Farmer v. State

Michael Farmer v. State of Maryland No. 31, September Term 2021 Criminal Procedure – Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence – Cognizability. A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) addresses errors that are “inherent” in a sentence. It is not a vehicle for belatedly raising alleged errors in a trial or proceedings that resulted in the sentence, for challenging the administration of the sentence, or for generally litigating the procedures that may govern a future reduction of that sentence or the defendant’s release from custody. Whether State-furnished counsel is available to assist an inmate in the parole process under current Maryland law does not inhere in the sentence of a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole.

Therefore, a claim that a juvenile offender would be entitled to such assistance when that defendant becomes eligible for parole in the future is not cognizable under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case Nos. 101243067, 101243072 Argued: January 6, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 31 September Term, 2021 MICHAEL FARMER V. STATE OF MARYLAND *Getty, C.J., *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould, JJ. Opinion by McDonald, J. Filed: August 26, 2022 *Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while active members of this Court. After being recalled Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the 2022-08-26 decision and the adoption of this opinion. 09:34-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In 10 simple words, Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” This provision is a necessary backstop to remedy a situation where a sentence in a criminal case that never should have been imposed or that is contrary to law escapes correction during the normal appeal and post-conviction process. However, a motion under the rule is not a vehicle to cure all ills in a criminal case that can be said, in some way, to be “illegal.” An illegal sentence, for purposes of this rule, is one where the illegality “inheres” in the sentence; it is not every sentence where a failure to comply with a law affects the sentence in some way. Petitioner Michael Farmer pled guilty in 2002 to committing two brutal murders when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.

As a result of those sentences and a consecutive sentence for an unrelated assault, he will not be eligible for parole, at the earliest, until he has served more than 25 years in prison. Supreme Court decisions issued during the past two decades have construed the ban on “cruel and unusual” punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to require that sentences imposed on a juvenile offender like Mr. Farmer afford the offender a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” – a condition generally thought to be satisfied by the possibility of parole. Citing those cases, Mr. Farmer filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He asserted that his sentence does not include the “meaningful opportunity” required by the Eighth Amendment because the Maryland parole laws do not provide a right to State-furnished counsel to assist an inmate during the parole process.

Therefore, he asserts, his sentence is illegal. The Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals rejected his various arguments supporting that claim. We hold that Mr. Farmer’s claim does not fall within the category of claims cognizable under Rule 4-345(a). I Background A. The Maryland Parole System and Juvenile Offenders The parole process in Maryland is overseen by the Maryland Parole Commission, a unit of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“the Department”).

Maryland Code, Correctional Services Article (“CS”), §7-101 et seq. The Commission consists of 10 commissioners appointed by the Secretary of the Department, with the approval of the Governor and the advice and consent of the Senate. CS §7-202. The Commission has the “exclusive power” to authorize the release of an inmate on parole.

CS §7-205(a)(1).1 Among other things, the commissioners (and, in some cases, hearing examiners employed by the Commission) conduct parole hearings to consider the release of eligible inmates serving sentences in Maryland prisons. CS §§7-204(b)(2), 7-205. As directed by statute, the Commission has adopted regulations governing the parole process. 1 Until recently, the Governor’s approval was required for the release of an inmate serving a life sentence. See Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295, 320-23 (2018); CS §4-305(b)(3), §7-301(d)(4) (2017 Repl.

Vol. & 2021 Supp.). Legislation enacted in 2021 eliminated the Governor’s role in the parole process. Chapter 30, 1st Spec. Sess., Laws of Maryland 2021, amending CS §4-305, §7-301. 2 CS §7-207; COMAR 12.08.

Those regulations distinguish, to some extent, between adult and juvenile offenders.2 1. General Considerations For all parole-eligible inmates in Maryland, the Commission must consider a list of factors that assess the inmate’s moral culpability, at both the time of the offense and the time of parole hearing, as well as the inmate’s capacity to return to society as a productive and law-abiding person. See generally CS §7-305; COMAR 12.08.01.18A.3 Accordingly, the Commission is to consider numerous factors and attributes of the inmate. Some items concern the inmate’s track record before incarceration, such as a prior criminal record, past use of controlled substances, and the circumstances surrounding the crime (although these circumstances “diminish in significance” after an initial parole hearing).

See COMAR 12.08.01.18A(5)(a),(e),(l). Other items include an inmate’s demonstrated improvement during incarceration, such as participation in institutional and self-help programs and “demonstrated emotional maturity and insight into the inmate’s problems.” COMAR 12.08.01.18A(5)(b),(f). Yet other items concern the inmate’s present outlook, including 2 Separate parole provisions, not relevant here, apply to juvenile offenders admitted to the Patuxent Institution as a person eligible for remediation. CS §4-101 et seq. 3 For a parole-eligible inmate, the general considerations listed by regulation include: the circumstances surrounding the crime; the “physical, mental, and moral qualifications” of the inmate; whether there is reasonable probability that the inmate, if released, will not violate the law; whether the release is “compatible with the welfare of society”; whether there is substantial risk the individual will not conform to the conditions of parole; whether release would “depreciate the seriousness of the individual’s crime or promote disrespect for the law”; whether release would have an adverse effect on institutional discipline; and whether continued incarceration would enhance the inmate’s ability to lead a law-abiding life if released at a later date.

COMAR 12.08.01.18A(1)-(2). 3 the inmate’s “current attitude toward society, discipline, and other authority” and “ability and readiness to assume obligations.” COMAR 12.08.01.18A(5)(d),(j). Other items address an inmate’s potential to succeed upon release, including vocational and educational training, employment plans and job potential, family status and stability, access to resources, and the “parole plan.” COMAR 12.08.01.18A(5)(c),(h),(i),(k). 2. Considerations Specific to Juvenile Offenders To ensure that juvenile offenders serving life sentences with the possibility of parole have the constitutionally mandated “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,”4 the Commission must also consider additional factors beyond what is normally required for adult offenders. See COMAR 12.08.01.18A(3)-(4).

First, “[w]hen deciding if an inmate serving a life sentence for a crime committed while younger than 18 years old is suitable for parole, the Commission shall consider whether the inmate has adequately demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation since commission of the crime.” COMAR 12.08.01.18A(3). Then, the Commission must consider mitigating factors regarding the inmate’s circumstances at the time of the crime: the inmate’s age, maturity, home environment, outside pressures, and educational background. COMAR 12.18.01.18A(4)(a)-(c),(e),(f). Additionally, the Commission must consider “whether the prisoner’s character developed since the time of the crime in a manner that indicates the prisoner will comply with the conditions of release” and, as determined to be relevant, “other factors or circumstances unique to prisoners who 4 See Part I.B of this opinion concerning this constitutional requirement. 4 committed crimes at the time that individual was a juvenile.” COMAR 12.18.01.18A(4)(d),(g). 3.

Process To assist the Commission in assessing the suitability for release of an inmate in a State correctional facility, the Division of Correction undertakes an investigation of the inmate. CS §7-301(a)(1).5 An inmate eligible for parole is to receive a hearing unless, following a review, the Commission “determines that no useful purpose would be served by a hearing.” COMAR 12.08.01.17A(1),(3). The Commission’s regulations describe a parole hearing as follows: A parole hearing is actually an interview of the inmate, and attendance shall be restricted to parole personnel and a representative of the institution. On occasions, others may be invited by the Commission to attend, provided their attendance does not impede the prisoner being interviewed.

The hearings are private and shall be held in an informal manner, allowing the prisoner the opportunity to give free expression to his views and feelings relating to his case. Formal presentations by an attorney, relatives, and others interested in the inmate are not permitted at the parole hearings. Attorneys, relatives, and others who are interested in the inmate may discuss the relative merits or other factors of the case with the Commission at its executive offices, any time before or after a parole hearing. COMAR 12.08.01.18C(1).

If a victim makes a timely request, a parole hearing is to be open to the public in accordance with the Commission’s regulations. CS §7-304; COMAR 12.08.02. The hearing is to be electronically or stenographically recorded and, for a juvenile offender serving a life sentence, the recording is to be retained until the next parole 5 For an inmate confined in a local correctional facility, the investigation is conducted by the Division of Parole and Probation. CS §7-301(a)(1). 5 hearing or the conclusion of any action seeking judicial review, whichever is later.

COMAR 12.08.01.18C(2)-(4). An inmate is to receive “adequate and timely written notice” in advance of the hearing. CS §7-303(a). The notice is to advise the inmate that the inmate – or the inmate’s representative – may examine any document that the Commission or a hearing examiner will use in determining the inmate’s suitability for release on parole.

CS §7-303(b)(1)(i).6 For an inmate serving a life sentence, two commissioners conduct the parole hearing. COMAR 12.08.01.17A(7)(f). If the two commissioners do not agree whether an inmate should be paroled, the case is referred to a three-commissioner panel for decision by majority vote. CS §7-307(b).

In either case, if the decision is in favor of parole for that inmate, the Commission en banc – defined as a majority of the commissioners – must consider the case. COMAR 12.08.01.17A(7)(f), 23A. For an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment for a crime committed after October 1, 2021, six commissioners must affirmatively vote in favor of parole for the inmate to be released on parole. CS §7-307(c).

A written decision is to be prepared and served upon the inmate. COMAR 12.08.01.18E(2). If parole is denied in a case involving a juvenile offender serving life imprisonment, the written decision must affirm that the Commission considered the “diminished culpability” and “hallmark features” of youth,” as well as “an individual’s capacity for growth and maturation.” COMAR 12.08.01.18E(3)(b). In addition, the 6 A document may be withheld from the inmate or the inmate’s representative if it contains a diagnostic opinion, if disclosure would disrupt seriously the inmate’s rehabilitation, or if it is confidential or otherwise privileged.

CS §7-303(b)(1)(ii). 6 decision must include “specific findings as to why the inmate has failed to demonstrate suitability for parole” and state why the Commission “determined that the inmate has not yet demonstrated sufficient maturity and rehabilitation.” COMAR 12.08.01.18E(3)(a),(c). Looking forward, the decision is to provide guidance on how the inmate may improve the likelihood of showing suitability for parole at a future hearing, provide specific recommendations for programming and treatment, if appropriate, and notify the inmate of any right to seek judicial review of the denial.7 COMAR 12.08.01.18E(3)(d)-(f). The Commission may neither permanently refuse parole to a juvenile offender serving a life sentence nor schedule a rehearing more than 10 years from the date of the previous hearing. COMAR 12.08.01.18E(12). 4.

Assistance of Counsel Under the Commission’s regulations, counsel may assist an inmate with the parole process. Those regulations allow an inmate’s legal representative to review the parole file and examine documents used by the Commission in its parole decision. See COMAR 12.08.01.17(C)(2),(5)(b). If the Commission conducts a fact-finding hearing regarding the inmate’s application, counsel may be present and assist with the testimony and cross- examination of witnesses.

COMAR 12.08.01.17(C)(6)(c)(iv). As indicated above, at the parole hearing itself, counsel may not make a formal presentation, but may discuss the case separately with the Commission before or after the hearing. COMAR 12.08.01.18C(1). 7 The parole statute does not provide for a right to judicial review. At oral argument in this case, counsel suggested that judicial review may be available in some cases in a habeas corpus action or through administrative mandamus (Maryland Rule 7-401 et seq.). 7 The State does not furnish counsel to indigent inmates for hearings before the Commission.8 B. Constitutional Limits on Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders As summarized by this Court in Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295, 308-14, 317-18 (2018), the Supreme Court has recognized in several cases during the last two decades that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets certain constraints on the sentencing of juvenile offenders who are convicted as adults.

In a nutshell, under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishments, a court may not sentence a juvenile offender to death, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005), and for juvenile non-homicide offenders, a court may not sentence a juvenile offender to life without parole, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). The same is also true for the vast majority of juvenile offenders convicted of homicide. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). In short, most juvenile offenders must be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 ; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 .

And, often, that “meaningful opportunity” comes through the availability of parole. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). In Carter, this Court recently addressed the constitutionality of the Maryland parole system for juvenile offenders serving life sentences. Like Mr. Farmer, the petitioners had challenged that system by way of a motion under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) to correct an 8 An inmate who is paroled and later is charged with a parole violation that may lead to revocation of parole has a right to the assistance of counsel, including State-furnished counsel for eligible parolees.

CS §7-401(b)(1); COMAR 12.08.01.22F(3). 8 illegal sentence. Two of the petitioners in that case, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, argued that their sentences were illegal because the sentences were effectively life without parole in light of the facts that: (1) the Governor had the final say regarding parole for inmates serving life sentences; and (2) the pertinent statute did not require the Governor to take account of the criteria identified in the recent Supreme Court cases for release of juvenile offenders – or, indeed, any criteria at all. The petitioners in Carter highlighted that the system had resulted in very few parole releases, as even if the Commission recommended parole, the Governor could – and often did – determine otherwise.9 As a result, they asserted, the Maryland parole system was effectively an executive clemency system in disguise, it failed to provide them with a meaningful opportunity for release, and their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment and were therefore illegal. 461 Md. at 340 . The Court held that a claim based on the Governor’s statutory role in the parole process was cognizable in a motion under Rule 4-345(a), although it ultimately concluded that the petitioners’ sentences were not illegal when related laws were taken into account.

Carter, 461 Md. at 336-46 . The Court recognized that the Governor’s unfettered discretion 9 In 1995, in the course of denying parole to several inmates serving life sentences, Governor Glendening declared that he would not approve the parole of any prisoner serving a life sentence unless the inmate was very old or terminally ill. Carter, 461 Md. at 323 . Even in the absence of such a pledge by a Governor, parole of such inmates was rare.

Between 2004 and 2017, the Commission recommended parole for only 14 juvenile offenders sentenced to life out of a population of more than 2,100 such inmates. Of these 14 inmates recommended for parole, only two were approved by the Governor for release. See Lila Meadows, Realizing “Meaningful” in Maryland: A Call for Reforming Maryland’s Parole System in Light of Graham, Miller, & Montgomery, 48 U. Balt. L.F. 59 , 63-64 (2018). 9 to adopt a no-parole policy would unconstitutionally deny juvenile offenders serving life sentences a meaningful opportunity for release.

Id. at 341. But the Court also recognized that a 2018 Executive Order appropriately guided the Governor’s decision within constitutional bounds, remedying the potential constitutional defect. Id. at 345. Thus, on the issue of whether the role of the Governor in the parole system violated the Eighth Amendment with respect to juvenile offenders, the Court concluded that “the laws governing parole of inmates serving life sentences in Maryland, including the parole statute, regulations, and a recent executive order adopted by the Governor, on their face allow a juvenile offender serving a life sentence a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” Id. at 307, 336-46.10 Since the Carter decision was issued, the General Assembly has eliminated the Governor’s role in the parole of inmates serving life sentences.11 10 The Court observed that allegations concerning how the laws governing parole were carried out in practice were not cognizable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence, although other remedies might be available.

Carter, 361 Md. at 337 n.26, 346 n.34. 11 See footnote 1 above. Other recent legislation has prospectively prohibited sentencing a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2021, codified in pertinent part at Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §6-235. 10 C. Facts and Proceedings 1. The Murders, the Guilty Plea, and the Sentencing In two separate incidents in March and April 2001, Mr. Farmer, then age 17,12 and two other teenagers robbed and murdered George Williams and Gerald Joseph Holle, both homeless at the time, in Baltimore City by beating them with a baseball bat and crowbar – an activity that the teenagers referred to as “bum-stomping.” A statement of charges against Mr. Farmer concerning the murders was filed in the District Court sitting in Baltimore City on July 30, 2001, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Farmer was arrested at his home in Kansas, confessed to his participation in the murders, and was returned to Maryland. A grand jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City returned indictments superseding the statement of charges on August 31, 2001. On September 5, 2002, Mr. Farmer pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in accordance with a written plea agreement that included a requirement that he testify at the trials of his two co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed that it would not charge him with assaults on four other men in February and March 2001 and would recommend that the court impose two concurrent life sentences with all but 60 years suspended followed by five years of probation.

The plea agreement included a condition that, if Mr. Farmer failed to fulfill his obligations under the agreement, “the State will recommend and 12 The Circuit Court docket for this case and Case Search indicate that Mr. Farmer was born in February 1983 which, if correct, would mean that he was 18 at the time of the murders in March and April 2001. In the Circuit Court, defense counsel asserted that Mr. Farmer had actually been born in August 1983 – which also appears to be the birth date associated with him in the original charging document in the District Court. The State has not disputed that he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses in question. 11 the Court shall impose the maximum penalties for each and every offense to which the Defendant has pled guilty, i.e., two consecutive life sentences.” (emphasis in original). In July 2003, Mr. Farmer was called as a witness at a pretrial hearing in the case of one of his co-defendants.

He refused to testify or respond to any questions. His counsel filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the Circuit Court denied. A month later, after holding a hearing at which Mr. Farmer confirmed his refusal to testify, the Circuit Court found that Mr. Farmer had “clearly and unequivocally” failed to comply with his obligations under the plea agreement. The court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole.

Mr. Farmer applied for leave to appeal, which the Court of Special Appeals denied. He also unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Currently, an inmate serving a life sentence becomes eligible for parole after serving “15 years of that sentence or the equivalent of 15 years considering … diminution” credits. CS §7-301(d)(1).13 An inmate serving two consecutive life sentences, such as Mr. Farmer, must first serve 15 years (or the equivalent of 15 years considering diminution credits) with respect to each sentence before the inmate is eligible for parole.

COMAR 12.08.01.17A(8)(a). Because Mr. Farmer has also received a consecutive 10-year sentence for first-degree assault, he must also serve half of that sentence (i.e., five years) before he 13 Recent legislation substituted “20 years” for “15 years” with respect to defendants convicted of an offense committed on or after October 1, 2021. Chapter 30, 1st Spec. Sess., Laws of Maryland 2021. 12 is eligible for parole.14 Thus, Mr. Farmer would likely be eligible for parole after serving something less than 35 years of his aggregate sentence.15 2.

The Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence and Appeal In August 2014, Mr. Farmer filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). Two years later, with the assistance of counsel, he filed a supplement to that motion and requested a hearing. In filings in support of the Rule 4- 345(a) motion, he argued that various aspects of the Maryland parole system denied him a meaningful opportunity for release and effectively converted his sentence into an unconstitutional life-without-parole sentence. His primary argument, like that of the petitioners in Carter, was based on the Governor’s role in the parole system at that time, but he also pointed to the absence of a right to counsel.16 14 See CS §7-301(c)(1) (specifying parole eligibility for conviction of “violent crime”); CS §7-101(m)(1) (defining “violent crime” in part by cross-referencing definition of “crime of violence”); Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §14-101(a)(21) (defining first-degree assault as “crime of violence”).

The first-degree assault conviction related to his stabbing a fellow inmate in 2008. 15 As noted in the text, the precise date of parole eligibility for Mr. Farmer depends on the extent to which he earns and retains diminution credits during the course of his confinement. See CS §3-701 et seq. At oral argument in this case, the State represented that Mr. Farmer had approximately eight and one-half years of diminution credits, although those credits can be subject to revocation. CS §3-709. 16 He made these arguments in the supplement to his motion and a post-hearing memorandum.

Each pre-dated both the Governor’s executive order concerning exercise of the Governor’s parole authority and the Carter decision. In addition to the claim that the parole system was effectively an executive clemency system for inmates serving life sentences, those filings faulted other aspects of the parole process: (1) lack of a right to counsel; (2) lack of access to diagnostic opinions, psychological assessments, and risk assessments; (3) failure to record parole release hearings and detailed written findings 13 The Circuit Court denied the motion in a written order. State v. Farmer, Nos. 101243067, -072 (Dec. 19, 2016). Citing this Court’s opinion in State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 (1999), the court held that, because the alleged illegality did not “inhere in the sentence itself,” a motion to correct an illegal sentence was not the appropriate vehicle for Mr. Farmer to challenge the “policies and procedures” of the Commission.

Id.17 Mr. Farmer appealed. The State moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Mr. Farmer’s claims were not yet ripe and were not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). The Court of Special Appeals temporarily stayed his appeal, pending