Frankel v. Frankel

MURPHY, C.J. The parties to this appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County — Stanley Frankel, the appellant/crossappellee (Stanley), and Sarah Schlesinger Frankel, the appellee/cross-appellant (Sarah) — were divorced by a Judgment of Absolute Divorce entered by the Honorable Ann N. Sundt. The judgment of divorce included the following provisions: ORDERED that [appellee/cross-appellant Sarah Schlesinger Frankel’s] request for alimony be and it hereby is DENIED, and it is further ORDERED that [Sarah’s] request for a monetary award be and it hereby is DENIED, except that [appellant/crossappellee Stanley E’rankel] is hereby ordered to transfer to [Sarah] 50 percent of the marital portion of the deferred compensation represented by his Genta, Inc. stock as follows: [Stanley] shall transfer to [Sarah] 50 percent of the marital portion (as determined by a coverture fraction, the numerator being the term of his employment with Genta, Inc. after the grant of options and during the marriage, and the denominator being the term of his employment with Genta, Inc. after the grant of options until the date of vesting) of [Stanley’s] 119,000 vested and unvested stock ⁵⁵⁸ options with Genta, Inc. as well as the 15,000 incentive stock options with Genta Inc, if, as, and when received by [Stanley]; and it is further Hi * H« ORDERED that [Stanley] shall pay to [Sarah] 59 percent of all unreimbursed costs of therapy for all four children within ten days of [Sarah’s] tendering in writing the receipts for said unreimbursed costs; and it is further ORDERED that [Stanley] shall pay to [Sarah] 59 percent of the cost of private school education for the parties’ four children, said cost to include tuition, books, and all required fees, within ten days of [Sarah’s] submitting said bills to [Stanley]; and it is further ORDERED that [Stanley] shall contribute the sum of $75,000 toward [Sarah’s] attorney’s fees, and a judgment for [Sarah] against [Stanley] shall be entered within 60 days of the entry of this Judgment of Absolute Divorce if that amount is not paid and satisfied within that period of time[.] Each party argues that Judge Sundt’s rulings were erroneous in three respects. Stanley argues: I. The trial court failed to afford greater weight to FL. Art. 8-502(b)(8) and abused its discretion when it ordered that Sarah was entitled to half of the marital portion of Stanley’s stock options.

II

The trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support because the order violates the policies in the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and Maryland law.

III

Where the trial court made no finding as to reasonableness or need of attorney’s fees, it was not appropriate to award attorney fees to Sarah. In the words of Stanley’s brief: The trial court did not follow Maryland law when it failed to afford greater weight to FL. Art. 8-502(b)(8) in evaluating how and when Stanley’s stock options were acquired. Instead the court gave extra weight to Sarah’s “enabling” ⁵⁵⁹ under section (b)(l)(8) and (11).

The court also abused its discretion by strictly applying Bangs [v. Bangs, 59 Md.App. 350 , 475 A.2d 1214 (1984)] when two possible modifications were available. It is also clear that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support. The ordered support is both contrary to the purpose and dictates of the Federal Consumer Protection Act and is not consistent with an extrapolation of the Maryland Child Support Guidelines. Further, by failing to attribute gift income to Sarah, the court has placed the burden of private school tuition on Stanley where this expense previously was paid for by Sarah’s parents.

Finally, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees does not satisfy the applicable statutory requirements, nor did the court make any analysis of reasonableness; the record lacks sufficient evidence from which to make a finding of reasonableness. Further, if Stanley prevails on either of the above two issues, reconsideration of attorney’s fees is also required. According to Sarah, although there is no merit in any of these arguments, she was unfairly prejudiced by the following rulings: IV. The Trial Court Erred in the Distribution of the Marital Property Stock Options.

V. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant a Monetary Award to the Wife.

VI

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Designate the Husband’s Arrears in Child Support. In the words of Sarah’s brief: Each of the arguments raised by the husband are simply without merit. The trial court was within its discretion in ordering that the benefits of the husband’s stock options be divided between the parties 50/50, and apportioning the non-vested stock options between the martial and separate estates according to the time-rule announced in Otley [v. Otley, 147 Md.App. 540 , 810 A.2d 1 (2002)]. ⁵⁶⁰ Further, there is no such thing as a federal cap on child support as evidenced by the federal Consumer Protection Act. The amount of child support awarded is determined by the principles in Voishan v. Palma [, 327 Md. 318 , 609 A.2d 319 (1992)] and its progeny, and the court did not order excessive child support.

Rather, it is clear that the husband can afford the child support, unreimbursed medical expenses, therapy and private school so desperately needed by these children. Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the gifts to the wife, gifts that the husband would use to avoid paying for the private school needed by the parties’ oldest son. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the wife. The record is replete with instances of the husband protracting and prolonging the litigation without regard to the consequences to the wife or the children.

For these reasons, the husband’s points are not well taken, and this Honorable Court should affirm the trial court’s decision on these matters. As to the points raised by the wife, the wife requests that the trial court’s opinion with regard to the transfer of the stock options themselves be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for entry of an order that orders a transfer of the benefits of the stock options to the wife and that the husband holds the stock options in constructive trust for the wife’s share, consistent with the wife’s recommended order. The wife further requests that the trial court’s decision denying the wife a monetary award be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a monetary award in favor of the wife in the amount of $81,697.10, to equalize the marital property. Finally, the wife requests that the trial court be instructed to enter an order requiring the parties to account for the funds expended on camp and private school during the pendente lite period, as stated in the Opinion. ⁵⁶¹ For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND Judge Sundt filed a Memorandum Opinion that included the following findings and conclusions: Factual History Certain facts are not in dispute. The parties were married June 20, 1982, while they were both in medical school in Chicago. Following the completion of medical school, [Sarah] was accepted in a residency program in New York City, and thus [Stanley] applied to positions in the same city and was accepted at Mount Sinai Hospital in internal medicine. By 1988, [Sarah] had a faculty position at Cornell and [Stanley] was in a fellowship program at Sloan Kettering.

In that same year their first son, Joshua, was born (January 25, 1988). The following year their second son, Zachary, was born (December 29, 1989). In 1991, however, when [Stanley] was not offered a staff position at Sloan Kettering, he determined he could not stay in New York City and thus the parties began interviewing in other cities. In that same year the parties moved from New York City to Búllalo, New York, where they lived for thx'ee years.

In 1992, the parties went to marriage counseling for a period of six or seven months. Their thii’d son, Daniel, was born April 27, 1993. While in Buffalo, [Sarah] was working three days a week, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. as well as teaching a half-day on Friday. [Stanley] was working long hours, leaving most of the child raising and house management to [Sarah], The two older boys were enrolled in the Kadema Jewish Day School by agreement of both parties, and for convenience, the older child Josh had been enrolled from the beginning; Zachary was enrolled because he would have been othexwise held back in public school because of his birth date. But both parties were becoming more observant and wanted to give their children Hebrew language training. [Sarah] ko ⁵⁶² shered the home, and the parties observed Shabbat, went to synagogue, and became increasingly involved in the traditions of Judaism.

As [Stanleyj’s long work hours kept him away from the participation and help with the family, [Sarah] became increasingly unhappy and finally gave [Stanley] an ultimatum: either they were going to move together or she would move with the children. In 1994 the parties moved to Rockville, Maryland. Despite the parties’ expectations to the contrary, [Stanley]’s work hours at the Georgetown Medical Center became very long, causing him to be absent from the home once again. Thus again the responsibilities for the children as well as for the household fell primarily to [Sarah].

Joseph was born December 22, 1994. [Sarah] became employed at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) full time; one year later, as a result of work that she published, she was invited to work at Walter Reed, where her career flourished. She became one of the top researchers, running a laboratory and supervising eight to ten people. At the same time, [Stanley]’s work hours at Georgetown Medical Center (GMC) escalated because of changes beyond his control. In addition, he spent weekends away from home at professional conferences, where he made contacts that led to additional income as a lecturer and expert witness.

Although [Sarah] had help with housecleaning, and at times had both a nanny and an au pair to assist her, [Stanley]’s long hours and weekends away from home left [Sarah] juggling children, household, and her ascending career. The tension between the parties inevitably resulted in arguments, and as the conflict escalated, it impacted the children. In 1995 Joshua began therapy with Dr. Rebarber because of problems in school. Dr. Rebarber also, at the request of the parties, did some therapy with the parties and with the three younger children.

Despite efforts on the part of the parties to follow Dr. Rebarber’s recommendations, the conflict between them continued and increased, and that conflict affected the children in that they too began having conflicts with their father and with each other. The ⁵⁶³ children were all enrolled at the Charles E. Smith Jewish Day School except that Joshua was moved to public school because he could not handle the dual curriculum (English and Hebrew). While he was enrolled in a program for gifted and talented children with learning disabilities he did well in public school, but in eighth grade he was “mainstreamed,” and from that point his school experience went downhill to the point that he ultimately refused to go to school. In 1999, [Stanley] lost his position with CMC.

The parties discussed moving to New York City at that point, but [Sarah] decided that she could not move until the end of school year 2000, first, because she had a clinical project to complete and secondly, because she wanted Josh to complete his last year in middle school. As a result, [Stanley] took a job at the University of Maryland. The conflict in the family reached a critical point when physical altercations broke out between the boys and their father. In the fall of 2001, after Labor Day, [Sarah] asked [Stanley] to leave.

She went with [Stanley] to New Jersey to interview for jobs. She assured [Stanley] that at the end of the school year 2002 she and the children would move up to the New York/New Jersey area, regardless of whether the parties reconciled or not. In December 2001 [Stanley] left the marital home and moved to Summit, New Jersey, where he had been offered employment by Genta, Inc. The only night that he has stayed with [Sarah] under the marital roof was in February of 2001 following Josh’s Bar Mitzvah. In October of 2001, [Sarah] told [Stanley] that she was offered a position at IAVI in New York.

Sometime thereafter she advised [Stanley] she was purchasing a home next door to her mother in Brooklyn, New York. In January of 2002, [Sarah] placed Joshua in Valley View, a therapeutic boarding school in Massachusetts where he currently continues to reside. The marital home was sold and the net proceeds have been divided by the parties. In June of 2002, [Sarah] and the children moved to Brooklyn, New York.

For several months they lived with [Sarah]’s mother while the residence [Sarah] ⁵⁶⁴ purchased was being renovated. Currently [Sarah] has moved into her new residence which is next door to her mother; the three younger children are attending Hannah Senesh, a Jewish day school in New York. Joshua remains at Valley View. [Sarah] is employed by IAVI, where she earns $138,745 annually. [Stanley] continues to be employed at Genta, Inc. at a base salary in 2002 of $207,100. At the time of the trial in the fall, he was residing in a rented apartment in New Jersey.

Alimony [Sarah] is seeking alimony and child support. In order to determine the latter, the Court has to make a determination as to whether there should be an alimony award as it will affect [Sarah]’s income for the purposes of any future child support award. The factors that the Court must consider in making an alimony award are set out in § 11-106 of the Family Law Article. The Court will review those factors as they apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.

(1) The ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting: [Sarah] is gainfully employed full time. Her current base salary at IAVI is $138,745.20 annually. Prior to moving to New York, her salary in Maryland was $140,000 per annum. In addition, she receives income from the rental of her garage in the amount of $960 a month and interest, dividend and trust income in the amount of $1226.77 per month, for total taxable income of $13,748.87 monthly. [Stanley] would have the Court also impute gift income to [Sarah] based on the history of her family’s payments to the parties.

For example, traditionally her father gives her $2,000 on her birthday; in 2002, [Sarah] received substantial loans from her father and her mother, including the $330,000 that she has used for gutting and renovating her Brooklyn residence, the approximately $95,000 loan from her father for closing costs on the house, and additional monies for mortgage payments since the time of the ⁵⁶⁵ purchase of the Brooklyn residence. [Sarah] lists monthly expenses for herself alone in the amount of $5,040.76, and, without including any imputed income or even addressing the reasonableness of those expenses, the Court finds that [Sarah] is currently able to meet her own expenses. Normally that would be the end of any inquiry on the subject of alimony, but [Sarah] is seeking alimony for an indefinite period, and the statute provides that in such a case, if the Court finds that without an award of alimony there may be an unconscionable disparity in the parties’ standard of living, the Court may consider an award of alimony even though the petitioner is self-supporting. Again, that requires an analysis of the factors set forth in § 11-106, and so the Court will continue that analysis. (2) The time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment: There is no question that [Sarah] has “suitable employment.” [Sarah] claims that her career growth has been severely limited by the fact that she is the primary caregiver for the minor children. [Stanley] claims that [Sarah] has unilaterally chosen to limit her earnings and her career.

He argues that there was no reason for her to leave her job in Maryland. However, the Court notes that [Sarah]’s job in Maryland did not pay her a significantly greater income than she is presently earning in New York. [Stanley] claims, however, that [Sarah] has moved to a more expensive geographical location and has made elections that increased her expenses and those of the children. [Sarah] testified numerous times that a number of her expenses had actually decreased as a result of her move to New York; for example, because her residence is considerably smaller, her utilities and maintenance fees are less. Likewise, her childcare costs are less, in part because of the help provided by her family. [Sarah] acknowledges that she consciously chose to limit her career path, putting her children above her ambition. ⁵⁶⁶ She argues that she cannot retrieve those lost years and ■will need time to refocus her career once the children need less of her time. However, no concrete plan was presented to the Court such as might justify an award of rehabilitative alimony.

(3) The standard of living that the parties established during their marriage: By both parties’ testimony, other than the payment of the mortgage itself, the largest expense the parties incurred throughout their marriage from the time of the first child’s birth was childcare; the next largest was household maintenance. These parties did not live a luxurious life in the sense of cruises, luxury cars, extravagant trips, or lavish furnishings. There were a number of times that gifts from the parties’ parents, especially [Sarahj’s parents, enabled the parties to do things they would otherwise not have been able to do, such as purchase a home in Rockville, Maryland, and send their children to private school. There were gifts of jewelry and items of furniture.

But their lifestyle, for people who were earning relatively substantial sums of money, was not a luxurious one. Instead, as stated above, most of their money was consumed in child care and child-related expenses such as private school, as well as in home care and maintenance, for with two professional physicians who were trying to raise four little boys, there was not a great deal of time for cooking, cleaning, chauffeuring, lawn mowing, painting, fix-up repairs, etc. (If The duration of the marriage: The parties were married in 1982; they separated in 2000. (5) The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family: Both parties made monetary contributions; only [Sarah] made significant nonmonetary contributions to the welfare of the family. That statement is not meant to denigrate [Stanley]^ contributions, for he made substantial monetary contributions and has continued throughout the marriage to struggle to ensure that his family’s financial needs are met. [Sarah], however, attempted, sometimes not very ⁵⁶⁷ successfully, to juggle the needs of small children with a potentially very successful career, and at times stinted one in order to accommodate the other.

Ultimately she made the decision to put the children first. In the early years of the marriage, [Sarah] converted what premarital assets she had into joint marital assets. She turned over her paychecks to her husband. And she did the rearing of the children and the managing of the household with outside help but very little help from her husband who was working grueling hours.

A number of times, when [Sarah] asked for help, [Stanley] told [Sarah] to hire more help. (6) The circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties: By both parties’ testimony, the first ten years of the marriage were relatively happy and successful years. For five-and-one-half years the parties were able to pursue their careers untrammeled by children; then in 1988 the first child was born followed by the second child in 1989, and by 1993 a major problem had erupted concerning the balance between work and home. [Sarah] ultimately chose to cut back on her work and spend more time with the children; [Stanley] never really considered that possibility. Although money was the ostensible source of conflict: who earned it, how it was spent, and the ever increasing need for more money, the real issue between the parties appears to have been an unsatisfied, unresolved allocation of time.

From the very beginning, [Stanley] worked long hours, and his lack of participation in the care and raising of the children resulted in both marital conflict and conflict between him and the children. Attempts to address their conflicts in therapy were unsuccessful. [Sarah] undoubtedly experienced some anguish and resentment in having to cut back on an apparently brilliant career in order to fulfill the role of both parents to her four sons. Eventually, the altercations between [Stanley] and the children became physical. [Sarah] asked [Stanley] to leave and he did so. ⁵⁶⁸ (7) The age of each party: As of the date of trial, [Sarah] was 42 and [Stanley] was 44. (8) The physical and mental condition of each party: Both parties appear to be in good health.

(9) The ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs, while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony: [Stanley] submitted a financial statement that reflects his ‘incomé and expenses. He earns a base salary of $207,100 per year, or $17,258.34 a month. He acknowledges receiving income from contract work as well as interest and dividend income. For the past two years he has received a bonus of more than $2,500 a month.

His gross income totals at least $20,000 a month. He lists expenses for himself alone of $14,000 per month. That includes periodic payments comprising attorney’s fees of $3,000 per month and debt servicing of $3,000 per month. If those two monthly expenses were eliminated (and [Stanley] has assets available to him in excess of $350,000), then he would have expenses of $8,000 a month.

The Court finds that [Stanley] has the ability to pay some alimony if he were ordered to so do. (10) Any agreement between the parties: There is none. (11) The financial needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; The Court has discussed the parties’ incomes; attached to this Opinion and Order is the Court’s Exhibit # 2 showing the parties assets. (ii) any award made under Sections 8-205 and 8-208 of this Article; There is no use and possession award except with respect to the family use personal property.

The family home has been sold; the monetary award is discussed below. (Hi) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party: [Sarah] claims liabilities in excess of $1 ⁵⁶⁹ million and a total net worth of $865,000. [Stanley] claims liabilities of $157,000 and a net worth of approximately $300,00. The Court finds that their total approximations are fairly accurate. Neither of these parties is in dire financial straits; both have the ability to earn substantial income.

(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits: Each has substantial retirement benefits earned during the marriage. [Stanley]’s are the greater. (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution ...: Not applicable. This Court determines, based on all the above, that neither an award of rehabilitative alimony nor an award of indefinite alimony is supported by the record and will deny [Sarah]’s claim for alimony. Property Issues/Monetary Award A monetary award is designed to accomplish an equitable division of the marital property.

The Marital Property Act requires that a three-step process occur: (1) first the Court shall determine which property is marital property; (2) the Court shall then determine the value of all marital property; (3) finally the Court may make a monetary award as an adjustment to the parties’ equities and rights concerning marital property after 'Consideration of the eleven statutory factors set out in 8-205 of the Family Law Article. Step One The parties supplied a joint statement of marital property (Joint Exhibit # 1) which the Court attaches hereto as Exhibit # 1. There is substantial property in this case, some owned jointly, some owned by one of the parties and the minor children. Fortunately, the parties are able to agree for the most part as to what is marital and what is nonmarital.

On page 10 of the Joint Exhibit, the parties ⁵⁷⁰ list the property that is in dispute, and the Court will focus solely on that property in this part of the analysis. The Real Property at 20 College Place, Brooklyn, New York The home at 20 College Place, Brooklyn, New York is titled in [SarahJ’s sole name. [Sarah] asserts that it is solely nonmarital; [Stanley] asserts that it is all marital. The party who is asserting a marital interest has the burden to produce evidence as to the nature (and value) of the marital interest. The uncontroverted testimony is that [Sarah] purchased the house in January 2002 for $700,000.

She obtained a mortgage that was cosigned by her father, Mr. Schlesinger, who also provided the down payment and monies due at settlement. Moreover the uncontroverted testimony is that Mr. Schlesinger personally or through his trust paid the monthly mortgage directly from the date of purchase to the date of trial with the exception of three monthly payments. The testimony was that Mr. Schlesinger gave [Sarah] a personal check for $11,000 to cover those three months. There is no question that [Sarah] deposited that check into her checking account and paid the mortgage therefrom.

At the same time that she was making these mortgage payments with funds from her father, [Sarah] was paying the mortgages on the Maryland home, payments that clearly inured to [Stanley]’s benefit. [Stanley] produced no evidence that the $11,000 deposit was commingled with marital funds to the extent that it was not traceable. Furthermore, [Sarah] borrowed $330,000 from her mother who took out a home equity loan for all the necessary renovations. [Stanley] having produced no evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the property at 20 College Place, and any appreciation therein, is nonmarital. The Genta Stock Opinions [Stanley] claims that his vested and non-vested stock options from his employer (Genta) were all acquired after the separation of the parties, and that [Sarah] made no ⁵⁷¹ contribution to their acquisition. That may be a factor for the Court to consider in making a monetary award, but it is not dispositive as to the nature of the asset.

Under § 8-201 of the Family Law Article, martial property means “property, however, titled, acquired by one or both parties during the marriage ” (emphasis added) unless it falls under one of the exceptions set forth in 8-201(e)(3) (which exceptions do not apply in this case). Stock options that have vested at the time of the divorce are martial property. Even stock options that are unvested and unexercised at the time of the divorce may be martial, at least in part. The Court may apply a coverture fraction to determine the marital portion.

In this case, the coverture fraction is: Term of employment after grant of options and during the marriage Term of employment after grant of options until date of vesting [Stanley] was granted 120,000 Genta non-qualified options on November 30, 2000. Twenty-five percent of the options vest each year on November 30th, with total vesting in four years. As of November 30, 2002, 60,000 options have vested. [Stanley] sold 1,000 of the options, so 59,000 vested options remain. The 59,000 vested options are marital property.

Of the third set of 30,000 options to vest on November 30, 2003, 78 percent (currently 23,400) are marital (numerator 28 months; denominator 36 months). Of the fourth set of 30,000 options to vest on November 30, 2004, 58 percent (17,462) are marital (numerator 28 months; denominator 48 months). [Stanley] was granted 15,000 Incentive Stock Options as of January 25, 2002, with 25 percent of the options to vest each year on January 25, with total vesting in four years. The first set of 3,750 options vested on January 24, 2003; they are 100 percent marital. The second set of 3,750 options will vest on January 25, 2004, by applying the coverture fraction, the Court determines that 58 percent (2,187) are marital (numerator 14 months; de ⁵⁷² nominator 24 months).

The third set of 3,750 options will vest January 25, 2005; 39 percent (1,463) are marital (numerator 14 months; denominator 36 months). The fourth and last set of 3,750 options will vest January 25, 2005; 29 percent (1,088) are marital (numerator 14 months; denominator 48 months). SBC Stock Nisource, IncJNipsco Investec Stock GE Stock EMC Stock Zimmer Holdings, Inc. McData Bristol Meyers Stock All of the above stocks and investment accounts are titled solely in [SarahJ’s name It is a puzzlement to the Court that [Stanley] claims a marital interest in these assets, for he presented no testimony to controvert the testimony of [Sarah] and her father, Mr. Schlesinger, as to the source of these stocks and investment accounts. Their testimony and the documents introduced support the following findings: The Nisource/Nipsco account was given to [Sarah] by her grandparents prior to the marriage; the Investec account was opened with Bristol Meyers Scribb [sic] stock distributed to [Sarah] from her father’s trust; SBC, Bristol Meyers Scribb [sic], GE and EMC stocks were either gifted to [Sarah] by her grandfather prior to his death or distributed from her father’s trust; the Zimmer Holdings and the McData stock were received as spin-off stocks from the Bristol Meyers Scribb [sic] and EMC stocks. [Sarah] was very clear that up to a certain point in time she had taken premarital assets and titled them jointly, and [Stanley] clearly benefited ⁵⁷³ [sic] from her doing so.

At some point, however, she ceased converting nonmarital gifts and inheritances into joint names. They clearly are not marital property as defined by § 8-201 (e)(3). Genta Stock Options As stated earlier, [Stanley]’s stock options comprise both nonqualified and incentive stock options. With respect to the nonqualified options, the parties cannot agree even as to the number; [Sarah] claims there are 120,000; [Stanley] contends there were 119,000.

However, [Stanley]^ numbers do not make sense: he claims that 29,000 vest each year for four years; by this Court’s figuring that would make 116,000. On the incentive stock options, both parties agree that 15,000 were granted January 25, 2002, and that 3750 vest each year for four years. As all of these options are a form of deferred compensation, the Court is not required to value them but instead may, under § 8-205 of the Family Law Article, transfer ownership on an “if, as and when” basis regardless of whether a monetary award is made, provided that no notice is given by either party of an intent to present evidence as to the value of the asset. [Sarah] gave and then withdrew such notice. Thus the value of this asset need not be considered in the Court’s consideration of a monetary award.

Step Three As the Court’s Exhibit # 2 reflects, [Sarah] has marital property valued at $362,370.11, all exclusive of the Genta stock options, the furniture and furnishings at each party’s home and the marital home, the marital jewelry, and some jointly held accounts. To equalize the parties’ interests, the Court would have to award [Sarah] $81,697. But an equal division is not required. The primary objective of a monetary award is equity.

And in order to make an equitable decision the Court is required to review the statutory factors set forth in § 8-205 of the ⁵⁷⁴ Family Law Article. Many of them are the same or similar to those set forth in § 11-106 of the Family Law Article which the Court has considered in its discussion of alimony above. Thus the non-applicable factors and those which replicate the factors pertaining to alimony will not be repeated here. (8) How and when specific property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the martial property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both: Other than [Sarah]’s nonmarital assets as set forth on Exhibit #2, and the Prudential account that [Sarah] had prior to the marriage but titled in the parties’ joint names at the time of the marriage, all assets were acquired during the marriage with the income of the parties. [Stanley] argues that [Sarah] should not be awarded any of the stock because