Floyd v. State

Gilbert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Orlando Floyd, is a victim of circumstances. The fortuitous events leading to his conviction in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for violation of the Controlled Dangerous Substances laws of this state ³⁶⁴ prove the accuracy of the old cliche that “truth is stranger than fiction.” 1 On August 21, 1973, at approximately 7:45 P.M., Officer William West of the Baltimore City Police Department, received a radio message to investigate a shooting at 2036 Edmondson Avenue. West proceeded to the scene and upon arrival at the Shabazz restaurant he observed a man, later identified as the appellant, in a prone position on the floor.

The man was bleeding profusely from a wound in the right arm, two in the right leg and three in the left leg. Officer Lawrence Mize also went to the scene. An ambulance was called and, while awaiting its arrival, Officer West asked the appellant’s name, but the appellant “didn’t say anything.” West stated that he then turned to the other people who were in the restaurant and asked if any of them knew the-identity of the wounded man, but the response was in the negative. The ambulance transported Floyd to Bon Secours Hospital, and Officer Mize, in a patrol car, followed the ambulance.

At the hospital Floyd’s bloody clothing was cut from his body in order that he could receive treatment for the multiple gunshot wounds. According to Officer Mize he was told that Floyd’s condition was “stable”, so he then asked Floyd if he, Floyd, wanted to talk. Floyd responded, “Man, I’m shot. I ain’t got time to talk.” The officer, believing that he had possible homicide on his hands as a result of the multiple gunshot wounds, proceeded to check Floyd’s clothing for identification, as well as for evidence that might be useful in a homicide investigation.

In addition to four bullets found in one of Floyd’s pants pockets, the officer discovered twenty-four glassine bags of what proved to be heroin. The glassine bags were in a watch pocket of the pants and in a shirt pocket. When the case was called to trial before Judge Paul A. Dorf, sitting without the intervention of a jury, Floyd moved ³⁶⁵ to suppress the evidence on the ground that it had been seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Although Floyd testified in the case in-chief that he had upon request identified himself to Officer Mize, he did not testify at the suppression hearing.

Thus, insofar as the warrantless search was concerned, Judge Dorf had before him only the uncontradicted testimony of the officer. Judge Dorf found no violation of Floyd’s Fourth Amendment rights. We agree with that holding, and we affirm the judgment. The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” By its very language the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, but only “unreasonable searches”.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Patently the question presented is the reasonableness, vel non, of the search by Officer Mize of the clothing of a