Fort v. Groves

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The bill of complaint filed by the appellants in this case prays for a writ of injunction, to compel the appellee to remove certain obstructions alleged to have been placed by him upon “ County street ” in the village of Ellicott’s Mills, and to restrain him from further’ obstructing the same. The appellants are owners of lots bounding upon the street, and the bill alleges that the obstructions complained of cause to them “ especial, peculiar and irreparable injury,” by impairing the enjoyment and value of their property. The chief defense taken by the answer and relied on in the argument, is that the complainants have full and complete remedy at law for the injury of which they complain, and therefore j:hey are not entitled to relief by injunction.

The proceedings show that County street is a public highway. It is alleged in the bill that under an Act of Assembly, passed in 1852, it was opened and condemned as a public road. The record does not contain the evidence of such condemnation; but that is not' material; because it is very clear, *from the deeds offered in evidence and other proof that by the acts of the original proprietors under whom both, the complainants and defendant derive their title, in laying off County street, and by the subsequent use of the same by the public, it has been dedicated as a public street or highway. The wrongful obstructions charged against the appellee, therefore, amount to a public nuisance, for which, if the charge be true, he is liable to be proceeded against by indictment. Ór if the appellants sustain ¹⁹⁴ special damage therefrom, they are entitled to maintain their action at law for such damage.

Under these circumstances it is difficult to see upon what ground a court of chancery can properly interfere by injunction. It is well settled “that an injunction is not granted to restrain a mere trespass, where the injury is not irreparable and destructive of the plaintiff’s estate, but is susceptible of perfect pecuniary compensation, and for which the party may obtain adequate satisfaction in the ordinary course of law.” Jerome v. Ross, 7 John. Ch. 315; Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 G. & J. 468 ; Cherry v. Stein,