case was decided initially by the Court on 26 June 1997. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. We shall grant in part and deny in part those motions.

Such revisions to the previously filed opinion, which has been recalled, necessary to effect those parts of the motions as we have granted are included in the following opinion. Those revisions do not change, however, the decision on the merits of the issues; they reflect merely clarifications of our reasoning. Before us is yet another insurance coverage dispute stemming from an accident involving equipment leased to a carrier sanctioned by the former Interstate Commerce Commission. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Empire) appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in a declaratory judgment proceeding in which the court concluded that Empire was obligated, under a policy it issued to James Perry, Jr. d/b/a J.P. Transportation to defend or indemnify for claims arising out of a motor tort case.

Empire challenges the circuit court’s conclusion that a truck driven by Mr. Perry was not operating in the business of O.S.T. Trucking Co., Inc. (O.S.T.), to whom the covered vehicle was leased, thereby preventing the application of a “business use” exclusion contained in the policy Empire issued to Mr. Perry. In addition, appellant claims that the court erred by not holding that appellee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty), was not obligated to provide coverage. Empire asserts that, based on a permissive use clause contained in a policy Liberty issued to O.S.T., Liberty was obligated to provide coverage for the vehicle leased to O.S.T. and being driven by Mr. Perry, the vehicle’s owner. We agree with the circuit court’s holding that, at the time of the accident, the truck was not being operated in the business of O.S.T..

Because the circuit court failed to consider whether Liberty was obligated to providé coverage under its permissive use provision and because the record does not contain ⁸¹ sufficient undisputed facts from which such a determination can be made, however, we must reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings. In remanding this case, we shall offer the trial court some guidance for determining whether the permissive use provision applies and in reconciling the potential dual coverage issues. ISSUES In order to facilitate our analysis of the instant appeal, we have reordered and rephrased the questions presented by appellant as follows: I. Whether the Peterbuilt tractor driven by James Perry, Jr. was being used in the business of O.S.T. at the time of the accident.

II

Whether Mr. Perry is an insured under a permissive use provision contained in an insurance policy issued by Liberty to O.S.T. III. WTiether Empire’s policy furnishes primary liability.

IV

Whether Liberty’s policy furnishes primary liability. V. If both policies furnish primary liability, how should the two policies’ “other insurance clauses” be reconciled. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In the proceedings before the circuit court, the parties submitted an agreed statement of fact and exhibits. We have excerpted the relevant portions of that statement below.

James Perry, Jr. is the owner and operator of a 1986 Peterbuilt Tractor____ Mr. Perry owned the subject tractor in January 1995. Mr. Perry would haul trailers owned by other entities at the request of [O.S.T.]. Mr Perry did business under the trade name “J.P. Transportation”. In January 1995, the subject tractor was under lease with [O.S.T.].[ 1 ] [O.S.T.] was in the business of hauling loads of ⁸² freight____ As stated in the lease, Mr. Perry cannot pick up or deliver trailers for another entity without [O.S.T.’s] prior permission. [O.S.T.] is a licensed I.C.C. [Interstate Commerce Commission] carrier operating under an I.C.C. permit____ In January 1995, the subject tractor was operated with an adhesive I.C.C. placard affixed, bearing the I.C.C. and D.O.T. [Department of Transportation] Permit Numbers assigned to [O.S.T.].

Mr. Perry was not employed by [O.S.T.], but was instead considered an independent trucker. [O.S.T.] did not withhold taxes or social security from payments made to Mr. Perry. With regard to scheduling trucking assignments, Mr. Perry contacts the [O.S.T.] dispatch office on a daily basis to obtain his next assignment. The arrangement is described by Mr. Perry as a “non-force dispatch,” ... [meaning that O.S.T] cannot force Mr. Perry to carry a load involuntarily. Mr. Perry is compensated for each trip by [O.S.T.] Trucking in accordance with a designated standard mileage rate.

All repairs and maintenance to [Mr. Perry’s] truck are the responsibility of Mr. Perry. Any needed repairs and maintenance to [Mr. Perry’s] truck were arranged by Mr. Perry. Mr. Perry assumed the cost of all fuel, repairs and maintenance to his vehicle, and was not reimbursed for those expenses.... The accident which is the subject of the underlying case occurred in the late afternoon on Friday, [20 January 1995].

Mr. Perry was last under dispatch by [O.S.T.] on Monday, [16 January 1995], when he was dispatched to take an empty trailer to Bayonne, New Jersey from Baltimore; and was instructed to bring back a load to Baltimore. On the return trip from Bayonne, New Jersey, Mr. Perry began experiencing mechanical problems with the tractor concerning a pressure plate (related to the transmission). The mechanical problem did not render the tractor inoperable. ⁸³ Mr. Perry returned to Baltimore on Monday evening, [16 January 1995] and delivered the full trailer to a warehouse in Baltimore. After completing this dispatch which had been given by [O.S.T.], Mr. Perry took the tractor without any trailer attached for repairs.

By Tuesday, [17 January 1995], Mr. Perry had taken the tractor to Chuck’s Fleet Service on North Point Road in Baltimore for repair of the pressure plate. The tractor remained in the shop throughout Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, i.e., [18,19, 20 January]. By the late afternoon hours on Friday, [20 January], the repairs had been completed; and Mr. Perry retrieved the tractor from Chuck’s Fleet Service at approximately 4 or 5 p.m.. Mr. Perry paid for the repairs, and was not reimbursed by [O.S.T.].

Mr. Perry had spoken with the dispatch office of [O.S.T], and anticipated his next dispatch by [O.S.T.] to be on Monday, [23 January]. Approximately two weeks earlier, Mr. Perry had ordered parts from Beal’s GMC Peterbuilt dealership located on Route 40 East. The Peterbuilt dealership is located in route between Chuck’s Fleet Service and Mr. Perry’s home. Beal’s dealership is the only Peterbuilt dealership in Baltimore furnishing parts for Peterbuilt tractors such as the subject tractor.

Mr. Perry recalls that the parts on order were related to a toolbox attached to the exterior of the subject tractor. The toolbox is approximately three feet long, and is located on the side frame of the tractor. The toolbox acts as a step upon which the driver enters and exists the trucking cab compartment, and can be used to store tools or other belongings. Mr. Perry believes that the parts on order were for a lock for the toolbox and possibly a hinge.

After retrieving the tractor from Chuck’s Fleet Service on Friday, [20 January], Mr. Perry drove into the Peterbuilt dealership, purchased the parts and drove out of the dealership onto Route 40. [O.S.T] did not reimburse Mr. Perry for these parts. The accident that is the subject of the underlying case then occurred on Route 40. ⁸⁴ Mr. Perry was not en route to pick up or deliver a trailer at the time of the accident. Mr. Perry was not receiving any compensation by [O.S.T] from [17 January 1995 — Friday 20 January 1995]. At the time of the accident, Mr. Perry was on his way home.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Perry was not operating under a bill of lading. The tractor was not under dispatch. Mr. Perry was not hauling a load, and the tractor was not connected to a trailer. Mr. Perry was bobtailing[ 2 ] when the accident occurred.

(Operating a tractor unattached to a trailer is commonly referred to as “bobtailing”). Mr. Perry was “off-duty” [17 January through 20 January 1995, inclusive], the day of the accident. Mr. Perry did not believe that he was within the control of [O.S.T.] at the time of the accident, nor operating the tractor pursuant to [O.S.T.] instructions. (Footnote omitted).

THE PERRY/O.S.T. LEASE On 22 March 1994, Mr. Perry and O.S.T. entered into a one-year written motor vehicle lease and agreement. The lease included the following terms: ... O.S.T. shall adhere to and perform said provisions and Independent [Mr. Perry] will operate the Equipment as the business of O.S.T. may require, and perform such other ⁸⁵ services herein stated for and in behalf of O.S.T., subject to the following terms and conditions. 3. INSURANCE.

O.S.T. shall maintain insurance for the protection of the public as required by the Interstate Commerce Commission while Independent is operating in the business of O.S.T., except Independent agrees to pay $500.00 for damage to property, caused by accident arising out of the use of said tractor in the business of O.S.T, which O.S.T. is obligated to pay any third person. During the term of this agreement, the Independent agrees to provide and maintain, at his sole expense, with O.S.T. as an additional named insured, public liability and property damage insurance ... covering bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, and damages to property, caused by accident and arising out of the use of said tractor when not being used in the business of O.S.T., as for example, when the tractor is not pulling a trailer or container/chassis for O.S.T., including so-called “bob-tail” insurance. 4. MAINTENANCE. Independent warrants that said tractor, including all additions, accessories, and equipment, are in good safe operating and mechanical condition; and in such condition as to comply with all rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation and with applicable statutes and administrative agency rules of any State in effect where such vehicle is operated; and Independent agrees to keep said tractor in such condition at his own expense for the duration of this lease. * * ❖ 8.

USE OF LEASED EQUIPMENT. As required by [ICC] regulations during the term of this lease, said tractor shall be used exclusively by O.S.T. and for no other person, firm or corporation, when engaged in the transportation of freight, and no freight will be transported by means of said tractor without the knowledge and consent of O.S.T.. Independent will be entitled to no payment from O.S.T. for any ⁸⁶ transportation rendered unless the conditions of this paragraph are strictly observed by Independent. 14. RESPONSIBILITY TO PUBLIC AND REGULATORY AGENCIES: ...

Independent agrees to comply fully with all applicable federal and state laws, rules, regulations and orders as well as all O.S.T. procedures ... respecting the operation, inspection and maintenance of vehicular equipment hereunder____ THE EMPIRE POLICY Mr. Perry obtained a non-trucking use insurance policy from Empire that provided for bodily injury and property damage coverage of $100,000. Essentially, a non-trucking use, or “bobtail,” insurance policy is intended to cover the insured when the vehicle is not being operating in the business of an I.C.C. carrier-lessee. The Empire policy contained the following provisions: * * Hi SECTION II LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR NON-TRUCKING USE A. COVERAGE 1. WHO IS AN INSURED The following are “insureds”: a.

You for any covered “auto” b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow except: (1) The owner or anyone else from whom you hire or borrow a covered “auto.” * * * B. EXCLUSIONS ⁸⁷ This insurance does not apply to any of the following: 13. BUSINESS USE “Bodily injury” or “property damage” while a covered “auto” is used to carry property in any business or while a covered “auto” is used in the business of anyone to whom the “auto” is leased or rented. SECTION IV — CONDITIONS * * * B. GENERAL CONDITIONS 5.

OTHER INSURANCE a. For any covered “auto” you own, this policy provides primary insurance. For any covered “auto” you don’t own, the insurance provided by this policy is excess over any other collectible insurance. THE LIBERTY POLICY O.S.T. obtained insurance through Liberty, which issued a business automobile insurance policy that furnished liability coverage of $1,000,000 for covered “autos.” Liberty’s policy contained the following pertinent provisions: SECTION II — LIABILITY COVERAGE A. COVERAGE We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered “auto.” ⁸⁸ 1.

WHO IS AN INSURED The following are “insureds”: a. You for any covered “auto”: b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow except: (1) The owner or anyone else from whom you hire or borrow a covered “private passenger type auto”. d. The owner or anyone else from whom you hire or borrow a covered “auto” that is not a “trailer” while the covered “auto”: (1) is being used exclusively in your business as a “trucker”; and (2) is being used pursuant to operating rights granted to you by a public authority.

SECTION V — TRUCKERS CONDITIONS * Hi B. GENERAL CONDITIONS Hi Hi Hi 5. OTHER INSURANCE — PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE PROVISIONS a. This Coverage Form’s Liability Coverage is primary for any covered “auto” while hired or borrowed by you and used exclusively in your business as a “trucker” and pursuant to operating rights granted to you by a public authority. This Coverage Form’s Liability Coverage is excess over any other collectible insurance for any covered “auto” while hired or borrowed from you by another “trucker”.... ⁸⁹ f.

When this Coverage Form and any other Coverage Form or policy covers on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the Limit of Insurance of Our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the Coverage Forms and policies covering on the same basis SECTION YI — DEFINITIONS N. “Trucker” means any person or organization engaged in the business of transporting property by “auto” for hire. In addition, Liberty’s policy had an MCS-90 Endorsement 3 attached to it, stating in relevant part: In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer ... agrees to pay, within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere. Such insurance as is afforded for public liability does not apply to injury to or death of the insured’s employees while engaged in the course of their employment, or property transported by the insured, designated as cargo.

It is understood and agreed that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall relieve the Company from liability or from the payment of any final ⁹⁰ judgment, within the limits of liability herein deserved, irrespective of the financial condition, insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured. However, all terms, conditions, and limitations in the policy to which this endorsement is attached shall remain in full force and effect as binding between the insured and the company. The insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company on account of any accident claim, or suit involving a breach of the terms of the policy, and for any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement. * * * This insurance is primary and the company shall not be liable for amounts in excess of $1,000,000.00 for each accident____ PROCEDURAL HISTORY This litigation involves two actions: 1) the underlying action by the injured party against the lessor, lessee, and driver; and 2) a second action for declaratory judgment between the insurers to determine which insurer is financially responsible for the loss. The issues presented by this appeal stem from the latter action.

On approximately 24 January 1996, Patrick Lauer filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking recovery for injuries he allegedly sustained in the 20 January 1995 accident with Mr. Perry’s truck. In his pleadings, Mr. Lauer named, inter alia, Mr. Perry, J.P. Transportation, and O.S.T. as defendants. A coverage dispute arose between Liberty and Empire, the companies that issued policies to O.S.T. and Mr. Perry, respectively. Consequently, on 6 March 1996, Empire filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking a declaration that, under the nontrucking policy it issued to Mr. Perry, either (1) it was not obligated to defend or indemnify for claims asserted in the suit filed by Mr. Lauer; (2) if its policy did provide coverage, that it was excess to the Liberty policy; ⁹¹ or (3) if the Empire and Liberty policies both provided primary coverage, that Liberty reimburse Empire for its prorated share of defense costs and any indemnity to be furnished.

Pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action, Empire agreed to provide a defense to the named defendants. The insurers filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing conducted on 14 August 1996, the court issued a “Ruling on Gross Motions for Summary Judgment” docketed on 22 August. The court held that Empire’s non-trucking policy was the sole policy that afforded coverage in the underlying motor tort action.

In so holding, the court reasoned as follows: At the time of the accident, the tractor was not being used “in the business of’ O.S.T. Perry was not operating the tractor in the business of O.S.T. because: Perry was not under dispatch at the time of the accident, and had not been for four days; Perry’s next dispatch was not until three days later; Perry was not hauling a load for O.S.T., and the accident occurred when Perry was on his way home for [sic.] purchasing some minor parts for the tractor’s toolbox which he had ordered two weeks previously. A timely notice of appeal followed. ANALYSIS I. We begin our analysis by attempting to understand and explain the labyrinth of applicable federal regulations governing the interstate trucking industry applicable to this case. Pursuant to the ICC Termination Act of 1995, 4 the existence of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) ended effective 1 January 1996.

Section 204(c) of the Act ⁹² provides that suits commenced before its enactment were subject to the law in effect prior to the sunset of the I.C.C. Unfortunately, the statute does not address causes of action, such as that encompassed by the instant litigation, which accrued prior to the Act’s enactment but for which suit was not filed until after its enactment. Notwithstanding this hole in the regulatory fabric, pursuant to a savings provision contained in Section 204 of the Termination Act, 5 the rules and regulations promulgated by the I.C.C. continue in effect until revised or revoked by parties designated in the Act’s savings provision. 6 As such, despite the demise of the I.C.C., the relevant law remains essentially the same. As our final tribute to the I.C.C., throughout the balance of this opinion we shall refer to the regulations governing the interstate trucking industry as the “I.C.C. regulations.” 7 The I.C.C. regulations governing leases of vehicles to carriers sanctioned by the I.C.C. can be traced to an early study concluding that the use by Commission-authorized motor carriers of leased vehicles led to several problems and abuses including avoidance of Commission safety requirements; the difficulty of establishing the lessee’s responsibility for accidents; and a general circumvention of the regulatory scheme. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 , ⁹³ 302, 73 S.Ct. 307, 310-11 , 97 L.Ed. 337 (1953); Empire Fire & Marine Ins.

Co. v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir.1989). In the 1950’s, it was common practice for trucking companies to attempt to immunize themselves from liability by using independent truck drivers or by denominating the regular drivers as independent contractors. To combat this practice and to ensure that the motoring public was adequately protected, Congress enacted 49 U.S.C. § 11107 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 304 (e)).

See Transamerican Freight Lines Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28 , 96 S.Ct. 229 , 46 L.Ed.2d 169 (1975). The federal statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder protect the motoring public by requiring the trucking company to have control of and to be responsible for the operation of leased vehicles. Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc., 145 Ariz. 317 , 701 P.2d 575, 578-79 (App.1984). Under the ICC regulations, leased vehicles are placed under the responsibility and control of the lessee.

See 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12 (c). The regulations also required that the lease address insurance coverage: (1) The lease shall clearly specify the legal obligation of the authorized carrier to maintain insurance coverage for the protection of the public pursuant to Commission regulations under 49 U.S.C. 10927. The lease shall further specify who is responsible for providing any other insurance coverage for the operation of the leased equipment, such as bobtail insurance.... Id. § 1057.12(j).

In addition, the regulations prescribed that leased trucks display identifying placards throughout the term of the lease. Id. § 1057.11(c). See generally Steven J. Kalish, Almost Everything you Wanted to Know about ICC Leasing Regulations, 55 Transp. Prac.

J. 160 (Winter 1988). Congress also enacted 49 U.S.C. § 10927 to provide protection for the public by ensuring that I.C.C. carriers were independently financially responsible. See Ford Motor Co. v. ⁹⁴ Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.1986); Carolina Casualty Ins.

Co. v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 304, 312 (5th Cir.1978); S.Rep. No. 1650, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2658. Pursuant to this statute, the I.C.C. promulgated regulations imposing financial responsibility requirements on motor carriers.

Proof of financial responsibility was a prerequisite to obtaining the necessary certification to qualify as an interstate motor carrier. The financial responsibility requirements covered matters such as the type of insurance, the limits of insurance, and a series of mandatory forms with which motor carriers were required to conform. See 49 C.F.R. § 1043.1 (a)(1). All carriers were required to be able to indemnify damages claims “for bodily injuries to or death of any person resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles in transportation ..., or for loss of or damage to property of others.” Id.

The regulations also prescribed that a certified insurance policy contain an Endorsement for Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance for Automobile Bodily Injury and Property Damage under 49 U.S.C. § 10927 . This special endorsement was commonly refereed to as the BMC 90 Endorsement. Id., § 1043.7(a)(3). In addition, motor vehicles with a gross weight of 10,000 pounds or greater were subject to the Department of Transportation’s regulatory jurisdiction.

See 49 U.S.C. § 31138 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. § 387.3 (c)(1). Like its I.C.C. counterpart, the DOT regulations prohibited a motor carrier from transporting property unless it had met certain financial responsibility requirements. Id. §§ 387.7(a); 387.9. Pursuant to section 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 8 the regulations established a minimum level of financial security of $750,000 for vehicles transporting non-hazardous materials.

See id. § 387.9(1); see also id. § 1043.2(b)(2)(A). Further, insurance policies were required to have a mandatory endorsement known as the MCS-90. 9 See id. § 387.15. The MCS-90 Endorsement was ⁹⁵ designed to satisfy the I.C.C.’s regulations and the Department of Transportation regulations simultaneously, obviating the need for obtaining the BMC 90 Endorsement once the MCS-90 Endorsement had been acquired. Finally, the federal regulations mandated that ICC carriers ensure that all vehicles operating under their permits underwent regular maintenance and repair: (a) General.

Every motor carrier shall systematically inspect, repair, and maintain, or cause to be systematically inspected, repaired, and maintained, all motor vehicles subject to its control. (1) Parts and accessories shall be in safe and proper operating condition at all times.... 49 C.F.R. § 396.3 . II We turn next to the general rules of construction employed by Maryland courts when construing insurance policies. Insurance is “a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or benefit upon determinable contingencies.” Md. Ann.Code, art. 48A, § 2.

An insurance policy is “the written instrument in which the contract of insurance is set forth.... ” Id., § 364. In Maryland, therefore, insurance polices are construed like other contracts. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 343 Md. 34 , 680 A.2d 480 (1996); Government Employees Ins.

Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. 548 , 366 A.2d 13 (1976); see also, Bond v. Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 289 Md. 379 , 424 A.2d 765 (1981).

Unlike many other types of contracts, however, the construction of insurance policies is also governed by “a few well-established principles,” Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388 , 488 A.2d 486, 488 (1985), ans. confirmed to, 774 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.1985), that are similar to those used in interpreting a statute. Travelers Ins.

Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542 , 365 A.2d 1000 (1976). Compare Pacific Indem., supra, with Mount v. Mount, 59 Md.App. 538 , ⁹⁶ 476 A.2d 1175 (1984). In fact, in Stanley v. American Motorists Ins. Co., the Court held that when an insurance policy which apparently has had a nationwide use and has been judicially constructed in many states, the parties to the insurance agreement adopt the policy with the uniform judicial construction accorded. 195 Md. 180 , 73 A.2d 1 (1950).

The “first principle of construction of insurance policies in Maryland is to apply the terms of the contract,” Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 250 , 508 A.2d 130, 133 (1986), to determine the scope and limitations of its coverage. Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 338 Md. 131 , 656 A.2d 779 (1995); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Knopf, 109 Md.App. 134 , 674 A.2d 65 , cert. denied, 343 Md. 333 , 681 A.2d 69 (1996).

This principle serves to achieve the touchstone of policy construction — to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties to the agreement. Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375 , 378 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (1977); see Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md.App. 499 , 568 A.2d 873 , cert. denied, 319 Md. 304 , 572 A.2d 183 (1990).

To divine properly the parties’ intent, the policy is viewed as a whole, without emphasis being placed on particular provisions. Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503 , 667 A.2d 617 (1995); Nolt v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 329 Md. 52 , 617 A.2d 578 (1993); Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Lexington Ins.

Co., 42 Md.App. 396 , 401 A.2d 181 , cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979). Moreover, whenever possible, each clause, sentence, or provision shall be given force and effect. See Pacific Indem, supra; Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428 , 418 A.2d 1187 (1980); Gottlieb v. American Auto.

Ins. Co., 177 Md. 32 , 7 A.2d 182 (1939). The nature of the policy, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the insurance agreement are also important considerations in determining the parties’ intent. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 388 , 488 A.2d at 488 .

Finally, statutes in force at the time the insurance contract was entered into must be read as a part of the contract when construing the terms of the policy. See Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stallings, 263 F.2d 852 (4th Cir.1959).

The legislative ⁹⁷ purpose of such controlling statutes should also be read in conjunction with the agreement. See Keystone Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 676 , 26 A.2d 761 (1942) (holding that insurance policy, issued pursuant to a statute forbidding the operation of a motor vehicle until good and sufficient security was given for the protection of the public, be construed together with a statute in light of legislative purpose).

Indeed, an insurance contract cannot be enforced as written when there is a statute requiring a different effect. Vollmer, supra. When examining the language of the policy, an “ordinarily and usually accepted” meaning should by accorded to the text, Aragona, 281 Md. at 371 , 378 A.2d 1346 , unless there is evidence that the parties intended to employ the word “in a special or technical sense,” Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766 , 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1989), or the contract provides a specific definition for the word.

See Valliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 324 Md. 139, 142 , 596 A.2d 636, 638 (1991). If the policy “language is unambiguous and plain as to its meaning, construction of the insurance contract is within the province of the courts.” Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 389 , 488 A.2d at 488 ; Aragona, 281 Md. at 375 , 378 A.2d at 1348 . Language is unambiguous when it has only one meaning to a reasonably prudent layperson.

See Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. at 433 , 418 A.2d at 1190 (“an ambiguity does arise if, to a reasonably prudent layman, the language used is susceptible of more than one meaning”). Unlike the majority of other states, Maryland does not follow the rule that insurance policies are to be most strongly construed against the insurer. Sullins, supra; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542 , 365 A.2d 1000 (1976); Government Employees Ins.

Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717 , 261 A.2d 747 (1970). Instead, under Maryland jurisprudence, the ordinary standards of contract construction govern in order to achieve an equitable and just construction. Gottlieb, supra. Nevertheless, under general principles of contract construe ⁹⁸ tion, if an insurance policy is ambiguous, it will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer as drafter of the instrument.

North River Ins. Co. supra; W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 325 Md. 301 , 600 A.2d 836 (1992); Aragona, 281 Md. at 375 , 378 A.2d at 1348-49 . 10 The vitality of this rule is in no way compromised when the dispute involves two insurance carriers. See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. General Trucking Co., 423 So.2d 168 (Ala.1982).

III

With the aforementioned rules of construction and the pertinent I.C.C. regulations in tow, we shall “keep on trucking” 11 in order to construe the terms of the policies before us in order to determine the respective risks of loss against which Empire and Liberty contracted to insure. See Fisher v. Tyler, 284 Md. 100 , 394 A.2d 1199 (1978); McNeill v. Maryland Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, 48 Md.App. 411 , 427 A.2d 1056 (1981). We shall first attempt to ascertain whether, at the time the accident occurred, Mr. Perry was operating the ⁹⁹ tractor in the business of O.S.T. 12 If we answer in the affirmative, then Empire is not required to furnish coverage pursuant to HIL, B., 13. of its policy (Exclusion for Business Use). 13 Empire asserts that Mr. Perry’s use of the tractor for purposes of arranging for repairs and maintenance and retrieving parts for the tractor was “in the business of’ O.S.T., thereby triggering the business use exclusion contained in the policy it issued to Mr. Perry.

In construing the phrase “in the business of,” 14 we shall follow the course of other courts that have sought guidance from the analogous common law doc ¹⁰⁰ trine of respondeat superior. 15 Accordingly, we shall consider whether the truck driven by Mr. Perry was under the control of O.S.T. or otherwise furthering the business of O.S.T. at the time of the accident. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Indem.

Co., 55 F.3d 1333, 1337 n. 5 (7th Cir.1995) (emphasizing control aspect but also considering furthering business of lessee); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 908 F.2d at 239; Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 685 F.Supp. at 126 (applying furthering the business test); Lime City Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Mullins, 83 Ohio App.3d 517, 521-23 , 615 N.E.2d 305, 308-09 (1992) (implicitly approving trial court’s application of respondeat superior analysis and emphasizing “furthering of the commercial interest” of lessee test).

Appellant cites several decisions from other jurisdictions in support of its contention that Mr. Perry could have been operating the truck in the business of O.S.T. even though he was not pulling a trailer or otherwise under dispatch. Empire argues that the stop at the Peterbuilt dealership was in furtherance of the business of the ICC carrier-lessee, O.S.T. Empire postulates that under the federal regulatory regime, either O.S.T. was responsible for maintenance of the vehicles it leased, including any parts and accessories, or, alternatively, O.S.T. was permitted to “cause” someone else to perform the necessary maintenance. In either case, because the toolbox is a part or accessory of a leased truck, repairs and maintenance on the toolbox were within the activities of O.S.T., the I.C.C. carrier. Furthermore, the O.S.T./Perry lease required Mr. Perry to perform services for and on behalf of O.S.T, including keeping the tractor in good safe operation.

Appellant, there ¹⁰¹ fore, concludes that pursuant to either federal regulations or the O.S.T./Perry lease, the acquisition of the toolbox parts was in the furtherance of O.S.T.’s business. Appellant fails to acknowledge, however, that the accident occurred while Mr. Perry was driving home, after he had picked up the parts for the toolbox. Generally, once a lessor-driver returns to his “home terminal” after completing an assignment, his business with the carrier-lessee is complete. If the lessor then drives to his residence, he is no longer operating the truck in the business of the I.C.C. carrier.

See, e.g., Pace v. Couture, 150 Ind.App. 220 , 276 N.E.2d 213, 218-19 (1971) (holding that trucker was not in business of another when he had dropped off load, was told he had no other assignment, and thereafter bobtailed home). In Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Frankart, the court formulated three indicia for recognizing the point in time when an owner-driver’s engagement in the lessee’s business terminates: (1) when he returns to the point where the haul originated; (2) when he arrives at the terminal from which the haul was assigned; or (3) when he returns to his “home terminal” — the place from which he customarily obtains his next assignment. 69 Ill.2d at 218-19, 13 Ill.Dec. at 35, 370 N.E.2d at 1062. Furthermore, the driver-lessor need not formally return to the “home-terminal” in order for his business with the I.C.C. carrier to be complete.

Instead, the driver-lessor is no longer operating his truck in the business of the I.C.C. carrier once he has returned to the area from where he was dispatched. See McLean Trucking Co. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 72 N.C.App. 285 , 324 S.E.2d 633 , review denied, 313 N.C. 603 , 330 S.E.2d 611 (1985) (holding that by returning to the area from where he was dispatched, owner-lessor had effectively returned to terminal from where the freight was assigned and was not thereafter “in the business of’ the lessee at the time of the accident because driver was heading home). See also Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Indem. Co, 55 F.3d at 1337 (noting an important factor in decisions that have held truck was not operated in business of I.C.C. carrier was that ¹⁰² driver had either completed delivery or was not assigned any delivery when the accident occurred). In the instant case, the accident occurred after Mr. Perry had returned to his “home terminal.” He was not under dispatch, nor had he been assigned another load.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the stop at the Peterbuilt dealership was for purposes of furthering the business of the I.C.C. carrier, 16 once he purchased the parts for the toolbox, his business with the I.C.C. carrier was complete. He was in the area of his “home terminal” and was heading home. Based on the holdings of McLean and Frankart, we conclude that at the time the accident occurred, Mr. Perry was not operating his truck in the business of O.S.T. Appellant has not cited, nor has our own research uncovered, a case holding that a vehicle was used “in the business” of a carrier-lessee when the vehicle was being driven to driver-lessor’s home after delivering a trailer, returning to the area of his home terminal, and not having another load assigned. As such, the bevy of cases cited by Empire fails to ¹⁰³ extricate it from its coverage obligations.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Indem. Co., 55 F.3d 1333 (driver en route to retrieve and complete assigned delivery; driver had taken trailer away from terminal but had uncoupled it from his tractor so that he could bobtail home for weekend); Hartford Ins.

Co. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 908 F.2d 235 (accident occurred while driver was in process of making a delivery for the lessee and was en route to pick up trailer that required repairs in order to complete delivery); Freed v. Travelers, 300 F.2d 395 (7th Cir.1962) (accident occurred while owner was taking tractor leased to trucking company to a garage for repairs); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 685 F.Supp. 123 (driver was pulling empty trailer between terminals); Carriers Ins.

Co. v. Griffie, 357 F.Supp. 441 (W.D.Pa.1973) (accident occurred during an inspection required by carrier, pursuant to carrier’s company policy at a garage selected by carrier and at the cost of carrier); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of the State of Penna., 638 So.2d 102 (Fla.App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051 , 115 S.Ct. 655 , 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994) (accident occurred when a trucker bobtailed to a service station to obtain an oil change between assignments); Simpkins v. Protective Ins. Co., 94 Ill.App.3d 951 , 50 Ill.Dec. 449 , 419 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1981) (basing its decision on fact that driver was under dispatch, the court held that owner heading to terminal to pick up load was operating in business of carrier); Mullins, 83 Ohio App.3d 517 , 615 N.E.2d 305 (holding that truck was not being driven for personal purposes when upon being notified that he was next in line for a load, owner drove toward terminal to be ready to receive load). 17 We are mindful of the inference that Mr. Perry probably intended to install the parts he had purchased once ¹⁰⁴ he arrived at his residence. As such, Empire might contend that at the time of the accident, the tractor was being operated in the business of O.S.T. because he was heading toward the facility wherein he intended to have the necessary repairs effectuated, namely his residence.

Such reasoning, however, would eviscerate the holdings of McLean and Frankart because it could always be argued that the lessor-driver was heading home in order to perform some minor repairs on his truck and, therefore, was in the business of the trucker-carrier. Furthermore, we note in passing that the mere fact that the vehicle was under lease is not dispositive of whether the vehicle was being used in the business of the lessee. As the trial court recognized, to hold otherwise would render the lessor’s bobtail insurance a nullity because if the permanent lessee’s insurer was always liable, there would be no need for the lessor to obtain bobtail insurance. See also Grimes v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co., 705 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Ky.App.1985). Clearly, there must be some point when a leased bobtailing tractor is not being operated in the business of the carrier-lessee. In this case, we hold that one such instance is when a truck is being driven to the driver-lessor’s residence after delivering his assigned load and returning to the area from where he was dispatched.

Finally, Empire’s public policy contentions cannot rescue it from its coverage obligations. The mere fact that the lessee is ordinarily liable by virtue of the federal regulatory scheme 18 does not prevent liability from being imposed upon the lessor. Carolina Cas. Ins.

Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 595 F.2d 128, 139 (3d Cir.1979); Huber v.