Eubanks v. First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Assoc., Inc.

EYLER, Judge. This case presents the question, one of first impression in Maryland’s appellate courts, whether an action against forcible detainer is an action under Maryland Code, Real Property (“RP”) § 8-402, such that rent escrow relief may be awarded under RP § 8-118. The action was filed by the record owner of real property seeking possession of the property from one alleged to be unlawfully in possession. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ordered, pursuant to the rent escrow provisions contained in RP § 8-118, that, pending a jury trial in that court, the person in possession pay into the registry of the court $1,500 per month for use and possession of the property, and further ordered, pursuant to RP § 8 — 402(b)(3), that the possessor file a bond in the amount of $5,000 with the clerk of the court as security for any damages found to be due.

We affirm the judgment of the circuit court ordering the payment of rent escrow, but reverse the judgment with respect to the bond. I. Facts On April 17, 1995, appellant, Beth S. Eubanks, borrowed $239,000 from appellee, First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Association. The loan was evidenced by a note secured by a deed of trust on certain real property owned by appellant. After appellant defaulted on the loan, the parties negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement.

Pursuant to its terms, appellant delivered into escrow a deed in lieu of foreclosure. When appellant breached the agreement, the deed was ⁶⁴⁸ delivered to appellee, and on September 9, 1997, appellee recorded it among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County. Appellant remained in possession of the property during the above transactions. Appellee filed suit in the District Court for Anne Arundel County seeking possession.

Count One was an action against forcible detainer, and Count Two was an action for ejectment. Appellant elected a jury trial, and on October 14, 1997, the case was transferred from the district court to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. On October 6,1997, prior to the transfer of the district court suit, appellant filed her own suit against appellee in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, with an election for jury trial. Appellant alleged various acts of deception by appellee, in violation of State and Federal law, and sought rescission of the deed in lieu of foreclosure and monetary damages.

On December 16, 1997, the two cases were consolidated, and an order was entered directing that all further pleadings and motions be filed in the case originally filed in circuit court. On October 24, 1997, in the case transferred from district court, appellee filed a motion for a protective order requiring appellant to pay money into a court supervised escrow account on a monthly basis for use and possession of the property. On October 30, 1997, in the same case, appellee filed a motion in limine, in which appellee recited that appellant had challenged title to the property before the district court and, citing RP § 8 — 402(b)(3), requested a ruling that appellant not be permitted to offer any evidence challenging title without posting a bond as provided for in that section. On February 9, 1998, the circuit court entered an order in which it (1) required appellant to pay $1,500 per month into an escrow account for the use and occupancy of the property, pursuant to RP § 8-118, retroactive to the date of the original request for relief in the district court (October 8, 1997) and continuing during the pendency of the litigation, and (2) required appellant to post a ⁶⁴⁹ bond in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to RP § 8 — 402(b)(3). 1 II.

Appealability of the Judgment The circuit court certified its order as a final order for the purposes of appeal under Rule 2-602(b). That Rule permits a trial court in certain instances to order the entry of a final judgment “as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.” Rule 2-602(b)(l). The judgment, however, “must be dispositive as to an entire claim or party before it may be certified as final and appealable.” Huber v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 347 Md. 415, 420 , 701 A.2d 415 (1997).

The term “claim,” as used in the Rule, refers to a complete, substantive cause of action. See Medical Mutual v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 331 Md. 301, 308-09 , 628 A.2d 170 (1993); East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 458-59 , 445 A.2d 343 (1982) (interpreting Rule 605 a, predecessor to current Rule 2-602); Suitland Dev. v. Merchants Mortgage, 254 Md. 43, 54 , 254 A.2d 359 (1969) (same). Appellee’s complaint originally stated causes of action in forcible entry and detainer and ejectment, the latter of which was dismissed by consent. The only issues on appeal have to do with the propriety of the interlocutory order regarding rent escrow and a bond — the forcible entry and detainer claim is still pending.

Consequently, the circuit court lacked authority to certify its judgment as final for purposes of appeal, and we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal under Rule 2-602(b). For the reasons set forth below, however, we exercise jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJ”), § 12-303(1) (1998). 2 Section 12-303 provides in pertinent part: ⁶⁵⁰ A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: (1) An order entered with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt or charging of the income, interest, or dividends therefrom, or the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order. The rent escrow and peculiar type of bond ordered by the circuit court in this case both fall within the category of judgments immediately appealable under CJ § 12-303(1). Initially, we note that the precise meaning of CJ § 12-303(1) is ambiguous, as is the applicability of the statute to the order in this case.

The statute apparently grants to an aggrieved litigant the right to take an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that is injunctive in nature and decides on an interim basis the right to possession or the income from property. The right of immediate appeal from injunctions is expressly granted in other subsections of the same statute, however. See CJ § 12-303(3)(i)-(iii). It is also clear that not every order is appealable that merely refers to the receipt or charging of income, interest, or dividends from property.

The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the principle that “[wjhere the meaning of the plain language of the statute, or the language itself, is unclear, ‘we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based.’ ” Blitz v. Beth Isaac, 352 Md. 31, 39-40 , 720 A.2d 912 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998)). Furthermore, the language of a statute, where possible, should not be read so as to render other portions of the statutory scheme “meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.” GEICO v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993). See also ⁶⁵¹ DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 445 , 677 A.2d 73 (1996). In order to reveal the present meaning and applicability of the language of CJ § 12-303(1), we find it necessary to trace the genesis and development of that language. 3 Before the language of CJ § 12-303(1) was first adopted, the Legislature had permitted immediate appeals from certain interlocutory orders of equity courts affecting the possession of property or the income derived from property.

See Md. Code (1957), art. 16 §§ 90, 129; Md.Code (Flack 1951), art. 16 §§ 232, 233. Such orders were immediately appealable in the same manner as injunctions. 4 See id.; Md.Code (1957), art. 5 § 7(a)-(b); Md.Code (Flack 1951), art. 5 § 31. Article 16, § 129 of the Maryland Code (1957), titled, “Orders pendente lite regarding possession of property or income,” provided: The court may, at any stage of any cause or matter concerning property, real or personal, on application, or of its own motion, pass such order as to it may seem fit, with regard to the possession of the same, pendente lite, or the receipt of the income thereof, on such terms preliminary thereto (as to security, etc.,) as to it may seem just, subject to the same right to move for its discharge, and the same right of appeal as is given in § 90. Section 90 permitted appeals “in such manner and on such terms as is now allowed in cases of injunctions.” Md.Code (1957), art. 16 § 90.

Thus, courts of equity had broad power under § 129 to pass orders determining interim rights to property or the income derived therefrom pending a trial on ⁶⁵² the merits of the claim, but any exercise of this power was subject to immediate appellate review. In Baker v. Baker, 108 Md. 269 , 70 A. 418 (1908), the Court of Appeals invoked this statutory scheme to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from an order appointing a receiver to protect real property pending a final judgment with respect to the property. See Baker, 108 Md. at 271-73 , 70 A. 418 (interpreting the Maryland Code (1904), article 16 § 192, a substantively identical predecessor to Maryland Code (1957), article 16 § 129). Baker involved a suit in equity for a sale of real property in lieu of partition in part against Isabel Baker, holder of two mortgages on the property, by certain heirs claiming interests in the property.

See id. at 271 , 70 A. 418 . A portion of the property was occupied by Isabel Baker, and a portion was occupied by tenants paying rent to her. Id. at 275 , 70 A. 418 . Before the action could be heard on the merits, the heirs petitioned the equity court for the appointment of a receiver, and the court issued an order appointing two receivers “to collect and receive all rents accrued and to accrue from the real estate mentioned in these proceedings, during the pendency thereof.” Id. at 276 , 70 A. 418 .

The Court of Appeals concluded the order was immediately appeal-able under § 192, id. at 273, 70 A. 418 , and held that although Mrs. Baker, as holder of the mortgages, might have had a right to petition the equity court for a receiver, the heirs had no such right, absent a showing of entitlement to the rents or a showing that the rents were jeopardized in some way. See id. at 276-77 , 70 A. 418 . By concluding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Baker Court broadly interpreted the above statutory scheme to include interlocutory orders with respect to the income from property that mandate payments to a court appointed receiver, not merely payments from one party directly to another party. The statutory right of immediate appeal from an interlocutory order with respect to the possession of property or the receipt of rents or income therefrom has survived subsequent modifications both by the General Assembly and the Court of Appeals and the elimination of distinctions between courts of ⁶⁵³ law and courts of equity in Maryland.

In 1961, nearly 23 years before the elimination of separate courts of law and equity, the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 532, which provided courts of law with the power to issue interlocutory orders of the kind previously available only to equity courts under article 16, §§ 129,130. That Rule provided, in part: A court may, subject to the provisions of Subtitle BB (Injunction), at any stage of an action, on motion or of its own accord, pass such order with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt of or charging of the income, interest or dividends therefrom for any purpose, on such terms and conditions, as justice may require. Md. Rules of Procedure, Rule 532 (1961). This language was broader than the language in § 129, encompassing the power under what was then § 130 to issue charging orders with respect to property.

See Md.Code (1957), art. 16 § 130. The explanatory note to Rule 532 stated that the Rule was intended both to supercede article 16, § 129, and to apply the powers under the Rule to actions at law as well as in equity, “so that a law court would, for example, be permitted in a proper case to pass a charging order with respect to property which was the subject of the litigation, as e.g., to charge the rents issuing out of property involved in an ejectment or replevin action.” Md. Rules of Procedure, Rule 532 (1961) (explanatory note). This Rule was substantively identical to Rule 572, which was adopted at the same time but was applicable only to courts of equity. See Md. Rules of Procedure, Rule 572 (1961).

In response to the adoption of Rule 532, the Legislature repealed article 16, § 129 in 1962, and enacted article 5, § 1A and article 5, § 7(h). See 1962 Md. Laws, ch. 36 §§ 1, 5, 6. Both article 5, § 1A and article 5, § 7(h) were modeled on the language of Rules 532 and 572 and provided for interlocutory rights of appeal in courts of law and equity, respectively. 5 ⁶⁵⁴ These new statutes, unlike previous article 16 §§ 129 and 130, did not provide the power to issue orders then permitted by Rule 532 and Rule 572, but provided for the right of interlocutory appeal from orders issued pursuant to those Rules. The power to issue interlocutory orders of the type previously available to courts of equity under article 16 §§ 129 and 130 in effect had been separated from the statutes and provided for by Rule.

While there is still an express right of appeal from the type of orders that could be granted under Rules 532 and 572, these Rules were rescinded during the sweeping reorganization of the Maryland Rules in 1984. Though Rules 532 and 572 initially were consolidated in a single proposed reorganization rule that would have maintained their specific grant of authority, the Rules Committee decided not to recommend the adoption of the new rule. This decision is detailed in the minutes of the committee: Noting that he was deviating from the order of the agenda, Judge McAuliffe presented Reorganization Rule 2-541 for the Committee’s consideration: Rule 2-541. ORDERS REGARDING PROPERTY Subject to the provisions of [Subtitle BB], a court may at any stage of an action, on motion of any party or on its own motion, enter an order with respect to possession of property relating to the action or with respect to the receipt or charging of income, interest, or dividends from such property.

The order may include those terms and ⁶⁵⁵ conditions which the court deems appropriate. The person against whom the order is directed is not bound by the order until the person has received actual notice of the order, by personal service or otherwise. Any affected party or person may move to have the order modified, dissolved, or discharged. Rule 2-541 was accompanied by the following explanatory note: Although Reorganization Rule 2-541 is substantively the same as current Rules 532 and 572, the [Planning] subcommittee is of the opinion that this Rule should be deleted.

Several reasons exist for this opinion. First, the Rule is expressly subject to the provisions of Subtitle BB dealing with injunctions. If the procedural safeguards of that subtitle apply, there is clearly no need for the last three sentences of this rule. Subtitle BB already contains these provisions.

Secondly, the first sentence of the Rule appears to be stated in an overly-broad fashion. It is the subcommittee’s belief that, absent statutory authority, a court cannot charge the income from property under any and all circumstances. Finally, if courts do possess the power to take the action permitted by this Rule under any circumstances where the court deems such action to be appropriate, it could be argued that courts can do so directly under the provisions of Subtitle BB. All action permitted by this Rule is in the nature of an injunction.

Judge McAuliffe explained that clear statutory authority exists for entering an order charging the interest of a debtor partner with the payment of the unsatisfied amount of a judgment debt. In the subcommittee’s opinion, the injunction procedure suffices to handle all other cases. The subcommittee therefore recommends the deletion of this rule. ⁶⁵⁶ There being no motion to the contrary, the subcommittee’s recommendation was approved and the rule was deleted. Md. Court of Appeals, Standing Comm, on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of June 19-20,1981, pp. 18-19.

The broad language of Rules 532 and 572 did not purport to define every type of order that could be issued under their authority. Similarly, CJ § 12-303(1) does not purport to define every type of order that is subject to its grant of interlocutory appellate authority. Notwithstanding the Subcommittee’s opinion that the powers previously granted by Rules 532 and 572 were adequately retained in existing authority regarding injunctions and charging orders, it is conceivable, although we have not conducted an extensive search, that statutes or rules conveying the authority to issue the type of orders subject to CJ § 12-303(1), other than injunctions and charging orders, either existed at the time Rules 532 and 572 were rescinded, or that such statutes or rules were enacted thereafter. The Committee apparently did not explicitly consider the continued appealability of this class of orders in the course of its decision to rescind Rules 532 and 572.

As the Subcommittee noted, however, the authority to issue orders of the type described by Rules 532 and 572 would in the future require an express grant of such power, either by statute or rule. As long as CJ § 12-303(1) remains in force, therefore, we must look to the nature of the order actually granted in a given case, and determine the appealability of the order with reference to the language of § 12-303(1) in the context of the relevant legislative history, case law, and the purposes behind the statutory framework. We conclude that the circuit court’s order with respect to monthly rent escrow payments was an appealable interlocutory order under CJ § 12-303(1). Maryland Code, RP § 8-118 provides authority for a court to order the payment of “rents” into a court supervised escrow account when a possessor of real property unlawfully holds over.

See Md.Code RP § 8-118(a), (b) (1996) (enacted July 1, 1982). As we mention ⁶⁵⁷ above, the notes to Rule 532 explained that the type of orders that were permissible in equity under article 16, § 129 could thereafter be issued by a court of law, and the note provided as an example an order charging the “rents” issuing from property under dispute in an ejectment action. As we discuss more fully below, the cause of action against forcible entry and detainer in Maryland, in its present form, is very similar to modern actions in ejectment. Moreover, orders allocating the receipt of income from property are subject to the same right of interlocutory appeal as orders “charging the rents” issuing from property.

See CJ § 12-303(1). The rent escrow order in this case would have been within the scope of orders permitted by Rule 532 in 1961, and is therefore appealable under the statutory grant of appellate authority that exists today in CJ § 12-303(1) and has remained substantively unchanged since 1962. Our analysis is not affected by the fact that the payments are flowing into a court supervised account, rather than directly from one party to another. The direct payment of rents into a court supervised account in this case is analogous to the direct payment of rents to be made to the receivers in Baker, supra. 6 The order in this case purports to protect the rents pending trial of the underlying property dispute, as apparently was the intention of the order subject to review by the Court of Appeals in Baker .

The order for the payment of rent escrow in the case at bar, therefore, was an order with reference to the receipt of income from the real property that is the subject of appellee’s forcible detainer action. As such, the order was appealable under CJ § 12-303(1). We conclude that the $ 5,000 bond purportedly ordered pursuant to RP § 8-402(b)(3) is also subject to immediate appellate review under CJ § 12-303(1). The circuit court ordered the bond for the purpose of securing “damages arising from Defendant’s plea of title and retention of the property.” This language indicates that the trial court’s purpose in ⁶⁵⁸ ordering the bond was similar to the court’s purpose in ordering rent escrow, and that the bond would have a similar effect.

The court apparently sought to protect the value of appellant’s retention of the possession of the property pending resolution of the underlying dispute. Like the rent escrow payments in this case, the bond is subject to the trial court’s control, and eventually would be distributed at the direction of the court. For these reasons, the bond ordered by the circuit court relates to the receipt of income from the property in the same way as the rent escrow, and we therefore exercise jurisdiction under CJ § 12-303(1) to consider the bond order. We note that RP § 8-402(b)(3) provides for a bond when a holdover- defendant disputes title to the property.

When such a dispute arises in the district court, the statute directs the court to order a stay of the pending holdover proceeding to permit the defendant to litigate a title dispute in circuit court with respect to the property. A bond properly ordered under RP § 8-402(b)(3) is held to ensure that the alleged title dispute is in fact prosecuted in a timely manner by the holdover defendant. Section 8-402(b)(3) does not authorize a bond to secure damages or to protect the value of the possession of the property for final distribution once the underlying title dispute is resolved. Moreover, it is unlikely, given our discussion in Part VI below, that a bond properly ordered under RP § 8-402(b)(3) could ever be considered by this Court on interlocutory appeal.

In any event, we conclude that we are not presented with a proper RP § 8402(b)(3) bond in this case. Consequently, while we exercise jurisdiction over the bond that was ordered in this case, we express no opinion as to whether a bond properly ordered under RP § 8-402(b)(3) would be appealable under CJ § 12-303(1).

III

Arguments of the Parties The substantive issues of this case center on the interpretation of §§ 8-118 and 8-402 of the Real Property Article as they apply to appellee’s common law action against forcible detainer. Section 8-402(a) establishes the liability of a “tenant under any lease or someone holding under him” for actual ⁶⁵⁹ damages caused when such a person unlawfully holds over “beyond the termination of the lease.” Md.Code, RP § 8-402(a) (Supp.1998). Subsection (b) defines the procedure to be followed when a landlord seeks possession of property and damages from one unlawfully holding over. The procedure set forth in subsection (b) primarily applies to an action by a landlord against a tenant holding over beyond the termination of a lease agreement.

Under the express language of RP § 8 — 402(b)(4)(i), however, the provisions of subsection (b) apply to tenancies from year to year, by the month, and by the week, and “the same proceeding shall apply, so far as may be, to cases of forcible entry and detainer.” 7 Section 8-118(a) provides that “[i]n an action under § 8-401, § 8-402, or § 8-402.1 8 of this article in which a party prays a jury trial,” a court is authorized to order a tenant “to pay all rents as they come due during the pendency of the action.” The proceedings established by § 8-402(b) are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the district court. See CJ § 4-401(4); Greenbelt Consumer Servs. v. Acme Markets, 272 Md. 222, 230 , 322 A.2d 521 (1974). First, appellant contends that the action transferred from district court is not an “action under” § 8-402 because it is a forcible detainer action against a non-tenant, and as such is not included within §§ 8-401, 8-402, or 8-402.1. Consequently, there is no authority to enable the court to establish a rent escrow account.

Appellant explains that a forcible detainer action was not created by §§ 8-401, 8-402, 8-402.1 or any portion of the Real Property Article but derives from British statutes adopted as part of this State’s common law. Appellant relies on rules of statutory construction and argues that the Real Property statutes in question, by their very terms, ⁶⁶⁰ only apply to landlords and tenants in a landlord-tenant relationship. If not interpreted to be so limited, appellant asserts that the statutes, all entitled as dealing with the landlord-tenant relationship, would be unconstitutional under the Maryland Constitution, article III, § 29 because of defective titling. Alternatively, appellant argues that RP § 8-118, if applicable, only requires appellant to pay all “rents” as they become due.

In this case, there was no tenancy and no rent due. At most, according to appellant, she should be liable for the fair market value of the use and occupancy of the property. If we agree with that proposition, appellant argues that the escrow amount actually set by the circuit court was without any basis and, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Second, appellant contends that the circuit court was without authority to require the posting of a bond under RP § 8-402(b)(3).

In support of this contention, appellant relies on the reasons set forth in support of her first contention but also asserts that, because of the consolidation of the action transferred from district court with the action originally filed in circuit court, the effect of the bond requirement is an unconstitutional interference with appellant’s right to a jury trial. For that proposition, appellant relies primarily on Lucky Ned Pepper’s Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n, 64 Md. App. 222 , 494 A.2d 947 (1985). Appellee acknowledges that there is no landlord-tenant relationship in this case and further acknowledges that an action for forcible detainer exists in Maryland by virtue of the adoption of British statutes in effect on July 4, 1776. In response to appellant, appellee asserts that the procedure in RP § 8-402(b) is applicable to a forcible detainer action, and thus, it is an action under RP § 8-402 within the meaning of RP § 8-118.

For the reasons set forth below, we agree with appellee that forcible entry and detainer actions are properly brought pursuant to RP § 8-402(b), and therefore are actions subject to the rent escrow provisions of RP § 8-118. We also hold, ⁶⁶¹ however, that the bond provision of RP § 8-402(b)(3) does not apply on the facts of this case, and generally is inapplicable outside of an actual landlord-tenant relationship.

IV

Legal Background A. Forcible entry and detainer at common law Forcible detainer is a common law cause of action in Maryland that lies when one unlawfully detains property from the lawful possessor. Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 53 , 447 A.2d 857 (1982). It is distinguished from the common law misdemeanor of forcible entry, which we have recognized as an entry on real property peaceably in the possession of another, against his will, without authority of law, by actual force, or with such an array of force and apparent intent to employ it for the purpose of overcoming resistance that the occupant in yielding and permitting possession to be taken from him must be regarded as acting from a well-founded apprehension that his resistance would be perilous or unavailing. Dean v. State, 13 Md.App. 654, 657 , 285 A.2d 295 (1971) (quoting 35 Am.Jur.2d Forcible Entry and Detainer § 1, p. 891 (1967)).

The restoration of the possession of real estate has always been the primary civil remedy for forcible detainer, although, as we discuss below, forcible detainer has been modified in Maryland since it was adopted from British statutes. Under British common law, prior to the 14 th century, a person entitled to possession of property could enter and take possession by force. Moxley, 294 Md. at 50 , 447 A.2d 857 (citing 2 George W. Liebmann, Maryland Practice § 841, at 82-83 (1976)). The right of self help was curbed by various statutes enacted in the 14 th century and early 15 th century.

See 'id. at 50-51, 447 A.2d 857 . Under the primary statute against forcible entries, 5 Richard II, chapter 8 (1381), entries upon land were limited to entries “not with strong hand, nor with a multitude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner.” 1 Julian J. Alexander, British Statutes in Force in ⁶⁶² Maryland 247 (2d ed.1912); Moxley, 294 Md. at 50 , 447 A.2d 857 (quoting Liebmann, supra, § 841, at 83). . The statute was enacted in order to “meet problems existing in the period following the Black Death, in which public policy demanded that real estate vacated by death be put to early use, thus making desirable limitation of the former eviction rights of property owners.” Liebmann, supra, § 841, at 83. A cause of action against forcible detainer was created by 8 Henry VI, chapter 9 (1429).

See Alexander, supra, at 299. That statute provided in part, [F]rom henceforth where any doth make any forcible Entry in Lands and Tenements, or other Possessions, or them hold forcibly, after Complaint thereof made within the same County where such Entry is made ... the Justices or Justice ... shall cause, or one of them shall cause, the said Statute duly to be executed____ [A]nd if it be found ... that any doth contrary to this Statute, then the said Justices or Justice shall cause to reseise the Lands and Tenements so entered or holden as afore, and shall put the Party so put out in full Possession of the same Lands and Tenements so entered or holden as before. 1429, 8 Hen. 6 , ch. 9, reprinted in, Alexander, supra, at 301-03. Pursuant to this statute, in order for a claimant to regain possession of property wrongfully detained, a justice of the peace had to summons a jury to visit the property and make a decision. 9 The statutes 5 Richard II, chapter 8 and 8 Henry ⁶⁶³ VI, chapter 9 were incorporated into Maryland common law by article 5 of the Declaration of Rights and have not been repealed by the Maryland Legislature. Moxley, 294 Md. at 49-50 , 447 A.2d 857 .

See also RP § 14-115 (1996). As a creature of Maryland common law, the present forcible detain-er cause of action is subject to change by the Maryland judiciary. See Moxley, 294 Md. at 51 , 447 A.2d 857 . In Clark v. Vannorl, 78 Md. 216 , 27 A. 982 (1893), the Court of Appeals stated that a forcible detainer occurs when a man who enters peaceably afterwards detains his possession by force; as if he threatens a corporal damage to him who attempts to enter. [A]nd the same circumstances of violence or terror which will make an entry forcible, will also make a detainer forcible.

Even a termor, it seems, is guilty of a forcible detainer if he holds over with force after the expiration of his term, though no attempt to enter be made. Clark, 78 Md. at 219 , 27 A. 982 (citations omitted). The requirement that the property be detained by force or threat of force was deleted by the Court of Appeals in 1982. See Moxley,