Fowlkes v. Choudhry

Lolita D. Fowlkes v. Shabbir Ahmed Choudhry, No. 6, September Term, 2020. Opinion by Battaglia, J. WRONGFUL DEATH — DAMAGES — PROOF OF PECUNIARY LOSS — The Court of Appeals held that, in order for a parent of a deceased adult to recover pecuniary damages for household services under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act, Sections 3-901 to 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the parent must present evidence not only that they reasonably expected to receive services from the adult child but that the adult child intended to continue providing services. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No.: 24-C-16-001919 Argued: October 1, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2020 ______________________________________ LOLITA D. FOWLKES v. SHABBIR AHMED CHOUDHRY ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, Battaglia, Lynne, A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Battaglia, J. ______________________________________ Filed: March 26, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-10-27 16:18-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This Court granted certiorari in the present case to determine what must be proven in a wrongful death medical malpractice case in order for a parent to recover pecuniary, also referred to as economic, damages for the alleged loss of household services rendered by a deceased adult child to the parent, under the Wrongful Death Act, Sections 3-901 to 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl.

Vol.).1 Fowlkes v. Choudhry, 467 Md. 712 (2020). The Petitioner, Ms. Lolita Fowlkes, asks that we reverse a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals that had vacated an award of $500,000 against Dr. Shabbir Choudhry, Respondent, by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for loss of household services, which she alleged she would have received from her adult daughter, Yenita Owens, who had died after having received medical treatment by Dr. Choudhry, among others.2 The Court of Special Appeals, in a published opinion, Choudhry v. Fowlkes, 243 1 We granted Ms. Fowlkes’s petition for a writ of certiorari, limited to the following question: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in its formulation and application of Maryland law regarding what a wrongful death plaintiff must prove in order to recover damages for the loss of household services that would have been provided by the plaintiff’s deceased adult child? Fowlkes v. Choudhry, 467 Md. 712 (2020).

We denied Ms. Fowlkes’s petition as to the following additional questions: 2. Did the circuit court err by refusing to take judicial notice of life expectancy tables? 3. Did the circuit court err by refusing to take judicial notice of Maryland’s minimum wage law? 2 Ms. Fowlkes, personally and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased daughter, Ms. Yenita Owens, along with her deceased daughter’s father, Mr. Derrick Owens, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, (continued . . . ) Md. App. 75 (2019), held that in a wrongful death action, a parent could recover economic damages for loss of household services, but that Ms. Fowlkes had not produced sufficient evidence to have the claim submitted to a jury, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2- 519.3 In so doing, the intermediate appellate court articulated a three-part “test” to ( . . . continued) alleging negligence on the part of nine defendants: Maryland General Hospital, Inc., Shabbir-Ahmed Choudhry, M.D., Dilraj Deol, M.D., Anthony & Banerjee M.D., P.A., University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, University of Maryland Medical Center, LLC, University of Maryland Emergency Medicine Associates., P.A., Michael Bond, M.D., and Nina Galluzzo, CRNP. The complaint included three causes of action including wrongful death, survival, and failure to obtain informed consent.

On the first day of the trial, the court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of University of Maryland Emergency Medicine Associates, P.A. and Michael Bond, M.D. At the close of Plaintiffs’ presentation of evidence, the court dismissed the failure to obtain informed consent claim against all remaining defendants and granted motions for judgment in favor of Maryland General Hospital, Inc., University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, and University of Maryland Medical Center, LLC. Plaintiffs’ claims against Anthony & Banerjee M.D., P.A. were subsequently dismissed by stipulation. Of the three remaining defendants, Dr. Choudhry, Dr. Deol, and Ms. Galluzzo, only Dr. Choudhry was found liable for the death of Ms. Fowlkes’ daughter. In the wrongful death claim, the jury awarded damages against Dr. Choudhry to the plaintiffs in the amount of $1,000,000, which included $500,000 in non-economic damages and $500,000 in economic damages for lost services; Mr. Owens remains a plaintiff and may retain rights to a share of the non-economic damages under the Wrongful Death Act.

In the survival claim, a jury awarded $1,544 in economic damages to the Estate of Ms. Owens for funeral expenses. 3 Maryland Rule 2-519, entitled Motion for Judgment, provides: (a) Generally. A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence. The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted. No objection to the motion for judgment shall be necessary.

A party does not waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of an opposing party's case. (continued . . . ) 2 evaluate claims for economic damages arising from the loss of household services performed for a parent by an adult child prior to her death. According to the intermediate appellate court: [A] beneficiary must: (1) identify domestic services that have a market value; (2) have reasonably expected the decedent to provide the identified services, which—absent the decedent’s legal obligation to provide the services—will typically require evidence showing that the decedent was regularly providing the services in the past; and (3) present some evidence concerning the duration the decedent would have likely provided the services. Id. at 86.

Application of the articulated “test” to the evidence presented by Ms. Fowlkes yielded a twofold concern for our brethren: the lack of “market value” evidence for the ( . . . continued) (b) Disposition. When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court may proceed, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence. When a motion for judgment is made under any other circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. (c) Effect of Denial.

A party who moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. In so doing, the party withdraws the motion. (d) Reservation of Decision in Jury Cases. In a jury trial, if a motion for judgment is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may submit the case to the jury and reserve its decision on the motion until after the verdict or discharge of the jury.

For the purpose of appeal, the reservation constitutes a denial of the motion unless a judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been entered. 3 services, as well as the absence of proof “that Ms. Owens intended to continue providing the identified household tasks to her mother on a regular basis in the future”, the latter being the basis for the Court’s reversal of the judgment for the economic damages for household services. Id. at 101. At trial, Ms. Fowlkes testified that she was seventeen years-old when her daughter was born and that she had raised her daughter as a single parent. Ms. Fowlkes stated that she and her daughter had lived together during her daughter’s twenty-two years.

The two of them had engaged in a variety of activities, by which they developed a very close bond, which, according to Ms. Fowlkes, “was more than a mother and a daughter.” According to Ms. Fowlkes, she and her daughter were best friends. Ms. Fowlkes also testified regarding household tasks that her daughter had performed, which, the parties agree was offered to support her claim for pecuniary damages related to lost household services: Q [MS. FOWLKES’S ATTORNEY]: And as Yunita [sic] got older, was she also -- was she helping you around the house at all? A Yes.

Q And what type of things was she helping you with? A She would clean the bathroom. She would wash the dishes. She would mop the floor.

She would vacuum. Q Are you able to drive? A No, I’m not, and she would drive me around. Q Okay.

And where would she drive you to? A She would take me to Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club. 4 Q Did Yunita [sic] have a car? A No, she would use my cousin’s car. Q And how much time did she spend doing those things for you, on any given day?

A I’m going to say like two hours a day. Q And I don’t know if I’ve asked you this before, At the time of her passing, who were you living with? A Yunita [sic]. Q Okay.

Throughout Yunita’s [sic] entire life, have you lived with her? A Yes. Q Okay. Was there ever a day in which you did not live with Yunita [sic]?

A No. Q Did you have any expectation as to whether you were going to continue to live with Yunita [sic]? A If I could live with her forever, then I was going to live with her forever. What constitutes proof of loss under the Wrongful Death Act to support a pecuniary damage award to compensate for the loss of household services from an adult child, now deceased, to a parent and whether Ms. Fowlkes’s testimony was sufficient to create a jury question regarding whether the loss of her daughter’s services in the future was compensable constitute the crux of the case before us. We shall agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the evidence adduced by Ms. Fowlkes was insufficient to meet her burden of proof because proof of intent on the part of the deceased adult child to 5 continue to perform household services on behalf of the parent must be adduced, in addition to evidence of what the parent expected, to survive a directed verdict.

The Wrongful Death Act was originally enacted in 1852 in Maryland as “An Act to compensate the families of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another person.” Maryland Laws (1852), Chapter 299. The Act provided: [1] That whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued), have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. [2] That every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the State of Maryland, for the use of the person entitled to damages, and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before mentioned parties, in such shares as the jury by their verdict shall find and direct; Provided, always, that no more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint; and that every such action shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after the death of the deceased person. [3] That in every such action, the plaintiff on the record shall be required, together with the declaration, to deliver to the defendant, or his attorney, a full particular of the person or persons, for whom and on whose behalf such action shall be brought, and of the nature of the claim, in respect of which, damages shall be sought to be recovered. 6 1852 Maryland Laws, Chapter 299. The statute and its evolution were summarized by this Court in McKeon v. State, for the Use of Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 442 (1956) as: Prior to 1852, under the common law, Maryland permitted no recovery for pecuniary loss suffered by a relative of one killed by the negligence of another. In that year, the Legislature enacted Ch. 299 of the Acts of 1852, which provided an action at law for the benefit of a wife, husband, parent and child of a person whose death shall have been caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, against the person wrongfully causing said death.

The list of persons entitled to recover under the then Sec. 2 of the above Act, remained the same until 1937, when it was enlarged to permit recovery by the mother of an illegitimate child and by an illegitimate child when the deceased person was the mother of such child. In 1952, the Legislature again added to this list by including relatives of the deceased who met certain dependency qualifications, but only if there were no surviving wife, husband, parent or child. In 1969, the General Assembly revised the Act to expand the type of damages recoverable to include non-economic, or solatium, damages. In the case of the death of a spouse or minor child, the damages awarded by a jury in such cases shall not be limited or restricted to the “pecuniary loss” or “pecuniary benefit” rule, but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable.[4] 1969 Maryland Laws, Chapter 352. 4 In Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 335 (1988), Judge William H. Adkins, II explained that Section 4(b) of Article 67, Maryland Code (1967 Repl.

Vol., 1969 Cum. Supp) contained a “defect” that “allowed recovery only for the death of a spouse or minor child although it included damages for loss of parental care and other lost parental benefits.” (emphasis in original). The General Assembly “enlarged the recovery in 1975 to allow damages for the death of the ‘parent of a minor child’.” Carolina Freight Carriers, 311 Md. at 341 (quoting 1975 Maryland Laws, Chapter 120). 7 Under the Act, now codified as Sections 3-901 to 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.), a “wrongful act” is “an act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.” Section 3-901(e).

The statute allows for “an action to be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another.” Section 3-902(a). The statute defines a primary class of beneficiaries as “the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased person.” Section 3- 904(a)(1). Ms. Fowlkes and Mr. Owens, as parents of Ms. Owens, qualified under the statute to seek pecuniary and solatium damages. Those provisions of the Wrongful Death Act most relevant to the present case, as they relate to damages, include: (c)(1) In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded to the beneficiaries proportioned to the injury resulting from the wrongful death.

(2) Subject to § 11-108(d)(2) of this article, the amount recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict. (d) The damages awarded under subsection (c) of this section are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or “pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable for the death of: (1) A spouse; (2) A minor child; (3) A parent of a minor child; or (4) An unmarried child who is not a minor child if: (i) The child is 21 years old or younger; or 8 (ii) A parent contributed 50 percent or more of the child's support within the 12-month period immediately before the date of death of the child. (e) For the death of a child, who is not described under subsection (d) of this section, or a parent of a child, who is not a minor child, the damages awarded under subsection (c) of this section are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or “pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, attention, advice, counsel, training, education, or guidance where applicable. Sections 3-904(c-e).

The origins of the Wrongful Death Act in Maryland lie in the Fatal Accidents Act enacted in England in 1846.5 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. State, Use of Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 281 (1866). The Fatal Accidents Act, more commonly known as Lord 5 Fatal Accidents Act 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (Eng.). The Act provided: § 1. Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. § 2.

Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executive or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom, and for whose benefit, such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before mentioned parties, in such shares as the jury, by their verdict, shall find and direct. 9 Campbell’s Act,6 provided a cause of action by which a “wife, husband, parent, and child” could seek damages as a result of the death of a relative through the negligence of another. English courts had occasion to address proof of damages under Lord Campbell’s Act for losses sustained by a parent because of the death of an adult child who had been providing services to them. In Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co., 3 H & N 211 (1858), parents sought recompense for the death of their son in a train accident, as a result of the son having been giving his wages to his parents, from a second job delivering coal. The Railroad argued that the parents’ loss of the son’s contributions was not a basis for recovery under the statute.

Franklin, 3 H & N at 212. The trial judge disagreed and had fashioned a question for the jury regarding whether the parents had a “reasonable expectation, if any, and what pecuniary benefit from the continuance of [the] son’s life”; the jury had returned a verdict in the favor of the parents. Id. On appeal, the Court of the Exchequer considered whether the parents were “entitled to maintain the action, it being contended that it was necessary the [parents] should shew a damage, and that [they] had shewn none.” Id. at 213.

The parents asserted that evidence of the father’s inability to work and the amount of money the son had been providing were sufficient to prove a pecuniary loss. Id. The Railroad countered that the 6 Lord Campbell’s Act is the more common name for the Fatal Accidents Act. David K. Rees, Note, Blind Imitation of the Past: An Analysis of Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 49 Denv.

L.J. 99 (1972). 10 son’s “assistance . . . was a mere act of kindness, which might have been discontinued at any time.” Id. According to the Railroad, because the parents had no legal right to the money they had been receiving from their son, they had not suffered a loss that was compensable under Lord Campbell’s Act. Id. The Court disposed of the Railroad’s contention that recovery under the Act was contingent on proof that the death resulted in a deprivation of a “legal right,” when Judge Pollock stated: damages are not to be given merely in reference to the loss of a legal right, for they are to be distributed among relations only, and not to all individuals sustaining such a loss, and accordingly the practice has not been to ascertain what benefit could have been enforced by the claimants, had the deceased lived, and give damages limited thereby.

Id. at 214. The Court held, rather, that damages could be awarded “in reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court, turning to the evidence, considered “[w]hether the plaintiff had any such reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuance of his son’s life, and if so, to what extent[?]” Id.

In concluding that the parents had provided sufficient proof of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, the Court emphasized that the father was “old and infirm,” as well as that the son, though living away from his parents, was “earning good wages” in his two jobs and had demonstrated a commitment to caring for his parents, noting that the son was “apparently well disposed to assist his father and, in fact he had so assisted him to the value of 3s. 6d. a week.” Id. at 214. 11 A companion case, Dalton v. South Eastern Railway Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296 (1858), arose from the same train accident that resulted in the death of the son in Franklin; it also was a claim for pecuniary benefits put forth by the parents of a deceased adult child. At trial, the parents presented evidence that the decedent was twenty-six or twenty-seven years old when he died and had, since moving away from them seven or eight years earlier, visited the parents every two weeks, “and on those occasions took them presents of tea, coffee, sugar, meat, &c., which with occasional donations of money averaged about 20 [pounds] a year.” Dalton, 4 C. B. (N. S.) at 298.

The Railroad advanced the same argument that it had in Franklin: the parents had not sustained a pecuniary loss by virtue of the fact that their son was under no obligation to provide support to his parents. The trial judge had instructed the jury that “the plaintiff and his wife had sustained a pecuniary injury from the death of their son as to entitle them to recover damages under the statute[,]” and the jury returned an award of 120 pounds in expectation damages, as well as 10 pounds for funeral expenses, and 15 pounds for “mourning.” Id. at 299. On appeal, the Railroad argued that, “[s]ince the passing of the statute, no intelligible rule has been laid down for the computation of damages[.]” Id. at 304. According to the Railroad, Lord Campbell’s Act “contemplates a ‘recompense’ for the loss of profit arising from some legal obligation.” Id. at 305.

As the son had been under no legal obligation to provide goods and money to his parents, the Railroad asserted that 12 the parents had not suffered a pecuniary loss of the type that was compensable under Lord Campbell’s Act. In rejecting the Railroad’s argument, the Dalton Court held “that the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the relation remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury, and damages may be given in respect of that expectation being disappointed, and the probable pecuniary loss thereby occasioned.” Id. at 305-06. The Court concluded that the parents could not recover for funeral expenses and “mourning,” but affirmed the award of expectation damages. Id. at 306.

The emphasis of the Court during argument was that the emancipated son had, for seven or eight years, “been in the regular habit of contributing to the support of his parents.” Id. at 304. As in Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co., the Court emphasized the undertaking of the deceased adult son, living on his own, in caring for his parents. This Court has relied on Franklin and Dalton in several cases in which we considered the award, or denial, of pecuniary damages under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, Use of Hauer, 60 Md. 449 (1883), Mr. Hauer was killed in a train accident and the State brought a wrongful death action against the Railroad, on behalf of his children, two of whom were unmarried adult women living with and being supported by their father prior to his death.

Before us, the Railroad argued that the adult daughters could not recover under the Wrongful Death Act, because, by virtue of their age, they had no legal entitlement to their father’s support. Hauer, 60 Md. at 466 . 13 We began our analysis by noting that Maryland’s statute was based on Lord Campbell’s Act and that the English statute made “no reference to the age or condition of the parties, but it simply provides for damages ‘proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties’ for whom suit may be brought.” Id. (quoting Lord Campbell’s Act). We then summarized English cases interpreting Lord Campbell’s Act: [I]n those cases it is distinctly held that “legal liability alone is not the test of injury, in respect of which damages may be recovered under the statute; but that the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the relative remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury, and damages given in respect of that expectation, if it be disappointed and the probable pecuniary loss thereby occasioned.” Id. at 467 (quoting Dalton).

With respect to the children’s claim in the case before it, the Court concluded that, under the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit standard, “the children may recover for the loss of education, comforts, and position in society, which they would have enjoyed if their father had lived and retained the income which died with him, and they had continued to form part of his family.” Id. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, Use of Mahone, 63 Md. 135 (1885), an adult daughter and two adult sons sued for pecuniary losses they averred had resulted from the death of their mother in another train accident. Mahone, 63 Md. at 145 . At trial, the adult daughter established the following: [T]he proof shows that the deceased made her permanent home with her daughter Martha, . . . that she attended to the housework and looked after the children while the daughter was away at work; that these services enabled the daughter to work out constantly, and when so at work she earned $6 a week, and that since her mother’s death she had not been able 14 to go out and work, because she had no one to take care of the house and children.

Id. at 145-46 . The two sons had asserted that they, too, had suffered pecuniary losses, because the mother had periodically provided childcare to their children: “The[ir] mother, although she made her home with her daughter Martha, was in the habit of assisting in nursing the sick members of her two sons’ families.” Id. at 147 . In determining that the evidence of the daughter’s loss was sufficient to go to the jury, we emphasized that: • The mother, who was a widow, had moved in with her daughter and her family more than three years before her death.7 • The mother performed domestic services for the daughter, including housework and meal preparation. • The mother attended to the daughter’s children while the daughter worked outside the home to earn approximately six dollars per week. • The daughter had not worked outside the home since her mother’s death, because she had to assume the domestic and childcare responsibilities, which had been previously rendered by the mother. In determining that the sons’ evidence was insufficient, we noted that: 7 The jury instruction that had been requested by the Railroad, which is reproduced in the opinion, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, to Use of Mahone, 63 Md. 135, 139 (1885), provided, in relevant part: “the mother of the plaintiffs, . . . for more than three years prior to the happening of the accident . . . which it is alleged caused her death, made her home with the said Thomas R. and Martha E. Mahone[.]” 15 • The mother was “in the habit” of assisting in nursing the sick members of the families of the two sons. • The frequency of her visits, the length of time of the visitations, and their value were not proven. • The sons had not employed anyone else to take their mother’s place since her death.

Essentially, then, evidence of the daughter’s expectation, “anchored” in proof of intent by the acts of her mother, who moved in with the daughter and performed household services, was sufficient to send the question of damages to the jury, but “habit” evidence was not. In State, for Use of Bowman v. Wooleyhan Transport Co., 192 Md. 686 (1949), we considered a case in which the legal issue and facts were reminiscent of the daughter’s claim in Mahone. During the trial, the daughter, who was blind, testified that: her mother visited her home every day and when the mother was not working at times she cleaned the house for her, cleaned windows, took care of the children, “she took them places, when they had to go, she did washing, ironing for me, sewing and mending, and a lot of times she cooked for me and then she took me places, where it required going across the street or required taking buses or street cars or anything else that required sight.” Bowman, 192 Md. at 690 . Additionally, the daughter testified that after her mother’s death, she had employed a “servant to perform the services the mother performed.” Id. at 16 691.

The trial court granted a demurrer,8 on the grounds