Fields v. Morgan

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. New phrases in the law have caused more confusion than the phrase “res ipsa loquitur.” 1 The truth of this statement is aptly demonstrated by the present case. On June 28, 1974, the appellant, Roger Fields, sustained personal injuries when the car in which he was riding crashed into a tree. Fields instituted suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County claiming the accident was attributable to the negligence of the driver, Alfred S. Morgan, the appellee.

At the close of Fields’ case, Morgan moved for a directed verdict which was granted by the trial judge. In assessing the propriety of the grant of a motion for a directed verdict the evidence, along with all fairly deducible inferences, must be considered in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made. E.g., United Bank and Trust Co. v. Schaeffer, 280 Md. 10 , 370 A. 2d 1138 (1977). When viewed in a light most favorable to Fields the evidence reveals the following.

On the evening of June 28, 1974, Fields was drinking beer with some friends at the Lakeland Tavern in College Park, Maryland. As the tavern was about to close, Fields approached Morgan, with whom he had been previously acquainted, and asked for a ride to Laurel, Maryland. Morgan agreed and the two men proceeded in Morgan’s car in the direction of Route 1. As the car turned north onto Route 1, it encountered two pedestrians who were in the process of crossing the street.

At the time the pedestrians were some distance away. As Morgan approached the spot where the pedestrians were crossing, they had already crossed the northbound lane of Route 1. Morgan, however, strayed into the southbound lane where he ⁸⁴ struck and fatally injured one of the pedestrians. The Morgan vehicle traveled in the southbound lane for approximately 25 to 30 yards prior to the accident.

Morgan did not stop after the accident but continued north on Route 1 until he reached Powder Mill Road. After the car had turned east on Powder Mill Road, Walter Tryon, an eyewitness to the pedestrian accident who had been pursuing Morgan, attempted to force Morgan to stop and return to the scene of the accident. Morgan struck the rear of the Tryon vehicle and continued on Powder Mill Road. He then turned onto Edmondson Road, and shortly thereafter the car left the road and struck a tree.

The final resting place of the vehicle was approximately lVz to 2 miles from the Tryon collision. There were ho tire tracks or skid marks on the roadway at the location of the final accident and the road surface was dry. According to a blood test administered at Prince George’s County Hospital, Morgan’s blood contained an alcohol level of 0.16% 2 During the trial Fields, through the testimony of a police officer, introduced a statement made by Morgan to the effect that after striking the pedestrian he wanted to stop but Fields insisted he continue. According to the statement the two men “drove off Powder Mill Road until they got to a government road and started fighting over the steering wheel; went into a spin and they struck a tree.” The statement was contradicted by Fields who testified that when Morgan swerved and hit the pedestrian, he struck his head on the steering wheel and did not remember another thing until he woke up in the hospital some time later.

In granting the motion for a directed verdict the trial judge ruled that Fields had paradoxically proved too much to rely on res ipsa loquitur and too little to establish a prima facie case of negligence. We think the trial judge erred in ruling that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. The conditions necessary for the application of res ipsa ⁸⁵ loquitur have been firmly established. In order to invoke the doctrine three elements must exist: “1.

A casualty of a sort which usually does not occur in the absence of negligence. “2. Caused by an instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control. “3. Under circumstances indicating that the casualty did not result from the act or omission of the plaintiff.” Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 547-548 , 276 A. 2d 81, 84 (1971). Accord, Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 597 , 332 A. 2d 1, 4 (1975); Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. Hicks, 25 Md. App. 503, 516 , 337 A. 2d 744, 752 (1975), cert. denied, 275 Md. 750 .

Morgan concedes that these criteria are ordinarily satisfied where an automobile runs off the highway for no apparent reason. See Hanes v. State, Use of Lamm, 236 Md. 28, 33 , 202 A. 2d 364, 365-366 (1964); Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 631-632 , 106 A. 2d 46, 48 (1954); Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 262 , 96 A. 2d 241, 245 (1953); Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. Bowles, 25 Md. App. 558, 563-564 , 334 A. 2d 532, 536 (1975). He argues, however, that Fields, by introducing the statement he gave to the police, was precluded from relying on res ipsa loquitur under Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85 , 63 A. 202 (1906) and Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, supra. In Hickory, the plaintiff attempted to establish a cause of action based on negligence by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The plaintiff, apparently not satisfied with merely relying on the inference of negligence that could be drawn from the happening of the event, offered proof which tended to show the accident was not due to the negligence of the defendant. In discussing the predicament in which the plaintiff had placed himself, the Court stated: “When the plaintiff invokes this procedure, thus putting his reliance upon the inference of negligence springing from the event, it has been authoritatively ⁸⁶ held that it must not appear by his own evidence, or the evidence adduced in his behalf,