Ford Motor Co. v. Wood

EYLER, Judge. This appeal involves two wrongful death and survival actions filed by appellees Nancy L. Grewe, individually, Rosanna Wood, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Nollie P. Wood, and Marjorie Grewe, as personal representative of the Estate of Keith K. Grewe, that were consolidated for trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The parties agree that appellees’ decedents died of mesothelioma, but disagree that the evidence at trial demonstrated that their diseases and resulting deaths were caused by their exposures to the asbestos-containing brake and clutch products of the appellant, Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). 1 Ford raises a number of challenges to the judgments entered in favor of appellees including challenges to the jury selection process and challenges to certain of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. In addition, Ford maintains that the evidence in ⁹ the Wood case was insufficient to support the judgment against Ford.

Finally, Ford asserts that the trial court should have applied the noneconomic damages cap to the survival/loss of consortium portions of the judgments. For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment in favor of Mrs. Wood and affirm the judgment in favor of the Grewe appellees. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Ford inquires on appeal: ' 1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by not striking two jurors for cause. 2.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying Ford its right to Maryland Rule 2-512(c) information. 3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to ask Ford’s voir dire questions. 4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in overruling Ford’s Batson challenges. 5. Whether there was sufficient evidence of Mr. Wood’s exposure to Ford’s brake and clutch parts to submit to the jury the issue of substantial factor causation in the Wood case. 6.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to permit Ford to introduce evidence of exposure of Grewe and Wood to other asbestos products to prove alternative causation. 7. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to apply the noneconomic damages cap to the survival/loss of consortium claims. In addition to those questions presented by Ford, Mrs. Wood’s arguments regarding Ford’s question 5 raise the novel question of whether Ford can be held liable for failure to warn of the latent dangers of asbestos-containing brake and clutch products that it neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce. ¹⁰ FACTS Nollie Wood was employed as a garageman at the United States Post Office Preston Street Garage in Baltimore City from 1948 to 1952. Although Mr. Wood did not work on brakes and clutches, there was evidence that Mr. Wood worked “within feet” of mechanics who did work on brakes and clutches at a rate of between three and nine jobs a day.

The brake and clutch parts contained asbestos and produced dust when they were replaced. In particular, Ford acknowledged that its brake linings, presumably similar in composition, were 40 to 60 percent chrysotile asbestos by weight. Dust was created during the replacement of brakes in a number of different ways. During normal use of brakes, dust accumulates in the brake drums, and it was a common practice at the Preston Street Garage to use an air hose to blow out the dust from old brakes.

The use of the air hose caused asbestos dust to be blown throughout the garage. In addition, during the process of replacing brakes, workers were required to grind the brake shoes so that the brakes properly fit the vehicles. This grinding process also would create dust. Finally, dust was created when the garage was swept at the end of each day.

It is undisputed that a majority of the vehicles that were serviced at the Preston Street Garage were Ford vehicles that were manufactured in the late 1920s and early 1930s. It further is undisputed that the vehicles did not contain their original brake and clutch parts by the time Mr. Wood began working at the Preston Street Garage in 1948. The two coworker witnesses who testified on behalf of Mr. Wood could not identify the manufacturers of the replacement brakes and clutches that were used at the Preston Street Garage between 1948 and 1952, and there was no documentary evidence, such as invoices or purchase orders, identifying the manufacturer of the brake and clutch products to which Mr. Wood was exposed. Mr. Wood was diagnosed with mesothelioma in January, 1990, and he died on May 26, 1990.

Experts testifying on ¹¹ behalf of Mr. Wood offered the opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Mr. Wood’s mesothelioma was caused by his exposure to respirable asbestos fibers emanating from brake and clutch work at the Preston Street Garage between 1948 and 1952. Ford contends that expert testimony excluded by the trial court would have shown that the most likely cause of Wood’s mesothelioma was his exposure to amphibole asbestos fibers in ship insulation when he worked as a longshoreman from 1942 until 1947. The jury awarded $2,000,000 for Mrs. Wood’s wrongful death claim, $840,000 for her loss of consortium claim, and $3,467,727 for the survival action, $3,450,000 of which was for noneconomic damages, for a total verdict of $6,307,727. The trial court denied Ford’s post-trial motion to apply to the survival action and loss of consortium claim the statutory cap on noneconomic damages set forth in § 11-108 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”).

Keith Grewe was employed as a mechanic at Foreign Motors in Baltimore City from 1957 through December of 1992, where he regularly worked on brakes and clutches. Mr. Grewe worked with Ford brakes at least weekly. Mr. Grewe testified that when he worked on Ford vehicles, he used Ford replacement brake and clutch parts because they fit better than the parts supplied by other companies. Mr. Grewe was exposed to dust containing asbestos during the repair of brakes when the worn parts were removed and compressed air was used to blow the dust from the drums.

Mr. Grewe testified that dust would get all over him and that he could taste the dust and would breathe it. Mr. Grewe also was exposed to dust when installing new brakes since he was required to use a file, hacksaw, and sandpaper in preparing the asbestos facings for installation. In October 1992, at age 56, Mr. Grewe sought medical attention for symptoms related to fluid which had accumulated around his lungs. Mr. Grewe was diagnosed with mesothelioma in January 1993, and he died on October 14, 1993.

Mr. Grewe’s medical experts testified that, to a reasonable degree ¹² of medical certainty, Mr. Grewe’s occupational exposures to Ford’s asbestos-containing brake and clutch products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma and resulting death. Ford contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that would have demonstrated that Mr. Grewe was exposed to asbestos while working as a sheet metal worker in the mid-1950s, and while using asbestos-containing joint compound while remodeling homes in the mid to late 1960’s. The jury awarded $4,000,000 for Mrs. Grewe’s wrongful death claim, $1,000,000 for her loss of consortium claim, and $8,069,934 for the survival action, $3,000,000 of which was for noneconomic damages, for a total verdict of $8,069,934. The trial court denied Ford’s post-trial motion to apply to the survival action and loss of consortium claim the statutory cap on noneconomic damages set forth in CJ § 11-108.

DISCUSSION I. Jury Selection Jury selection in Maryland is regulated by Title 8, Subtitle 2 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 143 , 691 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2536 , 138 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1997). “Modeled after the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. 1861-69 (1994), the selection process set forth in that subtitle necessarily embodies the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury.” Id. “A fundamental tenet underlying the practice of trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be ‘impartial and unbiased.’ ” Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 340 , 378 A.2d 1338 (1977) (citing Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)). “The objective of this tenet is to assemble a group of jurors capable of deciding the matter before them based solely upon the facts presented, ‘uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations....’” Id. ¹³ A. Challenges for Cause In a civil trial, a “party may challenge an individual juror for cause. A challenge for cause shall be made and determined before the jury is sworn, or thereafter for good cause shown.” Md. Rule 2 — 512(e); see also CJ § 8-210(b)(5). “In determining whether a juror should be excused for cause, the general question is whether a person holds a particular belief or prejudice that would affect his ability or disposition to consider the evidence fairly and impartially and reach a just conclusion.” King v. State, 287 Md. 530, 535 , 414 A.2d 909 (1980). “[T]he proper focus is on the venire person’s state of mind, and whether there is some bias, prejudice, or preconception.” Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 37 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993). During the course of voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if there were “any members of this panel or any member of their immediate family who has been involved or had a claim filed for an asbestos-related disease?” Appellant asserts that, in response to this question, seven panel members explained how their relatives “had been involved or had a claim filed for an asbestos-related disease” as follows: Juror No. 199 — His brother worked at Domino Sugar and filed a claim.

The trial court struck him without inquiring whether this fact would interfere with his ability to be fair to the parties. Juror No. 155 — Her father had black lung; her mother receives his pension for it. The trial court explained to the juror that “that is not asbestos.” When asked if this fact would interfere with her ability to be fair to the parties, she stated: “I don’t know. I don’t know.

I really don’t. I am not sure.” Juror No. 98 — Her brother-in-law had a claim that has been resolved; he receives residual benefits. When asked if this fact would interfere with her ability to be fair to the parties, she stated: “I don’t think so.” Juror No. 109 — His uncle recently settled a suit with an unknown asbestos company. When asked if this fact would ¹⁴ interfere with his ability to be fair to the parties, he stated: “I am unsure.

Yes, I guess.” Juror No. 195 — His father has a claim for asbestos. The trial court struck him without asking whether this fact would interfere with his ability to be fair to the parties. Juror No. 187 — Her father has an asbestos case and was represented by Peter Angelos (the same law firm that represented Mr. Grewe). The trial court struck her without asking whether this fact would interfere with his ability to be fair to the parties.

Juror No. 200 — “[His] fiancee is seeking an asbestos claim.” The trial court struck him without inquiring whether this fact would interfere with his ability to be fair to the parties. (Appellant’s Brief at 7-8). The trial court struck all of the foregoing jurors for cause with the exception of Juror No. 98. Although the defendant companies 2 had moved to strike Juror No. 98 for cause as well, the trial court denied that motion without an explanation.

Ford contends that the trial court’s refusal to strike Juror No. 98, or at least make further inquiry of her, constituted an abuse of discretion. Ford contends that Juror No. 98’s response to the trial court’s inquiry was just as equivocal as the responses of Jurors Nos. 155 and 109. Further, Ford cites the trial court’s failure to question Jurors Nos. 199, 195, 187 and 200 as support for its assertion that the trial court lacked a rationale for refusing to strike Juror No. 98. Ford implies that the trial court’s differential treatment of these jurors was arbitrary and capricious.

We note first of all that the trial court’s reasoning for questioning some of the jurors but not others is apparent from a review of the record. Specifically, each of the jurors that the trial court struck without questioning had a very close ¹⁵ relationship (brother, father, or fiancee) with an individual who had an asbestos-related claim. Further, Jurors Nos. 195 and 200 were related to individuals with pending, as opposed to resolved, claims. Jurors Nos. 98 and 109 had more attenuated relationships with individuals, brother-in-law and uncle respectively, who had resolved asbestos-related claims.

Juror No. 155 revealed that her father had black lung disease, not an asbestos-related disease. The trial court explained to the juror that black lung was not asbestos-related, but nevertheless asked her whether that fact would interfere with her ability to judge the case fairly and impartially. Similarly, we do not agree with Ford that Juror No. 98’s response was just as equivocal as responses supplied by Jurors Nos. 155 and 109. The hesitancy and uncertainty of the responses given by Jurors Nos. 155 and 109 is apparent from the face of the trial transcript.

By contrast, the response “I don’t think so” may express a degree of hesitancy or no hesitancy at all depending upon its delivery. In quoting Juror No. 98, Ford adds emphasis to the word “think” and informs us that it was preceded by a hesitant pause. That information, however, is not contained in the record. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe Juror No. 98’s facial expressions, intonation, and all of the subtle nuances that would render “I don’t think so” equivocal or unequivocal.

Accordingly, we must defer to the trial judge’s ability to interpret the response. Ford also challenges the trial court’s denial of the defendant companies’ motion to strike Juror No. 123. In response to the trial court’s question regarding hardships, Juror No. 123 revealed that she had an appointment on June 25, 1996, “a follow-up [for] lung cancer.” Ford maintains that the fact that the plaintiffs had mesothelioma, a cancer affecting the lungs, and that Juror No. 123 had lung cancer, required the trial court to strike Juror No. 123 for cause or, at the very least, make further inquiry of her regarding whether that fact would affect her ability to be fair and impartial. Ford argues that the trial judge’s introductory description of ¹⁶ the cases was insufficient to signal to prospective jurors that the cases were about a type of cancer affecting the lungs.

Hence, the trial court’s general question regarding bias would not necessarily be sufficient to uncover any bias Juror No. 128 may have had. We disagree with Ford’s position. In Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993), the defendant requested that the trial judge ask during voir dire whether any member of the venire was employed as a law enforcement officer or had friends or relatives employed in the law enforcement field. The defendant in Davis contended that he had a right to know such information because the prosecution’s case hinged upon the testimony of a police officer, and such a person would be more likely to believe a police officer than a criminal defendant.

The trial judge refused the defendant’s request, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court held that, although the trial court could, in its discretion, have asked such a question, it was not required to ask such a question. The Court first noted that the scope and form of voir dire rests firmly within the trial judge’s discretion, and further, that the purpose of voir dire is “to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.’ ” Id. at 34 , 633 A.2d 867 (quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58 , 146 A.2d 194 (1959) (quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140 , 88 A.2d 556 (1952) (citations omitted))). Although parties to a jury trial have a right to have questions propounded to prospective jurors concerning a specific cause for disqualification, id.

(quoting Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605 , 143 A.2d 627 (1958)), the Court determined that the question proposed by Davis was not such a question because an affirmative answer would not automatically disqualify the prospective juror. The Court further stated that [i]n general, the professional, vocational, or social status of a prospective juror is not a dispositive factor establishing cause to disqualify. Rather, the proper focus is on the venire person’s state of mind, and whether there is some bias, prejudice or preconception. Short of those instances where there is a demonstrably strong correlation between ¹⁷ the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification, mere status or acquaintance is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification of a prospective juror.

Id. at 37, 633 A.2d 867 . Just as the professional, vocational or social status of a prospective juror does not establish that the juror is biased, neither does a prospective juror’s affliction with a particular disease establish that the juror is biased. Just as a police officer would not necessarily be more likely to believe a police officer, a juror suffering from lung cancer is not necessarily more likely to believe plaintiffs who had a similar disease. The fact of Juror No. 123’s lung cancer arguably might influence her sympathy for the plaintiffs.

As we stated recently, however, a jury is not expected to judge a case without sympathy. See Fowlkes v. State, 117 Md.App. 573, 584 , 701 A.2d 862 (1997). (“[A] jury is expected to decide a case without bias or prejudice; it is not expected to do so without sympathy but is expected to follow the court’s instruction that it not be unduly swayed by it.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike Juror No. 123.

Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to voir dire Juror No. 123 regarding her illness. As we discuss more fully below, when a party requests inquiry regarding a specific area of potential bias, the trial court must engage in such inquiry. Davis, 333 Md. at 47 , 633 A.2d 867 . In this case, there was no request for voir dire regarding a specific area of potential bias. 3 ¹⁸ While we do not find reversible error, we note that a better approach in this case would have been to allow more expansive voir dire on issues of lung disease and, in introductory remarks, to explain to the panel that mesothelioma is a cancer affecting the lungs.

See Fowlkes, 117 Md.App. at 586 , 701 A.2d 862 . Such an approach would not significantly lengthen voir dire and would decrease the possibility that a prospective juror who should be disqualified for cause will not be identified. B. Rule 2-512(c) Information Ford next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Ford’s right to receive Rule 2-512(c) information. Rule 2-512(c) provides as follows: Jury List. — Before the examination of jurors, each party shall be provided with a list of jurors that includes the name, age, sex, education, occupation, and occupation of spouse of each juror and any other information required by the county jury plan.

When the county jury plan requires the address of a juror, the address need not include the house or box number. Such information is derived from juror qualification forms that are completed by each prospective juror. See Md.Code Ann., CJ, § 8-202 (1995 Repl.Vol., 1997 Suppl.). Relying on the rationale of Booze v. State, 347 Md. 51, 68-69 , 698 A.2d 1087 (1997), 4 Ford argues that the purpose of providing parties with Rule 2-512(c) information is to enable them to exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently and strategically.

Ford further argues that such information is useless to the parties if it is inaccurate. Prior to voir dire, one of the defendant companies indicated to the trial court that the voir dire process of a prior trial before the court had revealed certain inaccuracies in the juror ¹⁹ occupational information that had been supplied to the parties. Counsel asked that the trial court avoid a similar situation in this case by verifying the jurors’ occupational information during voir dire. Although the trial judge initially indicated a willingness to accommodate the parties, when he was asked again after voir dire had commenced, he declined to engage in such questioning based upon the holding in Davis, supra.

In Davis , the Court of Appeals expressly declined Davis’s invitation to broaden the scope of mandatory voir dire to include inquiry that would aid a party in the exercise of its peremptory challenges. Instead, it reaffirmed the principle that any questioning that seeks information to aid the parties in their exercise of peremptory challenges is wholly discretionary with the trial judge. In particular, the Court held that occupational information generally is the type of information that falls into the category of discretionary, as opposed to mandatory, voir dire. Davis, 333 Md. at 37-38 , 633 A.2d 867 .

Generally, the trial judge may, but need not, ask questions regarding occupation. Id. Absent some alternative remedy provided by Rule 2-512(e) or the statutory scheme of Title 8, Subtitle 2 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, the reasoning in Davis applies to Ford’s 2-512(c) challenge. Section 8-201 provides that each circuit court shall maintain a jury selection plan.

Section 8-202 provides that each jury selection plan shall specify detailed procedures to be followed by the jury commissioner or clerk in selecting jurors at random from voter registration lists or other sources, C J § 8-202(2), and provides for a juror qualification form which asks each potential juror certain information including occupation and occupation of spouse. CJ § 8-202(5). Section 8-205 provides that, when directed by the circuit court, the clerk or jury commissioner shall publicly draw at random, from the master jury wheel, the names of as many persons as are required for jury service. Section 8-206 provides for the mailing of juror qualification forms to those persons selected pursuant to § 8-205, with instructions that the form be com ²⁰ pleted and returned within ten days.

Section 8-206(c) provides that [w]hen a person appears for jury service, or is interviewed by the jury judge, clerk or jury commissioner, the person may be required to fill out another juror qualification form in the presence of the jury commissioner or the clerk of the court, and at that time, if it appears warranted, the person may be questioned, but only about his responses to questions contained on the form and grounds for his excuse or disqualification. The clerk or jury commissioner shall note any additional information thus acquired on the juror qualification form and transmit it to the jury judge. While § 8-206 gives the trial court the power to seek updated juror qualification information at the time a prospective juror appears for jury service, it does not require that such information be questioned or updated. Rule 2-512(c) merely provides that the information contained on the jury qualification form be transmitted to the parties.

It does not require that the parties receive more recent or current information. Subsection 8-211(b) provides that any party to a civil case may, before voir dire begins, move to stay the proceedings on the ground of substantial failure to comply with the jury selection procedures of Subtitle 2. Subsection 8-211(d) provides that where the trial court finds that there has been a substantial failure to comply with the selection procedures of Title 8, other than those contained in § 8-103, 5 and that the failure is likely to be prejudicial to the moving party, the court shall stay the proceedings pending selection of the jury in conformance with Title 8. ²¹ Title 8 provides a statutory remedy only in those instances in which the moving party has demonstrated (1) a substantial failure to comply with the selection procedures of Title 8, and, (2) when the violation is other than a § 8-103 violation, that the moving party is likely to be prejudiced by the substantial failure. Further, a § 8-211 challenge is timely only if made prior to voir dire.

That is true even if the party was unaware of the reasons for the challenge prior to the commencement of voir dire. See Hunt, 345 Md. at 143-16 , 691 A.2d 1255 (preventing, under § 8-211(a), the criminal equivalent of § 8-211(b), defendant in capital murder case from raising challenge post-voir dire). In this case, the defendants did state their challenge prior to the commencement of voir dire. They did not demonstrate, however, either substantial failure to comply with the jury selection process of Title 8, or a likelihood of prejudice.

In order to obtain a stay at this juncture, the defendants would have had to demonstrate (1) substantial noncompliance with the statutes governing the dissemination and completion of juror qualification forms (e.g., due to clerical error, juror qualification forms sent to prospective jurors do not include a question regarding the occupation of the juror’s spouse), and (2) that the defendants likely would be prejudiced by such substantial noncompliance. While it is true that a few inconsistencies in the occupational information were revealed during voir dire, such inconsistencies could have been due to recent changes in occupation, and are not evidence of substantial failure to comply with the procedures governing dissemination and collection of juror qualification forms. Further, given that the discrepancies were uncovered after the commencement of voir dire, Ford, under the reasoning of Davis , was entitled to verification of such information only if it could demonstrate that the information was linked to probable bias. That is a demonstration Ford was unable to make.

We are cognizant of the fact that, as a practical matter, a party often will not learn of inaccuracies in Rule 2-512(c) ²² information until after the commencement of voir dire. It is at this point that trial judges, under their broad discretion to fashion voir dire, have the ability to rectify such discrepancies. C. Ford’s Proposed Voir Dire Further, Ford contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to ask the venire panel the voir dire proposed by Ford. Ford submitted proposed voir dire containing forty-four questions.

The trial court declined to ask the voir dire submitted by Ford or any of the other parties, and instead, limited voir dire to the following nine questions: 1. Do the jurors know the decedents? 2. Do the jurors have any connection with any named company (defendants)? 3. Do the jurors know Plaintiffs’ counsel? 4.

Do the jurors know Defendants’ counsel? 5. Do the jurors know the potential product identification witnesses? 6. “Are there any member of this panel or any member of their immediate family who has been involved or had a claim filed for an asbestos-related disease?” 7. Do the jurors know the medical expert witnesses? 8. “If you do think that you have what is an extraordinary reason why you could not stay to a conclusion of this trial, please stand.” 9. “Is there any other reason at all that I have not specifically questioned you about, any other reason at all that would interfere with your ability to be fair to the parties in this case if you were selected as a juror?” Ford emphasizes the fact that, notwithstanding that the trial was expected to last up to four weeks, the trial court’s voir dire took only one hour to complete. The expected length of a trial, however, does not dictate the length of voir dire.

The scope and form of voir dire is left almost wholly to the discretion of the trial judge with the exception of those limited areas that are mandatory areas of inquiry under Maryland law. These mandatory areas recently were de ²³ scribed by the Court of Appeals in Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431 , 671 A.2d 33 (1996): [T]he mandatory scope of voir dire in Maryland only extends to those areas of inquiry reasonably likely to reveal cause for disqualification. There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service ...; or (2) “an examination of a juror ... conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.” ... In other words, we have held that the well-settled “right” to examine potential jurors, inherent in the constitutional right to fair trial and an impartial jury, translates into a defendant’s right to have certain questions propounded to the jurors where the proposed questions “concern a specific cause for disqualification.” Id. at 435-36 , 671 A.2d 33 (citations omitted).

When a party requests inquiry regarding a specific cause for disqualification, refusal to engage in such inquiry will constitute reversible error. Davis, 333 Md. at 47 , 633 A.2d 867 . In particular, where the parties identify an area of potential bias and properly request voir dire questions designed to ascertain jurors whose bias could interfere with their ability to fairly and impartially decide the issues, then the trial judge has an obligation to ask those questions of the venire panel. Merely asking questions, such as, “is there any reason why you could not render a fair and impartial verdict,” is not an adequate substitute for properly framed questions designed to highlight specific areas where potential jurors may have biases that could hinder their ability to fairly and impartially decide the case.

Id. Ford argues that a number of its questions “sought to reveal prejudices gained through education or training in the medical field or other employment.” Our review of such questions, however, reveals that they did not seek information ²⁴ regarding the panel members’ various states of mind. Instead, they sought the type of occupational information that is not mandatory under the holding in Davis. Davis does not foreclose the possibility that, in some instances, there may be a “demonstrably strong correlation” between a particular occupation and a particular bias (e.g., doctors in a medical malpractice case).

No such correlation, however, was demonstrated in the instant case. A few .other questions were directed to uncover information regarding the panel members’ experiences with cancer and other lung problems, and the panel members’ experiences with Ford products generally, not Ford friction products in particular. Even assuming that these questions were likely to uncover potential biases, Ford did not identify the areas of potential biases for the trial court and then request that its questions be asked. Instead, when the trial judge asked the parties whether they had any additional voir dire, Ford simply asked that all of its proposed voir dire be read: THE COURT: ...

For the defense, any request for additional voir dire? MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, for the record, Ford would go ahead and request that the voir dire questions that we submitted be read and specifically I can give you a list of those. THE COURT: Every area that you have asked has been fairly covered by the Court’s previous questions.

MR. WILLIAMS: Very good, Your Honor. In the absence of the identification of a specific question or questions coupled with an explanation that might have caused the trial court or this Court to come to a different conclusion, it appears that Ford’s lengthy voir dire was either fairly covered by the trial court’s voir dire or sought general information useful to the parties in the exercise of their peremptory challenges rather than specific causes for disqualification. D. Ford’s Batson Challenge Finally, Ford contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to conduct a Batson inquiry prior to ²⁵ the swearing of the jury.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal defendant who is a member of a cognizable racial group can challenge the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors ,of the defendant’s race. The Supreme Court has since applied Batson in a civil case. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). In addition, in Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 620-21 , 667 A.2d 876 (1995), the Court of Appeals held that Batson applied to peremptory challenges aimed at excluding white prospective jurors from the venire based on their race.

In Gilchrist , the Court of Appeals adopted the following three step process, first set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson , to determine whether the exercise of peremptory strikes is discriminatory: First, the complaining party has the burden of making a prima facie showing that the other party has exercised its peremptory challenges on an impermissible discriminatory basis, such as race or gender.... Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 625 , 667 A.2d 876 . Generally, a prima facie showing of discrimination is satisfied by showing a pattern of strikes against same race jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23 .

Second, once the trial court has determined that the party complaining about the use of the peremptory challenges has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering race neutral explanations for challenging excluded jurors____ Finally, the trial court must “determine whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 625-26 , 667 A.2d 876 (citations omitted). In the instant case, Ford made a prima facie showing of discrimination by pointing out to the trial court ²⁶ that appellees had used all of their strikes to strike white panel members. The trial court did not proceed to the second step, however. Instead, it ruled that Ford had not made a prima facie showing of discrimination because the racial composition of the jury approximated the racial composition of Baltimore City.

A comparison of the racial composition of the jury to the community from which it is drawn, however, is not the test required by Batson . When, as in this case, a party demonstrates a pattern of discriminatory strikes, the trial court must inquire whether the challenged party had race-neutral reasons for exercising his or her strikes. Then, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the strike has met its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Ultimately, at a post-trial hearing, the trial court did conduct a full Batson hearing.

At that time, appellees offered the following reasons for their strikes: MR. IGNATOWSKI: Number 94 was an auditor, and for that reason she was struck. This obviously — this case was going to involve economic values, economic figures. That was the reason that that juror was struck by the plaintiffs.

Number 157 was a high school teacher. There were a number of high school teachers in the venire that were part of the venire that indicated an unwillingness to serve. Number 157, I don’t believe, fell into that category, but we picked this jury in late May, and from the discussions of the whole panel, from the responses of the whole panel, there was some reluctance to serve by some teachers because it was the end of the school year, and we struck that individual who was a high school teacher. Also, numbers 94 and 157 both had postgraduate training, and that is evident from their juror selection list, and that was an additional reason that we used in our process to strike those two individuals.

Number 91, Juror Number 91, again, was an administrator. She had 20 years of education, and she was a wife of an attorney whom we believe to be an attorney who was ²⁷ affiliated or at least affiliated in the past with a defense firm in the Baltimore Metropolitan area.... With respect to Juror Number 99, she also, I believe, was a teacher, had 16 years of education, and that was the reason that we used to strike Number 99. With respect to Juror Number 202 who is listed as a banker, again, this case was going to involve a number of economic issues as is evident from the evidence in the case and evident from the analysis of the economist that testified in the case, and that was the reason that we struck Juror Number 202.

MS. HINES: ... Just briefly, I would concur with everything that Mr. Ignatowski has said, and just to make the record clear, we set forth in our opposition Juror Number 94, who was the auditor, and that was also the reason we struck him as well, and there is excerpts from the transcript in our memo where he basically set forth that he would not be able to support himself if he had to sit on a trial that was a duration that this trial was expected to last, and that was an additional reason for our striking— THE COURT: Number 157, John Wilcox, also said he couldn’t return. MS.

HINES: That was exactly the next point that I was going to make, and our transcript is attached to our opposition with respect to Juror Number 157 who was a high school teacher, and because of the size of his school, he had indicated he would have difficulties. Likewise, that is why we also struck, although that individual did not set forth any reasons on the record, as an additional reason as to why Juror Number 99 who is also a teacher was struck for the additional reasons. The foregoing reasons were race-neutral and were accepted by the trial court. Accordingly, we will not question the validity of those reasons on appeal.

As we stated in Ball v. ²⁸ Martin, 108 Md.App. 435, 672 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 342 Md. 472 , 677 A.2d 565 (1996), [i]n a practical sense, if, after the party opposing the strike has presented a prima facie showing, the proponent thereof proffers a facially neutral reason that is accepted by the trial court, then an appeal on Batson principles has little, if any, chance of success, given that the credibility of the proponent offering the reasons is, as it is generally, for the trial court — not an appellate court — to determine. Id. at 456, 672 A.2d 143 (discussing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 , reh. denied, 515 U.S. 1170 , 115 S.Ct. 2635 , 132 L.Ed.2d 874 (1995), and Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991))(emphasis in original). Ford argues that the timing of the trial court’s Bat-son inquiry constitutes reversible error. Ford argues that, after a four week trial, the events surrounding jury selection had to be reconstructed; memories were not as fresh.

Further, there was a tremendous disincentive for the trial court to sustain challenges after the trial had already completed. Finally, the lapse in time gave appellees additional time “to fine-tune their reasons,” and, as the appellees’ reasons originally were submitted in document filings, the trial court did not have an opportunity to evaluate their credibility. We note first that the trial court did have an opportunity to judge the credibility of appellees’ counsel. Although appellees initially submitted the reasons for their strikes in writing, they ultimately gave their reasons to the trial judge on the record in a post-trial hearing.

With respect to Ford’s other contentions, we agree that ordinarily a Batson inquiry should be conducted at the time the challenge is made. The trial judge in this instance, however, did not purposefully defer the Batson inquiry in this case. Instead, the judge thought that the inquiry was unnecessary based upon his initial determination that Ford had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the timing of the Batson inquiry is grounds for reversal. ²⁹ Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have remanded cases to trial courts for Batson hearings long after the jury selections and trials in such cases.

See State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124 , 596 A.2d 629 (1991); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267 (1988); Chew v. State, 71 Md.App. 681 , 527 A.2d 332 (1987), judgment vacated after remand, 317 Md. 233 , 562 A.2d 1270 (1989). Accordingly, a post-trial Batson hearing is not per se unreliable. While certainly, there are difficulties inherent in reconstructing events for such a hearing, see Chew, 317 Md. at 239 , 562 A.2d 1270 , in this case, the trial judge necessarily found that the events were reconstructed to his satisfaction. We have no basis for disagreeing with that determination.

II

Motion for Judgment in Wood In deciding whether to grant a motion for judgment, a trial court “assumes the truth of all credible evidence on the issue and of all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, and considers them in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.” Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 328 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978). If, when viewed in that light, “there is any legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a rational mind could infer a fact at issue, then the trial court would be invading the province of the jury by [granting a motion for judgment].” General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 733 , 410 A.2d 1039 (1980). Ford contends that the issue of substantial factor causation in the Wood case should not have been submitted to the jury because there was insufficient evidence that Ford’s products were a substantial contributing factor of Mr, Wood’s mesothelioma. We agree.

Among the questions set forth on the jurors’ verdict sheet was the