Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Human nature being what it is, the average taxpayer wishes to purchase at the lowest possible cost and to be assessed for tax purposes at the lowest possible amount, but to sell for the highest dollar amount possible. Here appellant, Fairchild Hiller Corporation (Fairchild), is unhappy with the assessment on its real estate in Washington County. It does not wish to concede that it may have bought a bargain.

Its appeal from the decision of the Maryland Tax Court was entered prior to the passage of Chapter 385 of the Acts of 1971 providing in what is now Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol., 1972 Supp.) Art. 81, § 229 (1) for a direct appeal to this Court. It may be well to set forth the legal ground rules for such an appeal. Under § 229 (1) as it existed prior to ⁵²¹ the 1971 amendment, the circuit court was required to affirm the tax court’s determination unless its “order [was] erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by substantial evidence appearing in the record.” The Maryland Tax Court is not to “be bound by the technical rules of evidence,” § 229 (f).

The supervisor of assessments was required to assess the land at its full cash value on the date of finality (January 1, 1968, in this instance), which is defined as “current value less an allowance for inflation, if in fact inflation exists,” Art. 81, § 14 (b) (1). Ordinarily cash value would be current market value, or what a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller in the open market, Bornstein v. State Tax Commission, 227 Md. 331, 337 , 176 A. 2d 859 , 96 A.L.R.2d 661 (1962), unless the property is of such a special nature that no market for it exists and then its intrinsic value must be ascertained by consideration of its cost, nature, utility, and other characteristics, Schley v. Montgomery County, 106 Md. 407, 410 , 67 A. 250 (1907). Assessing authorities, however, are not required to be guided entirely by market prices regardless of how “thin” the “spot market” may be. Meade Heights v. Tax Commission of Maryland, 202 Md. 20, 30 , 95 A. 2d 280 (1953), and Rogan v. Commissioners of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 311 , 71 A. 2d 47 (1950).

Moreover, as we said in Weil v. Supervisor of Assessments of Washington County, 266 Md. 238 , 292 A. 2d 68 (1972) : “Valuation of land is not an exact science. Experts nearly always differ as to their opinion of fair market value.” Id. at 254 . The common denominator for testing judicial review of the act of an administrative agency such as the Maryland Tax Court has been defined as “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.” Insurance Com ⁵²² missioner v. National Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 309-310 , 236 A. 2d 282 (1967), quoted in Supervisor of Assess. v. Banks, 252 Md. 600, 610 , 250 A. 2d 860 (1969).

In this case Fairchild asks us to read State Tax Commission v. Brandt, 202 Md. 533 , 97 A. 2d 290 (1953), as sanctioning the resort to factors other than market value in determining full cash value only in the absence of a market or in the case of a thin market, a point we shall not be required to reach. Fairchild purchased its plants from the United States Government by deed dated November 29, 1967, but a few days prior to the date of finality. It has struggled manfully to establish that purchase price as indicative of its fair market value. To us, Fairchild urges (1) that the Maryland Tax Court erred as a matter of law in declining to consider the market value of the property as a criterion for