Maryland case law › Fire & Police Employees' Retirement System v. Middleton

Fire & Police Employees' Retirement System v. Middleton

192 Md. App. 354 (2010) · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Court of Special Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedMatricciani✓ Good law
HoldingOfficer Amy Middleton responded to a Signal 13 call on July 4, 2006, injuring her back.

MATRICCIANI, J. Appellant Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baltimore appeals the reversal, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, of its decision to grant non-line-of-duty disability retirement to appellee, Amy Middleton. The appellant presents one question for our review: I. Did the court err in reversing the administrative decision to award non-line-of-duty disability because the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record and the hearing examiner correctly applied the law? Finding substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner’s decision, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Facts On July 4, 2006, the appellee, a Baltimore City police officer, was working crowd control at the Inner Harbor Park in Baltimore when she received a “Signal 13” call, indicating that a fellow officer needed immediate assistance.

She described her response as follows: [SJeveral of us, pretty much everybody that was available by foot, took off. It ... required me to go down a set of steps, 357 jump over some walls at Harborplace ... down the curb across the street, up a curb. And then there was just a wall of people, [who] ... were pushing and shoving. People were reaching for me ... somebody came across through me and I pushed their, grabfbed] their arm and pushed them aside.

The appellee did not reach her destination before the call was cancelled, and she returned to her post. After returning to her post, the appellee started to feel pain in her lower back. The appellee had severe pain the following morning and informed her sergeant that she needed to visit the clinic at Mercy Hospital. The doctor examined her and recommended that she be placed on light duty with “no suspect apprehension, no prisoner contact ... [she should] be able to change positions at will if needed.” The appellee remained on light duty and under the care of the doctors at Mercy until September 11, 2006, when she was released to full duty.

The appellee remained on full duty until March 15, 2007, when she reported to Mercy complaining of lower back pain that she had noticed two days earlier after she had been baking cookies at home. The pain spread to her right leg at some point thereafter. As a result of these symptoms the medical staff scheduled an MRI for March 19, 2007, and advised the appellee to use her medications and ice as needed. On June 13, 2007, Dr. Mohammed H. Zamani conducted an independent medical evaluation and concluded that the appellee was capable of working without restrictions.

The examination was performed on behalf of the City of Baltimore in connection with the appellee’s worker’s compensation claim arising from the incident on July 4, 2006. In the aftermath of the March 2007 hospital visit, the appellee was seen by three other doctors between August 2007 and March 2008, all of whom opined that her medical condition was chronic in nature and prevented her from performing the essential functions of a police officer. On November 13, 2007, the appellee applied for line-of-duty disability. On April 28, 2008, a hearing examiner from the 358 Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System held a hearing to determine whether the appellee was eligible for line-of-duty disability.

On May 8, 2008, the hearing examiner issued a written decision in which the examiner denied line-of-duty disability retirement but awarded non-line-of-duty disability retirement to the appellee. The examiner found: [T]he Claimant did prove by the preponderance of the evidence that she has suffered an illness or injury of such a nature that she is totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of her job classification as a police officer[.] However, the Claimant did not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that her disability was a result of an injury arising out of or in the course of her duties as a ... [pjolice [ojfficer. The Claimant was completely discharged in September 2006 with full range of motion and no complaints as a result of the accident of July 4, 2006. Dr. Zamani does not indicate the Claimant’s complaints are a result of the July 4, 2006 incident, nor does Dr. Halikman indicate the injury occurred as a line of duty incident.

There was no treatment from September 2006 until March 2007. The Claimant specifically noted that she first noted pain to her lower back and numbness to her feet while baking cookies in the kitchen. Diagnostic tests were contradictory and therefore, inconclusive as to the cause of the Claimant’s injury ... [Ijt is the opinion of the Hearing Examiner that the Claimant recovered from her injury of July 4, 2006 and therefore her complaints of March 2007 were not a result of a line of duty incident. On November 20, 2008, the Baltimore City Circuit Court held a judicial review hearing and reversed the decision of the hearing examiner.

The court remanded the case with instructions to grant the appellee’s application for line-of-duty retirement. The appellant timely noted this appeal. I. The appellant contends that the circuit court erred in reversing the administrative decision, arguing that the stan 359 dard of review is extremely narrow for an administrative decision. Furthermore, the appellant argues that the decision of the hearing examiner was supported by substantial evidence and was not based on prejudicial legal error.

The appellee contends that the hearing examiner’s decision was not supported by the record and was therefore erroneous. The appellee contends that, although she reached maximum medical improvement by September 11, 2006, she never recovered fully from the incident on July 4. The appellee also argues that the hearing examiner erroneously relied on the cookie-baking incident as an explanation for the recurrence of pain that ultimately forced her to retire. Our role in reviewing an administrative decision is precisely the same as that of the circuit court.

Bd. of Trs. for the Fire & Police Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Mitchell, 145 Md.App. 1, 8 , 800 A.2d 803 (2002). We must presume that a decision made by an administrative body is prima facie correct.

Marsheck v. Board of Trustees of the Fire & Police Employees Retirement Sys., 358 Md. 393, 402 , 749 A.2d 774 (2000). We must limit our review of a final decision by an administrative agency to determine whether the agency had substantial evidence to support its decision and whether that decision is free from prejudicial legal error. Id. In applying the substantial evidence test, we must decide whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.

Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 , 873 A.2d 1145 (2005) (citations omitted). We will refrain from making our own findings of fact or substituting our judgment for that of the agency if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the agency’s decision. Id. We have no power to substitute our assessment of credibility for that of the agency if there was evidence to support the findings of fact in the record before the agency.

Terranova v. Board of Trustees, 81 Md.App. 1, 13 , 566 A.2d 497 (1989). However, we will not uphold the agency’s order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings of fact and for the reasons stated by the agency. United 360 Parcel Serv. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 586 , 650 A.2d 226 (1994). In addition to the principles which normally guide our review of an administrative decision, the Baltimore City Code provides a statutory standard of review for decisions made by a hearing examiner from the retirement system.

The Retirement Act, Baltimore, Maryland City Code (Baltimore City Code) art. 22, §§ 33(0(12) (1983 RepLVol. & 1995 Supp.), states that a final determination of a hearing examiner is presumptively correct and may not be disturbed on appeal unless it is arbitrary, illegal, capricious or discriminatory. Under § 34(e-l)(l) of the Baltimore City Code, line-of-duty disability benefits are available for any member whom the hearing examiner has determined to be totally and permanently incapacitated and thus unable to further perform the duties of his or her job classification. An applicant for line-of-duty disability benefits must also prove that the total and permanent incapacitation was the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of duty. We have explained the difference between line-of-duty disability and non-line-of-duty disability as such: If the injury arose out of or in the course of the actual performance of duty, then the claimant who is totally incapacitated is entitled to special disability benefits; if the injury was caused by any other means, then the claimant who is totally incapacitated is entitled to ordinary disability benefits.

Marsheck, 358 Md. at 410 , 749 A.2d 774 . The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability was the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of duty. Baltimore City Code, Art. 22, § 33(0(10). The hearing examiner determined that the appellee was disabled, but not due to an on-the-job injury.

The hearing examiner relied on the fact that neither Dr. Halikman nor Dr. Zamani indicated that the injury occurred as a result of a line-of-duty incident. With respect to Dr. Halikman’s report, the 361 hearing examiner’s factual conclusions are simply not accurate. Dr. Halikman noted in his report that “Ms. Middleton described being injured in a

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