Fitzgerald v. R & R TRUCKING, INC.

DAVIS, Judge. On August 24, 2001, appellant Larry T. Fitzgerald filed a claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The claim emanated from a work-related accident that occurred on January 10, 2001, when appellant slipped and fell on ice at a Pennsylvania truck stop. On March 22, 2002, a hearing was held before the Commission on the issue of whether Maryland had jurisdiction over appellant’s claim.

In an order dated April 22, 2002, the Commission concluded that Maryland did have jurisdiction over the claim. Appellee R & R Trucking, Inc. appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Wicomico County on May 2, 2002. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and a hearing was held on January 10, 2003. The trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and therefore reversed the decision of the Commission by concluding that Maryland did not have jurisdiction over appellant’s claim.

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 22, 2003 and the motion was denied on March 6, 2003. Subsequently, appellant noted his timely appeal on March 25, 2003, presenting one question for our review, which we rephrase as follows: Did the trial court err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment? We answer appellant’s question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the trial court. ⁸⁸ FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant, a resident of Maryland, applied for employment as a tractor-trailer driver with appellee in August 2000. Ap-pellee, a trucking company headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, has no offices in Maryland and, thus, appellant traveled to Missouri to apply for employment.

After accepting a position, appellant operated a tractor-trailer for appellee from approximately August 14, 2000 until January 10, 2001. During that time, appellee provided a truck for appellant to drive and dispatched driving assignments to him via satellite radio. The driving assignments were random, requiring appellant to travel throughout most of the United States. The only semi-regular route traveled by appellant was between Landover, Maryland and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Appellant made the Landover/Oklahoma City trip approximately nine times in the months of November and December 2000, hauling mail for the holiday season. Although appellant frequently passed through Maryland en route to other destinations and occasionally made deliveries in Maryland, such as Landover, he rarely visited his Maryland residence. 1 Instead, appellant spent most of the five months of his employment traveling and sleeping in his truck. When appellant did travel home, he parked his truck in Maryland at a relative’s residence. The employment relationship also required that appellee withhold Maryland income taxes from appellant’s paychecks and that the paychecks be directly deposited into appellant’s checking account at a bank in Maryland.

It is undisputed that appellant had a Maryland commercial driver’s license (CDL) at the time he applied for employment, but the parties disagree on whether appellee required appellant to obtain a Maryland CDL Hazardous-Material (Haz-Mat) license, which is required for the transportation of hazardous materials. ⁸⁹ On January 10, 2001, appellant slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot of a truck stop in Madison, Pennsylvania, resulting in an injury to his left shoulder. At the time of the accident, appellant was driving a tractor-trailer for appellee to a destination in New York State and, therefore, the parties do not dispute that appellant was within the scope of employment when he fell at the truck stop. Following the accident, appellant did not immediately seek medical treatment but instead continued on his delivery route, which eventually ended in Joplin, Missouri. While in Joplin, appellant received medical treatment, including surgery, which was performed on February 20, 2001.

Also, workers’ compensation benefits were initiated in Missouri, covering appellant’s lost wages and medical benefits. Subsequently, appellant returned to Maryland and, on August 24, 2001, he filed a claim with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission. On March 22, 2002, a hearing was held before the Commission. The primary issue addressed at the hearing was whether Maryland was the proper jurisdiction for appellant’s claim.

Appellee argued that Maryland was not the appropriate jurisdiction because appellant was not a regular employee in Maryland. Appellee suggested that Missouri was the correct jurisdiction because appellant applied for employment, initially received medical treatment, and received workers’ compensation benefits in Missouri. The Commission disagreed with appellee and ruled, on April 22, 2002, that Maryland did have jurisdiction over the claim. Appellee appealed the decision of the Commission to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on May 2, 2002.

As we noted, appellant and appellee both filed motions for summary judgment and, after the court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration, this appeal followed. LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. Specifically, appel ⁹⁰ lant asserts that he is a “covered employee” under Md. Code (1999 Repl. Vol.), Lab. & Empl.

(L.E.) § 9-203 and, therefore, that Maryland has jurisdiction over his claim. For support, appellant primarily cites Pohopek v. McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. 140 Md.App. 235 , 780 A.2d 383 (2001) [Pohopek I], aff'd, McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek, 375 Md. 574 , 826 A.2d 474 (2003) [Pohopek II]. 2 According to appellant, Pohopek is almost factually identical to the case sub judice because it also dealt with whether a tractor-trailer driver was a “covered employee” for purposes of a Maryland workers’ compensation claim under L.E. § 9-203. Appellant contends that, in Pohopek and the instant case, both drivers applied to a company based in another state, had paychecks mailed to Maryland, had Maryland taxes withheld, were required to obtain a Maryland license, and began and ended each trip in Maryland. Because this Court and the Court of Appeals both decided in Pohopek that the truck driver was a “covered employee” and that Maryland was the proper jurisdiction, appellant argues we should also conclude that Maryland is the proper jurisdiction for his workers’ compensation claim.

Appellee posits that appellant is not a “covered employee” under L.E. § 9-203 because the facts in the instant case are substantially different from those observed in Pohopek. The case sub judice, it says, is governed by Dixon v. Able Equipment Co., 107 Md.App. 541 , 668 A.2d 1009 (1995). “When granting summary judgment, the circuit court makes rulings as a matter of law and does not resolve disputed issues of fact.” Pohopek I, 140 Md.App. at 238 , 780 A.2d 383 . The trial court shall enter summary judgment when the moving party shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501 (e) (2001). Thus, the standard of review for summary judgment is whether the circuit court is legally correct.

Bow ⁹¹ en v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 454 , 677 A.2d 81 (1996); Pohopek I, 140 Md.App. at 238 , 780 A.2d 383 . The appropriateness of the summary judgment in the case sub judice, therefore, depends on whether the trial court was legally correct in its ruling that appellant was not a “covered employee” under L.E. § 9-203. Section 9-203 provides: § 9-203 Site of Employment (a) In general. — Except as otherwise expressly provided, an individual is a covered employee while working for the employer of the individual: (1) in this State; (2) outside of this State on a casual, incidental, or occasional basis if the employer regularly employs the individual within this State; or (3) wholly outside the United States under a contract of employment made in this State for the work to be done wholly outside of the United States (b) Incidental service in State. — (1) An individual is not a covered employee while working in this State for an employer only intermittently or temporarily if: (1) the individual and employer make a contract of hire in another state; (ii) neither the individual nor the employer is a resident of this State; (iii) the employer has provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage under a workers’ compensation or similar law of another state to cover the individual while working in this State; (iv) the other state recognizes the extraterritorial provisions of this title; and (v) the other state similarly exempts covered employees and their employers from its law. (2) If an individual is exempted from coverage under this subsection and injured in this State while working for the employer of the individual, the sole remedy of the individual ⁹² is the workers’ compensation or similar law of the state on which the exemption is based.

(3) A certificate from an authorized officer of the workers’ compensation commission or similar unit of another state certifying that the employer is insured in that state and has provided extraterritorial insurance coverage for the employees of the employer while working within this State is prima facie evidence that the employer carries that compensation insurance. (c) Outside State. — Except as otherwise expressly provided, an individual who is employed wholly outside of this State is not a covered employee. In order for appellant to be eligible for Maryland workers’ compensation benefits, he must be a “covered employee” under L.E. § 9-203(a). At the time of the accident, appellant was neither working exclusively in Maryland nor working outside the United States under a contract made in Maryland and therefore L.E. § 9-203(a)(l) and L.E. § 9-203(a)(3) do not apply.

Appellant was instead working in Pennsylvania when he fell and consequently the only portion of L.E. § 9-203(a) which has any potential application is L.E. § 9-203(a)(2).