Engle v. Mayor of Cumberland

Sloan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The only question in this case is the validity of a section of the City Charter of Cumberland, respecting suits for damages against the city “to persons or property arising from or occasioned by any public street, highway, or grounds.” The plaintiff, appellant, Margaret Engle, brought suit and filed a declaration on July 21, 1941, wherein she charged the city with having placed in the foot pavement in front of No. 400 Walnut Street, a public highway of the city, a watercock, water pipe, water lid, or stop box, “about fifty-six inches inside of the curb line of the pavement, and was negligently constructed or suffered by the defendant, who knew or should have known of this defect, to extend about one and one-half to three inches above the footway or sidewalk, so that it impeded or interfered with the free and unobstructed use by the public of the highway and-its sidewalks; that on the night of October 3, 1940 (inore than eight months after the event) the plaintiff, while passing along the highway and over the pavement or sidewalk, while in the exercise of due care, without the knowledge of the pro ⁴⁶⁷ jection of the aforementioned obstruction above the sidewalk, and which, it being nighttime * * * she neither saw nor was able to see,” stumbled on the obstruction and was injured. The city demurred, and from an order sustaining the demurrer, the plaintiff appealed. The sole ground of demurrer is that the city is not suable on the allegations of the declaration under Section 89, Chapter 96 of the Acts of 1922, Code of Public Local Laws, 1930, Section 89, Article 1A, which reads as follows: “Before the City of Cumberland shall be liable for damages of any kind, the person injured, or someone in his behalf, shall give the Mayor or City Clerk notice in writing of such injury within thirty days after the same has been received, stating specifically in such notice when, where and how the injury occurred, and the extent thereof.

The City of Cumberland shall never be liable on account of any damage or injury to person or property arising from or occasioned by any public street, highway or grounds, including accumulations of snow or ice, or any public work of the city, unless the specific defect or the accumulation of snow or ice causing the damage or injury shall have been actually known to the Mayor or City Engineer by personal inspection for a period of at least twenty-four hours prior to the occurrence of the injury or damage, unless the attention of the Mayor or Engineer shall have been called thereto by notice thereof in writing at least twenty-four hours prior to the occurrence of the injury or damage and proper diligence has not been used to rectify the defect or cause said accumulations of snow or ice to be removed after actually known or called to the attention of the Mayor and City Engineer as aforesaid.” There is no case in this State construing such a provision of a city charter, but in many other States the question is not new, and in only two of them has it been held invalid. The main effect of such a charter provision is to be rid of the decisions of courts sustaining a charge of constructive notice, which makes a case of ⁴⁶⁸ this character almost impossible to defend, where municipalities and county commissioners are charged with the maintenance of streets, roads and highways. Annapolis v. Stallings, 125 Md. 343 , 93 A. 974 ; County Commissioners of Baltimore County v. Collins, 158 Md. 335 , 148 A. 242 . The plaintiff contends that it is not necessary to allege that the Mayor and City Engineer had personal knowledge of the condition of Walnut Street or that notice in writing of its condition had been given to them at least twenty-four hours previous to the injury complained of and that it was only necessary to allege her complaint in the general terms of the form prescribed by Article 75, Section 28, Subsection 37, Code, 1939, last enacted by the Act of 1888, Ch. 547.

An answer to this, and we think sufficient, is Section 48, Article 3 of the Constitution of Maryland, that municipal corporations cannot be formed under any general law, but must be created under special or local laws, on such conditions and with such powers, duties, rights and obligations as the Legislature may prescribe. McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland 407 ; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 , 74 Am. Dec. 572 ; Mayor, etc., of Hagerstown v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 231 , 164 A. 743 . The plaintiff cites Cole v. City of St. Joseph, Mo.

Sup., 50 S. W. 2d 623 , 82 A. L. R. 742, as holding that a notice of intention to sue would seem to apply to the proof and not to the pleading. What was decided there was that the requirement of notice was not waived by the failure to plead the statute, and that the failure to notify the Mayor in writing within sixty days of the notice of the accident or injury could be shown by evidence. In the annotation, 82 A. L. R. 754, three cases are cited, one from Canfield v. Jackson, 112 Mich. 120 , 70 N. W. 444 , in which it was held that failure to plead the want of notice of the claim to the defendant was a waiver of the defense, and in Clark v. Davison, 118 Mich. 420 , 76 N. W. 971 , it was held that the non-presentment of ⁴⁶⁹ a verified claim could be offered in evidence under the general issue. In Sheel v. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 , 5 N. W. 27 , it was held that failure to object by