Flores v. Bell

RAKER, J. Respondents Ronald and Melanie Bell filed an action sounding in negligence in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against petitioner Rafael Flores, alleging that Flores negligently caused injury to Mr. Ronald Bell in an automobile accident on October 4, 2000. The issue before this court concerns a stipulation entered into by the parties before the trial began, and the impact this stipulation had on questions submitted by the trial court for consideration by the jury. At the conclusion of a seven-day jury trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bells and awarded $5,329 in damages. The Bells appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and, in an unreported opinion, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial.

We granted Flores’ petition for writ of certiorari to primarily address the following question: 1 “On review of the trial court’s decision to reserve ruling on a motion for judgment and submit an issue to the jury, can ³⁰ the Court of Special Appeals vacate a jury’s verdict when, if it was error, it was harmless?” Flores v. Bell, 394 Md. 478 , 906 A.2d 942 (2006). I. Ronald Bell was struck from behind while driving a van near Crofton, Maryland on October 4, 2000. Seventeen days later, on October 21, 2000, Mr. Bell was in a second automobile accident. The Bells filed a Complaint against Flores for injuries that Mr. Bell allegedly sustained in the first accident and filed a separate suit against a different party for injuries that Mr. Bell claimed occurred in the second accident.

Prior to trial, counsel for both sides orally agreed to stipulate that Flores was liable for the underlying accident. The stipulation was not reduced to writing, nor was it formally placed on the record. During opening argument, the Bells’ counsel informed the jury that the parties have “stipulated that—and they admitted that it was Mr. Flores’ fault.” Flores’ counsel, in opening argument, also acknowledged the stipulation for liability. Flores’ counsel stated: “In this case, liability has been admitted.

Why? Because Mr. Flores admits that he made a mistake.... For whatever reason, whether Mr. Flores didn’t pay enough attention, took his eyes off the road, thought he had more time to stop than he did, for whatever that reason is, he couldn’t stop in time to avoid an impact so an impact occurred. Now, he has admitted it.

He has accepted responsibility for that and he comes before you today not to try to avoid responsibility, but to say that even though he is responsible for causing this impact ... he is not responsible for this litany of medical expenses that you have just heard.” In the Bells’ case-in-chief, the investigating police officer at the scene identified Flores as the driver of the vehicle that crashed into the Bells’. The officer, examined by the Bells’ counsel, testified as follows: “Q. Who did you determine was operating the vehicles? ³¹ “A. The gentleman sitting in the Defendant’s seat ... He was driving the passenger vehicle. The gentleman sitting next to you was driving the white van. * * * * * * “Q. Officer, testifying from your report, can you tell us who was in which car? “A. Mr. Rafael Flores was driving a Dodge Caravan, my correction, and Mr. Bell was driving a Ford van that was white in color.” At the close of respondents’ case and after the jury had been excused from the courtroom, Flores’ counsel informed the trial court that he intended to make a motion.

Before counsel articulated the grounds for his motion, the trial court, suei sponte, raised the issue of whether the Bells had proven that Flores was driving the vehicle that hit the Bells’ van. The following colloquy occurred: “[THE COURT]: For the record, the Plaintiff has rested his case. I will consider a motion by the Defendant at this time. Let me ask you a question?

Has anybody put the Defendant behind the wheel of the car that hit the Plaintiff from behind? “[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. “[THE COURT]: I didn’t think they did. Mr. Miklasz [the Bells’ counsel], I don’t think there is any evidence that puts that man behind the wheel of the trailing car. “[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: And it is on that basis, Your Honor, that we would move for judgment in favor of the Defendant, Mr. Flores. “[THE COURT]: I have been waiting. % s£ * s*s “[BELLS’ COUNSEL]: Now, the Defendant has admitted liability. They said that they have admitted liability in this case; they stipulated to liability. The question before the Court was for damages, and that is what we were here for____ ³² “[THE COURT]: Let me just say—as you know—Mr. Evans [Flores’ Counsel] didn’t even begin his motion, and I knew exactly what the motion would be about.

And I have gone home from this five-day trial everyday thinking, “I wonder when Mr. Miklasz [the Bells’ counsel] is going to put this Defendant behind the wheel.” “[THE COURT]: How about your admission of liability? “[FLORES’ COUNSEL]: We were careful. We admitted responsibility for the damages if the damages were causally proven to have related from this accident. That is a difference between saying that we admitted that he was the driver on that day in the vehicle. He could be a third party responsible party, just like an insurer, or just like any other—the parent of a minor child, saying that they will be responsible should the jury find that damages were causally related to an accident.

But there is a distinction between that and saying that Mr. Flores was the operator of the vehicle in question at the time of the accident. Mr. Flores has not taken the stand, and was not called as an adverse witness in their case.” The trial judge reserved ruling on Flores’ Motion for Judgment and informed counsel that he would include a question on the verdict sheet asking the jury to determine whether Flores was the driver of the vehicle that collided with the Bells’ vehicle. The first question on the verdict sheet stated as follows: “Do you find that the Plaintiffs have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Rafael Flores, was the operator of the second vehicle involved in the accident of October 4, 2000?” The Bells’ counsel objected to including the question on the verdict sheet. The jury answered “yes” to the first question (driver-identification), “yes” to the second question (whether Ronald Bell’s injuries were.proximately caused by Flores’ negligence), and awarded $5,329 in damages: $2,149 for past medical expenses; $680 in lost wages; $2,500 in non-economic damages; and $0 for loss of consortium. ³³ II.

It has long been the policy in this State that this Court will not reverse a lower court judgment if the error is harmless. Greenbriar v. Brooks, 387 Md. 683, 740 , 878 A.2d 528, 563 (2005); Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 , 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004). The burden is on the complaining party to show prejudice as well as error. 2 Greenbriar, 387 Md. at 740 , 878 A.2d at 563 ; Crane, 382 Md. at 91 , 854 A.2d at 1185 ; Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 330 , 368 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1977). Precise standards for determining prejudice have not been established and depend upon the facts of each individual case.

Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 356 , 825 A.2d 1042, 1050 (2003); see also State Deposit v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17 , 580 A.2d 1044, 1051 (1990) (reiterating that appellate court balances the probability of prejudice from the face of the extraneous matter with the circumstances of the particular case). Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below; an error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error. Crane, 382 Md. at 91 , 854 A.2d at 1185 ; Beahm, 279 Md. at 331 , 368 A.2d at 1011 (1977). We have also found reversible error when the prejudice was substantial.

Fry, 375 Md. at 356 , 825 A.2d at 1050 . The focus of our inquiry is on the probability, not the possibility, of prejudice. Crane , 382 Md. ³⁴ at 91, 854 A.2d at 1185 ; Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 148 , 577 A.2d 7, 12-13 (1990). We discussed the standard of review in civil cases in Crane, 382 Md. 83 , 854 A.2d 1180 , noting as follows: “Prejudice will be found if a showing is made that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below.

Tt is not the possibility, but the probability, of prejudice which is the object of the appellate inquiry.’ ‘Courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless they cause substantial injustice.’ Substantial prejudice must be shown. To justify the reversal, an error below must have been ‘... both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.’ ” Id. at 91-92 , 854 A.2d at 1185 (citations omitted).

III

Petitioner argues that, even if the trial court erred by submitting the driver-identification issue to the jury, the error, if any, was harmless because respondents suffered no prejudice. Petitioner further asserts that, because the error was harmless, it was improper for the Court of Special