Eusebio v. State

Eusebio v. State of Maryland, No. 3278, September Term 2018 Opinion by Kehoe, J. SEARCHES AND SEIZURE – WARRANTS – PARTICULARITY A warrant’s authorization to search must be limited to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, and the description of the limited places to be searched must be definite enough to prevent unauthorized and unnecessary invasions. These related requirements—limitedness and definiteness—ensure that a warranted search is carefully tailored to its justifications and cannot lawfully devolve into the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. The particularity requirement will not be offended just because the command portion of a warrant reaches further than intended by the officer who drafted it or the judge who signed it. The requirement is not a bar on warrants for the search of two or more places, as long as probable cause exists for each one independently.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – WARRANTS – SCOPE OF WARRANTED SEARCH When police execute a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment confines them strictly within the bounds set by the warrant. But in determining where those boundaries lie, we read the language of warrants in context and with the understanding that, although they are legal documents, warrants are drafted by police officers, not legal linguists. Warrants are meant to preclude officers from conducting fishing expeditions into the private affairs of others, but they are not intended to impose a constitutional strait jacket on police. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – REASONABLENESS – WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO EFFECT SEARCH UNDER WARRANT Based on a balancing of the relevant interests, a warrantless seizure of a car to facilitate the warranted search of the same is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The state’s need to seize a car to perform a warranted search of it is obvious, as police cannot search a car in motion. On the other hand, because police have already gotten a warrant to search the car, its owner’s privacy interests have been sufficiently protected by the Fourth Amendment. And the effect of the seizure on the driver’s liberty interests is de minimis, as he or she is precluded from using the car only for the duration of the search. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES – WARRANTS – SEARCH OF “ALL PERSONS” Warrant provisions that authorize the search of all persons present at some site certain do not offend the Fourth Amendment, so long as the issuing judge determines there is probable cause to believe anyone present at the anticipated scene will be a participant.

Physical presence—and not names, eye color or height—becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the Fourth Amendment’s particularity clause. Warrant provisions that command the search of all persons present who may be participating in the criminal conduct investigated, or who may be concealing evidence thereof, also do not offend the Fourth Amendment. But this is because they are inoperative. The judge who issues a command to search all present participants leaves it to the executing officers to select the persons to be searched, on the basis of the information the officers have while executing the warrant.

These searches cannot be justified on the basis of the warrant, because there was no prior judicial determination of probable cause. Police who search someone on the basis of an all-present-participants provision may as well have no warrant at all; they must identify some other grounds to uphold the legality of the search. Circuit Court for Cecil County Case No. C-07-CR-18-001144 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 3278 September Term, 2018 ____________________________________ ALVIN EUSEBIO v. STATE OF MARYLAND ____________________________________ Kehoe, Nazarian, Arthur, JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Kehoe, J. ____________________________________ Filed: March 2, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-07-27 12:16-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk After the Circuit Court for Cecil County, the Honorable William W. Davis, presiding, denied his motion to suppress 50.2 grams of suspected heroin, appellant Alvin Eusebio entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute.

He was sentenced to five years’ incarceration, with all but six months suspended, and three years of supervised probation. In his brief, Eusebio presents three questions, which we have consolidated: Did the suppression court err in denying Eusebio’s motion to suppress the drug evidence found in a police search of his person?1 We conclude the circuit court did not err in denying the motion. Explaining why requires us to examine a rare bird in the ornithology of Maryland’s constitutional criminal law: the search of a motor vehicle pursuant to a warrant.2 It also gives us an opportunity to 1 The questions presented in Eusebio’s brief are: 1. Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress, finding that the language contained in a search warrant described with sufficient particularity the scope of the search? 2.

Did the court err in determining that there was a lawful stop of a motor vehicle and its occupants absent probable cause that an offense had been committed and without authorization to effectuate a stop in the warrant? 3. Was there probable cause to determine that Appellant was an individual that may be engaged in the suspected criminal infractions, thereby subjecting him to a search under the warrant? 2 Professor Wayne LaFave has observed that: Most likely because it is ordinarily permissible to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile on probable cause, there are comparatively few appellate decisions dealing with the question of how specific a description is required for a warrant to search an automobile. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5(d) (5th ed. 2019). consider the proper scope of a warrant that authorizes the search of a person who happens to be present upon execution of the warrant and who may be a participant in the underlying criminal enterprise.3 The search warrant at the heart of this case authorized police to search a suspected drug dealer, his car, “and other person/s found in or upon said premises who may be participating in [the drug-distribution scheme], and who may be concealing evidence, paraphernalia, and/or Controlled Dangerous Substances.” When they executed the warrant, the police searched Alvin Eusebio, a passenger in the dealer’s car when it was stopped by the police. At a subsequent suppression hearing, the prosecutor took the position that the warrant gave the police an absolute right to search Eusebio simply because he “may” have been a participant in the crime. “Probable cause has nothing to do with” the validity of Eusebio’s search, she said. The prosecutor’s view that the police could conduct the search of a person without probable cause is problematic.

As we will explain, a determination of probable cause, whether made by a judge in issuing a warrant or later made by a police officer on the scene, is an essential prerequisite to an unconsented-to exploratory search. The notion that, because police had a warrant, probable cause “has nothing to do with” police authority to search a person is not, has never been, and—barring a tectonic change in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—will never be the law. 3 Maryland’s appellate courts last addressed this issue in Griffin v. State, 232 Md. 389, 393 (1963), and even then not explicitly. -2- Background The investigation and the warrants In August 2018, Detective Charles Travis of the Cecil County Drug Task Force witnessed a suspected drug deal in the parking lot of an Elkton gas station. Over the next six weeks, Travis kept tabs on the suspected dealer, Reginald McClure, tracking his whereabouts by in-person surveillance and by an electronic GPS tracker installed on McClure’s car pursuant to a court order. During that time, Travis and other members of the Cecil County Drug Task Force witnessed many more suspicious parking-lot transactions.

They also tracked McClure’s black Infiniti as it made several trips to New York City, staying each time less than an hour before driving back home to Elkton. On September 17, 2018, Travis applied for two search-and-seizure warrants. In his affidavit in support of that application, Travis recounted in detail what he and other members of the task force had witnessed over the course of their six-week investigation. The affidavit also included more general information about Travis’s experience and training, and it outlined some commonalities between what police had theretofore observed in their investigation of McClure and what Travis had seen in prior drug-trafficking investigations.

For example, Travis explained that traffickers often “front” controlled dangerous substances to their customers and maintain books and records to keep track of the debts owed to them; that these records and the controlled substances are often found inside the homes and cars of the traffickers; and that people with a history of drug distribution (like McClure) travel to “[s]ource [c]ities” like New York and Philadelphia, staying there “less time than it takes to travel there” (like McClure) “to purchase controlled -3- dangerous substances.” On the basis of all of this information, Travis averred that there was: probable cause to believe the laws relating to the illegal Manufacturing, Distribution, Possession with intent to Distribute and Possession of controlled dangerous substances as defined in Sections 5-601 through 5-619 of the Maryland Criminal Law Article are being violated in and upon certain premises, vehicles and persons as described below: 1) Reginald Auther [sic] McClure. . . 2) Black 2009 Infiniti, bearing Maryland registration 3DJ2997, VIN: JNKAY01F97M462462 3) 3504 Spanish Bay Ct, Elkton, Maryland, Cecil County 21921 [detailed description of the residence omitted]. The judge who reviewed Travis’s application issued two separate warrants. The caption on the first warrant identified McClure’s townhouse apartment at 3504 Spanish Bay Court, Elkton, MD 21921. The caption on the second warrant identified McClure’s car by its owner (McClure), its make, year and color (“Black 2009 Infiniti”), as well as its Maryland license-plate number and its vehicle identification number.

In all other respects, except for the time of the authorizing judge’s signature, the warrants were identical. Both listed the same suspected criminal violations and incorporated by reference the warrant application and Travis’s affidavit, which set forth “[t]he grounds for search and the basis for probable cause.” The command portions of both warrants were also identical, authorizing police to do, among other things, the following (emphasis added): Enter, and search the residence, chattels, and, out buildings on the curtilage as completely described above; Search the person of Reginald Auther [sic] McClure . . ., and other person/s found in or upon said premises who may be participating in -4- violations of the statutes before cited, and who may be concealing evidence, paraphernalia, and/or Controlled Dangerous Substances; Open and search any safes, boxes, bags luggage, compartments, or things in the nature thereof, found in or upon said residence, chattels and, which may contain controlled dangerous substances and paraphernalia. Seize all controlled substances, paraphernalia, papers, receipts, or other evidence relating to the crime of possession, distribution of controlled dangerous substances, found in or upon said vehicle, and chattels and or found in close proximity. . . . The seizures and searches at issue The task force executed the warrants on September 18, 2018, the day after they were issued.

That evening, Travis and other officers waited outside McClure’s apartment, tracking his car by GPS as it made another quick trip to New York City and back to Elkton. When McClure’s car pulled onto Spanish Bay Court and parked on the street in front of McClure’s home, police vehicles pinned the Infiniti against the curb and the officers initiated what Travis later called a “traffic stop.” As Travis approached the car, he would later testify, he saw Eusebio, theretofore unknown to Travis and the other officers, sitting in the front passenger seat, fidgeting with his hands “inside his waistband” and “in his groin area.” The officers ordered both McClure and Eusebio out of the car. When the men did not exit the car on the their own, the officers forcibly removed them. As they removed Eusebio, two bags of marijuana fell from his pants to the ground.

Police then searched the car and the persons of both McClure and Eusebio. Those searches revealed, among other things, 61.1 grams of suspected cocaine hidden in McClure’s clothing and 50.2 grams of suspected heroin secreted in the groin area of Eusebio’s pants. Both men were then arrested. -5- The motion to suppress Eusebio was charged with six counts of related drug offenses. He moved to suppress the heroin evidence found during the search of his person, and a hearing on the motion was held in the Circuit Court for Cecil County.

At the suppression hearing, Eusebio’s counsel made it clear that he was not challenging whether the officers had probable cause sufficient to secure a warrant to search McClure’s home, car or person. His challenge, he said, was to the scope of “the actual search warrants themselves.” He made two arguments: First, counsel argued, “there’s actually nothing [in the warrants] that says you are authorized to search the vehicle.” Counsel told the court that although he believed Travis had “intended to get two separate warrants, one for the vehicle, one for the residence,” the language of the warrants, which counsel said authorized the police “to search the premises, chattels, property, curtilage thereon,” did not actually authorize a search of McClure’s car because it was not “on the premises” described in the warrants. Without this authorization and without a separate traffic violation, counsel argued, “[t]here was no grounds to do an initial stop.” Second, counsel asserted that, even if the warrants authorized the search of McClure’s car, police lacked the factual “nexus” needed to lawfully search Eusebio under the warrant. According to counsel, because there was no probable cause to search the additional people present, the provision in the warrant commanding the search of “other persons found in or upon said premises who may be participating in violations of the statutes” made the warrant an impermissible general warrant.

Under the facts of the case, counsel argued, there was -6- not enough of a link between Eusebio and the criminal activity being investigated to permit a search of Eusebio under the warrant. In response, the prosecutor argued that, although the command portion of the warrant used the word “premises,” the warrant for the search of the Infiniti undoubtedly was issued to authorize a search of McClure’s car and the court should not be “fooled by this one word difference . . . when there are clearly two [warrants] for two different locations.” The prosecution also argued that with a warrant to search the car and its occupants, the police “d[id] not need probable cause to do anything with anybody in that car.” With the warrant, the prosecutor said, the police could search any other persons who may, the word is “may,” be participating in violations of the statute before cited and who may be concealing evidence, paraphernalia and/or controlled dangerous substances. Probable cause has nothing to do with this. They have a warrant, any person may be concealing those items, it could be a baby, it could be a box, it could be Mr. Eusebio, and at that point they legally, based on this warrant, have the right to search him.[4] Although the prosecutor argued that probable cause was not required to search Eusebio, she also argued that there was enough of a nexus between Eusebio and the crimes investigated under the warrant to authorize the search of his person.

The only witness at the hearing was Detective Travis. When asked by defense counsel on what basis he searched Eusebio, Travis said there were “several reasons.” He explained that he searched Eusebio “because he was in the vehicle, because he had marijuana that fell . . . off of his person.” He also said that he searched Eusebio “because when [he] 4 Unsurprisingly, the State does not endorse the prosecutor’s position on appeal. -7- approached the vehicle Mr. Eusebio had his hands inside his waistband, so I also wanted to be sure that Mr. Eusebio wasn’t armed.” When confronted by defense counsel about his statement in the post-arrest memorandum that “the Infiniti search warrant included other persons found in or upon the vehicle,” Travis explained that he thought the “premises” language in the warrant would include the vehicle: “[Y]ou could argue premises is a vehicle, it’s a building, it’s an outhouse, whatever it is. A premises to me is semantics. I believe premises is the same as the vehicle.

I mean, we know what we were trying to search here is the vehicle.” On cross-examination by the prosecution, Travis said it was his intention to search “[w]hoever was in the vehicle” when he approached McClure’s car. The suppression court denied Eusebio’s motion to suppress. The court first noted that although the case would have been “20 times easier” had the warrant used the word “vehicle” instead of “premises,” the court believed “the intent of the warrant was for the car. . . . because there’s specifically two separate warrants, the one titled with the home and the one titled with the car.” In context, the court said, the warrant’s language was sufficiently precise to provide for the stop and search of McClure’s car. With respect to the subsequent search of Eusebio, the court explained that it believed the marijuana that fell from Eusebio’s person could have provided independent grounds for searching Eusebio without any warrant, but that the drug evidence also established “more of an obvious connection” to McClure and the criminal activity that was the subject of the warrant.

Accordingly, the court decided, the language commanding the search of “other person/s found in or upon said premises who may be participating in violations of the statutes before cited” provided the authority for Eusebio’s search. -8- After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress, Eusebio entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute. On appeal, he challenges the result of the suppression hearing. Analysis To support his contention that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress, Eusebio makes more detailed versions of the arguments that he raised at the suppression hearing. Eusebio’s first group of contentions focus on what he asserts are defects in the warrant.

He contends that the warrant purportedly authorizing the search of McClure’s car was defective because it did not define with particularity the scope of the search authorized. At the same time, he argues that the warrant was specific and the police executing it exceeded its scope. Second, Eusebio contends, because the warrant did not authorize the search of McClure’s car, the seizure of Eusebio—that is, the stop of McClure’s car—was unlawful absent probable cause of “any sort of traffic offense.” In what appears to be an alternative argument on this point, Eusebio further contends that the warrant at issue authorized only searches, not “stop[ping] or seiz[ing] the vehicle or its passengers.” Third, Eusebio asserts that even if the warrant were not defective on its face, the police lacked the probable cause necessary to subject Eusebio to a search under the provisions of the warrant, which purported to authorize the search of McClure “and other person/s found in or upon said premises who may be participating in violations of the statutes before cited, -9- and who may be concealing evidence paraphernalia, and/or Controlled Dangerous Substances.” The State’s response differs from the position taken by the prosecutor at the suppression hearing. The State asserts that the warrant, given a commonsense reading, authorized the stop and search of McClure’s car.

And, the State argues, the police could lawfully detain Eusebio during the execution of this valid search warrant. It was during this lawful detention, the State says, that the police developed the probable cause necessary to arrest Eusebio and perform a search incident to this arrest. Because the initial seizure and subsequent arrest and search were lawful, the heroin discovered during the search incident to arrest should not have been suppressed. The admissibility of the drug evidence depends on the legality of each seizure made and search performed when the police executed their warrants.

Accordingly, our analysis is structured as follows: We will begin by outlining some basic principles of Fourth Amendment law. We will then apply those principles to evaluate the lawfulness of each seizure and search in the sequence that led police to the incriminating evidence Eusebio sought to suppress: the initial seizure of McClure and Eusebio, the additional intrusion of removing Eusebio from the car, and the subsequent search of Eusebio’s person. This analysis leads us to conclude that the search and the preceding seizures were lawful. 1. The standard of review When Maryland appellate courts consider a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, their review is “limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing.” Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 694 (2017).

That record must be assessed “in the - 10 - light most favorable to the party who prevails on the issue that the defendant raises in the motion to suppress.” Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 386 (2017). As the Court of Appeals has recently explained in Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019), We accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the court’s application of the law to its findings of fact. When a party raises a constitutional challenge to a search or seizure, this Court renders an independent constitutional evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 319–20 (cleaned up). 2.

The warrant “preference” in search-and-seizure law The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and Affirmation, and - 11 - particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”).5 On its face, the amendment’s text commands only that searches and seizures be reasonable; no absolute warrant requirement is imposed. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 587 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”).

Nevertheless, courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have found in the text a “strong preference” for warrants. Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709, 723 (2017) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)); see also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured.”). Subject to a (somewhat) finite list of exceptions, some of which we discuss below, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumed unreasonable. Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 17 (2016) (citing Katz v. United States, 5 Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states: That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.

Eusebio’s challenges to the searches and seizures at issue are premised solely upon alleged violations of the federal Constitution, and he does not assert a violation of Article 26. This does not matter for purposes of our analysis, which relies on Supreme Court precedent and Maryland cases alike. This is because, although the language of the Maryland constitutional provision differs from that of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he Court of Appeals of Maryland has made it abundantly clear that it regards Article 26 as providing an identical protection to that afforded by the Fourth Amendment.” Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution: A Reference Guide 36 (2006) (footnote omitted). - 12 - 389 U.S. 347 , 356–57 (1967); Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 112 (2009)). And in warrantless-search and -seizure cases, it is the state who bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.

Id. (citing Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 105 (2002)). The law surrounding the Fourth Amendment incentivizes police to abide by the general warrant rule, principally by imposing a heavy cost on unlawful searches and seizures. When a search or a seizure is unreasonable—when the search is made without a valid warrant and no exception to the general rule applies—the evidence it yields is subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”); Carter v. State, 243 Md. App. 212 , 226–27 (2019) (“The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is essential to the Fourth Amendment.”). In cases in which various searches and seizures are challenged, the exclusionary rule reaches beyond “evidence found as a direct result of unconstitutional conduct.” Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122, 150 (2019) (emphasis added). It also bars the admission of any “‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ meaning any evidence ‘discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’” Id. (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)) (emphasis added).

There are other incentives for police to get a warrant. For example, when police search or seize without a warrant, the state bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of the intrusion. But when police have a warrant, that warrant is presumed valid, which essentially shifts to the criminal defendant the burden of proving the unlawfulness of the search. Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 146, 164 (2010).

When the defendant challenges the pre-search or - 13 - -seizure determination of probable cause by the warrant-issuing judge, that determination will receive “great deference” in a suppression hearing. Carter v. State, 178 Md. App. 400, 408 (2008) (cleaned up). Even if it is doubtful that a substantial basis existed, a search under a warrant still “may be sustainable where without one it would fail.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965). Finally, if a reviewing court determines that probable cause was lacking and a warrant should not have been issued, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule may step in to shield the unlawfully obtained evidence from suppression.

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); Stevenson, 455 Md. at 728–29. The state receives this favorable judicial treatment in a suppression hearing only if the warrant authorizing the challenged search or seizure meets the requirements spelled out in the text of the Fourth Amendment itself: Warrants must be issued “upon probable cause,” which must be supported by “Oath and Affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV

To effectively cabin police discretion, see United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 647 (4th Cir. 2013), warrants must also “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV

The Supreme Court has also made it clear that, in addition to meeting these textual requirements, a warrant must be issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). In this case, Eusebio’s challenges to the validity of the warrant strike at two of the requirements explicit in the Fourth Amendment: probable cause and particularity. - 14 - 3. The initial seizure As we mentioned above, under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, even evidence resulting from a lawful search or seizure may still be subject to exclusion if the search or seizure was made possible only by some antecedent unlawful intrusion. Accordingly, it is critical that courts ruling on the suppression of evidence—or deciding an appeal arising out of a court’s denial of a motion to suppress—evaluate the lawfulness of each search and seizure that led to the evidence sought to be suppressed.

We begin with the first link in the chain that led police to the heroin evidence discovered on Eusebio’s person: the seizure of the car and the two men inside it. When the police surrounded McClure’s parked car, both McClure and Eusebio were seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007) (holding that a passenger in a car subjected to a traffic stop is seized as much as driver and may therefore challenge the lawfulness of the stop). As we explained above, this seizure, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, must have been either authorized by warrant or allowable under some exception to the warrant clause.

The State argues that the seizure of McClure’s car and anyone inside it was authorized by the warrant to search the car. Eusebio disagrees. He first asserts that the warrant purportedly authorizing the search of McClure’s car was invalid on particularity grounds— that it failed to “describe[] with sufficient particularity the persons, places and things to be searched.” At the same time, he argues the warrant provided a specific scope unlawfully exceeded by police: “Nowhere in the body of the warrant does it give authorization to - 15 - conduct a search of the vehicle or the persons therein.”6 Without authorization under the warrant and without probable cause of a traffic violation, Eusebio argues, the stop of McClure’s vehicle was unlawful. Alternatively, Eusebio argues that even if the warrant authorized a search of the car, it did not specifically authorize “stop[ping] or seiz[ing] the vehicle or its passengers,” making the seizure of the car and its occupants unlawful.

We disagree with Eusebio on all fronts. With respect to Eusebio’s particularity challenge, we hold that the warrant was not impermissibly general, because it specifically described McClure’s car and authorized its search. Eusebio’s argument that the officers executing the warrant exceeded its scope is similarly unavailing. The warrant did not restrict officers to a search of the car only if it was found within the curtilage of McClure’s apartment building.

And finally, with respect to Eusebio’s challenge to the officers’ authority to seize the car under a warrant for its search, we hold police with a warrant to search a car may seize the car to conduct their search without offending the Fourth Amendment’s bar on unreasonable searches and seizures. a. The warrant specifically authorized the search of McClure’s car and was not impermissibly “general.” For a warrant to comport with the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, it must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV

As the Supreme Court explained in Maryland v. Garrison, 6 We address whether the warrant authorized the search of the persons in the vehicle in part 5 of our analysis, in which we evaluate the lawfulness of the search of Eusebio’s person. - 16 - 480 U.S. 79 (1987), the particularity requirement prevents “general searches” by limiting the authorization to search “to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search.” Id. at 84 . In this way, the scope of a lawful search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Id. at 84–85 (cleaned up).

Additionally, the description of the limited places to be searched must be “definite enough to prevent any unauthorized and unnecessary invasion” of privacy rights. Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682, 708 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring) (quoting Saunders v. State, 199 Md. 568, 572 (1952)). The description must be “such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). These related requirements—limitedness and definiteness—ensure that a warranted search is “carefully tailored to its justifications” and cannot lawfully devolve into “the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 .7 7 Our formulation of these concepts owes much to Professor Wayne R. LaFave’s explanation of the particularity requirement in his Search & Seizure treatise.

There, he explains that particularity is made of two components: “focusing” (like definiteness, describing the place to be searched in such a way that “minimize[s] the risk that officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the place intended by the magistrate”) and probable cause (like limitedness, ensuring that a search is limited only to the particular places for which a magistrate finds there is probable cause to believe incriminating evidence will be found). 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §§ 4.5, 4.5(d) (5th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). - 17 - Undoubtedly, the warrant in this case satisfies the definiteness requirement because it both particularly described McClure’s car and authorized its search. The caption of the warrant described the car by make, color, model year, VIN and Maryland license-plate number, which is more than sufficient to enable the officers executing the warrant to identify with certainty the car to be searched. Cf. Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016) (warrant specifically describing van’s color, VIN, and plate number was not impermissibly “general”); Baird v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 44, 44 (Ky. 1954) (description in affidavit of “Buick sedan, 1951, maroon body and light top,” plus “motor number and license tag number,” was sufficient); State v. Brown, 412 So.2d 1064 , 1064– 65 (La. 1982) (warrant that incorporated affidavit describing vehicle by make, model, color, VIN and plate number met particularity requirement); State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26, 33 (S.D. 1988) (warrant affidavit’s description of an automobile’s make and operator was sufficiently particular, even though the police were mistaken as to who actually owned the car).

Detective Travis and the other officers executing the warrant could not reasonably have identified some other car as the proper subject of their search. The warrant’s terms do not offend the limitedness component of the particularity requirement either. It is true that the warrant’s terms purport to authorize searches beyond that of the car described in the warrant’s caption, that is, the residence and “out buildings on the curtilage” just mentioned. But even with this language—superfluous because of the separate warrant issued for the search of McClure’s apartment—the scope of the warrant remained limited “to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 .

The language would not allow a legitimate search of - 18 - McClure’s car to “degenerate into a fishing expedition or a general ‘rummaging about.’” Feaster v. State, 206 Md. App. 202, 228 (2012). Although the command portion of the warrant for McClure’s car may have reached further than was intended by the detective who drafted the warrant or the judge who signed it, the Fourth Amendment particularity