Evans v. State

²⁶ McAULIFFE, Judge. Johnny Evans was charged with murder and related offenses in connection with the slaying of a disc jockey at a Baltimore City nightclub. According to eyewitnesses, Evans left the club after having been involved in a fight with several of the club’s employees, but returned with a sawed-off shotgun which he used to kill the disc jockey. Evans entered pleas of “not guilty” and “not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.” The sole expert proffered by Evans in support of his plea of not criminally responsible was Doctor Maxie Collier, a board certified psychiatrist.

Immediately prior to trial, defense counsel offered the testimony of Dr. Collier “on the threshold question of sanity.” 1 Dr. Collier testified that in his opinion Evans was suffering from an amnesic episode at the time of the shooting; that the amnesic episode amounted to a mental disorder; and, that as a result of this mental disorder, Evans lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law. The State conceded that Dr. Collier was generally qualified to express an opinion on the question of criminal responsibility, but argued that in this case the foundation for the opinion, as revealed by Dr. Collier’s testimony, was deficient. Judge Kathleen O’Ferrell Friedman agreed with ²⁷ the State, and held the defendant’s evidence insufficient to generate the issue of criminal responsibility. At the jury trial that followed, Evans was convicted of manslaughter and of the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

He appealed, and the convictions were affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion. 2 We granted Evans’s petition for certiorari, and we now affirm. We hold that the trial judge properly excluded the proffered testimony of Dr. Collier, because there was no legally sufficient foundation to support the doctor’s opinion that the defendant suffered from a “mental disorder” within the meaning of § 12-108 of the Health-General Article, Maryland Code (1982, 1990 Repl.Vol.). Additionally, even if we assume that the testimony of Dr. Collier may have been admissible on the separate question of the defendant’s ability to form the requisite criminal intent, it was not offered on that basis. Evans related the following story to Dr. Collier.

On the evening of 3 January 1986, Evans went to his girlfriend’s home in Baltimore City. There, he smoked three marihuana cigarettes and shared two pints of vodka with two other persons. He then went to a “disco” nightclub where he was involved in an argument with a club bouncer. At Evans’s suggestion, he and the bouncer went outside to settle the dispute.

The bouncer, however, did not go alone. He was accompanied by other club employees, and together they got the better of Evans. After having been beaten, the defendant walked away, feeling “dazed” and “out of it.” Evans claims his mind then went blank, and he could not recall anything until several hours later when he was at his home, suffering from a severe headache. ²⁸ Dr. Collier learned from other sources that a short time after leaving the nightclub, Evans returned, brandishing a sawed-off shotgun. After firing the shotgun into the air at least twice, Evans walked alone across the parking lot, opened the door of the nightclub and, while holding the door open with his foot, shot and killed one of the club employees with whom he had fought.

Evans then turned and walked hurriedly from the scene. Dr. Collier also received the following history concerning Evans: chronic antisocial behavior with several periods of incarceration; an earlier diagnosis of psychopathic personality; lead poisoning during childhood; a previous stab wound to the head; head trauma from being pistol whipped three to four months before the incident; and, persistent headaches in the right temporal area. The defendant denied previous blackouts, but claimed occasional dizzy spells. Dr. Collier found no evidence of any major thought disorder, though he did note some tangential thought association.

Reality testing was intact, and the defendant's affect was common and detached. Recent psychological testing by another doctor disclosed no evidence of cognitive dysfunction that could be associated with significant central nervous system impairment. From this information, gained by reviewing reports and by interviewing the defendant for IV2 hours, Dr. Collier concluded that Evans had suffered an amnesic episode, which began when the defendant was walking away from the nightclub and continued several hours until the defendant was at his home. Dr. Collier opined that this amnesic episode involved a loss of consciousness — that the defendant did not know what he was doing, had no cognitive abilities, and thus was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

Dr. Collier equated this condition to that of a person in a coma, or under anesthesia, or delirious from fever, or in the midst of an epileptic seizure, or even sleepwalking. It is difficult to tell from the record exactly what reasoning the ²⁹ psychiatrist employed in reaching the conclusion that Evans was essentially unconscious when he left the nightclub, obtained a shotgun, and returned to kill the victim. It would appear that his reasoning proceeded along these lines: Evans says that he didn’t remember anything that happened during that period of time; if he didn’t remember, he must not have been able to perceive; if he could not perceive, he was not conscious; if he was not conscious, he was suffering an amnesic episode. Dr. Collier testified: Based upon my examination of this man, if he has no recollection of those events, then I can only say he was not responsible.

The trial judge wanted to be sure she understood what the doctor had said: JUDGE: Are you saying then that every time that somebody does not remember an incident, that they are not conscious at the time that the incident took place? DR. COLLIER: If it is, yes, I am. If there is no awareness of something then one is not conscious. ***** * JUDGE: Well, the question is: just because someone doesn’t remember, does that necessarily mean that the person wasn’t conscious of the conduct at the time?

DR. COLLIER: I would say yes, it does. * * £ aje s]{ jje JUDGE: And you are saying that you think lack of memory is equivalent to unconsciousness at the time that conduct takes place? DR. COLLIER: That is correct.

On redirect examination, however, defense counsel led Dr. Collier to a less strident position. He asked whether the inability to remember someone’s name years after meeting that person meant that one was legally insane at the time of the meeting. The psychiatrist said no. He explained: That means that the memory of your name has become, that data has become unconscious.

That’s the reason ³⁰ there is no memory of it. That data has become unconscious. Assuming that the evidence of potentially predisposing circumstances coupled with the known trauma of a beating immediately before the claimed alteration of consciousness and a history of no recollection of events during the time in question may be sufficient to support the diagnosis of amnesic episode, the question remains whether there is any evidence of a mental disorder within the meaning of the Maryland test for criminal responsibility. 3 Section 12-108 of the Health-General Article sets forth the test for criminal responsibility in Maryland: (a) Test — In general. — A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity: (1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law. (b) Same — Exclusion.—For purposes of this section, “mental disorder” does not include an abnormality that is manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

Section 10-101(h) of the Health-General Article defines “mental disorder”: (1) “Mental disorder” means a behavioral or emotional illness that results from a psychiatric or neurological disorder. (2) “Mental disorder” includes a mental illness that so substantially impairs the mental or emotional functioning of an individual as to make care or treatment necessary ³¹ or advisable for the welfare of the individual or for the safety of the person or property of another. (3) “Mental disorder” does not include mental retardation. We conclude that the condition of “amnesic episode” described by Dr. Collier in this case was not shown to be a mental disorder because it was not shown to be a mental, behavioral, or emotional illness within the meaning of § 10-101(h).

It is, at least as described in this case, a medical condition. Dr. Collier so testified: PROSECUTOR: What medical diseases did you find the defendant has? DR. COLLIER: The medical diseases?

The medical condition [is] as reflected in my assessment. PROSECUTOR: The diseases he had is? DR. COLLIER: He suffers from amnesic condition.

PROSECUTOR: Is that a disease, Dr. Collier? DR. COLLIER: That is the medical condition. Evans offered no evidence that the “amnesic episode” allegedly suffered by him, or the underlying condition producing that episode in this case, is