Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County Executive

WRIGHT, J. This appeal arises from appellee, Montgomery County Executive (“County Executive”) Isiah Leggett’s, failure to include sufficient funds to implement a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) in the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2012 (“FY12”). Appellant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 (“FOP 35”), filed a prohibited practice charge against the County Executive, accusing him of violating §§ 33-80(g) and 33-82(a)(8) of the Montgomery County Code (“MCC”), part of the Police Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”). The Permanent Umpire (“Umpire”) found that the County Executive was required to include the CBA and sufficient funds to implement it in the proposed budget and that the County Executive’s failure to do so constituted a prohibited practice. The County Executive filed a motion for a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and FOP 35 filed a motion for summary judgment in response.

The circuit court granted the County Executive’s writ, denied FOP 35’s motion, and reversed the decision of the Umpire. This timely appeal followed. Question Presented FOP 35 asks us to determine the following: Is the decision of the Permanent Umpire supported by substantial evidence of record which is fairly debatable and premised upon a correct application of law? ¹²¹ Finding that the circuit court erred in denying FOP 35’s motion for summary judgment and reversing the decision of the Umpire, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment. Facts and Procedural History The facts in this case are undisputed.

FOP 35 is the exclusive certified bargaining unit representative for Montgomery County police officers below the rank of lieutenant. 1 In June 2010, FOP 35 and the County Executive entered into a two-year CBA (“2011 Agreement”). In November 2010, the parties began negotiations for an amendment to the 2011 Agreement and soon came to an impasse. Upon impasse, the parties submitted the issues to an Impasse Neutral (“the Neutral”), pursuant to MCC § 33-81(c), 2 which stated in pertinent part: (c) An impasse over a reopener matter or the effects on employees of an exercise of an employers [sic] right must be resolved under the procedures in this subsection. Any other impasse over a matter subject to collective bargaining must be resolved under the impasse procedure in subsections (a) and (b).

(1) Reopener matters. (A) If the parties agree in a collective bargaining agreement to bargain over an identified issue on or before a specified date, the parties must bargain under those terms. Each identified issue must be designated as a “reopener matter.” (B) When the parties initiate collective bargaining under subparagraph (A), the parties must choose, by agreement or through the processes of the American ¹²² Arbitration Association, an impasse neutral who agrees to be available for impasse resolution within 30 days. (C) If, after bargaining in good faith, the parties are unable to reach agreement on a reopener matter by the deadline specified in the collective bargaining agreement, either party may declare an impasse.

(D) If an impasse is declared under subparagraph (C), the dispute must be submitted to the impasse neutral no later than 10 days after impasse is declared. (E) The impasse neutral must resolve the dispute under the impasse procedure in subsection (b), except that: (i) the dates in that subsection do not apply; (ii) each party must submit to the impasse neutral a final offer on only the reopener matter; and (iii) the impasse neutral must select the most reasonable of the parties’ final offers no later than 10 days after the impasse neutral receives the final offers. Section 33 — 81(b)(5) required the Neutral to analyze the offers as follows: (5) On or before February 1, the impasse neutral must select, as a whole, the more reasonable, in the impasse neutral’s judgment, of the final offers submitted by the parties. (A) The impasse neutral must first evaluate and give the highest priority to the ability of the County to pay for additional short-term and long-term expenditures by considering: (i) the limits on the County’s ability to raise taxes under State law and the County Charter; (ii) the added burden on County taxpayers, if any, resulting from increases in revenues needed to fund a final offer; and (iii) the County’s ability to continue to provide the current standard of all public services. ¹²³ (B) After evaluating the ability of the County to pay under subparagraph (A), the impasse neutral may only consider: (i) the interest and welfare of County taxpayers and service recipients; (ii) past collective bargaining contracts between the parties, including the bargaining history that led to each contract; (iii) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of similar employees of other public employers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in Maryland; (iv) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of other Montgomery County employees; and (v) wages, benefits, hours[,] and other working conditions of similar employees of private employers in Montgomery County[.] The Neutral found that the final offer made by FOP 35 was the more reasonable offer.

On February 18, 2011, the Neutral issued a decision, or arbitration award (“Award”). Under MCC § 33-81 (b)(7), the Award then became integrated into the 2011 Agreement, resulting in the final agreement between the parties (“Final Agreement”). Section 33-81(b)(7) states: The offer selected by the impasse neutral, integrated with the previously agreed upon items, shall be deemed to represent the final agreement between the employer and the certified representative, without the necessity of ratification by the parties, and shall have the force and effect of a contract voluntarily entered into and ratified as set forth in subsection 33-80(g) above. The parties shall execute such agreement.

In turn, section 33-80(g) states: Submission to Council. A ratified agreement shall be binding on the employer and the certified representative, and shall be reduced to writing and executed by both parties. In each proposed annual operating budget, the ¹²⁴ County Executive shall describe any collective bargaining agreement or amendment to an agreement that is scheduled to take effect in the next fiscal year and estimate the cost of implementing that agreement. Any term or condition of a collective bargaining agreement which requires an appropriation of funds or enactment, repeal or modification of a County law shall be timely submitted to the County Council by the employer by April 1, unless extenuating circumstances require a later date.

If a later submission is necessary, the employer shall specify the submission date and the reasons for delay to the Council President by April 1. The employer shall make a good faith effort to have such term or condition implemented by Council action. Each submission to the Council shall include: (1) all proposed legislation and regulations necessary to implement the collective bargaining agreement; (2) all changes from the previous collective bargaining agreement, indicated by brackets and underlines or a similar notation system; and (3) all side letters or other extraneous documents that are binding on the parties. On March 15, 2011, the County Executive submitted a proposed operating budget for FY 12 (“FY 12 Budget”) to the Council.

The County Executive did not include the Final Agreement in the FY12 Budget, but instead submitted the final offer that he had presented to the Neutral. In response, FOP 35 filed a prohibited labor practice charge against the County Executive. In his answer to the charge, the County Executive admitted that he failed to submit the Final Agreement in the FY12 Budget but argued that his actions were permitted by Charter § 303 and, therefore, the charge should be dismissed. On April 13, 2011, the Umpire conducted a hearing and on April 28, 2011, issued a decision.

After analyzing whether Charter § 303 permitted the County Executive’s actions, the Umpire’s decision stated: ¹²⁵ For all of these reasons, I find that the County Executive violated Sections 33-80(g) and 33-82(a)(8) of the PLRA by failing to request in the FY 2012 Budget Request funding necessary to implement the 2011 Agreement and the FY 2012 Award. The assertion that Section 303 of the Charter sanctioned this action is rejected. To the contrary, although I lack jurisdiction to enforce a violation of the Charter, I find that Section 303 of the Charter was violated by the County Executive’s refusal to follow the directive that the FY 2012 Budget Request conform to applicable law, including specifically the PLRA. On April 29, 2011, the County filed a petition for judicial review with the circuit court.

On May 3, 2011, FOP 35 filed a motion for summary judgment and on May 6, 2011, the circuit court conducted a hearing and issued an oral ruling. The circuit court stated that it relied on Wicomico County v. Todd, 256 Md. 459 , 260 A.2d 328 (1970) for “a number of legal points [to] guide [its] decision.” Citing the Wicomico case, the trial court stated, “the question of just how much power has been granted to one branch or the other is a matter of statutory construction.” The court stated further that in Montgomery County, Charter § 101 “vests the legislative powers which may legitimately be exercised under the Maryland Constitution and under the laws passed by the General Assembly in the Council.” The court noted that, according to the Charter, a clear separation of powers exists between the Council as the legislative branch and the County Executive as the executive branch of the county government. The court acknowledged that collective bargaining with binding arbitration is required for police officers in the Charter. The circuit court then posited the issue in the case and made its decision as follows: The question then becomes has the Executive in this case complied with its obligations under the Charter and has the Executive in this case complied with its obligations under the ordinances.

Section 303 of the Charter requires the County Executive to submit to the Council not later than ¹²⁶ January 15 and March 15 respectively of each year, proposed capital and operating budgets, including expenditures and revenue sources for the upcoming year. That’s part 1. And part 2, and any other information in such form and detail as first the Executive thinks is appropriate and second and separately, as may be prescribed by law. I interpret that to mean as may be required by the County Council pursuant to a code provision.

Conceivably although it’s not really raised in this case, it may be as required by the General Assembly pursuant to a public law, but that’s not this case, okay? Then the question becomes has the Executive done that in this case? I am directed to 33 — 80(g) of the Police Labor Relations Act which is in the Montgomery County Code. That subsection requires in each annual operating budget, that the County Executive to first describe any collective bargaining agreement or an amendment to an agreement that is scheduled to take effect in the upcoming fiscal year, and second, to estimate for the Council the cost.

I conclude, having reviewed the parties’ submission of record, that the Executive has done so in this case. The argument is made that well, that is insufficient. That a provision of the Charter, specifically 803, requires the County Executive to do more than what he’s done. And that conclusion was echoed by the Permanent Umpire.

I respectfully disagree, employing ordinary principles of statutory construction.... If I read the plain language of Section 303 of the Charter, which is captioned Capital and Operating Budgets, I conclude that the County Executive in this case has complied with his obligations under the Charter. The import, as I understand it, of the Permanent Umpire’s decision is that the County Executive is required to endorse, sponsor, include as a line item in his budget of any contract under a collective bargaining agreement. Respectfully, that’s not what 303 says.

As a consequence, since that’s not what 303 says, the County Executive is not required to do it. ¹²⁷ In the event, however, that I am incorrect in my reading of Section 303, of Section 33-80(g), as an independent alternative ground, I respectfully conclude that to the extent that either Section 303 of the Charter or 33-80(g) of the Code were to be read to require the Executive to endorse it, under the principles of separation of powers as articulated in Todd , such a requirement would trench upon the authority of the Executive and would create an unnecessary conflict and be inconsistent with, in my judgment, Section 201 of the Charter, which vests in the County Executive the executive power. To the extent that it is necessary to reach that independent alternative conclusion, which it may not be necessary to do, although strictly speaking the discussion by the Court of Appeals in Schisler v. The State [sic], 394 Md. 519 [ 907 A.2d 175 (2006) ] was in respect of Article 8 of the constitution, the concepts filtered through the lens of cases such as Todd apply. The concerns of separation of powers in 1776, respectfully, are the same and no less than they are today. And while it may be that by Charter, with language that is sufficiently clear and unequivocal, the powers of the County Executive may be either circumscribed or the County Executive may be directed to do very specific things.

In the absence of such requisite clarity, it is my view that for me to infer that such is what either was intended by the Charter or that is now currently desired by the Council would ran afoul of the separation of powers concept as articulated, although they are filtered thorough the lens of Todd in Schisler v. The State. The concern at bottom was that one branch of government not be subservient to or trench upon the authorities of the other branches. If by Charter the people of Montgomery County want to diminish, on the one hand, or expand on the other hand the power of the executive or the legislative branch at least in theory ... they may do so. But, in my judgment, they have not done so heretofore.

By Order dated May 9, 2011, the circuit court denied FOP 35’s motion for summary judgment, granted the County’s ¹²⁸ petition for judicial review, and reversed the decision of the Umpire. The decision was entered on May 12, 2011, and on June 6, 2011, FOP 35 filed this timely appeal. Standard of Review FOP 35 urges us to apply the usual standard of review of administrative agency decisions. Under this standard, the appellate court’s role is identical to that of the circuit court, and we review the agency, or in this case, the Umpire’s decision.

Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md.App. 264, 273-74 , 47 A.3d 1087 (2012). As such, our review is limited to determining if the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and “no error of law exists.” Id. The agency’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Generally, we accord some deference to the agency when it is interpreting the statutes it administers.

Id. Aviation Admin, v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572 , 873 A.2d 1145 (2005). However, here the ultimate issue lies not with the collective bargaining statutes themselves, but with an interpretation of the Charter and the Council’s ability to limit the County Executive’s budgetary discretion. Therefore, no deference is required.

The Court of Appeals reminds us, in Balt. Cnty. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4 v. Balt. Cnty., 429 Md. 533, 560 , 57 A.3d 425 (2012), that the standard of review in this Court “is determined by the circuit court’s disposition of the matter.” Quoting Mont.

Cnty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mont. Cnty. Lodge 35, Inc. (“FOP 35 I”), 427 Md. 561, 571 , 50 A.3d 579 (2012) (reviewing circuit court’s disposition for legal error rather than reviewing arbitrator’s decision). Our review is, thus, constrained to the circuit court’s denial of FOP 35’s motion for summary judgment.

As the FOP 35 I Court stated, “[t]he standard of review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is ... whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were legally correct.” Id. at 572 , 50 A.3d 579 (quoting Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672, 684 , 821 A.2d 22 (2003)). “We review de novo ... the interpretation of a statute.” ¹²⁹ Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 , 46 A.3d 443 (2012) (citations omitted). In sum, “where an order [of the trial court] involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory[,] or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (citations omitted). Discussion I. Collective Bargaining Law and Montgomery County Charter FOP 35 argues that the Umpire’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was legally correct. According to FOP 35, the Umpire properly concluded that the County Executive committed unfair labor practices under MCC §§ 33-80(g) and 33-82(a)(8) by not “providing] full funding in the amounts necessary to fully implement the [Final] Agreement.” FOP 35 contends that the Umpire also correctly concluded that Charter § 303 does not grant the County Executive “unlimited discretion as to what to include or not to include in the proposed Budget” and that the County Executive failed “to accord meaning to the ‘and as may be prescribed by law 1 language in Section 303 which, on its face, includes the PLRA.” FOP 35 argues that MCC § 33-80(g) is a law contemplated by Charter § 303 and that the collective bargaining laws are mandated by Charter § 510.

The County responds that the County Executive has a “virtually unchecked” discretionary legislative function in proposing a budget delegated by Charter § 303 that cannot be divested by any collective bargaining laws enacted by the County Council. The County avers that the Charter “allocates the role of recommending the operating budget to the County Executive, and not to the Council, and the Council is not authorized to impinge on the County Executive’s power through enactment of a local law that, by its plain terms, conflicts with the County Executive’s Charter power under ¹³⁰ § 303.” The County also argues that a prohibited practice charge cannot arise out of the County Executive’s “expression of his views,” and that the County Executive “cannot be called to account before an arbitrator for an exercise of his legislative discretion.” Ultimately, the dispute involves the interpretation of the Charter and any effect the collective bargaining laws enacted by the Council has on the County Executive’s responsibilities under Charter § 303. The Court of Appeals, after noting that “[t]he tension between public employee unions and local governments, particularly those bound by an executive budget system, has surfaced in Maryland appellate cases since at least [1945],” provided an extensive review of the cases arising since then in Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 728 , 53 A.3d 1184 (2012). Succinctly, the Court concluded that collective bargaining is appropriate charter material, and a county can impose binding arbitration on the executive branch. 3 Therefore, there is no need to reiterate that analysis here in response to the parties’ arguments that binding arbitration cannot apply to the County Executive.

A. The State Executive Budget System The Montgomery County budget system is modeled in many respects on the State budget system. The State has an “executive” budget system, where the budget originates with the Governor. So too, does Montgomery County — as the County points out, “[u]nder the Charter, only the County Executive can initiate the County’s budgetary process.” However, where the State system limits the ability of the General Assembly to alter the budget submitted to it, 4 the Montgom ¹³¹ ery County system gives the Council unfettered authority to alter, reduce, or increase the appropriations submitted by the Executive. 5 The similarities of the two systems, in regard to the limitations placed on the executive branch’s discretion as to what must be included in the budget is instructive. The State budget process is set forth in Art. III, § 52 of the Maryland Constitution.

Section 52 was adopted, in large measure, to correct the haphazard system of appropriation that existed prior to 1915, which could easily lead to a deficit. 6 ¹³² See McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 96 , 98 A.2d 561 (1953) (“Appropriations for various purposes were made piece-meal by the General Assembly, each project receiving independent consideration without relation to other claims upon the public purse.”). Section 52 apportioned responsibility according to the established branches of government by vesting “sole responsibility, within the limits of the Constitution and the provisions of existing law, of presenting to the Legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State” to the Governor. Md. Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 146 , 367 A.2d 491 (1977) (quoting Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland at 133-34). The General Assembly was given authority to initiate appropriations, but was subject to the balanced budget requirement of Art. III, § 52.

The underlying purpose of establishing an orderly budget system with clearly delineated responsibility was the rationale behind the Court’s holding in Foster Children, where it stated: The provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Maryland Constitution, Art. III, § 52, and the purposes underlying those provisions set forth in the Goodnow Commission’s report, compel the conclusion that he funding of Art. 88A, ¹³³ § 60B(b) of the Code in future annual budgets is a matter constitutionally committed to the Governor’s discretion. For a court to require that the Governor fund the foster care program administered by the Juvenile Services Administration at a particular level in future Budgets prepared and submitted by the Governor would be inconsistent with several provisions of the Budget Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 148, 367 A.2d 491 . The Court further explained: “The Legislature, by enacting statutes specifying minimum spending limits, cannot deprive the Governor of the discretion which the Constitution explicitly vests in him.” Id. at 151 , 367 A.2d 491 .

The Court stated that if the General Assembly could specify what was to be included in the budget and the amounts, then the executive budget system would be destroyed. Id. at 152 , 367 A.2d 491 . Dissenting, Chief Judge Murphy stated: To impose such a mandatory duty on the Governor is not to cause the destruction of the executive budget system, as the majority suggests. Indeed, not to impose such a duty upon the Governor has far more deadly consequences; most certainly it would herald the demise of the delicate and time-honored balance existing between the power and responsibility of the legislature to make the laws and the Governor’s duty to see that they are faithfully executed....

Under the majority’s interpretation, the Governor enjoys unbridled authority to ignore the legislative will, or even worse, to decide, in his sole discretion, which enactments will be funded and which will not. Id. at 153 , 367 A.2d 491 . The dissent pointed to the language of Art. III, § 52(4) requiring the Governor to include appropriations “for such other purposes as are set forth in the ... laws of the State” and argues that this provision removes the Governor’s discretion to simply exclude items from the budget. Id. at 157, 367 A.2d 491 .

The dissent explains that it is not “new or novel” for the General Assembly “by enacting a general law [to] compel the Governor to include an appropria ¹³⁴ tion in his Budget Bill[.]” Id. at 158 , 367 A.2d 491 (citations omitted); see also id. at 160-61 , 367 A.2d 491 (citing the Goodnow Commission which drafted the Budget Amendment and Md.Code (1957, 1967 Repl.Vol.) Art. 15A, § 21A). Citing to amicus curiae briefs, the dissent clarified the position of the General Assembly: Maryland’s adoption of an executive budget system has resulted in no transfer from the General Assembly of its fundamental power to declare what the law shall be, in fiscal as in other matters. At most, the adoption of such a system shifted to the Governor a role of initiation or proposal; it did not give to the executive branch any power to overrule legislative policy determinations. The Governor still has the power, within the guidelines established by the General Assembly by law, to allocate the general revenues of the state among the various programs provided by law and to determine the extent to which these programs shall be funded.

If in his opinion the general revenues of the state will not be sufficient, then it is incumbent upon him to make this fact known to the Legislature so that it may levy such taxes as it deems best to provide the necessary revenue. Id. at 158-160, 367 A.2d 491 . The majority’s holding was superceded in part by a 1978 constitutional amendment, which required the Governor to include in the annual budget bill any minimum level of funding for a program specified by statute. It is our view that, as a result, the dissent’s argument has been vindicated and, as the County Executive analogizes his role to that of the Governor, this discussion is pertinent to the case sub judice.

Further, because the question of whether the Council can permissibly constrain the County Executive’s discretion in his budget submission is one of first impression, we will be guided by the State’s example. ¹³⁵ B. History of the Montgomery County Charter Montgomery County evolved differently than the State, with the position of the County Executive established via an amendment to the County’s original Charter. Montgomery County is a “home rule” county, authorized by Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution to adopt a county charter. The county charter functions as a “constitution” for the county. Mont.

Cnty. v. Anchor Inn Seafood Rest., 374 Md. 327, 331 , 822 A.2d 429 (2003) (citing Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248 , 743 A.2d 748 (2000)). Article XI-A, § 3, requires “that a county adopting a home rule charter must select one of two types of government: (1) an elective legislative body known as the County Council without an elected County Executive or (2) an elective County Council plus an elective County Executive.” Id. at 331, 822 A.2d 429 (footnote omitted); see Md. Const. Art. XI-A, § 3. In 1948, Montgomery County adopted a charter.

In the original charter, Montgomery County had no county executive, making the elected County Council the entire governing body with both legislative and executive powers. Id. at 332, 822 A.2d 429 . Twenty years later, in 1968, Montgomery County adopted a new charter, effective in 1970, which, pursuant to Article XI-A, imposed separation of powers with the Council as the legislative branch and a county executive as the executive branch of the government. Id.; see also Eggert v. Mont.

Cnty. Council, 263 Md. 243, 256-60 , 282 A.2d 474 (1971) (discussing the new charter and how the Council’s efforts to exercise powers now reserved to the executive branch were invalid). The original Charter expressly prohibited the Council, when sitting in executive session from exercising legislative powers. Scull v. Mont.

Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 280 , 239 A.2d 92 (1968). In construing the Council’s powers in its respective roles, the Court in Scull stated that “unambiguously ... the Council in executive session has and may exercise the administrative and executive powers ... and may implement and facilitate and insure the proper execution of laws and ordi ¹³⁶ nances passed by the Council in legislative session[.]” Id. at 281-82 , 239 A.2d 92 . This same delineation of power is reflected in the new (and current) Charter. Article 1 of the Charter describes the legislative branch of the county, with § 101 stating, in pertinent part: All legislative powers which may be exercised by Montgomery County under the Constitution and laws of Maryland, including all law making powers heretofore exercised by the General Assembly of Maryland but transferred to the people of the County by virtue of the adoption of this Charter, and the legislative powers vested in the County Commissioners as a District Council for the Montgomery County Suburban District, shall be vested in the County Council.

The legislative power shall also include, but not be limited to, the power to enact public local laws for the County and repeal or amend local laws for the County heretofore enacted by the General Assembly upon the matters covered by Article 25A, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957, as now in force or hereafter amended, and the power to legislate for the peace, good government, health, safety or welfare of the County. Article 2 of the Charter sets forth the executive branch powers, stating in § 201: The executive power vested in Montgomery County by the Constitution and laws of Maryland and by this Charter shall be vested in a County Executive who shall be the chief executive officer of Montgomery County and who shall faithfully execute the laws. In such capacity, the County Executive shall be the elected executive officer mentioned in Article XI-A, Section 3 of the Constitution of Maryland. The County Executive shall have no legislative power except the power to make rules and regulations expressly delegated by a law enacted by the Council or by this Charter.

The Charter’s delegation of power is critical to an analysis of the meaning of Charter § 303. Section 303 states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 and March 15, respectively of each ¹³⁷ year, proposed capital and operating budgets including recommended expenditures and revenue sources for the ensuing fiscal year and any other information in such form and detail as the County Executive shall determine and as may be prescribed by law. These budgets shall be consistent with six-year programs. A summary shall be submitted with the budgets containing an analysis of the fiscal implications for the County of all available budgets of any agencies for which the Council sets tax rates, makes levies, approves programs or budgets.

As discussed, Charter § 305 gives the Council the authority to “add to, delete from, increase or decrease any appropriation item in the operating or capital budget.” The Council clearly did not divest itself of authority to overhaul the budget submitted by the Executive in the way that the General Assembly is precluded from altering that submitted by the Governor. Section 510, which was adopted in 1980, states, “The Montgomery County Council shall provide by law for collective bargaining with binding arbitration with an authorized representative of the Montgomery County police officers. Any law so enacted shall prohibit strikes or work stoppages by police officers. (Election of 11-4-80.).” The Council enacted the collective bargaining laws at issue pursuant to Charter § 510 and imposed binding arbitration on the Executive, but not on itself.

See footnote 7 and accompanying text, infra. It is evident that the Council retained nearly all the discretion in enacting a budget, subject only to the Executive’s line-item veto power. C. Statutory Interpretation Recently, in FOP 35 I, the Court of Appeals stated the following regarding statutory interpretation: It is a well-settled principle that the primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. The first step in this inquiry is to examine the plain language of the statute, and if the ¹³⁸ words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.

Thus, where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Furthermore, words may not be added to, or removed from, an unambiguous statute in order to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use[.] FOP 35 I, 427 Md. at 572-73, 50 A.3d 579 (quoting Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hayward, 426 Md. 638, 649-50 , 45 A.3d 224 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). “Charters are subject to the same canons of statutory construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes.” Just as the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, so it is “the cardinal rule of charter interpretation.” Mayor & City Council v. Bunting, 168 Md.App. 134, 141 , 895 A.2d 1068 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals has said: where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.

Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Even under the plain meaning rule, however, we do not ignore the Legislature’s purpose if it is readily known ... [and] may ... consider the particular problem or problems the Legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain. ¹³⁹ Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 164 Md.App. 540, 569-70 , 884 A.2d 157 (2005) (internal citations omitted). “[W]e are obligated to construe the statute as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled and harmonized.” Id. at 570 , 884 A.2d 157 (citations omitted). A statutory provision should be interpreted in the context of the entire statutory scheme, and reading the various provisions together and giving effect to each can aid in determining the intent of the legislature.

Office of the Pub. Defender, 413 Md. 411, 464 , 993 A.2d 55 ; see Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997). Thus, viewing § 303 in context of the entire Charter is instructive. Section 302 of the Charter, entitled “Six Year Programs for Public Services, Capital Improvements, and Fiscal Policy,” states: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 of each even-numbered year, a comprehensive six-year program for capital improvements.

The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than March 15 of each year, comprehensive six-year programs for public services and fiscal policy. The six-year programs shall require a vote of at least five Councilmembers for approval or modification. Final Council approval of the six-year programs shall occur at or about the date of budget approval. The public services program shall include a statement of program objectives and recommend levels of public service by the County government, and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of revenue sources, and an estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the capital budget.

The capital improvements program shall include a statement of the objectives of capital programs and the relationship of capital programs to the County’s long-range development plans; shall recommend capital projects and a construction schedule; and shall provide an estimate of costs, a statement of anticipated revenue sources, and an ¹⁴⁰ estimate of the impact of the program on County revenues and the operating budget. The capital improvements program shall, to the extent authorized by law, include all capital projects and programs of all agencies for which the County sets tax rates or approves budgets or programs. The Council may amend an approved capital improvements program at any time by an affirmative vote of six Council-members. The fiscal program shall show projections of revenues and expenditures for all functions, recommend revenue and expenditure policies for the program period and analyze the impact of tax and expenditure patterns on public programs and the economy of the County.

The County Executive shall provide such other information relating to these programs as may be prescribed by law. All capital improvement projects which are estimated to cost in excess of an amount to be established by law or which the County Council determines to possess unusual characteristics or to be of sufficient public importance shall be individually authorized by law; provided however, that any project declared by the County Council to be of an emergency nature necessary for the protection of the public health or safety shall not be subject to this requirement if the project is approved by the affirmative vote of six Councilmembers. Any project mandated by law, statutory or otherwise, interstate compact, or any project required by law to serve two or more jurisdictions shall, likewise, not be subject to this requirement. The County Council shall prescribe by law the methods and procedures for implementation of this provision.

(Emphasis added). Just as in Charter § 303, in the above-cited section of the Charter, the County Executive is required to include in the six-year plan any “other information ... as may be prescribed by law.” The Council may amend an approved capital improvement program at any time by an affirmative vote of six ¹⁴¹ Councilmembers. Here, the Charter again reserves to the Council the authority to amend the County Executive’s submissions. Section 303 requires the County Executive to make the budget consistent with these six-year programs, a clear and uncontested limit on the County Executive’s discretion.

The Council retains the authority to limit the County Executive’s power through legislation in other Charter provisions as well. Section 217, entitled “Reorganization of the Executive Branch,” states that “[t]he Council may prescribe by law the organization of the Executive Branch of County Government.” (Emphasis added). Section 309, entitled “Transfer of Funds,” permits the County Executive to “transfer an unencumbered appropriation balance within a division or between divisions of the same department” but allows the Council to limit that authority in stating that “[transfers between departments, boards or commissions, or to any new account, shall be made only by the County Council upon the recommendation of the County Executive.” Section 501, entitled “Disaster-Continuity of Government During Emergencies,” states: In order to ensure continuity of government during an emergency caused by a disaster or enemy attack, the Council shall prescribe by law for the temporary suspension of specific provisions of this Charter and for temporary succession to the powers and duties of public offices whether filled by election or appointment. (Emphasis added).

The Charter affords the Council the authority to control the County Executive’s action or limit the County Executive’s discretion by enacting laws specific to more general Charter provisions. Moving on, the Charter provision in question, § 303, is not ambiguous. It requires, as the Umpire found, the County Executive to include information “required by law” in the proposed budget. The County argues that “other information” does not need to be included in the budget, and that so long as the information is transmitted to the Council by April 1, the County Executive has satisfied his obligation.

We ¹⁴² disagree. Parsing the sentence into its component parts results in the following: The County Executive shall submit to the Council, not later than January 15 and March 15, respectively of each year, proposed capital and operating budgets including [1] recommended expenditures and revenue sources for the ensuing fiscal year and [2] any other information in such form and detail [a] as the County Executive shall determine and [b] as may be prescribed by law. The disputed provision requires that the County Executive “includ[e]” in the budget “information in such form and detail” that is “prescribed by law” in addition to information that he chooses to include in his discretion. “Other information” cannot be separated from “including” in the way that the County and the circuit court suggest. MCC § 33-80(g) dictates what collective bargaining information must be included in the budget, discussed infra.

Charter § 510 is also not ambiguous. This section gave the Council the authority to enact collective bargaining laws by stating that the “Council shall provide by law for collective bargaining with binding arbitration ...” The Council abided by that mandate by enacting MCC §§ 33-75 to 33-85. Those laws are binding on the County Executive as well as the employees to which they relate. If the County Executive, as the employer who is required to be bound by an arbitrator’s decision, can effectively undo an arbitrator’s decision by refusing to include any agreement in the budget proposal that requires appropriation, then an intractable conflict results.

See Atkinson, 428 Md. at 748 n. 9, 53 A.3d 1184 (discussing that if the legislative body is required to have the “discretion to refuse to fund a binding arbitration award, then there can never be binding arbitration”). We are required by another canon of statutory construction to “ ‘avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Bunting, 168 Md.App. at 142 , 895 A.2d 1068 (quoting Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 75 , 854 A.2d 879 (2004)).

The Bunting Court ¹⁴³ stated by way of example that Montgomery County had used its code to “define the boundaries of what had been granted in [its] charter[ ].” Id. at 146 , 895 A.2d 1068 . Thus, in the MCC, the Council defined the boundaries of the County Executive’s budgetary discretion granted generally in Charter § 303 as related to collective bargaining agreements. Such an interpretation is consistent with the other Charter provisions that provide for the Council to supplement Charter requirements by enacting legislation. The Court of Appeals explained that ‘“if two statutes contain an irreconcilable conflict, the statute whose relevant substantive provisions were enacted most recently may impliedly repeal any conflicting provision of the earlier statute.’ ” Atkinson, 428 Md. at 743 , 53 A.3d 1184 (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 , 607 A.2d 552 (1992)).

Moreover, “[w]hen ... two statutes conflict and one is general and the other specific, the statutes may be harmonized by viewing the more specific statute as an exception to the more general one.” Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 306 , 835 A.2d 1175 (2003) (citations omitted). Here, the County Executive has discretion as to what to recommend in the budget pursuant to Charter § 303, except where otherwise constrained by the later-enacted § 510 and collective bargaining laws. Interpreting the phrase “as otherwise required by law” in § 303 to exclude the collective bargaining provisions of the MCC is to render the words meaningless. Such an interpretation violates the canon of statutory interpretation requiring that no word is rendered superfluous or meaningless and, as discussed, would require interpreting § 303 inconsistently with rest of the Charter.

Atkinson, 428 Md. at 744-45 , 53 A.3d 1184 ; see also Office of Pub. Defender, 413 Md. at 465 , 993 A.2d 55 . An amendment to the Charter, such as § 510, “is necessarily limited in substance to amending the form or structure of government initially established by adoption of the charter.” Bunting, 168 Md.App. at 147 , 895 A.2d 1068 (citation omitted). Unlike the cases cited by the parties in which charter provi ¹⁴⁴ sions were invalidated by virtue of being too specific, or in the nature of “legislative” schemes, the County’s argument is that § 510 is not specific enough because it does not require the