Fisher v. State

MOYLAN, Judge. At 2:41 P.M. on June 25, 1997, nine-year-old Rita Fisher was pronounced dead at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. The subsequent post mortem report of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner revealed that she had died of dehydration and malnutrition, conditions resulting from inadequate water and food intake. The post mortem report indicated that she had been admitted to the Johns Hopkins Hospital on June 25, the day of her death, and had “expired as a result of abuse and negligence.” Rita Fisher’s physical development was described as “retarded.” Her weight at the time of her death was forty-seven pounds, which was, in the opinion of the assistant medical examiner, considerably less than the average weight of a nine-year-old girl.

Other medical records indicated that at an earlier period in her life she had weighed as much as 54-1/4 pounds. The evidence of physical abuse included “numerous recent and old abscesses and bruises to her head, chest, extremities, and buttocks.” There were “multiple rib fractures exhibiting] a pattern of healing consistent with a severe chest injury several weeks prior to death.” There was evidence of internal bleeding and of subdural bleeding of the brain. In addition, there were “multiple ligature marks on her wrists and ankles” which “indicate that she had recently been bound.” There was also evidence that “a ligature [had been] placed recently around the chest.” On the next day, June 26, 1997, Rita Fisher’s fifteen-year-old sister, Georgia Fisher, was admitted to the Northwest Hospital Center. Nurse Martha Chinery described Georgia, at the time of her admission, as “frightened, emaciated, malnourished, bruised, and scarred.” ⁸⁸ The appellants in this case were the three adult members of the household at 4106 Old Milford Mill Road in the Pikesville area of Baltimore County.

Both Rita Fisher and Georgia Fisher had been members of that same household. The three appellants are 1) forty-nine-year-old Mary Utley, the head of that household and the mother of both Rita Fisher and Georgia Fisher; 2) twenty-year-old Rose Mary Fisher, daughter of Mary Utley and older sister of Rita and Georgia Fisher; and 3) twenty-one-year-old Frank E. Searpola, Jr., the live-in boyfriend of Rose Mary Fisher. 1 The three appellants were jointly tried by a Baltimore County jury, presided over by Judge Dana M. Levitz, and convicted of a number of charges. All three appellants were convicted of: 1) The murder in the second degree of Rita Fisher; 2) The child abuse of Rita Fisher during the period of April 15,1997 through June 23,1997; 3) The child abuse of Rita Fisher on June 24 and June 25, 1997; 4) The child abuse of Georgia Fisher during the period of April 15,1997 through June 23,1997; 5) Conspiracy to commit child abuse on Rita Fisher; and 6) Conspiracy to commit child abuse on Georgia Fisher. Rose Mary Fisher alone was additionally convicted of the child abuse of Georgia Fisher on June 24 and June 25, 1997.

Frank Searpola received a combined sentence of ninety-five years' imprisonment; Mary Utley received a combined sentence of seventy-five years imprisonment; and Rose Mary Fisher received a combined sentence of thirty years imprisonment. All three appellants raise the following five joint contentions: 1) That Maryland does not recognize the offense of second-degree felony-murder predicated on the felony of child abuse; ⁸⁹ 2) That Judge Levitz erroneously failed to instruct the jury with respect to the necessary causal connection between the underlying felony and the death of the victim; 3) That Judge Levitz erroneously refused to compel disclosure to the defense of certain confidential and privileged records and in refusing to have the disputed records sealed and made a part of the record for this appeal; 4) That Judge Levitz erroneously refused to compel the State to reveal to the appellants the whereabouts of Georgia Fisher prior to trial and facilitate access to her on the part of the appellants; and 5) That Judge Levitz erroneously joined the appellants for trial. Mary Utley alone raises three additional contentions: 6) That Judge Levitz erroneously admitted three out-of-court statements in violation of the rule against hearsay and the confrontation clause; 7) That Judge Levitz erroneously admitted evidence of misconduct on the part of Mary Utley for which she was not on trial; and 8) That Judge Levitz erroneously permitted counsel for Frank Scarpola to cross-examine Mary Utley as to whether other witnesses were lying or telling the truth and erroneously denied the resulting motion for a mistrial. The appellant Rose Mary Fisher alone raises the additional contention: 9) That Judge Levitz erroneously refused to permit her to introduce expert testimony in her defense.

The appellant Frank Scarpola alone raises the additional contention: 10) That the evidence was not legally sufficient to support his convictions on the two conspiracy charges. ⁹⁰ The Factual Background In the course of a ten-day trial, the State called fourteen witnesses, including one of the victims, Georgia Fisher. The defense called twenty-two witnesses, including the three appellants. The only undisputed facts were that prior to November of 1995, the residents of that address were Mary Utley, Rose Mary Fisher, 2 Georgia Fisher, and Rita Fisher. In November of 1995, Frank Scarpola moved into the residence as well.

The key witness for the prosecution was Georgia Fisher. Georgia related the abuse that she and her sister Rita had suffered at the hands of her mother, Mary Utley, for years before Scarpola moved in and the abuse that continued once Scarpola became a part of the household. With respect to the time period after Scarpola moved in, Georgia explained how she and Rita had to perform chores such as cleaning the house and looking after the pets and if those chores were not performed, “we would get a beating.” When asked who, specifically, inflicted those beatings, Georgia answered, “Frank, Rosie and my mom.” Georgia explained that the beatings would sometimes be with a yardstick and that sometimes the girls would be hit, kicked, or punched by the appellants. Scarpola would sometimes take Georgia and Rita into the basement and would use boxing gloves to hit them.

When either of the girls fell down from being hit, Scarpola would order them to get back up so she could be hit again. Georgia also described the many hours and days that she and Rita spent in “the hole.” According to Georgia, “the hole” was “a small place [in the basement] that had a toilet and it had a stall and they locked us in there for punishment.” Georgia explained that the “they” to whom she referred were “Frank, Rosie and my mom.” The girls would be locked in “the hole” for “days at a time” with no light and only an occasional drink brought by the appellant Utley. When asked ⁹¹ how often the girls were fed while in “the hole,” Georgia replied, “once in a blue moon.” Neither Rita nor Georgia was permitted to go into the refrigerator for food. In fact, at one point a lock was placed on the refrigerator door to prevent just that.

Georgia testified that, pursuant to Searpola’s orders, she was not permitted to help Rita with her homework. On one occasion when she did so and was caught, Scarpola beat her over the head with a metal flashlight. The beating resulted in a “big gash.” Scarpola then proceeded to shave Georgia’s head, pour wine over the open wound, and sew the wound with a needle and thread. Georgia did not go to school for several days after the incident.

Georgia also described for the jury an occasion, a few months before Rita died, when she had been tied to her bed, gagged, and blindfolded by Scarpola so that he could rape her. 3 Georgia stated that she and Rita had been locked in their room for five consecutive days before Rita died. During those five days they were fed “sometimes” and permitted to use the bathroom once every other hour. At such times, one of the appellants would unlock the girls’ bedroom door and accompany the girls into the bathroom. If either of the girls could not “perform” and use the toilet, she would be hit in the face.

While in their bedroom, Rita was forced to sleep on the wooden floor because her mattress had been removed by Scarpola. Rita was required to sleep “with her arms straight up above her head and [with] her legs straight ... face up.” Georgia was given the responsibility of seeing that Rita did not move from that particular position. If Rita did move, Georgia would be “held responsible for it” and would be beaten. ⁹² Georgia testified that both she and Rita were kicked in the ribs by Scarpola the week prior to Rita’s death. Scarpola then smashed or threw away the girls’ toys, including a dollhouse to which Rita was very attached.

Scarpola told Rita and Georgia that they would not need the toys any longer because the girls were going “to go someplace until they were twenty years old,” i.e., an institution. The night before Rita died, Scarpola tied Rita up because she had been picking at a wound that Scarpola had earlier inflicted on her chin. Scarpola ordered Georgia to remove the shoestrings from her shoes. He then proceeded to tie Rita’s hands to the dresser and her feet to the bed post with those shoestrings.

Scarpola ordered Georgia to watch her sister. Georgia testified that during the course of that night and early the next morning, “[Rita] kept yelling [because she had to go to the bathroom] and Frank hit her and she couldn’t be quiet so Frank taped her mouth shut.” Georgia briefly untied her sister in the middle of the night to give Rita some relief, but then, fearing repercussions, she retied Rita after about an hour so that neither of the girls would be caught and punished. Georgia then described what transpired on the morning of June 25. Rita “was blue, I banged on the doors because she kind of mumbled she wanted something to drink.” Scarpola came into the room and struck Georgia.

The other appellants then entered. They tried to give Rita a warm bath and they laid her on the floor on a blanket. Georgia then lay down beside her dying sister and “told her to hang in there,” only to be pushed away by Utley. Georgia was then ordered by the appellants to “get dressed and to hurry up.” She was ordered by all three appellants “to lie.” Dr. James Locke, the assistant medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Rita on June 26, 1997, catalogued the numerous signs of extensive physical abuse that Rita had suffered.

Those injuries included: a bruise on the forehead with bleeding underneath the scalp; abrasions and bruises on the cheek and face; subdural bleeding of the brain; a ligature ⁹³ mark on the chest; abrasions and scratches on the chest; scratches and bruising over the abdomen; a bruise over the left hip; bleeding in the chest cavity; fractures of four separate ribs with two of those ribs containing more than one fracture; bleeding internally within the abdomen; bruises and abrasions on both arms; ligature marks on both wrists; bruises and abrasions on both legs; ligature marks on the left ankle; a group of bruises along the mid-back; numerous abrasions in the back region; and numerous bruises to the buttocks. Dr. Locke also read to the jury the opinion portion of his autopsy report, wherein he wrote: This nine-year-old white female, Rita Fisher, died of dehydration and malnutrition, conditions resulting from inadequate food and water intake. She had been admitted to Johns Hopkins Hospital on June 25th, 1997 and expired as a result of abuse and neglect. Her physical development was retarded, whereas, she weighed 47 pounds, approximately one-half of the average weight of a nine-year-old girl.

Evidence of physical abuse included numerous recent and old abrasions and bruises to her head, chest, extremities, and buttocks. Multiple rib fractures exhibited a pattern of healing consistent with a severe chest injury several weeks prior to death. Multiple ligature marks on her wrist and ankles indicated that she had recently been bound. There was also a ligature placed recently around the chest.

Test for drugs and alcohol were negative. And no evidence of sexual abuse was seen. The manner of death is homicide. Dr. Locke concluded that Rita Fisher was “deprived of food and water and physically abused.” Martha Chinery, a nurse at Northwest Hospital Center, testified that she admitted Georgia Fisher to the hospital on June 26, 1997 at approximately 11:80 p.m.

Ms. Chinery described Georgia’s physical and emotional condition on being admitted: She was just a very scared, withdrawn little girl. Very emaciated. Painfully thin. Malnourished.

Her hip bones were sticking out, just a mess____ There were bruises all ⁹⁴ over her body of varying age.... [W]e got her off the stretcher into the bed and she just kind of hovered in the fetal position____ She wouldn’t talk unless spoken to. Ms. Chinery testified about an occurrence on the evening June 27, when Frank Scarpola and Rose Mary Fisher came to visit Georgia at the hospital. Well, it was Mr. Scarpola and Rose Fisher. They had come, and I remember him saying, “don’t give the nurses a hard time.

Don’t try and run away.” Basically that was what they said---- He [Scarpola] also questioned me as [to whether] a pregnancy test been done. Ms. Chinery also testified that Scarpola admitted to having locked Georgia and Rita in their room on prior occasions. Numerous social workers, teachers, and administrators in the girls’ respective schools testified for the State. Mary Friedman, an instructional assistant in Rita’s class the spring before Rita died, testified that on January 7, 1997, Rita came to school with a bruise on her face.

When questioned about the cause, Rita ultimately stated that “My mother hit me.” School personnel notified the Department of Social Services of the abuse. All three appellants testified in their own defense. Each, in essence, blamed the others for the crimes committed on the two girls. Rose Mary Fisher testified that she had moved out of the residence at 4106 Old Milford Mill Road for a period of several months and that when she returned in November of 1995, she brought her boyfriend of approximately two years, Frank Scarpola, with her.

She stated that when she and Scarpola first moved into the home, it was her mother, Mary Utley, who still had the responsibility for disciplining Georgia and Rita. Later, however, Scarpola took over the primary responsibility for disciplining the girls. Rose Mary Fisher admitted to having inflicted a very limited amount of physical abuse on the girls, as well as to having locked them in their bedroom and in “the hole” on at least one occasion when Scarpola was out of town. Rose Mary ⁹⁵ Fisher admitted that she had hit Georgia on the buttocks with a yardstick once because Georgia had stolen some money.

She denied, however, ever having punched or kicked the two girls, ever having withheld food or water from them, ever having had any knowledge that the girls were being deprived of food and water, or ever having had an awareness of the multitude of bruises that were found on Rita’s and Georgia’s bodies on June 25 and June 26,1997. With respect to the night of June 24, the night before Rita died, Rose Mary Fisher testified that she and Frank went out to dinner to celebrate the third anniversary of their having begun to date and that, upon their return from a restaurant, she went upstairs and went directly to bed. She explained she had no knowledge that Frank had tied Rita up. The following morning, Rose Mary Fisher went into her sisters’ bedroom and noticed that Rita’s hands were tied to the dresser.

She proceeded to cut the ties loose with a pair of scissors. At the direction of Scarpola, she helped him place Rita in a tub of warm water. Shortly thereafter, either Scarpola or Mary Utley told her to tell the authorities that Rita had fallen down the steps. The three appellants then proceeded to the hospital where Rita had been taken.

Rose Mary Fisher denied every having had any intention to harm either Georgia or Rita. With respect to her relationship with Scarpola, she testified that Scarpola made all of the decisions. She also stated that Scarpola had struck her on more than one occasion and that he had locked her in unspecified rooms in the house on more than one occasion. Mary Utley, the mother, next testified.

She laid much of the blame for the abuse committed on the girls on Scarpola. Utley testified that in early 1996 Scarpola “took control” over Rita’s and Georgia’s schedules, including the chores they were to do, their homework, and their discipline. According to Utley, Scarpola’s punishments increased in harshness and, when Utley expressed her disagreement with such punishing, he responded by calling her an “unfit mother,” “dumb,” or “stupid.” Scarpola would sometimes strike Utley. Utley also ⁹⁶ detailed that as part of Scarpola’s exercise of control over the entire household, he took the phone cord off the downstairs phone so that Utley could not use it, he locked Utley in her room, and he imposed a curfew on her.

Utley denied ever having locked Rita or Georgia in “the hole,” although she did acknowledge an awareness that the girls were being put down there. Utley testified that she did not intervene because she was “afraid of making things worse for them.” Utley did contend that she took the girls food and water while they were in “the hole.” Mary Utley admitted that she realized that there were “problems in the home.” She ultimately called the Department of Social Services. When asked why she had resorted to doing so, she explained: For the main fact that things were really out of control, it — Frank was totally in control. And there was no reasoning with him and [no] talking to him about anything.

And the fact that he wanted to put the girls in an institution. Utley met with a social worker, Tear Plater, at Utley’s place of employment on June 24, 1997. She explained that, prior to the June 24 meeting -with Tear Plater, “I couldn’t do it at home because Frank made clear that if I went over his head that he would see to it that I was put into an institution and my house would be taken away.” At that meeting between Utley and Ms. Plater, a home visit was scheduled for June 26. It never took place because Rita died the day before.

On the evening of June 24, Utley returned from work to find Rita and Georgia in their room, with Rita “sitting Indian style up against the bureau.” Utley denied having any knowledge that Rita was tied up. Scarpola informed Utley that the girls “had just been repunished” for lying to him. After questioning the girls about why they had lied, Utley went downstairs to fix dinner for herself, Rita, and Georgia. She gave the food for the girls to Scarpola and she later received back two empty plates.

She concluded that Rita and Georgia had eaten. Thereafter, she went to bed. The following morning when she awoke: ⁹⁷ Frank unlocked my door and told me to go downstairs and call [Kennedy Krieger Institute] to say that Rita would not be in [presumably for an appointment], that she was still sick with the flu. Utley complied.

When she later went to the girls’ bedroom, she noticed that Rita was “looking very bad.” Utley testified that she intended to call the pediatrician to obtain help for Rita but “she died before I had a chance to.” She then called 911. When questioned about that 911 call, she replied that she “told them that I found her at the bottom of the steps” because she had been “told to say that.” She elaborated: I told doctors and police [that Rita had fallen down the stairs], yes____ I was scared ... Frank had said that if we didn’t tell the same story that we would all answer to him. Utley then went to the Johns Hopkins Hospital where she was informed that Rita had died.

Utley also testified in some detail about Scarpola’s exercise of control over the household. She explained that she never called the Department of Social Services or anyone for help because Scarpola had “made it very clear that if I would call or contact anyone that I would be put in a mental institution and my children would live with him and Rose.” Scarpola would occasionally make the girls stand in a corner with their hands straight up in the air. When Utley objected, Scarpola would either hit her or call her an “unfit mother.” During the days leading up to Rita’s death, Utley admitted that she never checked on the girls to ensure their well-being. She explained that she failed to do so because “Frank would not allow anybody in the room but himself.” Utley exonerated her daughter Rose Mary Fisher to a large extent.

She testified that Scarpola did all of the punishing of Rita and Georgia and that Rose Mary only did so “when he demanded Rosie to do it.” Frank Scarpola was the last of the three appellants to testify. He stated that he moved into the Old Milford Mill Road home in November of 1995 and that at that time, the house “looked like a junkyard” and was a “complete wreck” ⁹⁸ with “mice and roaches” throughout the house. He acknowledged having become involved in disciplining Rita and Georgia Fisher in the spring of 1996, approximately three months after he had moved in, largely because Mary Utley could not handle the two children on her own. Scarpola painted a picture of himself as the Good Samaritan, entering an already unstable and chaotic household for the purpose of trying to restore some kind of order.

According to Scarpola, in early 1997 he contacted the Department of Social Services in an effort to get help for the family, and he further arranged for Rita to be seen at the Kennedy Krieger institute. Scarpola denied ever having hit the girls with boxing gloves or having punched them. He denied ever having hit Georgia over the head with a metal flashlight. According to Scarpola, Georgia made up the story as to how she received the injury.

He did, however, admit to shaving her head, pouring alcohol over the wound and sewing it, because he thought he could take care of it himself without seeking medical attention. He insisted that he “loved [Rita] like she was my daughter” and that he would never do anything intentionally to harm either Rita or Georgia because he “cared about both of them too much.” Scarpola did, however, admit to having inflicted numerous punishments on both girls. He explained that when efforts at “normal punishments” failed, he would then resort to measures such as spanking with a belt or a paddle and “occasionally” smacking the girls. He admitted to placing a lock outside of the girls’ bedroom to lock them in because he could not trust them any longer.

On the night before Rita’s death, Scarpola admitted to having tied her to a dresser with shoestrings. According to Scarpola, Rita had fallen and hit her chin on the floor, causing her chin to bleed. Rita would not stop “picking at” the wound on her chin, so Scarpola tied her up to “stop her from hurting herself.” Scarpola explained that he tied the strings very loosely. He insisted that it was Georgia who, after briefly untying her sister in the middle of the night to play with her for about an hour, had retied the strings too tightly.

Scarpola denied having any knowledge that Rita was dehydrated or ⁹⁹ malnourished. He further claimed that he only knew of a few bruises on Rita’s buttocks and back. Scarpola added that it was Mary Utley’s idea to lie to the authorities and tell them that Rita had fallen down the stairs. Second-Degree Felony Murder All three appellants contend that they should not have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on the underlying predicate felony of child abuse.

They do not seem to question, as a more abstract generality, the fact that the residual common law felony murder doctrine, as an integral part of Maryland common law, is broader and embraces more potential predicate felonies than the limited number of more egregious, or at least more high profile, felonies chosen as first-degree aggravators by Art. 27, §§ 408, 409, and 410. The appellants’ contention seems to be that the latter-day statutory felony of child abuse 1) was not a crime recognized by the common law and 2) is not inherently life-endangering and for either reason does not qualify as a predicate felony even in the broader arena of second-degree felony murder. Although we see no shred of merit in the contention, the subject is doctrinally fascinating and one on which this Court would happily discourse if it had the appropriate opportunity. 4 This appeal, however, does not present such an opportunity because of the utter failure of the appellants to raise such an argument before the trial court or to raise before us any alleged error with respect to it committed by ¹⁰⁰ the trial judge even by way of omitting some sua sponte responsibility. Even if the contention were properly before us, however, our resolution of it would be, at best, of only academic interest to Frank Scarpola.

A single charge of second-degree murder was submitted to the jury with respect to each of the three appellants. On the verdict sheets, the jury indicated “guilty” with respect to each of the three. Under that verdict, however, the jurors were further permitted to indicate whether a second-degree guilty verdict had been based on any one or more of three possible rationales: 1) intentional killing, 2) depraved heart, or 3) felony murder. Mary Utley and Rose Mary Fisher were found guilty on the basis of only the felony murder rationale.

Frank Scarpola, on the other hand, was found guilty on the basis of both the felony murder rationale and also the intentional killing rationale. Even if his conviction for second-degree murder, therefore, were found to have been flawed on the basis of the felony murder rationale, his conviction for murder in the second degree would still stand undisturbed on the basis of the self-sufficient intentional killing rationale. The first failing of all three appellants with respect to this contention came at the trial itself. At no stage of the trial was this present argument even allusively raised, let alone preserved for appellate review.

At the end of the State’s case, all three appellants moved and argued for judgments of acquittal. The subject of second-degree felony murder did not come up. At the end of the entire case, all three appellants renewed their motions for judgments of acquittal. Again, the subject of felony murder was not raised by anyone.

When the verdict sheets were submitted to the jury, no objection was lodged by any of the appellants on the basis of the inclusion of felony murder as a supporting rationale for a second-degree verdict. When the jury’s verdicts were rendered, no objections in that regard were raised by anyone. After Judge Levitz instructed the jury, Rose Mary Fisher objected to the instruction on second-degree felony murder, ¹⁰¹ but only on the express ground that it had not indicated that to be found guilty, a defendant must have participated in the particular phase of child abuse that caused the death of the victim. Mary Utley and Frank Scarpola joined in that contention and stressed the failure of the court to emphasize the necessary causative link between the death and the underlying felony.

Following Judge Levitz’s reinstruction, Rose Mary Fisher indicated her complete satisfaction with it. Mary Utley and Frank Scarpola renewed their earlier objections, but again those objections were couched only in terms of the proof of causation. It is not necessary to parse more finely these objections, however, for the appellants do not allege that Judge Levitz committed any error in instructing the jury on second-degree felony murder generally or on second-degree felony murder specifically predicated on the underlying felony of child abuse. Without suggesting that we would be at all inclined to notice a non-preserved contention on the basis of some plain error notion, the short answer is that the appellants have not even raised the suggestion that we resort to plain error as a way of avoiding the non-preservation obstacle.

The appellant Utley alone makes the effort, post-trial, to avoid the preservation problem by pointing to her motion for a new trial. After the State, in its appellee’s brief, argued that this second-degree felony murder contention had nowhere been preserved, Utley filed a reply brief in which she alleged that she had raised the issue in her motion for a new trial. She further argued in that reply brief that the opinion of this Court in Jeffries v. State, 113 Md.App. 322, 331 , 688 A.2d 16 (1997), is authority for the proposition that the timely inclusion of a contention in a motion for new trial will preserve the contention for appellate review even if it had not been preserved in the course of the trial proper. Jeffries holds no such thing.

We were not in that case discussing the issue of preserving particular arguments for appellate review. As a matter of logic, moreover, the inclusion of a contention in a motion for new trial might preserve it for review if we were reviewing whether the trial court had abused its discretion in ¹⁰² denying the motion for new trial. It would self-evidently not preserve the issue if we were reviewing the proceedings of the trial proper. In any event, Scarpola did not even file a motion for a new trial.

Rose Mary Fisher did, but she did not raise in that motion anything with respect to this issue. Neither did she argue anything with respect to this issue in the short, several-minutes-long hearing on the new trial motions before Judge Levitz. Whatever success in this regard Mary Utley may have will not rub off on them. In her new trial motion, Mary Utley did list among her eight reasons the following: 4.

Application of the felony-murder rule to the crime of Child Abuse is contrary to the law. 5. Application of the felony-murder rule to the crime of Child Abuse is unprecedented. There was no follow-up memorandum of law elaborating on those claims. At the hearing on the new trial motions, her argument consisted exclusively of pointing out that the child abuse statute was enacted in 1963 and was never, therefore, a crime at common law.

Judge Levitz denied both Utley’s and Fisher’s motions for new trial without comment. The fatal flaw in this last-ditch effort by Mary Utley to eke out some semblance of preservation for appellate review is that she has not appealed from Judge Levitz’s denial of her motion for a new trial nor claimed that he abused his discretion in that regard. For that reason alone, the contention is self-evidently not before us. Perhaps she was disinclined to appeal from that decision because of the words of Judge Digges in Carlile v. Two Guys, 264 Md. 475, 477-78 , 287 A.2d 31 (1972): There is probably no principle of law that rests on more decisions of this Court than the concept that a trial judge’s granting or refusing a new trial — fully, partially, conditionally, or otherwise — is not reviewable on appeal except under the most extraordinary or compelling circumstances.

This is true even though the trial judge’s decision is based on ¹⁰³ mistake or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Our adherence to this rule is unwavering and we do not find any extraordinary or compelling circumstances in the present case which would permit a review. In fact, this Court, in its long history, has never found such circumstances to exist. (Emphasis supplied).

See also Couser v. State, 36 Md.App. 485, 495 , 374 A.2d 399 (1977), aff'd, 282 Md. 125 , 383 A.2d 389 (1978); Burkett v. State, 21 Md.App. 438, 446 , 319 A.2d 845 (1974). Non-preservation, however, turns out to be the least of the hobbles crippling this appellate contention. The overarching reason why it cannot succeed is that none of the appellants points to anything that might qualify as reversible error. On this contention, the appellate brief of Frank Scarpola simply adopts the contention as posed by Mary Utley.

In combing both the Mary Utley and the Rose Mary Fisher briefs, we cannot find a single instance where they claim that Judge Levitz in the course of the trial committed any error with respect to this contention. They do not allege that Judge Levitz ever made an erroneous ruling, ever erroneously failed to rule when called upon to do so, or ever failed to take some action sua sponte even in the absence of a request. They do not claim that, either on request or sua sponte, he erroneously failed to dismiss the second-degree murder charge or any supporting rationale for that charge. They do not claim that at the end of the State’s case, he erroneously failed to grant their motions for a judgment of acquittal as to second-degree murder generally or as to the felony murder theory of second-degree murder.

They do not claim that at the end of the entire case, he erroneously failed to grant their motions for a judgment of acquittal as to second-degree murder generally or as to the felony murder theory of second-degree murder. They do not claim that he erroneously instructed or reinstructed the jury on the theory of second-degree felony murder predicated on the underlying felony of child abuse. They do not claim that he erroneously presented to the jury a verdict sheet that permitted a finding ¹⁰⁴ of guilty of second-degree murder on that theory. They do not claim that he erroneously accepted that verdict from the jury.

They do not claim that he abused his discretion in denying the motions of two of the appellants for a new trial. They do not claim that he erroneously sentenced the appellants for their convictions for second-degree murder. The appellants do not tell us what they ever asked Judge Levitz to do about second-degree felony murder which he failed to do. They do not even tell us what they now claim he should have done even absent any request from them.

They overlook the most fundamental principle of appellate review, which is that the action of a trial court is presumed to have been correct and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party claiming error first to allege some error and then to persuade us that that error occurred. In this case, the appellants do not even allege error. In DeLuca v. State, 78 Md.App. 395, 397-98 , 553 A.2d 730 (1989), we discussed this quintessential nature of the appellate process: We begin our analysis by restating one of the most fundamental tenets of appellate review: Only a judge can commit error. Lawyers do not commit error.

Witnesses do not commit error. Jurors do not commit error. The Fates do not commit error. Only the judge can commit error, either by failing to rule or by ruling erroneously when called upon, by counsel or occasionally by circumstances, to make a ruling.

(Emphasis supplied). In Ball v. State, 57 Md.App. 338, 359 , 470 A.2d 361 (1984), we elaborated on this same fundamental requirement of the appellate process: The very framing of this contention illustrates for the thousandth time the epidemic fuzziness of so much recent appellate rhetoric. “Error” is a precise term of art in the appellate context. No matter how reprehensible their conduct, trial attorneys, civil or criminal, for the State or for the defense, cannot, by definition, commit error; their conduct can do no more than serve as the predicate for possible judicial error. As Judge Powers carefully and thoughtfully ¹⁰⁵ analyzed for this Court in Braun v. Ford Motor Company, 32 Md.App. 545, 548, 363 A.2d 562 (1976): We know of no principle or practice under which a judgment of a trial court may be reversed or modified on appeal except for prejudicial error committed by the trial judge.

It is a misuse of language to label as error any act or failure to act by a party, an attorney, a witness, a juror, or by anyone else other than the judge. In other words, error in a trial court may be committed only by a judge, and only when he rules, or, in rare instances, fails to rule, on a question raised before him in the course of a trial, or in pre-trial or post-trial proceedings. Appellate courts look only to the rulings made by a trial judge, or to his failure to act when action was required, to find reversible error. (Emphasis supplied).

The appellant Mary Utley, almost like a character out of a Greek tragedy standing on some windswept crag, raises the cosmic lamentation that she was “convicted of a nonexistent crime.” Quite aside from the fact that appellate review is not designed to deal with cosmic lamentations, she was not convicted of a non-existent crime. Even if, arguendo, child abuse could not serve as a predicate felony for second-degree felony murder, Mary Utley was still not convicted of a non-existent crime. She was convicted of murder and murder is not a non-existent crime. In Jeffries v. State, 113 Md.App. 322 , 688 A.2d 16 (1997), the appellant there also claimed to have been convicted of a nonexistent crime and, indeed, had a far stronger argument in that regard than do the appellants here.

Jeffries was convicted of first-degree felony murder where the predicate felony alleged in the indictment was carjacking. Carjacking had not been added to Art. 27, § 410, however, until one month after the murder in question and the amendment to the statute was not made retroactive. Although we addressed certain aspects of that contention in other regards that had properly been ¹⁰⁶ raised, we dismissed Jeffries’s claim that he had been convicted of “a non-existent crime” known as “carjacking-murder”: The appellant ... was not convicted of, let alone charged with, a non-existent crime. He has badly misidentified the crime in issue.

He was neither charged with nor convicted of some crime known as carjacking-murder. There is no such crime. The appellant was charged with and convicted of the crime of murder. Murder, of course, was not only in existence as a crime on September 9,1994, the day on which the appellant murdered Daniel Huston; it has been in existence as long as the Anglo-American common law itself....

That is the charging document in question and there is no mention of “carjacking” therein. Murder was “the crime” with which the appellant was charged and of which he was convicted____ Even so basic a division of murder as that which split it into two degrees for punishment purposes, ch. 138 of the Acts of 1809, did not turn murder into two separate crimes. The crime, regardless of degree, remained simply murder. A fortiori, even lesser distinctions among the various theories, rationales, or mentes reae that may support a conviction for either second-degree or first-degree murder do not create separate crimes.

The crime is still murder whether based, for instance, on a finding of an intent to commit grievous bodily harm or on a finding of a depraved heart..... Within the more particularized realm of statutory felony-murder, the even more parochial distinctions among fifteen separate felonies and fifteen respective attempts (Art. 27, §§ 408, 409, 410) do not create thirty separate crimes. They represent nothing more than thirty different factual possibilities or modalities for committing felony-murder in the first degree. 113 Md.App. at 334-35 , 688 A.2d 16 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Mary Utley’s conviction for murder was not a conviction for a non-existent crime. ¹⁰⁷ What the appellants with this contention are implicitly asking us to do is to bend and to stretch the rules of appellate review and to exercise extraordinary discretion to deal with what they deem to be an injustice crying out for redress.

It is not even necessary to discuss whether we might be able to do so until the threshold is crossed of why we would wish to do so even if we could. The appellants ignore the distinction between due process and gratuitous process that we attempted to make clear in Jeffries v. State, 113 Md.App. at 325-26 , 688 A.2d 16 : When due process demands, the law will reverse the conviction of an undisputed and cold-blooded killer even on a technicality because it must. A critical component of that principle, however, is the qualifying clause “because it must.” It is not with any sense of satisfaction that a court reverses on a technicality. When it does so, it does so reluctantly and with heavy heart, and only because it must.

The philosophical converse is that when the procedural posture of an issue makes a reversal on a technicality a consequence that is not compelled but only gratuitously permitted, a court is frequently not motivated to be thus gratuitous. There is a vast philosophical, as well as legal, distinction between due process and gratuitous process. There are procedural requirements that must be satisfied before process literally becomes due. For a reviewing co'u/rt to overlook a precondition for review or to interpret loosely a procedural requirement, on the other hand, is an indulgence in favor of a defendant that is purely gratuitous.

Even those who are indisputably factually guilty are entitled to due process. By contrast, only instances of truly outraged innocence call for the act of grace of extending gratuitous process. This appeal is not a case of outraged innocence qualifying for an act of grace. (Emphasis in original; emphasis supplied).

This was a bad case, one resulting in the tragic death of a nine-year-old girl and the equally tragic psychological scarring of a fifteen-year-old girl. The criminal agency of the three ¹⁰⁸ appellants is not in dispute. They were unquestionably to blame for the barbaric treatment of two little girls who were deserving of their protection. Under the circumstances, this is not a case of “outraged innocence qualifying for an act of grace.” Second-Degree Felony Murder Jury Instruction on Causation All three appellants contend that Judge Levitz, in instructing the jury on the subject of felony murder, erroneously failed to explain adequately the necessary causal connection between the perpetration of the underlying felony and the resultant homicide.

In the course of explaining to the jury the various crimes with which all three appellants were charged, Judge Levitz informed the jurors that the three defendants were “charged with homicide.” He then explained that that overall charge included “murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and involuntary manslaughter.” He proceeded to give brief explanations of all three degrees of criminal homicide. With respect to murder in the second degree, moreover, he further explained that “[t]here are three types of second degree murder.” He first instructed the jury as to 1) second-degree murder of the specific intent to kill variety, then 2) second-degree murder of the depraved heart variety, and finally 3) second-degree murder of the felony murder variety: The third type of second-degree murder is referred to as second degree felony murder. In order to convict a defendant of this type of second degree murder the State must prove one, that the defendant committed a child abuse. Two, that the defendant or another participating in the crime killed Rita Fisher.

And three, that the act resulting in the death of Rita Fisher occurred during the commission of a child abuse. In this type of second degree murder the State is not required to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim. ¹⁰⁹ But for the substitution of “second degree” for “first degree,” that instruction followed, word for word, Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction — Criminal 4:17.7 for first-degree felony murder. The Pattern Jury Instruction, in turn, follows precisely from Art. 27, Sects. 408, 409 and 410, which provide, “All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of [a particular felony] ... shall be murder in the first degree.” (Emphasis supplied). After describing the various crimes with which the appellants were charged, Judge Levitz then explained generally the degree of complicity or level of participation that a defendant must have had to be found guilty of a crime: In this case the defendants are charged with the crimes of homicide and child abuse.

A person who aids and abets in the commission of a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator, even though he or she did not personally commit each of the acts that constitutes the crime. A person aids and abets the commission of a crime by knowingly associating with the criminal venture, with the intent to help commit the crime, being present when the crime is committed and seeking by some act to make the crime succeed. In order to prove that a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime the State must prove one, that a defendant was present when the crime was committed. And two, that a defendant wilfully participated with the intent to make the crime succeed.

Presence means being at the scene or close enough to render assistance to the other perpetrators. Wilful participation means voluntary and intentional participation in the criminal act. Some conduct by a defendant in furtherance of the crime is necessary. We would have no problem with the adequacy of that instruction as to the necessary causative link between the underlying felony of child abuse and the resultant death of Rita Fisher.

Judge Levitz’s statement that the jury must find that “the act resulting in the death of Rita Fisher occurred during the commission of a child abuse” follows verbatim ¹¹⁰ MPJI-Cr. 4:17.7’s language that “the act resulting in the death of [the victim] occurred during the commission of [the underlying felony].” They both parallel the statutory requirement of first-degree felony murder that the killing “be committed in the perpetration of [the underlying felony].” Both at that point in the instructional process and again following the reinstruction, Frank Scarpola alone expressly objected to the adequacy of the instruction on the issue of causation. We hold that the instruction was adequate. It is highly dubious whether the objection made by Mary Utley at the end of the initial instructions went to anything except the giving of a felony murder instruction generally. To the extent to which some objection by her on the issue of causation can be inferred, however, our rejection of the contention is the same as in the case of Frank Scarpola.

What Scarpola, and perhaps Utley, sought to do was to obtain a jury instruction that would limit the cause of death to some highly particularized constituent element of child abuse, thereby negating any causative link between Rita’s death and all other aspects of the child abuse totality. They wanted to carry out the causation to the last possible decimal point. The child abuse in this case, however, cannot be so finely parsed or endlessly fragmented into a series of discrete and unconnected acts. The course of abuse was an ongoing and cumulative “whole” over a period of many months for which all of the appellants were jointly responsible.

The medical examiner gave as the ultimate cause of death “malnutrition, and dehydration.” To be sure, he did then testify that as between those two contributing causes, dehydration would literally take effect first, killing the victim before the malnutrition would be lethal. There is no solace to be found there, however, permitting one codefendant to claim that her depriving Rita of food could not be a cause of death because the last-second cowp de grace had actually been a codefendant’s depriving Rita of water. De Vaughn v. State, 232 Md. 447, 455-56 , 194 A.2d 109 (1963); Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 353 , 164 A.2d 467 (1960); Duren v. State, 203 Md. ¹¹¹ 584, 593-94, 102 A.2d 277 (1954); Blackwell v. State, 34 Md.App. 547 , 558-59 n. 3, 369 A.2d 153 (1977); Tipton v. State, 39 Md.App. 578, 588 , 387 A.2d 628 (1978). Even focusing narrowly on dehydration itself, moreover, Rita’s dehydration was a continuing and cumulative condition, not the unique deprivation of the last possible drink of water for which a single codefendant bore exclusive responsibility, exculpating all prior deprivers of blame.

On the basis of the electrolyte changes in Rita’s body, Dr. Locke concluded that the dehydration that was the cause of death was not an “acute” or sudden dehydration but a “chronic dehydration,” a “process that takes days or, if not longer, weeks.” He described her dehydration as “severe,” resulting in the loss of “approximately 15% of her body water.” That long-term dehydration was clearly the result of having been locked in the bedroom without food or water on multiple occasions and of having been locked in the “hole” for days at a time without food or water on multiple occasions. It was as a result of an ongoing pattern of child abuse in which all of the appellants had participated. At the end of the initial instruction, however, Rose Mary Fisher, because of the State’s charging pattern, did have a technical point which Judge Levitz acknowledged could have merit. The State had charged all three appellants with two distinct periods of child abuse: one from April 15 through June 23 and the other on June 24 and June 25 specifically.

Rose Mary Fisher’s argument was that 1) if she were found guilty of the first period of child abuse but not guilty of the second and 2) if the death of Rita were found to have been only as a result of the second period of child abuse, the initial instruction might have permitted her, Rose Mary Fisher, to be convicted of felony murder predicated on a felony she had not committed. 5 ¹¹² Judge Levitz accordingly reinstructed the jury, adding a critical clause to make certain that a defendant must be guilty not only of some act of child abuse but of that particular phase of child abuse charged as the underlying predicate felony. I want to again give you the definition of felony, second degree murder, because I left out a phrase that I think counsel has brought to my attention that I think is important. So this is the definition of felony second degree murder, the type of second degree murder. In order to convict the defendant of this type of second degree murder the State must prove one, that the defendant committed a child abuse.

Two, that the defendant or another participating in the crime killed Rita Fisher. And three, that the act resulting in the death of Rita Fisher occurred during the commission of child abuse and that the defendant participated in that child abuse. (Emphasis supplied). That reinstruction fully satisfied Rose Mary Fisher and she made no further objection.

Neither did Mary Utley make further complaint, except to renew her objection to the giving of any second-degree felony murder charge at all. Frank Scarpola simply renewed his earlier objection on the subject of causation generally. Even if preserved, on the issue of jury instructions or reinstructions, we see no error. Non-Disclosure of Confidential and Privileged Records All three appellants make the free-wheeling and undifferentiated charge that Judge Levitz erroneously “refus[ed] to compel disclosure to the defense [of] confidential and privileged records.” Although we will attempt to answer what we deem to be the most significant sub-aspect of this amorphous charge on its apparent merits, our more summary rejection of large parts of the contention follows from its unfocused nature.

This contention could easily have been dismissed without serious consideration because of its lack of specificity. ¹¹³ To answer this omnibus complaint in meaningful detail, we would have to do for the appellants what they have not done for themselves. We would have to isolate a dozen distinct subclaims controlled by various statutory provisions and legal principles, something the appellants have not done. Although the appellants do not tell us this, the disclosure of confidential information from the Baltimore County Department of Social Services, for instance, is governed by Art. 88A (Department of Human Resources), Sect. 6A, whereas the disclosure of confidential information from the Baltimore County Board of Education is governed by the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 13A.08.02.20A. Presumably other statutory provisions control the disclosure of confidential information from other agencies involved in this contention, but the appellants have been content to lump them all together without any statutory citation.

We would have to make a distinct legal argument pertinent to each subclaim, referring to the apposite statutory provision, something the appellants have not done. We would ultimately have to answer the distinct arguments that we had concluded the appellants would like to have made. For their part, the appellants have simply thrown generous handfulls of subissues against the wall, hoping that something will stick. They do not differentiate, for instance, their entitlement to review records as part of eleventh-hour discovery from their entitlement to introduce the records into evidence at trial.

Their contention deals expressly with the former although the key ruling to which they object at least implicates the latter. They do not differentiate the privacy interest in “a student’s education records” from that in “a state’s child abuse information.” Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 76 , 602 A.2d 1247 (1992) (“There is not the same degree of urgency to limit access to the education records of students as is true in the case of maintaining child abuse information confidential.”) Most significantly, they do not differentiate the breaching of confidentiality from the breaching of a privilege. Reynolds v. State, 98 Md.App. 348, 368 , 633 A.2d 455 (1993) (“These records are confidential and the patient has a right to privacy with respect ¹¹⁴ to them, but they should not be kept from defense counsel under the theory that they are privileged.”) We have not even alluded to the problem of trying to figure out, -without a scorecard, which appellants summoned which records and which appellants did not even issue subpoenas the quashing of which they now challenge. An appellant may not deftly dodge a preservation problem by adopting an appellate contention of a codefendant who has no preservation problem.

There seems to be an unstated .assumption that everything applies to everybody. In essence, what we have been presented with on this contention is a case of undifferentiated angst. Because of the importance of the case, however, we will make an effort to compartmentalize this amorphous mass and then look at it, compartment by compartment. A. Confidentiality of Agency Records: Initially before Judge Levitz on March 19, 1998, was a defense motion that he issue a subpoena duces tecum for documents and tangible evidence [of] various records, custodian of records of Kennedy Krieger Institute, for all records pertaining to the treatment rendered to Rita Fisher; custodian of the records of Baltimore County Board of Education for any and all school records; ARD team notice; student health records and records from Chatsworth School for Rita Fisher, also for Georgia Fisher, also for Rose Mary Fisher and Robin Utley Fisher, now Robin Longest; custodian of the records for the Baltimore County Department of Social Services, for all records in case files as it pertains to Rita Fisher, Georgia Fisher, Rose Mary Fisher and Robin Utley Fisher; Doctor Alvin Stambler, the medical records of Rita Fisher; Dutch Ruppersberger, Baltimore County Executive, all investigative records and files as it relates to the Baltimore County Executive’s investigation into Social Services as it pertains to the death of Rita Denise Fisher and other children in that household; And Mark Vidor, Assistant Director of Family Services, all files relating to the ¹¹⁵ Fisher/Utley family; as well as investigative reports that have been written after the death of Rita Denise Fisher.

With respect to requests for subpoenas, Judge Levitz explained that it is not the trial judge’s responsibility to issue a subpoena duces tecum in the first instance. It is the job of the defendant to request the clerk of the court to issue subpoenas. If the agency on which the subpoena is served then elects to assert the confidentiality of the records as a reason not to respond to the subpoena, that agency must file an objection with the court and a representative from it may have an opportunity to be heard. That procedure was followed.

When the next pre-trial hearing convened on March 27, 1998, representatives from four Baltimore County agencies were present to move that the respective subpoenas duces tecum served on them be quashed. The agencies were the Board of Education, the Department of Social Services, the Office of the County Executive, and the Health Department (Division of Developmental Disability). Bruce Mermelstein responded for the Department of Social Services and, uniquely among the responding representatives, relied on Maryland Code, Art. 88A, Sect. 6, which provides for “Social Services records being confidential.” None of the appellants has, in appellate brief or argument, even referred to Art. 88A, Sect. 6, let alone informed the Court of what it says. They have not argued as to whether it precludes disclosure or not.

It is not the job of this Court to search out reasons why Judge Levitz may have been correct in a particular ruling. His ruling is presumed to have been correct, and the burden is on the appellants to persuade us that the presumptively correct ruling was in error. On this subissue, the appellants demonstrably have not so persuaded us and we will look no further at anything concerning the records of the Department of Social Services. We do note, however, that at the March 27 hearing, Judge Levitz deferred action on the motion to quash that particular subpoena.

On April 6, however, he ruled that the Department of Social Services would not be required to divulge any of its ¹¹⁶ records except for one document that was released to Rose Mary Fisher, because a single sentence on a single page could have been exculpatory as to her. As far as individual social workers themselves were concerned, there was no impediment to their being called as trial witnesses, and, indeed, five of them were called and testified for the defense. In terms of those witnesses referring to notes or records, moreover, there was no limitation imposed on their direct or cross-examinations. With respect to any records of the Department of Social Sendees, therefore, there is no suggestion as to what possible prejudice may have been suffered by any of the appellants.

We see no error with respect to this subcontention. As Robert Haines responded for the Board of Education, most of the controversy with respect to the confidentiality of its records dropped out of the case. In the course of his testimony at the hearing, it became apparent that there was much confusion in the defense ranks as to the scope of the motions to quash the subpoenas. It became clear that the defense attorneys were primarily apprehensive about their entitlement at trial to call various teachers and social workers who had been involved with different members of the Fisher family.

The defense erroneously assumed that the quashing of a subpoena duces tecum for the respective agency’s records would preclude the defense from calling teachers and the social workers as trial witnesses. Judge Levitz assured counsel that whatever was decided with respect to the production of records had nothing to do with their right to call live witnesses. In fact, at trial the appellants did call numerous teachers and social workers as defense witnesses and were in no way impeded in that effort. Robert Haines further reduced the area of the controversy.

He indicated that although the subpoena to the Board of Education called for all school records, ARD notes, health records and reports from Chatsworth School concerning four members of the family, and ARD team meeting notes, the Board was not contesting the subpoena with respect to any of those items. It was only challenging the order to produce the ¹¹⁷ psychotherapy records of Georgia Fisher. Nothing but the reports of the interviewing psychiatrists or psychologists was sought to be protected as privileged. 6 The controversy with respect to the Board of Education was thus reduced from one involving both agency confidentiality and privilege to one involving only the issue of privilege. Because the motion to quash filed by the Board of Education dealt only with psychotherapy records, Judge Levitz, on March 27, ruled that the divulgence of those particular records involved not the issue of confidentiality but the issue of privilege and, on that basis, he quashed the subpoena.

The merits of that ruling will be discussed infra when we turn to a consideration of the issue of privilege. The third agency involved in the hearing to quash the subpoenas was the Baltimore County Health Department, Division of Developmental Disability, as the apparent umbrella agency for a group called the Cerebral Palsy Children. Rita Fisher had once been evaluated by the Cerebral Palsy Children. Mary Utley argued that Dr. Alvin Stambler, a pediatrician, would probably be called as a witness by the State and that part of Dr. Stambler’s diagnosis would probably be based on a report received by him from the Cerebral Palsy Children.

She felt she would need the report for effective cross-examination. The apparent subject matter of the evaluation and the report was a congenital hip condition suffered by Rita. At the March 27 hearing, Judge Levitz deferred action on that particular motion to quash the subpoena. On April 6, however, he ruled that the Division of Developmental Disability was not required to divulge to the defense any of its records.

Subsequent events revealed that there was no conceivable prejudice suffered by the appellants as a result of that particular ruling. The State never called Dr. Stambler as a witness. Co-defendant Frank Scarpola did. Dr. Stambler was Rita’s ¹¹⁸ pediatrician from June of 1993 until the time of her death.

He mentioned the preexisting hip condition and indicated that his records showed that Rita “had been seen by not only one orthopedist, but I think a consulting orthopedist who diagnosed her hip as femoral anti-version.” That report from the consulting orthopedist was presumably the report from the Cerebral Palsy Children. Dr. Stambler explained what a “femoral anti-version” is and further indicated that it was a condition that one would not attempt to correct “until many years had passed.” He went on to describe other and more relevant observations he had made of Rita. Counsel for Mary Utley briefly cross-examined Dr. Stam-bler and was not in any way impeded in the scope of her cross-examination. The only arguable reference to a report from the Cerebral Palsy Children was the following: Mr. Nugent: Doctor, did you have the opportunity to speak with Dr. Parker or did you receive any records from him?

A: I received some records. Q: Okay. Mary Utley seemed satisfied and pursued it no further. At this point we cannot imagine what possible prejudice Mary Utley, or either of the other appellants, are suggesting might have flowed from the ruling that the Division of Developmental Disability need not divulge any of its records to the defense.

The appellants suggest none. As to this subcontention, we see no error. With respect to the fourth and final subpoena duces tecum, the representative of the Office of County Attorney had nothing to say at the hearing and none of the appellants said anything with respect to records subpoenaed from that office. At the March 27 hearing, that subpoena was quashed by Judge Levitz.

On this appeal the appellants have said nothing with respect to any such records or to any prejudice suffered because of the lack of such records. For lack of argument, that subcontention languishes. We see no error. To the extent that the appellants are now claiming some right of discovery in order to review anything except the ¹¹⁹ privileged psychotherapy records of Georgia Fisher, it must be noted that the appellants actually were furnished with virtually, if not literally, everything they are now claiming they were denied.

At the hearing on March 19, 1998, Assistant State’s Attorney James Gentry informed the court that almost all of the records that were the subject matter of the later subpoenas duces tecum had already been voluntarily turned over by the State to the defense. [W]e do have records that have been supplied to the defense. They are the records from the Department of Social Services relating to all of the investigation of the Fisher/Ut-ley household. We have Rita and Georgia’s school records. We have supplied that to them.

We have their health records. We have supplied that to them. We have the records from Georgia, Doctor Stambler, the pediatrician. We have supplied that to them.

We have the records from the Johns Hopkins Hospital. We have supplied that to them. From Northwest Hospital, we have supplied that to them. We have the records from the other schools that Georgia attended.

Her school records and health records we have supplied that to them.... [W]e gave them everything leading up to the 25th of June. Judge Levitz had the State clarify and reiterate that revelation and it was clear that the voluntary disclosure by the State included everything in dispute except the psychotherapy records relating to Georgia Fisher that were generated after June 25,1997, the day Rita Fisher died. The Court: Are you stating here for the record that all of the records that you have obtained from anybody who’s treated Georgia Fisher you’ve given to the Defense? [Prosecutor]: Everything, every record, every record that we have pertaining to Rita and Georgia, be it school records, therapy notes, DSA reports, Child Protective Services records, everything, every piece of paper we have has been given to the defense. Everything.

And numbered for them so there is no dispute later on. So they’ve gotten our entire five volumes of information. ¹²⁰ At the subsequent hearing on March 27, Assistant State’s Attorney Ann Brobst reconfirmed that the defense team had had full disclosure. Ms. Brobst: All records which were subpoenaed by my office during the investigation were provided to defense counsel. They were numbered and sent out after the court signed a protective order limiting their disbursal beyond that to the immediate counsel.

The Court: So are you relating that all records that you received have been given to the defense under seal? Ms. Brobst: Subject to your protective order, that’s correct, Your Honor. Despite all of the forensic thunder, therefore, there really does not appear, on close examination, to be anything in dispute except the psychotherapy records relating to Georgia Fisher after June 25, 1997. Mary Utley’s brief, indeed, acknowledges, “The State asserted that it had already disclosed to the defense all records up to June 25, 1997; the bone of contention was records generated thereafter.” The Scarpola brief piggybacked on the Utley brief and presumably agrees.

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the agency records in issue had already been furnished to the defense by the State, the appellants’ contention is framed not in terms of introducing at trial otherwise confidential records but exclusively in terms of reviewing a mass of records in the hope of finding usable material therein. Contention IV in Utley’s brief is labeled “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE TO THE DEFENSE OF CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED RECORDS.” (Emphasis supplied). This contention begins, “A recurring issue in this case was the entitlement of the defense to review confidential and/or privileged documents compiled by various government entities ...” (Utley brief at 27)(emphasis supplied). “The trial court erred both in refusing to permit at least counsel for appellant to review the records ...” (Id. at 30)(emphasis supplied). “While these cases confer no automatic right to disclosure, they do recognize that under certain circumstances ¹²¹ the needs of the defendant in preparing for trial may outweigh the confidentiality or privacy interest of the alleged victim.” (Id. at 30)(emphasis supplied). “Under these circumstances, permitting review by counsel in conjunction with a protective order limiting further disclosure was the minimally necessary relief consistent with guaranteeing a fair trial.” (Id. at 31)(emphasis supplied). The Scarpola brief on this contention simply adopted the Utley brief.

The Rose Mary Fisher brief is essentially a copy of the Utley brief. Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 127 , 651 A.2d 866 (1995), before reaching the subject of more sacrosanct privileged records, discussed the limited access available to even “merely confidential” records. Even if the records in the instant case were not privileged, but were merely confidential, we would nonetheless hold that the motions judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to issue the pre-trial subpoena and declining an in camera review of those records. It is the defendant who bears the burden of showing not only a possibility but a likelihood that a review of confidential records will reveal relevant information. [T]o overcome a privacy interest in ... records, some relationship must be shown between the charges, the information sought, and the likelihood that relevant information will be obtained as a result of reviewing the records.

Thus, to obtain pre-trial discovery of confidential records, Zaal and Harris require the defendant to show a likelihood of obtaining relevant information. 337 Md. at 128 , 651 A.2d 866 (citations omitted). Most significantly for the present case, a mere assertion that the credibility of a witness is an issue and that “some latitude” is necessary in looking for impeaching material is not enough to cross the threshold. [I]t is the defendant who bears the burden of establishing the need for pre-trial disclosure. In the instant case, Goldsmith did not establish a need for the records. Goldsmith ¹²² asserted only that Laura’s credibility would be an issue at trial.

He did not establish that discovery of the records would likely lead to relevant information. Rather, he sought “some latitude in obtaining information that may enable him to confront his accuser in some meaningful way.” There was no showing of any likelihood of obtaining information relevant to the defense in the records. Id. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).

The threshold showing by the appellants in this case was no stronger than the showing held to have been inadequate in Goldsmith . There was not enough to compel an in camera review even by Judge Levitz alone. Notwithstanding the failure of the appellants to cross that threshold, even with respect to the confidential reports of the Department of Social Services and the Division of Developmental Disability, Judge Levitz nonetheless conducted an in camera review of all of the records in question. In open court on April 6, he ruled: I have, for the record, spent a number of hours last week reviewing all of the records that were submitted to me for review in camera.

From the Developmental Disabilities Agency, from the Department of Social Services, which I believe also included the records from Sheppard Pratt, as we discussed at a previous hearing in regard to my review for exculpatory information. After reviewing those records, which were literally hundreds of pages, I have determined that there was nothing exculpatory in the Developmental Disability records. There is, quite frankly, one page of the Department of Social Service records which I believe under the case law could be exculpatory, and I intend this morning to release that document to counsel for Miss Fisher, because that’s who it involves. It doesn’t involve anybody else, the exculpatory nature of it.

I intend to give that to you this morning, as well as a copy to the State. Other than that one page, which is really, it comes down to, one sentence, ¹²³ there was nothing else in the records that was exculpatory in my view. And so those records will not be divulged. As an alternative and independent rationale, we would rely on that in camera review as a basis for affirming Judge Levitz’s decision not to breach the confidentiality of the records in question. 7 B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege of Georgia Fisher: What the appellants were really concerned about were the psychotherapy records concerning Georgia Fisher.

Almost all of their argument concerned the possible discovery of material that might be helpful to impeach her credibility by showing prior inconsistent statements, to show bias or motive on her part, and to question her competence as a witness to perceive and to narrate events. All of the static about other records is little more than appellate opportunism. "When it comes to the reports of psychiatrists and psychologists, and their attendants, about the observation, interviewing, diagnosis, and treatment of Georgia Fisher, we move onto a higher and more sacrosanct plane of informational protec ¹²⁴ tion. We confront the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

Md. Code (1998 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 9-109(b),