Fedder v. Component Structures Corp.

³⁷⁷ Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Alan and Carol Fedder, appellants, sought to recover damages and to obtain other relief from Component Structures Corporation, Alan Bentley Glass and Craig W. Damon, Charles J. Miller, Inc., and Malcolm E. Hudkins in a suit demanding Ejectment and alleging Violation of Easement and Trespass Quare Clausem Fregit. 1 The issues arose after the Fedders purchased a three acre tract of land on August 1, 1969, improved by a house and a barn, from Stone Haven, Inc. 2 Stone Haven reserved a fifty foot right-of-way across the property to a forty-two acre tract adjacent to the southwest portion of the Fedders’ land. The right-of-way, described by metes and bounds, intersected the public way known as Mineral Hill Road and provided access to the forty-two acre tract. The course it took divided the Fedders’ house from their barn. 3 The non-use of the right-of-way for the next two years apparently obscured its existence for appellants until Stone Haven, Inc. sold the undeveloped forty-two acres to Component Structures Corporation.

In May of 1971 Component commenced the improvement of the right-of-way to conform to the specifications required by Carroll County for roads to be dedicated to the County. The right-of-way, now known as Snowden’s Run Road, was originally laid out and later designated by stakes by ³⁷⁸ Malcolm E. Hudkins who was brought into the suit by Component under a third party claim. The perimeters of the right-of-way were marked for Charles Miller, Inc., a road construction contractor, whom Component had hired to improve the right-of-way to County specifications. As the construction proceeded the road equipment severed electric lines, sewer lines and waterlines which had been established under the right-of-way.

The record does not disclose whether those lines were installed before or after the creation of the easement. In addition, the grading substantially altered the land elevation between the house and barns, and consequently, the course of surface water flow. The trial was bifurcated by stipulation. On November 15, 1972 the three issues upon which the parties had agreed were decided against the appellants by Judge Edward O. Weant.

The issues thus resolved were: 1. Is Snowden’s Run Road laid out in the right place on the property? The court decided it was. 2. Did the Defendants wrongfully regrade and change the elevation on said land within the right-of-way area?

The court decided they did not. 3. Did the Defendants wrongfully convert a private easement to a public road? Again the court decided they did not. One year later the second phase of the case was tried in the Circuit Court for Carroll County.

Again Judge Weant presided, but on this occasion he presided over a jury. Prior to presentation of evidence, appellants prepared to amend their declaration to allege negligence in addition to the trespass count which alone remained after the preliminary decisions on the issues. The court denied that motion. Appellants contend first, that the change of grade resulting from road construction was itself a violation of the easement; second, that Component was not entitled to ³⁷⁹ dedicate the road to Carroll County; third, and we feel most significantly, that the trial judge erred when he refused to permit evidence of any damage off the right-of-way if caused by appellees while working on the right-of-way.

As their final contention, appellants assert that the court’s denial of their motion to amend the declaration was an abuse of discretion. To reach the key issue, we need first dispose of the assertion that the construction was in violation of the easement. Appellants argue that the easement was restricted to ingress and egress over the prescribed area, with no improvement rights. In support of this position, they point out that the language in the deed simply reserved a “right-of-way” without mention of its extent or use.

Because contractual provisions for improvement rights were not reiterated, appellants would limit us to the words of the deed to determine the parties’ intent and purpose. While we agree that an easement acquired by an express grant depends for most part on the construction of the deed conveying it, where its purpose, use and extent are not readily discernible from that document, courts must give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the contract was made. 4 Such rule is elementary for the construction of contracts and is applicable to the construction of a grant of an easement. Buckler v. Davis Sand and Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 537 . The most dependable indicium of the parties’ intentions is the language of the sales contract between Stone Haven, Inc., for whom the easement was reserved, and the Fedders: “Seller to have option to create a right-of-way for future road.

Said road to meet Carroll Co. Specs, as to width and location.” Although appellants correctly argue that the contract has “merged” into the deed as the latter was the final executed ³⁸⁰ instrument, that observation prevents our resort to the contract only where its terms are inconsistent with correlative terms in the deed. Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515 . We find no inconsistency here. The deed provided for a right-of-way but did not elaborate on its intended extent and use.

The contract merely amplified that provision by indicating that what the parties contemplated was a right-of-way which would eventually be converted to a public road. It is an old and well established principle of law: “ . . . that parol evidence may be given of collateral and independent facts, which tend to support a deed, provided it is not offered to vary the agreement and is consistent with the deed.” Creamer v. Stephenson, 15 Md. 211, 222 ; accord, Buckler, supra. When the simple language of the contract is considered in the surrounding circumstances — as it should be, Desch v. Knox, 253 Md. 307 — the intention of the parties becomes crystal clear. The contract provides for “a right-of-way for future road . . . ,” and that the road shall meet “Carroll County Specs.” The width of the right-of-way, when described in the easement is the minimum standard prescribed by Carroll County, fifty feet.

The plat, incorporated by a reference in the deed shows the right-of-way widening considerably into a flange for easier turning access onto the public road to which it connects the corporate owner’s retained property. That retained property, undeveloped and uninhabited at the time of execution of Fedders’ deed obviously becomes developable only if the access road is improved to conform to the requirements of the County for new roads in such developments. Indeed, simple logic tells us that the road construction standards provided by the contract, viz., “Carroll County Specs.” (introduced by appellants as “Specifications for New County Roads”) must have anticipated the eventual assumption of maintenance of that road by Carroll County. It is significant that at no time have appellants denied the apparent intention for future improvement, nor do they ³⁸¹ imply more limited intention.

They hope to prevail, it seems by precluding our consideration of the evidence of intent by manipulating rules of construction. Viewing the reservation of the fifty foot easement in light of the intention of the parties at the time, we hold the construction was within the intended extent of use of the easement. Generally, an owner of a right-of-way may prepare, maintain, improve, or repair the way in a manner and to an extent reasonably calculated to promote the purposes for which it was created. See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1303 ; see also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 960 for rights of parcel owners of subdivided dominant tenements to use a pre-existing right-of-way.

We may summarily dispose of appellants’ tangential issue that Component had no right to transfer its interest in the road to Carroll County because the County regulations required ownership of the fee. The County’s relaxation of their requirements is a matter of County concern but not justiciable as to appellants so long as this transfer did not increase the burden placed upon the servient land beyond the intention of the parties. Cf., Tong v. Feldman, 152 Md. 398, 405 . Appellants introduced no evidence to indicate any increased burden.

Beyond that, we have indicated that the circumstances surrounding the reservation of the right-of-way including the reference to minimum specifications for new county roads, anticipated the County take-over. We now reach the substance of appellants’ complaints. Precisely, it is related to the refusal of the judge, at the trial of the trespass issue, to permit evidence of damages which appellees committed while on the right-of-way. The court confined appellants’ proofs to damage which occurred when appellee left the easement and physically encroached on appellants’ land. 5 ³⁸² Recognizing the proffers during the jury phase of the trial as somewhat disingenuous, we are nevertheless able to separate out two proposals of damage rather confusingly interwoven by appellants.

One we find to be properly rejected, the other we hold should have been admitted. That which was properly rejected related to the utility lines running underground across the right-of-way. When advised of the proposed construction appellants apparently removed a fence crossing the right-of-way but refused to remove the underground utility lines. Although advised of ³⁸³ their existence, appellees chose to proceed with construction, apparently assuming the excavation would not reach them.

After severing the lines, they subsequently repaired and replaced them. Appellants argue appellees were bound to remove the lines without interruption of service, or to cease any construction work which might endanger them at the point they crossed the right-of-way. We do not agree and hold that the trial judge properly rejected evidentiary proffers of damage resulting from severance of the lines. “The law is also established in Maryland that where anyone unlawfully obstructs an easement, a person whose rights are interfered with need not resort to an action at law for damages or a suit in equity for an injunction, but may abate the nuisance by removing the obstruction, provided that he does so in such a manner as not to disturb the public peace or to put innocent persons or their property in peril.” Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 299-300 . Appellants were aware of imminent road construction, as attested by their notice to appellees not to cross the utility lines with their equipment.

Having recognized their lines operated as an obstruction to the right-of-way improvement, and having not acted to protect their interests by removal, we cannot see them in the position of “innocent persons or . . . property” imperiled. We hold to the contrary as to proffers of damage to