Fowler v. Jacob

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The precise question to he decided in this case, is. whether a married woman who has become the purchaser of property at trustee’s sale, and who has failed to pay tho whole purchase money, can he held personally liable for it. Mrs. Jacob the appellee, a feme covert, purchased at a. trustee’s sale, made by order of a Court of equity, certain real estate_lying in Anne Arundel County. The sale was. duly ratified by the Court, and Mrs. Jacob took possession of the land;, and paid a part of the purchase money. She gave, however, no bond for the balance due upon her purchase, hut retained the land in her possession for some eight or nine years.

In the meantime a certain Manelia. W. Hodges established a claim and it was ordered to he paid out of the purchase money. Mrs. Jacob having failed to pay the balance of the purchase money, upon the application of the trustee, an order for a re-sale of the land at the risk of the purchaser was obtained from the equity Court, and the land was re-sold. At the re-sale, the land did not sell for the amount then due by Mrs. Jacpb as first purchaser.

The Court then passed an order directing Mrs. Jacob to pay or bring into Court, the difference between the amount she then owed and the amount realized from the re-sale of the land. Subsequently, however,, upon the petition of Mrs. Jacob, the Court rescinded so much of the order for re-sale as required the same to. be ³²⁹ made at her risk, and also the order requiring her to pay the difference, and from this rescinding order this appeal is taken. Waiving all the technical and unimportant questions that have been argued, the broad question presented, is the personal liability of a married woman for her purchase made at a trustee’s sale under the sanction and direction of a Court of equity. This question has remained up to this time, undecided in this State.

Section 131 of Art. 16, of the Code, gives to the Courts of equity of this State full power and authority to order a re-sale of any real estate sold by a trustee, appointed by such Court, at the risk of the first purchaser, whenever default is made in any of the terms of the sale, and if, at such re-sale, the property does not bring what it originally sold for, then the Court has authority to pass a decree against the first purchaser in personam for the difference. The letter of this law includes all purchasers at a trustee’s sale made under the orders and direction of a Court of equity, and as it is conceded that a married woman has the undoubted right and power to purchase at such a sale, she is certainly included within its literal terms. Before we can exclude her from the operation of the whole of this section we must be satisfied that she was not intended to be subject to what is to her in this case, the objectionable personal liability clause. Either some other existing statute law, or reasons of sound public policy must show that she was so excepted.

This law, it will be observed, applies exclusively to sales made by trustees acting under the orders of a Court of equity, and in all such cases the Court itself is considered the vendor. The law has no application to transactions between individuals. In all such cases of sale under the direction of a Court of equity, there are more persons interested and more interests involved than those of the vendor and vendee. The rights ³³⁰ of a multitude of creditors and conflicting claimants, generally depend on such. sale.

Such sales being almost universally for the payment of debts, or a division of the proceeds among those entitled. The real and proper vendor, the Court, acting through its agent, the trustee, has no interest except to do full and complete’ justice to the parties for whose benefit the land is sold. The vendee has no interest but his own to look after. In private sales made by individuals the interests of the vendor and vendee alone are affected.

It being conceded that a feme covert has the right to purchase, and that a trustee could not legally refuse her bid, why should she not be compellable to pay the purchase money? To allow a married woman the privilege of bidding for and having any property struck down to her, the salé ratified, and the vendor bound to perform his part of the contract, and then to permit her, at her will and pleasure to escape personally from the payment of the purchase money, would be to put a most potent instrument for wrong and fraud in the hands of every feme covert. It would enable her to attend any sale, that her caprice might lead her to, and bid over and