Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Husted

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On October 26, 1914, Minnie J. Husted, widow of Edward J. Husted, deceased, was appointed, by the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City, guardian for her son and daughter, Mortimer J. and Marcia T. Husted, the former being nearly nineteen years of age, and the latter in her fifteenth year, at that time. The guardian qualified by giving a bond executed by the appellant company as surety. Shortly after her appointment and qualification there was paid to the guardian the sum of $1,115.72 as the proceeds of certain life insurance of which the wards were the beneficiaries, and in May, 1915, she received from herself as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband the further1 sum of $4,223.08 which was distributed to the two children upon the final account of the administration.

These funds were deposited with the Fidelity Trust Company of Baltimore, and they constituted the entire assets of the estate. At the expiration of a year from the -time of her appointment the guardian filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court submitting an account, which showed the amounts and deposit of the principal funds and the receipts and application of interest, and requesting in effect that her guardianship be revoked and that the fund be deposited in bank, subject to the order of the Court, in the individual names of the wards, to the end that the surety on the bond might be relieved of further liability. Hpon this ²⁷⁷ petition ail order was passed by the Court authorizing the guardian to withdraw the funds to her credit in the Fidelity Trust Company and deposit them in equal and separate shares in the individual names of the wards in the Central Savings Bahlt of Baltimore, subject to the order of the Orphans’ Court, and that upon such deposit being made and the bank-books in which they were credited being exhibited to the Court, the guardian and her bond should he discharged. In pursuance of this order, and on the day of its passage, the deposits were changed as it provided, and hooks issued by the Central Savings Bank were submitted to the Court showing that accounts had been opened in the names of the wards individually for the full amounts to which they were respectively entitled.

The appellant, as surety on the guardian’s bond, has appealed from the order undertaking to discharge the guardian, and the liability of her surety, the theory of the appeal being that the Orphans’ Court had no power to pass an order whicho could effectively accomplish those objects. As the release of the surety from responsibility for any future losses would necessarily result from a. valid discharge of the principal obligor, the real and only question to he determined is whether the liability of the guardian was extinguished by the order under review and her compliance with its provisions. The condition of the guardian’s bond, as prescribed by statute, was that if she should “faithfully account with the Orphans’ Court, as directed l>y law, for the management of-the property and estate of the infants under her- care, and also deliver up the said property agreeably to the order of the said Court or the directions of law,” and should in all respects perform the duty of guardian to her wards according to law, then the obligation of «the bond should cease. Code, Art. 93, sec. 155.

It is provided by section 242 of the Article just cited that the Orphans’ Court may in its discretion order, “any guardian whom they may have appointed or whose bond they may have approved, to bring into Court, or place in bank, or invest in bank or other incorporated stock, ²⁷⁸ or any other good security, any money or funds received by such * * * guardian; and the Court shall direct the manner and form in which such money or funds shall be placed in bank or invested, and the same shall at all times be subject to the order and control of the Court.” Under the provisions of section 181 of the same article the Orphans’ Court “may, in their discretion, upon the application in writing, of any guardian whom they may have appointed, revoke the appointment of such guardian and appoint a new guardian or guardians.” In this case the guardian applied in writing for the revocation of her appointment, and having fully accounted for the estate and having delivered it up as directed by the Court and required by her bond, the application for her discharge was granted. The provisions we have quoted afford ample authority for such action. In granting the discharge, to which the guardian was entitled, and in providing