Falck v. Barlow

Schmucker, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant brought an action of ejectment against the appellee, in the Court of Common Pleas, for a parcel of land in Baltimore City. The appellee, as defendant below, pleaded not guilty and also by leave of Court filed an additional plea for defense on equitable grounds. The equitable defense set up by the plea was possession under a written lease for ten years, at an annual rent of $560 payable in monthly instalments, with the privilege of five years extension — made July 20th, 1900, by the appellant to Patrick J. Barlow the husband and intestate of the defendant.

It was alleged in the plea that possession of the land described in the declaration had been taken under the lease at its' date by Barlow who had paid the rent therein specified down until January 28th, 1907, when he died intestate, and that the rent had been accepted by the plaintiff; that at Barlow’s death his leasehold title to the land devolved upon the appellee as his administratrix who in due course of administration had under the authority of the Orphans’’ ¹⁶¹ Court distributed and conveyed” it to herself and his two children as his next of kin; and that they had ever since then continued in possession thereof and had from time to time tendered to the plaintiff the rent specified in the lease. It is not alleged in the plea that the lease was acknowledged or Pecorded in the public records; The appellant as plaintiff demurred to the equitable plea but the Court overruled the demurrer and judgment thereon was entered for the defendant and from that judgment this appeal was taken. . The appellee contends, on the facts stated in the plea, that although the lease was insufficient, for want of acknowledgment and recording, to convey a legal title to the term of ten years for which it called, it was good as a contract and was enforceable in equity, and that a Court of equity would have restrained execution upon any judgment the appellant might have recovered in ejectment and therefore the plea presented a complete “defense on equitable grounds” within the meaning of sec. 86 of Art. 75 of the Code of 1904. She further contends that the facts stated in the plea did not constitute a legal defense available to her under the general issue or other legal plea.

The appellant on the contrary insists that the facts stated in the plea, if proven, would have shown a tenancy in the appellee amounting to a legal defense which, could not be set up by an equitable plea. As we have recently decided in Robey v. State, use of Mallory, 94 Md. 71 , and Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 551 , that a defense which is good at law cannot be pleaded on equitable grounds, it is evident that 'the practical question to be determined in this case is whether the facts stated in the equitable plea show such a tenancy of the land in question in the appellee as would constitute a good defense at law to the appellant’s ejectment suit. Sec. 1 of Art. 21 of the Code of 1904, provides in plain language that: “FTo estate of inheritance or- freehold or any declaration or limitation of use or any estate above seven years shall pass or take effect unless the deed conveying the ¹⁶² same shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as herein provided.” The terms of that section are so clear and positive that this Court, when called upon to construe them, has uniformly held that, although equity will in a proper ease treat a defective deed or lease as a contract and enforce its execution and otherwise protect the rights of the parties to it, no legal estate, of. the character mentioned in the section, will be conveyed by a deed or lease neither acknowledged nor recorded. Lester v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 54 ; Polk v. Reynolds, 31 Md. 112 ; Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633 ; Sitler v. McComas, 66 Md. 135 ; Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 186 ; Hoffman v. Gosnell, Ibid, 589-90.

It is clear therefore that no legal interest or estate in the land in controvesy was cotvveyed to the appellee by the lease set up in the equitable plea in this case. It by no means follows, however, that she acquired no legal interest in the land as a result of the entire state of facts and transactions set out in the plea, which avers not only the execution of the lease but the entry thereunder into possession and- continued occupancy of the land by her husband and intestate and the payment by him of the yearly rent therefor at the rate reserved in the lease until his death in 1907 and its acceptance