Farrell v. Mayor of Baltimore

Bryan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Mrs. Farrell, by her husband and next friend, entered an appeal in Baltimore City Court from the decision of the Street Commissioners assessing benefits to her in the matter of the opening of Durham street. It appeared that no benefits had been assessed to her, but that dam ⁴⁹⁴ ages had been awarded to her for taking her property.' She therefore moved to amend her appeal by substituting the word “damages” for “benefits.” The “benefits” assessed by the Commissioners are the amounts which they decide ought to'be paid by the landholder for the increase in the value of his property which is caused by the opening . of the street; the “damages” are the amounts to be paid by the city for the injury inflicted upon the property by the same cause. These terms are usually found in exactly the opposite association of ideas, and consequently by inadvertence, one of them might readily he used by mistake for the other.

The appellant certainly did not intend to appeal from a decision which determined that she was to pay nothing for benefits; it is just as certain that she intended to appeal from a decision which she regarded as affecting her interests injuriously. The only decision which could injure her was the award of damages; if she was not allowed a sufficient compensation for her property, she had reason to complain of the decision, and to wish to have it reviewed and modified. If this is not what she appealed from, then her appeal was intended by her to he a perfectly meaningless and nugatory proceeding. But it is transparent that the word “benefits” was used by a mere slip of the pen in the paper filed as an appeal, and that its meaning was to obtain a review of the decision on the question of damages.

It is the duty of the Court in construing written.instruments to ascertain their meaning; and this must he done, even if it is necessary to depart from the literal meaning of the terms employed. Judge Story mentions a case where a person signed a paper in these words: “Borrowed of J. S. fifty pounds, which I promise not to pay,” and it was held to be a good promisissory note, and that the word not ought to be rejected. Story’s Promissory Notes, sec. 12. Here the meaning was evident upon the paper as it stood without any change. ⁴⁹⁵ It was not necessary to reform the instrument, because the Court construed it to mean what the parties must have intended, although in direct opposition to the words used.

In Story on Contracts, section 116, we find other cases to the same effect as follows: “Thus, where the condition of a hond for the payment of money was, that the bond should be void if the money was not paid, it was held to be wholly inconsistent with the nature of the bond itself, and was therefore rejected, leaving the bond in full force as a perfect contract. * * * The same rule applies to cases where an evident mistake has been made in an instrument. * * * * So also, where a bond was given, conditioned to pay one hundred pounds by six equal instalments, on certain specified days, ‘until the full sum of owe pound should be paid,’ the Court allowed the word hundred to he inserted after one, in order to effectuate the evident intention of the parties.” And instances of the like kind are not wanting in the Courts of our own State. In Ellicott vs. Peterson’s Executors, 4 Md., 416 , a commission purported to have been issued in a case in which Ellicott was plaintiff, and the defendants were Peterson and Turner, executors of John Turner, deceased; the testimony taken under it was offered in a case in which Ellicott was plaintiff and the defendants were Peterson and Turner, executors of John Peterson, deceased. It was held that the testimony was not admissible; but it was also held that if there had been proof that there was no case on the docket against Peterson and Turner, executors of John Turner, deceased, the words “John Turner” ought to have been regarded as a clerical