Frederick Classical Charter School, Inc. v. Frederick County Board of Education

Getty, J. How many times have you heard someone say ³⁴⁰ “If I had his money, I could do things my way?” But little they know that it’s so hard to find One rich man in ten with a satisfied mind Porter Wagoner, Satisfied Mind (RCA Records 1955). When the Maryland General Assembly passed a state enabling statute in 2003 to create a charter school program, it expressed its intent for the program in the statutory findings that charter schools “provide innovative learning opportunities and creative educational approaches to improve the education of students.” 2003 Md. Laws, eh. 358. See also Md. Code, Educ, (“ED”) 9-101. However, the enabling statute created a statutory scheme under which such schools would be “public” schools overseen by the school board of the local jurisdiction.

See ED § 9-102. Moreover, the General Assembly did not create a separate funding stream for these public charter schools but instead provided that charter funding would come from other people’s money, ie., the local school board’s budget. See ED § 9-109. The autonomy of a public charter school is further limited by the statute’s other provisions that give local school boards the “chartering authority” to approve applications to form a public charter school, and by a requirement that, for those counties that have entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a teacher’s union, only members of the union that is a party to that agreement can be assigned as staff for a public charter school.

See ED §§ 9-103; 9-104; 9-108(b). Under this statutory organization, there is a natural and inherent conflict with the local school board’s role in supervising charter schools and approving charter school applications and its own self-interest; to the extent that the local school board authorizes the creation or expansion of a charter school, there is a concomitant reduction in funds available for the education of the non-charter students in the local public system. This tension in the funding stream for public charter schools has left dissatisfied minds on both sides and has led to appeals from local school board funding decisions that have come before Maryland’s appellate courts. See, e.g., Balt City ³⁴¹ Bd. of Sch.

Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 400 Md. 324 , 929 A.2d 113 (2007); Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc. v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Educ., 227 Md.App. 439 , 134 A.3d 376 (2016); Monarch Acad. Balt. Campus, Inc. v. Balt.

City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 231 Md.App. 594 , 153 A.3d 859 , cert. granted sub nom., Monarch Acad. Balt. Campus v. Balt.

City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 452 Md. 523 , 157 A.3d 809 (2017). This case involves a dispute between Frederick Classical Charter School, Inc. (“Frederick Classical”), the Petitioner, a charter school located in Frederick, Maryland and the Frederick County Board of Education (“the Local Board”), the Respondent. The parties’ dispute focuses on whether the Local Board’s annual funding allocation to Frederick Classical in its first year of operation satisfied ED § 9-109.

Under that statute, a local school board is required to disburse to a public charter school “an amount of county, State, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction.” ED § 9-109. In this case, Frederick Classical was not satisfied with its annual commensurate funding allocation as determined by the Local Board because it did not include a proportional share of funds which the Local Board had budgeted for student transportation. The funds withheld amounted to $544.26 per-pupil and $135,926.22 in the first year of the school’s operation, and more in subsequent years. Frederick Classical challenged the allocation, first in a letter to the Local Board and, when the Local Board summarily refused to amend the allocation, in an appeal to the State Board.

In reviewing Frederick Classical’s appeal, the State Board regarded the issue as one of local policy, and thus applied a deferential standard of review, in which it assumed that the Local Board’s decision to withhold transportation funds was “prima facie correct” unless proven to be “arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal.” See Md.- Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C). On the merits, the State Board determined that “it does not appear that [Frederick Classical] ³⁴² provides any transportation services” to its students. The State Board concluded that, under ED § 9-109 and its own precedent, “a charter school is not automatically entitled to funds for services it does not provide,” and that “if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of [ ] funds.” The State Board also focused on language in the charter agreement between Frederick Classical and the Local Board, which stated that transportation of students “shall be the responsibility of [Frederick Classical] families,” with certain narrowly defined exceptions.

The State Board interpreted that provision to mean that Frederick Classical had “agreed it is not entitled to [transportation] funds by virtue of having parents take on the responsibility for transportation.” For those reasons, the State Board upheld the Local Board’s decision to withhold transportation funding from Frederick Classical’s annual funding allocation. Frederick Classical petitioned for judicial review of the State Board’s declaratory ruling before the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which upheld the State Board’s ruling. Then, Frederick Classical appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which, in a reported opinion, likewise affirmed the State Board’s decision. Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc. v. Frederick Cty.

Bd. of Educ., 227 Md.App. 439 , 134 A.3d 376 (2016). Frederick Classical thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on July 11, 2016. 448 Md. 724 , 141 A.3d 135 (2016). We hold that the State Board erred by applying the deferential standard of review for decisions of a local school board on a matter involving a local policy or a local dispute, as defined in COMAR 13A,01,05.05(A)-(C), instead of the “independent judgment” standard for the “explanation and interpretation of the public school laws and State Board regulations” defined in COMAR 13A,01.05.05(E). We further hold that the State Board’s conclusion that Frederick Classical was not entitled to transportation funds when it did not provide ³⁴³ transportation services is contrary to its own precedent as well as the statutory purpose and legislative history of the statute.

Hence, the State Board’s decision to deny transportation funds to Frederick Classical on that basis was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. And, we hold that the State Board erroneously determined that Frederick Classical agreed, in its charter agreement, that it was not entitled to transportation funds. Therefore, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remand the case to the intermediate appellate court with instructions to remand to the circuit court, and with further instructions for the circuit court to remand the case to the State Board, for further proceedings before the State Board consistent with this opinion. H-Í BACKGROUND A. Charter Schools and Commensurate Funding Charter Schools Charter schools are a statutorily created alternative to traditional public schools that are “in the nature of semi-autonomous public schools,” operating “under a contract with a State or local school board.” Balt.

City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 400 Md. 324, 328 , 929 A.2d 113 (2007). “The contract, or charter [agreement], defines how the school will be structured, staffed, managed, and funded, what programs will be offered, and how the school will operate and account for its activities.” Id. The first charter school law was passed in Minnesota in 1991, and currently forty-two states and the District of Columbia have public charter school laws, with more than 6900 charter schools currently in operation, enrolling an estimated 3.1 million students. 1 ³⁴⁴ Maryland’s Charter School Statute The legislative struggle to establish a publicly funded charter school program in Maryland was a long and arduous one, lasting over six years. City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 348-54 , 929 A.2d 113 .

Ultimately, in 2003, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Maryland Public Charter School Program (“Charter School Program”). See ED §§ 9-101 et seq.; see generally City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 329-31 , 929 A.2d 113 (summarizing the provisions of the Charter School Program). The General Assembly subsequently significantly revised the Charter Schools Program in 2015, with the passage of the Public Charter School Improvement Act. 2015 Md, Laws, ch. 311. More than a decade after the enactment of the program, there are an estimated forty-nine public charter schools in Maryland, with 19,370 students enrolled in those schools. 2 The Charter School Program statute sets forth a process for establishing new charter schools as well as monitoring, oversight, and accountability standards for charter schools once they are established.

Section 9-101(b) states that the purpose of the Charter School Program is to “establish an alternative means within the existing public school system in order to provide innovative learning opportunities and creative educational approaches to improve the education of students.” Section 9-102 defines a public charter school as one that meets the thirteen conditions set forth in the section, including that a charter school must operate “in accordance with its charter.” The public chartering authority, or the charter school au-thorizer, is “the county board of education.” ED § 9-103. Thus, charter school advocates must submit applications to ³⁴⁵ establish a new charter school to the local school board. For a new charter school, that application must be in compliance with the requirements of § 9-104, whereas existing charter schools may seek to renew their charter school agreements under a process set out in § 9-104.1. At issue in this appeal is § 9-109, which provides a mandate for public funding of public charter schools: A county board shall disburse to a public charter school an amount of county, State, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction.

The statutory interpretation of this provision and deciphering the meaning of “commensurate” in this context has required extensive administrative deliberations and left most parties dissatisfied. City Neighbors Charter School The first case in which this Court addressed a dispute between a charter school and a local school board over the meaning of the funding provision of ED § 9-109 was Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners v. City Neighbors Charter School, 400 Md. 324 , 929 A.2d 113 (2007). Judge Alan M. Wilner, writing for the majority, provided an extensive analysis of the General Assembly’s passage of the Charter Schools Program and, in particular, the legislative history of the “commensurate” funding provision in ED § 9-109. At issue in City Neighbors were three cases before the State Board—two appeals from local board actions, and one request for a declaratory ruling—all stemming from charter school disputes with local county boards of education over the allocation of “commensurate” funds pursuant to ED § 9-109.

Id. at 334, 929 A.2d 113 . The disputed local school board actions included “excluding certain categories of its system-wide spending when calculating the charter school allocation,” and “requiring the charter schools to accept other categories ³⁴⁶ of [funds] in the form of services rather than cash.” Id. at 332 , 929 A.2d 113 . The State Board proceeded to issue three declaratory rulings based on those cases, in which it “addressed three basic subjects—the standard of review to be applied by [the State Board], the application process, 3 and the proper interpretation of ED § 9-109(a).” 4 Id. at 335, 929 A.2d 113 . “The three opinions obviously attracted considerable comment, some of it critical, in the news media and among the educational establishment,” which prompted the State Board to hold an open meeting and thereafter issue revised opinions in each of the three cases on May 26, 2005 (hereinafter, “the City Neighbors declaratory rulings”). Id. “Those opinions, which were both clarifying and substantive in nature, constitute^] the final decisions of the [State] Board.” Id.

As to the appropriate standard of review in cases involving funding disputes for a charter school under ED § 9-109, the State Board determined that, under ED § 2-205(e), “it was empowered to ‘explain the true intent and meaning’ of the provisions of the Education Article that were under its jurisdiction and to decide ‘all controversies and disputes under [those] provisions.’ ” Id. Furthermore, the State Board determined that “COMAR 13A.01.05,05[ (E) ] directed that the [State] Board ‘exercise its independent judgment on the record before it in the explanation and interpretation of the public school laws and State Board regulations,’ ” Id. The “main issue” in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings was “funding and the meaning of ED § 9-109(a), in particular ³⁴⁷ the phrase ‘commensurate with the amount disbursed to other schools in the local jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 336, 929 A.2d 113 . The State Board concluded that ED § 9-109(a) “expressed a legislative intent that a charter school ‘receive federal, State, and local funding in an amount proportionate to the amount of funds expended for elementary, middle, and secondary level students in the other public schools in the same system.’ ” Id.

Furthermore, the State Board determined that the calculation of commensurate funds must include “ ‘funding for services for which students in the public charter schools are eligible such as free and reduced price meals, pre-kindergarten, special education, English-language learners, Perkins, Title I, and transportation.’ ” 5 Id. (emphasis added). The Board further specified that the commensurate funding was to be calculated by starting with the local school system’s total annual operating budget that includes all federal, State, and local funding, 6 and dividing by enrollment for the previous year 7 to reach an average per-pupil figure, overall and for each major category of spending. Id. at 336-37, 929 A.2d 113 .

Then, after deducting two percent for central office administrative costs, the State Board directed that local boards multiply the average per-pupil figure “by the student enrollment of the charter school ³⁴⁸ to determine the total funding amount for the charter school.” Id. at 337 , 929 A.2d 113 . The State Board determined that “[b]ecause the total school system operating budget encompassed all funds,” including funds for specific services, “the average per[-]pupil amount derived from [the total operating budget] figure would be sufficient for the charter school to deliver the services for which its students were eligible.” Id. The State Board noted, however, that charter schools “would have to make budgetary allocations in light of the students’ eligibility requirements” under federal or state law “and in doing so must comply with all applicable Federal and State requirements.” Id. “For the special services that must be provided to eligible students,” the State Board determined that “[a] charter school could elect either to provide the services directly or have them provided by the school system, but if it opted for the latter, it would be required to reimburse the school system for the proportionate cost of those services.” Id. at 337-38 , 929 A.2d 113 . A charter school would also need to reimburse the local school board “ ‘for salary, local retirement, and other fringe benefit costs for the public school employees working in the charter school as well as for regular services and supplies that the charter school requests the local school system to provide.’ ” Id. at 338 , 929 A.2d 113 . “As ‘further guidance’ on the implementation of that funding methodology, [the State Board] adopted and incorporated by reference ‘guidance documents’ ... that had been discussed at the Board’s open meeting[.]” Id. at 338 , 929 A.2d 113 .

One of those documents, Exhibit 2, “Use of Average Per Pupil Funding and Central Support,” noted that “[t]he calculation of average of cost does not mean that the funding mix of each fund source” in a local county board’s budget “must be duplicated at the [c]harter [s]chool level,” and that “[t]here is reason neither to assume nor expect that [a local county board] would create a mirror image of itself within the [Charter [s]chool.” City Neighbors Charter Sch. v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, MSBE Op. No. 05-17 (May 26, 2005).

That document also stated that “[t]he actual funding sources that ³⁴⁹ would be provided to [a charter] school would be dependent on the specific school’s eligibility for those restricted funds.” Id. Another document, Exhibit 4, “Charter Schools and Special Education,” stated the following regarding transportation: As a part of the contract agreement between the [local school system] and Charter School, transportation should be addressed for all students including students with disabilities attending the charter schools. This may include the Charter School returning to the [local school system] the portion of funds provided for transportation or the Charter School providing the transportation service for the student. .., Id. Notably, the State Board also stated that “its opinions should be used as ‘guidance and direction’ to [ ] other charter school applicants and local school systems ‘for the refinement of their working relationships on behalf of the public school children throughout this State.’ ” City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 339 , 929 A.2d 113 .

This Court began our analysis in City Neighbors by considering whether the State Board’s rulings amounted to a “regulation” as defined in the State Administrative Procedure Act, codified in Maryland Code, State Government Article § 10-101 et seq., and were thus invalid because they were not issued in conformance with the requirements of that statute for formal rulemaking through regulations. Id. at 344, 929 A.2d 113 . We noted that “administrative agencies have discretion to establish policy either through the adoption of regulations or through ad hoc contested case adjudications and that it would [be] patently unreasonable to conclude that every time an agency explains the standards through which it applies a statute in a contested proceeding it is promulgating rules.” Id. at 345 , 929 A.2d 113 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore concluded that the State Board “was well within its discretion to proceed in the manner it did— adjudicating the cases before it and offering ‘guidance’ to ³⁵⁰ other applicants, rather than proceeding with more formal and binding regulations.” Id. at 346 , 929 A,2d 113 .

Turning to the principal question of whether the State Board “had properly construed and applied ED § 9-109,” we discussed the text of the statute, concluding that it was “patently ambiguous,” explaining that, [Local] school boards do not disburse funds to the other public schools in the local jurisdiction. The school boards do not send checks, wire funds, or deliver wads of cash to the principals for the payment of teachers’ salaries or the salaries of anyone else, or for the purchase of textbooks, other instructional materials, or incidental supplies and equipment, or for the maintenance of their respective facilities, or to provide transportation, lunch, or health or guidance services for the students. The phrase “disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction” [in the statute] therefore cannot be read literally. No one can calculate a precise dollar amount disbursed to the X Middle School in order to determine a “commensurate” amount that should be disbursed to the Y Public Charter Middle School, because there is no such disbursement.

The whole comparative framework, therefore—what the disbursement to the public charter schools should be commensurate with—requires interpretation. It is not even close to being clear on its face. Id. at 346-47, 929 A.2d 113 . We therefore discussed in detail the legislative history of the “commensurate” funding requirement in § 9-109(a).

Id. at 348-64, 929 A.2d 113 . We concluded from our review of the legislative history that the General Assembly had clearly intended “that the determination of commensurate funding would necessarily be on a per[-]pupil basis.” Id. at 365 , 929 A.2d 113 . However, we also concluded that the General Assembly had also “left some room for interpretation” as to “what was commensurate and how [ ] the amount disbursed to other public schools [was] to be determined[.]” Id. Furthermore, we concluded that the General Assembly “must have envisioned” that the primary authority to interpret that provision would rest in the State Board, “the body [the General Assembly] has consistently vested with the ³⁵¹ ultimate administrative authority to interpret, explain, and apply the public education laws.” Id.

We determined that the State Board’s interpretation of ED § 9-109 and the “commensurate” funding requirement was well within its discretion. We found “no legal error in the [State] Board’s use of the average per[-]pupil funding approach.” Id. at 356, 929 A.2d 113 . And, we determined that the State Board did not err in interpreting the provision to require local school boards to disburse money, as opposed to services, unless a charter school elects to “negotiate for the provision of services, if they would rather have the services, for which [it] would be required to reimburse the county board[ ].” Id. We concluded that under the statute, services “cannot be forced on the charter schools at the whim of the county boards.” Id.

Furthermore, we held that the State Board was “clearly entitled” to conclude that “commensurate” funding to charter schools must include funding for Title I and special education funds “to the extent that students in the charter school are eligible for those services.” Id. Monocacy Montessori Communities, Inc. In Monocacy Montessori Communities, Inc. v. Frederick County Board of Education, MSBE Op. No. 06-17 (May 24, 2006) (hereinafter, “Monocacy"), the State Board decided an appeal by a public charter school, Monocacy Montesori Communities, Inc. (“MMCI”) from a “commensurate funding” decision of the Frederick County Board of Education that, according to MMCI, deprived it of funding to which it was entitled by statute. Monocacy is thus very similar to Frederick Classical’s appeal to the State Board from a “commensurate funding” decision of the same local school board.

In Monocacy, the State Board noted that the Local Board used a formula in calculating MMCI’s per-pupil allocation that differed from the one the State Board had endorsed in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings. Id. at 3. The State Board described the formula used by the Local Board as follows: The formula used by the local board had three steps. First, it subtracted from the total budget all restricted budget ³⁵² amounts targeted for specific programs and services.

That resulted in the “unrestricted budget.” Second, it adjusted the total unrestricted budget proportionally [by] subtracting the value of the services it provided in-kind and directly to MMCI. It divided that amount by the number of students enrolled.... Finally, the local board would add on to that per[-]pupil amount any restricted funds for which [the] charter school or its students were eligible. Id.

The State Board determined that the Local Board’s formula was “not consistent with the State Board’s formula” set forth in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings. Id. at 4. Nonetheless, the State Board did not deem that an error of law, stating that it had not intended to require that the formula for per-pupil funding stated in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings must be used “without deviation[ ] by every local school system in calculating a charter school’s funding allocation, no matter what the circumstances.” Id. at 5. However, the State Board did not stray far from the formula put forth in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings.

It stated that the City Neighbors formula “results in a bottom line amount of money that this Board considers proportionate/eommensurate funding.” Id. Although a local school board may apply a different formula, “that formula must result” in the same “bottom line amount of money” so that the State Board could “conclude that the school system was providing proportionate/commensurate funds to the charter school.” Id. Applying that standard, the State Board determined that, after taking into account the value of the in-kind services that the Local Board was providing to MMCI, the per-pupil allocation figure reached under the Local Board’s formula was $932 lower than that under the State Board’s formula. Id. at 8.

However, one of the main reasons for that difference was that “[the Local Board] put no money into the charter school budget for transportation.” Id. The State Board determined that the withholding of transportation funding was justified by the charter agreement ³⁵³ between MMCI and the Local Board. That agreement was entered into on January 14, 2005—after the General Assembly had enacted the Charter Schools Program statute and ED § 9-109, but before the State Board had clarified the meaning of “commensurate” funding in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings. Id.

The MMCI charter agreement contained a provision stating that “transportation shall be the responsibility of MMCI except for students who live along [an] established [bus] route and for special education students.” Id. The State Board interpreted that language to mean that that “MMCI essentially has agreed that it is not entitled to the transportation dollars contained in [the Local Board’s] Total Operating Budget,” and consequently, that “the cost of transportation services per[-]pupil should be deducted” from MMCI’s per-pupil allocation. Id. at 9. The State Board therefore reduced its “bottom line” per-pupil figure by $420 “to reflect the transportation agreement.” Id. at 10.

With little discussion, the State Board also made a final adjustment to its “bottom line” per-pupil amount, by following the lead of the Local Board and subtracting all restricted budget amounts targeted to specific programs and services from the total operating budget figure. Id. at 11. Consequently, the State Board further reduced its “bottom line” per-pupil figure by an additional $500. Id.

After making the adjustments for transportation funding and restricted funds, the difference between the State Board and the Local Board’s figures was $12. Id. The State Board therefore found that “to provide commensurate funding ... [the Local Board] must provide an additional $12 per[-]pupil to MMCI.” Id. at 12. And, although it had approved removing restricted funds from the per-pupil allocation formula, it also found that the Local Board must also add to the per-pupil amount “any restricted funds to which MMCI is entitled.” Id.

B. Current Proceedings Frederick Classical Charter School Frederick Classical is an educational nonprofit corporation created to establish, organize, and operate a charter school. ³⁵⁴ On April 6, 2011, the Local Board approved Frederick Classical’s application to form and operate a charter school with amendments and conditions. On February 3, 2012, Frederick Classical and the Local Board executed a charter agreement, which commenced on July 1, 2013. The charter agreement authorizes Frederick Classical to operate a charter school for four school years, from July 1, 2013 until June 30, 2017, but permits Frederick Classical to request an extension of the term of the agreement at any time. Prior to the expiration of the term of the charter agreement on June 30, 2017, Frederick Classical may also request a renewal of the agreement.

The charter agreement outlines the relationship, rights, and obligations between Frederick Classical and the Local Board. The pertinent provisions relevant for this appeal are the funding and transportation provisions. The funding provision of the agreement states, in pertinent part In accordance with ED § 9-109 and further clarified in corresponding State Board rulings, the [Local] Board shall disburse to [Frederick Classical] an amount of county, state, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction. [Frederick Classical] may seek and receive other funds through local, state or federal government sources and/or from private sources without a reduction in its annual commensurate allocation. The student transportation provision states: Transportation shall be the responsibility of [Frederick Classical] families with the following exceptions: 1.

Students who live along an established bus route that passes the School facility; and 2. Special education students with transportation on their [Individualized Education Plans], If [Frederick Classical] subsequently determines to provide transportation during the term of this Charter, it may contract with an approved provider for transportation ser ³⁵⁵ vices within provisions allowable under the negotiated agreement. Frederick Classical 2014 Fiscal Year Funding Allocation On June 26, 2013, Leslie Pellegrino, the Executive Director of Fiscal Services for the Local Board, sent an email to representatives of Frederick Classical advising them of their financial information for the 2013-2014 school year (“2014 Fiscal Year”), which was Frederick Classical’s first year of operation. The email stated that Frederick Classical’s 2014 Fiscal Year per-pupil allocation would be $8818.54, resulting in the school receiving approximately $2.4 million in total funds based on an enrollment of 280 students.

Attached to that email were several charts, including a chart showing how the Local Board had reached the per-pupil allocation for the 2014 Fiscal Year: 8 [[Image here]] In the first column of that chart, the Local Board broke ³⁵⁶ down how it had calculated the per-pupil allocation under its own preferred approach. The Local Board started with the county’s total education operating budget for the 2014 Fiscal Year ($532,697,886). The first step in its calculation process was to deduct all funds targeted for specific programs and services that it placed in a “restricted budget” ($75,454,769) to reach a “total unrestricted budget” figure ($457,243,117). Then, the Local Board further deducted additional funds for “further adjustments for in-kind services” ($99,192,999). 9 The “total budget after adjustments” ($358,050,118) was then divided by the estimated enrollment of all students in the system (40,668), reflecting both students in traditional public schools as well as charter schools.

This resulted in an initial per-pupil amount of $8804.22. The second column of the chart, according to the Local Board, showed its calculations applying a different formula, which it regarded as approved by the State Board in Monocacy. 10 Applying that alternate formula, the Local Board employed the same first step as in its own formula: taking the county’s total education operating budget for the 2014 Fiscal Year ($532,697,886) and deducting all funds targeted for specific programs and services placed in a “restricted budget” ($75,454,769) to reach a “total unrestricted budget” figure ($457,243,117). However, instead of deducting for in-kind services, the Local Board divided the total unrestricted budget ³⁵⁷ figure ($457,243,117) by total estimated enrollment (40,668) to reach a figure of $11,243.31. Then, it deducted two percent for administrative costs from that figure to reach an “initial per[-]pupil amount” of $11,018.44.

As a final step, the Local Board further reduced the “initial per[-]pupil amount” by a “transportation deduction” ($544.26) to reach an “average per[-]pupil amount adjusted” of $10,474.18. Although not clearly stated in the chart, the “transportation deduction” appears to be a per-pupil figure for transportation costs. 11 Even after deducting restricted funds and the “transportation deduction,” the $10,474.18 figure reached under the alternate formula based on Monocacy was substantially greater than the $8804.22 per-pupil figure reached under the Local Board’s own preferred approach. But, in a final adjustment, the Local Board increased its own figure by $1655.64, to reflect “in-kind add ins,” apparently meaning the average per-pupil cost of the in-kind services it provided to Frederick Classical. Thus the Local Board’s final figure under its own formula was $10,459.86, which was $14.32 less than the $10,474.18 figure it reached applying the alternate formula drawn from Monocacy.

Because the Local Board’s average per-pupil amount reached under its own formula was $14.32 less than that reached under the formula based upon Monocacy, it increased the initial per-pupil amount reached under its own figure ($8804,22) by $14.32 in order to reach Frederick Classical’s 2014 Fiscal Year per-pupil allocation of $8818.54. A separate funding calculation document was also included that divided all of the major categories in the Local Board’s budget into smaller categories of funding, which were then designated as one of the following: ³⁵⁸ In-Kind Services are services provided to the Charter School based on specific service related determinates; Buy Backs are services purchased back from the Charter School after the distribution of the allocation; and Per[~]Pupil Allocation (PPA) indicates funds distributed to the [Charter [S]chool, That document listed the following as “in-kind services:” the costs of employing a superintendent, a deputy superintendent, a Chief Operating Officer, other mid-level management, and the Local Board members; the costs for the Human Resources, Legal, Communication Services, Budget, Finance, Purchasing, Technology Services, and Curriculum Instruction, Assessment & Innovation departments; special education services; non-public placement for disabled students; a pupil personnel worker; the CASS program; 12 a school therapist; student health, including health room technicians and workers; and, food services. Transportation was a category in the funding calculation document. Transportation was divided into two subcategories—student transportation and athletic transportation.

Student transportation was explained as “[b]us services for students to and from schools, field trips, extracurricular activities[,] and state approved nonpublic and state institutions and schools.” The Local Board did not include a designation of in-kind services, buy backs, or per-pupil allocation for student transportation, but rather stated that student transportation was “[n]ot included in [Frederick Classical’s] allocation, except In-Kind for [Individualized Education Plan] identified students and budgeted curricular field trips.” Athletic transportation was explained as “[b]us services for athletic events[.]” Similarly, athletic transportation was “[n]ot included in [the] allocation” to Frederick Classical. ³⁵⁹ Funding Dispute In the June 26, 2013 email that provided Frederick Classical’s 2014 Fiscal Year per-pupil allocation figure and supporting documents, Ms. Pellegrino requested that Frederick Classical use the documents to submit a detailed operating budget by August 16, 2013. In response, Frederick Classical submitted to the Local Board a budget based on the Local Board’s funding calculation and the $8818.54 per-pupil allocation figure. 13 However, in correspondence accompanying that budget proposal, Frederick Classical stated that “our submission of this budget does not constitute our assent to the per[-]pupil allocation formula [the Local Board] uses.” Frederick Classical claimed that the Local Board’s allocation formula was not consistent with Maryland law because it did not include transportation funding. And, Frederick Classical contended that the formula applied by the Local Board based on Monocacy “should not apply to charter schools generally.” Finally, Frederick Classical asserted that based upon the Local Board’s funding formula, “our charter school is being denied over $135,926.22 in real dollars over our first year, and increasing amounts in the second and third years.” For those reasons, Frederick Classical requested that the Local Board provide funding “in accordance with the law and include, at least, the Transportation category of funding in the calculation of [the 2014 Fiscal Year] per-pupil allocation and every year thereafter.” Frederick Classical also requested that, if the Local Board did not agree to provide the funding, that it “state its reasoning in writing.” On September 25, 2013, the Local Board responded to Frederick Classical’s request for additional funding. The Local Board stated that the “allocation [of funds was] based on the formula that has been previously accepted and approved by the Maryland State Board of Education as being consistent with Maryland law and the [Local] Board has determined that ³⁶⁰ it is the formula that will be applied here.” The denial letter did not provide any further explanation.

Appeal to the State Board of Education On October 25, 2013, Frederick Classical appealed the Local Board’s decision to the State Board, pursuant to ED § 2-205 and ED § 4-205 14 and COMAR 13A.01.05.02 (describing the required contents of an appeal to the State Board, and a deadline to file the appeal “within 30 calendar days of the decision of the local board”). In its appeal filing, Frederick Classical asserted that the Local Board’s decision to withhold the transportation funds when calculating its allocation denied it commensurate funding for the 2014 Fiscal Year to operate the charter school, as required by ED § 9-109. In support of that contention, Frederick Classical noted that its charter agreement with the Local Board “specifically invoke[d] and incorporate^] [ED] § 9-109,” by stating that “the [Local] Board shall disburse to [Frederick Classical] an amount of county, state, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amounts distributed to other public schools in the local jurisdictions.” And, Frederick Classical cited the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, where the State Board had interpreted the ED § 9-109 “commensurate” funding provision to mean a county board was required to provide a charter school with a proportional per-pupil allocation of funds, including funds budgeted for services such as transportation. Frederick Classical also attempted to distinguish the State Board’s ruling in Monocacy, asserting that in that opinion the State Board upheld an exclusion of transportation funds “only because [MMCI] had freely and expressly agreed to forego those funds it was otherwise eligible to receive,” which it asserted was “emphati ³⁶¹ cally not the ease here.” Frederick Classical requested that the State Board reverse the Local Board’s decision and direct the Local Board to provide the appropriate level of funding.

In the alternative, Frederick Classical petitioned the State Board for a declaratory ruling directing that the Local Board revise its funding allocation to Frederick Classical. The Local Board filed a response to Frederick Classical’s appeal and a motion for summary affirmance, with a memorandum in support. The Local Board’s supporting memorandum stated that the current method of calculating the per-pupil allocation was “correct and proper” as it was based on the formula that the State Board applied in its decision in Monocacy, which it asserted was “fully dispositive of the issues raised” in the appeal. The Local Board contended— inaccurately—that the charter agreement transportation provision in Monocacy was “exactly the same” as the similar provision in Frederick Classical’s charter agreement. 15 Lastly, the Local Board contended that “it would be irrational and unreasonable for the [Local] Board to pay Frederick Classical an amount of money that would represent the per-pupil amount of its Transportation budget in a circumstance where the Charter Agreement expressly provides that the [Local] Board has no general responsibility for transportation.” Frederick Classical filed a Reply to the Local Board’s Response, claiming that the Local Board mischaracterized the Monocacy opinion and that the only relevant ruling in Monocacy was “that a charter school may agree that it is ‘not entitled to transportation dollars contained in the [local board’s] [Total] Operating Budget.’ ” See Monocacy, MSBE Op.

No. 06-17 at 9. Frederick Classical contended that Monocacy was not dispositive because, unlike the charter school in ³⁶² that case, it had never agreed that it was not entitled to transportation dollars. Frederick Classical also noted the discrepancy described above between the transportation provision in its charter compared with the provision at issue Monocacy. It claimed that the language in its charter that Frederick Classical families would be responsible for transportation did not reflect a voluntary agreement to surrender transportation funding, because those parents were not parties to the contract.

And, it also highlighted additional language in its charter agreement that provides that “[i]f [Frederick Classical] subsequently determines to provide transportation during the term of this Charter, it may contract with an approved provider for transportation services ...” Frederick Classical maintained that language indicates that it “clearly [had] contractually retained the right to provide transportation to its students.” Finally, Frederick Classical asserted that because it had not contractually surrendered the transportation funding, it was entitled to that funding even if it was not providing transportation, as in its view “[c]harter schools are entitled to funding commensurate with other public schools, which they may allocate as they see fit.” On May 20, 2014, the State Board issued its opinion in this matter, without holding a hearing. Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc. v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Educ., MSBE Opinion No. 14-21 (May 20, 2014). The State Board’s opinion summarized the standard of review that it was applying: This appeal concerns a controversy or dispute regarding the rules and policies of a local board.

Accordingly, the local board’s decision “must be considered prima facie correct” and upheld unless [Frederick Classical] proves that the local board’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal. See COMAR 13A.01.05.05; Kitzmiller Charter [Sch] Initiative, Inc. v. Garrett County Bd. of Educ., MSBE Op. No. 13-52 (2013). Id. at 2.

The State Board began its legal analysis by summarizing its previous rulings on the commensurate funding requirement of ED § 9-109 in the City Neighbors declaratory ³⁶³ rulings and in Monocacy, as well as the claims raised by the parties in their appeal filings. Id. at 2-4. Applying its prior decisions to the facts of the case, the State Board concluded that Frederick Classical was not entitled to transportation funds as part of its per-pupil allocation. The State Board’s explanation as to how it reached that conclusion, though at times muddled, made two distinct points.

First, the State Board determined that because Frederick Classical did not provide transportation services, Frederick Classical was not entitled to the transportation funding under ED § 9-109 and the State Board’s prior ruling in Monocacy. The State Board found that requiring county school boards to “provide charter schools with a lump sum without regard to the services provided” would be contrary to its previous ruling in Monocacy, and that “a charter school is not automatically entitled to funds for services it does not provide,” Id. at 4. Rather, it stated that whether transportation costs are among the funds included in calculating a per-pupil allocation “will depend on the nature of the arrangement between the local school system and the charter school” as to those services. Id.

Applying that standard to the facts, the State Board found that “if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services [that] it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds,” and that it was “not arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal for [the Local Board] to consider the actual services provided by [Frederick Classical] to reach a commensurate level of funding.” Id. at 4-5. The State Board thus concluded that withholding transportation funds from the per-pupil allocation was “not contrary to state law” and that the formula employed by the Local Board “is consistent with our past rulings.” Id. at 5. Second, the State Board found that Frederick Classical was not entitled to the transportation funding because of language in its charter agreement with the Local Board. As noted above, the charter agreement provided that transportation “shall be the responsibility of [Frederick Classical] families” with certain limited exceptions.

The State Board concluded that, “[i]n our view, a plain reading of the Charter language ³⁶⁴ indicates that [Frederick Classical] is not responsible for providing transportation.” Id. at 4. And, the State Board interpreted its decision in Monocacy as standing for a broad proposition that if a charter school “agreed to cover transportation (except for certain students)” then the cost of transportation services per-pupil should be deducted from its per-pupil allocation. Id. at 5. The State Board acknowledged that the language in the Frederick Classical charter agreement differed from the language of the agreement at issue in Monoca-cy, which provided that transportation generally “shall be the responsibility of [the charter school].” Id. at 4-5 (quoting Monocacy, MSBE Op.

No. 06-17 at 9). Nevertheless, the State Board concluded that the charter language at issue meant that “[Frederick Classical] has [ ] agreed that it is not entitled to [transportation] funds by virtue of having parents take on the responsibility for transportation.” Id. at 5. For those reasons, the State Board denied Frederick Classical’s request that it reverse the Local Board’s funding decision, and likewise denied its alternative request that it issue a declaratory ruling that the Local Board’s ruling was contrary to Maryland law and must be revised. Id. at 5.

Circuit Court for Frederick County On June 18, 2014, Frederick Classical petitioned the Circuit Court for Frederick County for judicial review. On December 8, 2014 the circuit court held a hearing and thereafter took the matter sub curia. On February 5, 2015, the circuit court filed a written opinion affirming the decision of the State Board. The circuit court held that the State Board was correct to have cited and applied the deferential standard of review described in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C).

As to the merits of the State Board’s decision, the circuit court held that, under ED § 9-109 and Monocacy, the formula stated in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings “is not mandatory,” and therefore the Local Board was not required to apply it. And, the circuit court found that, pursuant to Monocacy, “a local board is not required to provide [funds] for transportation when [a] charter school does not provide [that] service.” Therefore, as ³⁶⁵ Frederick Classical did not provide transportation services, the circuit court found that the State Board had correctly upheld the Local Board’s decision to withhold the transportation funds. Court of Special Appeals On March 6, 2015, Frederick Classical appealed the judgment of the circuit court to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. On March 31, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals issued a reported opinion, in which it affirmed the holding of the circuit court and the State Board.

Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc. v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Educ., 227 Md.App. 439 , 134 A.3d 376 (2016). The Court of Special Appeals stated that the appeal presented a single issue for its review, which it had rephrased: “Did the State Board err in finding that the Local Board provided full funding despite the fact that it did not include transportation funding in Frederick Classical’s funding allocation?” Id. at 443 , 134 A.3d 376 . The Court of Special Appeals considered whether the State Board had erred by applying the deferential standard of review under COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C).

The Court of Special Appeals determined that “[i]n view of the heavy deference that must be accorded to State Board of Education interpretations of the public school laws and its own regulations,” the State Board did not err in applying the deferential standard of review. Id. at 451 n.5, 134 A.3d 376 . The Court of Special Appeals then addressed the State Board’s interpretation of the transportation language in Frederick Classical’s charter agreement. The intermediate appellate court agreed with the State Board that “the plain language of the charter [agreement] clearly shifts the responsibility for transportation from [the Local Board] to Frederick Classical families.” Id. at 454 , 134 A.3d 376 .

Therefore, the intermediate appellate court found no error as to the State Board’s additional interpretation of that provision as meaning that Frederick Classical was not entitled to transportation funds. Id. ³⁶⁶ Then, turning to the issue of whether the State Board had correctly determined that the Local Board could withhold transportation funds from its calculation of Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the State Board’s ruling was consistent with its prior decisions in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings and Monoeacy, as well as this Court’s holding in City Neighbors, Id, at 454-68, 134 A,3d 376. Citing to the guidance documents attached to the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, the Court of Special Appeals stated that the State Board in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings “appreciated that transportation [funds] may, but [do] not have to be, included in the funds provided to a charter school.” Id. at 455 , 134 A.3d 376 . Therefore, it determined that the State Board’s decision in the instant case “is not inconsistent with its City Neighbors [declaratory rulings decision].” Id.

And, the Court of Special Appeals construed this Court’s decision in City Neighbors, 400 Md. 324 , 929 A.2d 113 , as standing for the proposition that a county school board could not require “the mandatory exclusion of transportation funds from [a] per[-]pupil allocation amount,” but that this Court did not make an “affirmative holding that transportation funds can never be excluded from the funds disbursed to a charter school.” Id. at 455-56 , 134 A.3d 376 (emphasis in original). In support of its construction of City Neighbors , the Court of Special Appeals cited a 1997 State Department of Education guideline document that stated that “[o]ther fiscal support such as transportation may be part of the negotiations between the charter requestor and the local education authority.” Id. at 456 , 134 A.3d 376 (quoting City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 350 , 929 A.2d 113 (citing Maryland State Department of Education, Guidelines for Use by Local School Systems in Considering Charter School Applications (July, 1997), at 8)). The Court of Special Appeals also determined that the State Board’s ruling was in accordance with the State Board’s prior decision in Monoeacy, The Court of Special Appeals regarded Monoeacy as having clarified that the “language [the State Board] used in [the City Neighbors declaratory rulings] should ³⁶⁷ not be strictly construed, and that the formula it announced there was not the only way a local school board could distribute funding to a charter school.” Id. at 456 , 134 A.3d 376 . And, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the State Board’s position “that if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds” was announced in Monocacy, “albeit using different words.” Id. at 457 , 134 A.3d 376 .

Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals noted that the State Board had stated in Monocacy that “[i]f MMCI were entitled to the full per[-]pupil amount, however, MMCI would receive an amount greater than an ‘equal amount of funds.’ ” Id. (quoting Monocacy, MSBE Op. No. 06-17 at 9). Finally, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the State Board that, even though “Frederick Classical’s charter places the responsibility for transportation on Frederick Classical families,” as opposed to the provision at issue in Monocacy that placed responsibility on the charter school itself, “the outcome is the same.” Id.

In the Court of Special Appeals’ view, if a charter agreement “provides that either the charter school or families have a duty to transport the students, the result is that the local school system is not responsible for the transportation or for including funds for transportation in a per[-]pupil allocation.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court of Special Appeals also dismissed additional contract interpretation and policy arguments raised by Frederick Classical. In terms of contract interpretation, the Court of Special Appeals was not persuaded that “the families of [Frederick Classical] are not parties to the [charter], and so cannot be deemed to have voluntarily contracted to surrender portions of [Frederick Classical’s] funding,” or that the contract should be construed against the Local Board “because the [L]ocal [B]oard prepared the document.” Id. at 458-59 , 134 A.3d 376 .

The Court of Special Appeals also discounted Frederick Classical’s claim that “by failing to disburse transportation funding, [the Local Board] retained that money in the system-wide budget, ‘inevitably redistributing and spending those funds on other students in the school district.’ ” Id. at ³⁶⁸ 458 , 134 A.3d 376 . Instead, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Local Board’s assertion that its transportation budget represented a fixed “total cost to actually transport students living in the transportable areas and for special education students needing specialized transportation,” a population that, aside from certain special education students, did not include any charter school students “who are not entitled to transportation.” Id. Frederick Classical thereafter petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which was granted on July 11, 2016. Frederick Classical Charter Sch. v. Frederick Cty.

Bd. of Educ., 448 Md. 724 , 141 A.3d 135 (2016). Frederick Classical presents three questions for our review, which we have reordered and restated as follows: 1. Did the State Board err by applying a deferential standard of review to the Local Board’s decision to exclude transportation funds when calculating Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation? 2. Did the State Board err in affirming the Local Board’s decision to exclude transportation funds when calculating Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation on the ground that, pursuant to ED § 9-109 and its own precedent, Frederick Classical was not entitled to those funds when it did not provide transportation services? 3.

Did the State Board err in affirming the Local Board’s decision to exclude transportation funds when calculating Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation on the basis of its finding that Frederick Classical had contractually agreed that it was not entitled to transportation funds? 16 ³⁶⁹ STANDARD OF REVIEW “When this Court sits in review of an administrative agency decision, we reevaluate the decision of the agency under the same statutory standards as would the circuit court; we do not employ those standards to reevaluate the decision of the circuit or intermediate appellate court.” Spencer v. Md. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 523 , 846 A.2d 341 (2004). Thus, our inquiry “is not whether the Court of Special Appeals erred, but whether the administrative agency erred.” Id. In this case we are reviewing the decision of the State Board. Section 2-205 of the Education Article enumerates the powers and duties of the State Board including, in § 2—205(e), the State Board’s authority to explain the intent and meaning of the Education Article and Maryland education policy.

In pertinent part, that section provides, (1) Without charge and with the advice of the Attorney General, the State Board shall explain the true intent and meaning of the provisions of: (i) This article that are within its jurisdiction; and ³⁷⁰ (ii) The bylaws, rules, and regulations adopted by the Board. (2) ... [T]he Board shall decide all controversies and disputes under these provisions. (3) The decision of the Board is final. [[Image here]] Pursuant to § 2-205, the State Board “has very broad statutory authority over the administration of the public school system in this State, [and] that the totality of its statutory authority constitutes a visitatorial power of such comprehensive character as to invest the State Board with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education.” City Neigh bors, 400 Md. at 342-43 , 929 A.2d 113 (2007) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty. v. Waeldner, 298 Md. 354, 359-62 , 470 A.2d 332 (1984)). We have previously explained the scope and purpose of this “visitatorial” power: We think it beyond question that the power of visitation vested in the State Board is one of general control and supervision; it authorizes the State Board to superintend the activities of the local boards of education to keep them within the legitimate sphere of their operations, and whenever a controversy or dispute arises involving the educational policy or proper administration of the public school system of the State, the State Board’s visitatorial] power authorizes it to correct all abuses of authority and to nullify all irregular proceedings.

Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty. v. Heister, 392 Md. 140, 163-54 , 896 A.2d 342 (2006) (footnote omitted) (quoting Zeitschel v. Bd. of Educ., 274 Md. 69, 81 , 332 A.2d 906 (1975)). “[T]he broad statutory mandate given to [the State Board] requires that special deference be given to its interpretation of statutes that it administers.” City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 343 , 929 A.2d 113 . That deference is over and above that generally afforded to other administrative agencies; “[w]hile administrative agencies generally may interpret statutes, as well as rule upon other legal issues, and while an agency’s ³⁷¹ interpretation of a statute which it administers is entitled to weight, the paramount role of the State Board of Education in interpreting the public education law sets it apart from most administrative agencies.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. for Dorchester Cty. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 790-91 , 506 A.2d 625 (1986) (footnote omitted)). However, the discretion that courts afford to the State Board “is not unlimited.” Id.

We have recognized that there are at least “four instances where judicial review may be more expansive in its inquiry: (1) the matter involves a purely legal question; (2) the State Board has contravened state statute; (3) the State Board exercised its power in bad faith, fraudulently, or in breach of trust; or (4) the State Board exercised its power arbitrarily or capriciously. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty. v. Heister, 392 Md. 140 , 154 n.13, 896 A.2d 342 (2006) (quoting Hurl v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard Cty., 107 Md.App, 286, 299, 667 A.2d 970 (1995) (additional citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 1—4 i-H DISCUSSION A. The Standard of Review in the State Board’s Opinion Frederick Classical contends that the State Board incorrectly viewed the Local Board’s decision as one that involves “a controversy or dispute regarding the rules and policies of a local [school] board,” and consequently erred in applying the standard of review for such local school board decisions that they “must be considered prima facie correct and upheld” by the State Board unless deemed “arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal.” See COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C). Frederick Classical asserts that the State Board not only failed to identify any local policy that was at issue in the ³⁷² parties’ dispute, but expressly stated in its decision that the “appeal concern[ed] the allocation of money to public charter schools and the State Board’s interpretation of commensurate funding.” See Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc., MSBE Op. No. 14-21 at 2.

According to Frederick Classical, the State Board should have instead applied a de novo standard of review defined in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(E) because the Local Board’s decision, and Frederick Classical’s appeal from that decision, “presented the State Board [with] questions regarding the explanation and interpretation of a contract, State public school laws, and the State Board’s prior opinions.” The Local Board responds by stating that the State Board utilized the appropriate standard of review because the issue before the State Board concerned “the formulation and calculation of the amount of funding a [local school] board disbursed to a charter school,” which, according to the Local Board, is a controversy or dispute regarding the rules and policies of a local board. In the alternative, the Local Board contends that even if the State Board incorrectly stated the standard of review, the State Board’s decision shows that it actually applied the correct standard of review and exercised its independent judgment. Finally, the Local Board claims that even if the State Board both cited and applied the incorrect standard of review, this error was “irrelevant in a case like this one, which turns not on factual disputes, but rather on statutory interpretation, [and] where the standard of review specifically includes ‘illegal’ as one of the grounds for reversal.” COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C) describes the standard of review that the State Board applies to local school board decisions on matters involving a local policy or a local dispute: A. General. Decisions of a local board involving local policy or a controversy and dispute regarding the rules and regulations of the local board shall be considered prima facie correct, and the State Board may not substitute its judgment for that of the local board unless the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal. ³⁷³ B. A decision may be arbitrary or unreasonable if it is one or more of the following: (1) It is contrary to sound educational policy; or (2) A reasoning mind could not have reasonably reached the conclusion the local board or local superintendent reached.

C. A decision may be illegal if it is one or more of the following: (1) Unconstitutional; (2) Exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the local board; (3) Misconstrues the law; (4) Results from an unlawful procedure; (5) Is an abuse of discretionary powers; or (6) Is affected by any other error of law. COMAR 13A.01.05.05(E) describes the standard of review that the State Board applies to local board decisions involving the interpretation of state public school laws or of State Board policies: E. State School Laws and Regulations. The State Board shall exercise its independent judgment on the record before it in the explanation and interpretation of the public school laws and State Board regulations. Thus, pursuant to COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C), the State Board applies a deferential standard of review to purely local policies or disputes, regarding the local school board decision as “prima facie correct” and narrowing its review only to whether the decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal.” But, pursuant to COMAR 13A.01.05.05(E), the State Board does not defer to local school board determinations when the issue presented for its review involves the explanation and interpretation of the public school laws and State Board regulations,” but instead must “exercise its independent judgment” in a de novo review.

As we noted in City Neighbors , these separate and distinct standards of review are also supported by case law precedent: ³⁷⁴ [An] unbroken and consistent line of cases supports the precepts embodied in COMAR 13A.01.05.05.—that (1) decisions of a local board involving a local policy or a dispute regarding rules or regulations of the local board shall be considered by [the State Board] as prima [facie] correct, and [the State Board] will not substitute its judgment for that of the local board in such cases unless the local decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal, but (2) [the State Board] shall exercise its independent judgment on the record before it in the explanation and interpretation of the State public school laws and State Board regulations. 400 Md. at 343-44 , 929 A.2d 113 . As described above, City Neighbors involved a set of cases in which the State Board considered whether funding decisions of local boards, including to exclude certain categories of funds from its calculation of a per-pupil allocation to a charter school, was permissible under ED § 9-109. Id. at 331-35, 929 A.2d 113 . We held that in that situation, “[the] State Board was construing a State statute, not a local [school] board policy or regulation,” and therefore “owed little deference to the city and [local school] board decisions, but was required to exercise its own independent judgment as to the proper interpretation of ED § 9-109[;]” Id. at 344, 929 A.2d 113 .

Similarly, in the instant case, the primary issue presented by Frederick Classical’s appeal centered on the “proper interpretation of ED § 9-109,” as clarified in the State Board’s own prior precedent and this Court’s holding in City Neighbors . Frederick Classical’s main contention on appeal to the State Board was that the Local Board’s decision to exclude the transportation funds when calculating its allocation denied it commensurate funding under ED § 9-109. And, in their respective appeal filings, the parties focused on whether the Local Board’s decision to exclude those transportation funds was consistent with State Board precedent interpreting ED § 9-109, namely in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings and Monocacy. ³⁷⁵ The State Board opinion reflects that the issues it was deciding involved the commensurate funding requirement of ED § 9-109 and its precedent interpreting that requirement. The State Board began its legal analysis in the opinion by summarizing its previous rulings interpreting ED § 9-109 in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings and in Monocacy, Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc., MSBE Op.

No. 14-21 at 2-4. Then, when evaluating the parties’ claims, the State Board interpreted the “commensurate” funding requirement of ED § 9-109 and its own precedent. It determined that “if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services [that] it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds” and that it was “not arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal for a county to consider the actual services provided by [Frederick Classical] to reach a commensurate level of funding.” Id. at 4-5. And, it denied Frederick Classical’s request for a declaratory ruling because it found that withholding transportation funds from the per-pupil allocation was “not contrary to state law” and that the formula employed by the Local Board “is consistent with [its] past rulings.” Id. at 5.

The appeal to the State Board also presented a separate contract interpretation issue, but one that likewise centered on ED § 9-109 and the commensurate funds requirement. Frederick Classical contended before the State Board that it was entitled to the inclusion of the transportation funds in the per-pupil allocation because its charter agreement with the Local Board “specifically invoke[d] and incorporate^] [ED] § 9-109,” by stating that “[the Local Board] shall disburse to [Frederick Classical] an amount of county, state, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amounts distributed to other public schools in the local jurisdictions.” Furthermore, in resolving the parties’ dispute as to the meaning and significance of the charter agreement language, the State Board relied primarily upon its decision in Monocacy. The State Board interpreted its decision in Monocacy as standing for a broad proposition that if a charter school “agreed to cover transportation (except ³⁷⁶ for certain students)” then the cost of transportation services per-pupil should be deducted from its per-pupil allocation. Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc., MSBE Op.

No. 14-21 at 4-5. On that basis, the State Board found that “[Frederick Classical] has [ ] agreed that it is not entitled to [transportation] funds by virtue of having parents take on the responsibility for transportation.” Id. at 5. Thus, the only issues that were before the State Board and decided in its opinion were: (1) whether transportation funds must be included in Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation pursuant to the commensurate funds requirement contained in ED § 9-109; and, (2) whether Frederick Classical had contractually waived its right to the inclusion of transportation funds in its commensurate funding allocation through its charter agreement. Both of those issues involve an interpretation of ED § 9-109 and prior State Board precedent.

Moreover, the State Board did not consider or address any local policy or rules of the Local Board. 17 As we stated in City Neighbors , to permit local school boards to determine “what funding is commensurate with the amounts disbursed to the other public schools” pursuant to ED § 9-109 “by methodologies of their choosing” is impermissible because it “raises the specter of 24 disparate methods of implementing a uniform State law and would denigrate the [State Board’s] long-established authority to explain the true intent and meaning of the public education laws that it is charged with enforcing.” 400 Md. at 346-47 , 929 A.2d 113 . ³⁷⁷ We therefore hold that the State Board erred by incorrectly articulating and applying the standard of review set forth in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C) for local policy or disputes, 18 and that the State Board should have applied the standard of review set forth in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(E), and “exercise[d] its independent judgment on the record.” We cannot say, as the Local Board urges, that even if the State Board cited the incorrect standard of review that was deferential to the Local Board’s decision, its opinion shows that it actually applied the correct standard and “exer-eise[d] its independent judgment.” First, we note that the State Board made its determination without a hearing, and therefore the record is devoid of evidence that the State Board actually examined and reviewed the positions and arguments of each side and made an independent review of the record. Second, the State Board’s decision indicates that it did not apply such an independent review but instead deferred to the position advanced by the Local Board. The State Board’s legal conclusions were strikingly similar to those of the Local Board in its denial letter to Frederick Classical and filings to the State Board in the appeal. In the denial letter, the Local Board stated that “[its] allocation [of funds was] based on the formula that has been previously accepted and approved by the Maryland Stated Board of Education as being consistent with Maryland law and the [Local] Board has determined that ³⁷⁸ it is the formula that will be applied here.” And, in its response and supporting memorandum to Frederick Classical’s appeal, the Local Board stated that the current method of calculating the per-pupil allocation was “correct and proper” as it was based on the formula which the State Board applied in its decision in Monocacy, which it asserted was “fully dispositive of the issues raised” in the appeal.

The State Board’s decision to affirm the funding formula mirrored the Local Board’s view and concluded that the Local Board’s decision to exclude transportation funds while calculating the per-pupil allocation “was not contrary to State law and the formula used by the [Ljocal [B]oard is consistent with our past rulings.” And, the State Board likewise relied almost exclusively upon its Monocacy ruling to reach that result. In contrast, in its evaluation of the parties’ claims the State Board did not rely upon the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, which was the precedent upon which Frederick Classical primarily relied in its filings to the State Board. 19 Thus, the record reflects that the State Board did not apply a thorough, independent judgment as to whether the Local Board’s allocation was consistent with its prior decisions and the underlying statute. Instead, it appears that the State Board deferred to the decision of the Local Board, and the Local Board’s reasoning in support of that decision. Nor can we say that the State Board’s error in stating the incorrect standard of review was “irrelevant” to its decision.

The Local Board correctly points out that even the more deferential standard of review in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C) requires the State Board to reverse local school board decisions that are “arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal.” And, it notes that COMAR 13A.01.05.05(C) states that a local school board’s “decision may be illegal if,” among other things, it “misconstrues the law,” “is an abuse of discretionary powers,” ³⁷⁹ or “is affected by any other error of law.” Thus, the Local Board urges us to conclude that “if the State Board [had] agreed with Frederick Classical’s [claim] that the [Local] Board’s allocation formula misconstrued the law, was an abuse of its powers, or was affected by any other error of law, it would have reversed the [Local] Board’s funding formula, whatever standard it applied.” However, the Local Board ignores the other half of the more deferential standard of review for purely local policies and disputes in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A), namely, that the State Board must view the Local Board decision as “prima facie correct.” An administrative agency decision that is prima facie correct carries with it “the presumption of validity,” and a court or other reviewing body must therefore view the decision “in the light most favorable to the agency.” See Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., Licensing & Reg. et al, 356 Md. 180, 185 , 738 A.2d 856 (1999) (citing Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569 , 709 A.2d 749 (1998)). Thus, in this case, the State Board may have been predisposed to accept the Local Board’s claim that its allocation formula was merely an application of State Board precedent from Monocacy, and to distinguish or discount the claims raised by Frederick Classical that suggest that the Local Board’s decision was incorrect. Our view that the Local Board erred in applying the more deferential standard of review stated in COMAR 13A.01.05.05(A)-(C) is at odds with the Court of Special Appeals, below, which determined that, “[i]n view of the heavy deference that must be accorded to State Board [ ] interpretations of the public school laws and its own regulations,” the State Board did not err in applying that standard. Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc., 227 Md.App. at 451 n.5, 134 A.3d 376 .

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the State Board is accorded a significant amount of judicial deference in the interpretation of its own regulations, including its decision as to which of the standards of review in COMAR 13A.01.05.05 apply to a given situation. However, that deference does not extend to upholding the State Board’s decision ³⁸⁰ to apply the more deferential standard of review when the issue before the State Board did not involve any local policy or local dispute, and the record indicates that the State Board improperly deferred to the decision or arguments of a local school board instead of applying the much more stringent “independent judgment” standard of review. B. The State Board’s Ruling That Frederick Classical Was Not Entitled to the Inclusion of Transportation Funds in Its Per-Pupil Allocation When It Did Not Provide Transportation Services Frederick Classical contends that the State Board erred in affirming the Local Board’s decision to exclude transportation funds from its per-pupil allocation on the basis that, under ED § 9-109 and its own precedent, Frederick Classical was not entitled to those funds when it did not provide transportation services. Frederick Classical claims that the State Board’s decision was contrary to its own City Neighbors declaratory rulings, affirmed by thjs Court in City Neighbors, 400 Md. 324 , 929 A.2d 113 .

According to Frederick Classical, those decisions “demonstrate that a charter school operator is to receive funding even if the charter school is not providing a ‘service’ that the local board generally provides [] so long as the charter school does not request the local school system [] provide [ ]the service.” Frederick Classical thus asserts that it is entitled to the full per-pupil allocation under the formula in City Neighbors and “which it can use to prioritize and fund its innovative programs.” Frederick Classical also insists that the State Board’s decision in Monocacy does not support that proposition that “a charter school operator does not receive funding associated with categories of services it does not provide.” Frederick Classical notes that the charter school operator in that case was, in fact, providing transportation services. Moreover, Frederick Classical maintains that the statement in Monocacy which the Court of Special Appeals determined supports the State Board’s decision here—that if the charter school in Monocacy “were entitled to the full per[-]pupil amount” that it had claimed, it would “receive an amount greater than an ³⁸¹ ‘equal’ amount of funds”—is “concerned an entirely different and distinct subject matter” than at issue in this case. According to Frederick Classical, that statement in Monocacy refers only to a situation where a charter school requested certain in-kind services from a local board, in which case the charter school must “buy back” the costs of those services through a deduction from its per-pupil allocation, so that the charter school “does not get both the cash and the [services].” However, Frederick Classical insists that the costs of transportation should not be deducted in its case, because “it is not purchasing a service from the local board with the $544.26 per student” withheld from its per-pupil allocation. Frederick Classical also raises a policy argument against the State Board’s decision, contending that permitting the Local Board to withhold funds from its per-pupil allocation to which it is entitled under ED § 9-109 and State Board precedent, while providing no service in exchange, results in “retaining that money instead in the school system budget, inevitably redistributing and spending those funds” on students in traditional public schools.

Frederick Classical insists that this amounts to it “being compelled to subsidize the rest of the [local school] system at great cost to Frederick Classical and little benefit to the rest of the system.” In response, the Local Board claims that the State Board “appropriately determined that the funding formula used by the [Local] Board here, which did not include a share of its transportation budget, does not violate provisions of Maryland law regarding ‘commensurate funding’ for charter schools and was consistent with City Neighbors.” The Local Board contends that in City Neighbors , this Court recognized that certain local school board funds, including transportation, “are dependent upon whether or not [] students [at the charter school] ‘are eligible’ for such services.” Apparently regarding students’ ‘eligibility’ for a service as synonymous with students ‘actually receiving’ that service, the Local Board asserts that because the students at Frederick Classical were not actually receiving transportation services from the school, Frederick Classical was “not entitled to funding.” ³⁸² The Local Board also claims that its funding allocation was “based on the same approach and formula” that was approved in Monocacy, It further insists that the Monocacy approach and formula applies broadly and “was not based on any agreement by the charter school there that it would waive, forfeit, or forego transportation funding.” Finally, the Local Board disputes Frederick Classical’s policy argument that the exclusion of transportation funds from its funding allocation resulted in Frederick Classical subsidizing the costs of transportation services to students in traditional public schools. As to that point, the Local Board reiterates the same argument that it raised before the Court of Special Appeals, that its transportation budget represented a fixed “total cost to actually transport students living in [ ] transportable areas and for special education students needing specialized transportation,” a population which, aside from certain special education students, did not include any charter school students “who are not entitled to transportation.” The Loeal Board insists that “it would be an absolute windfall” for Frederick Classical to receive a proportionate share of those costs. In its Reply Brief, Frederick Classical asserts that, as to the Loeal Board’s position that Frederick Classical students are ineligible for transportation services, the State Board in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings clearly stated that per-pupil allocations are only reduced when students are ineligible for those funds based upon explicit restrictions in state or federal law. Here, Frederick Classical asserts, there are no such restrictions on transportation funds.

Frederick Classical also contends that, in addition to the reasons it provided in its initial brief, the exclusion of transportation funds in Monocacy does not control the outcome of this case because that exclusion was based on a contractual agreement between the charter school and the local county board that the State Board interpreted to mean that the charter school had agreed to “forego transportation funds.” Finally, relying upon this Court’s holding in CBS, Inc, v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 319 Md. 687 , 575 A.2d 324 (1990), Frederick Classical main ³⁸³ tains that “to the extent that the [State Board’s decision] represents a change in the State Board’s interpretation of the statute, it could not be adopted through a contested case proceeding at all; it would have required there first to be a rulemaking.” As discussed above, the State Board determined that under ED § 9-109 and its own precedent interpreting that statute, “a charter school is not automatically entitled to funds for services it does not provide.” Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc., MSBE Op. No. 14-21 at 4. Applying that standard to the parties’ dispute, the State Board found that “if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services [that] it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds.” Id. The State Board therefore affirmed the Local Board’s exclusion of transportation funds from the per-pupil allocation, concluding that it was “not contrary to state law” and was “consistent with [its] past rulings.” 20 Id, at 5.

The State Board’s conclusion that a charter school is not entitled to funds for services it does not provide was not squarely addressed in our City Neighbors opinion. The City Neighbors declaratory rulings that we reviewed in that opinion did set forth a formula for local school boards to use to calculate a charter school’s per-pupil allocation that included transportation services and funding, but we did not discuss the State Board’s treatment of transportation in our holding. 21 Nor did we address whether the charter schools involved in ³⁸⁴ that case were providing transportation services to their students. Nonetheless, just as in City Neighbors , in this appeal we must evaluate a State Board decision that involves ED § 9-109 and the “commensurate” funding requirement. In that opinion, we determined that the “commensurate” funding requirement in ED § 9-109 is “patently ambiguous.” 400 Md. at 347 , 929 A.2d 113 .

Consequently, we held that we must give “heavy deference” to the State Board’s interpretation of that statute, and defer to its interpretation unless it is “patently wrong.” Id, at 347-48, 929 A.2d 113 . We also stated that “[t]o the extent that we desire to look further, we would apply the most relevant rules of statutory construction to determine the legislative intent, and, in that regard, may consider legislative history and the statutory purpose.” Id. at 348 , 929 A.2d 113 . Applying a similar analytical approach to ascertain whether the State Board’s legal determination that Frederick Classical was not entitled to transportation funding when it did not provide transportation was legally correct, we shall assess whether those determinations are consistent with the State Board’s own interpretation of ED § 9-109, set forth in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings and Monocacy. And, “[t]o the extent that we desire to look further,” we shall consider whether the State Board’s legal determinations in those opinions regarding transportation funds are consistent with the legislative intent behind ED § 9-109, as extensively described by this Court in City Neighbors, 400 Md. 324 , 929 A.2d 113 .

Transportation in the City Neighbors Declaratory Rulings In the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, the State Board provided its first broadly applicable interpretation of ED § 9-109. That statute provides, ³⁸⁵ A county board shall disburse to a public charter school an amount of county, State, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction. The State Board interpreted that statute to mean “that a public charter school ‘receive federal, State, and local funding in an amount proportionate to the amount of funds expended for elementary, middle, and secondary level students in the other public schools in the same system.’ ” 400 Md. at 336 , 929 A.2d 113 (emphasis added). Most significantly to this appeal, the State Board specified in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings that “commensurate” funding provided to a charter school must include “ ‘funding for services for which students in the public charter schools are eligible such as free and reduced price meals, pre-kindergarten, special education, English-language learners, Perkins, Title I, and transportation.’ ” Id, (emphasis added).

Thus, the State Board plainly determined that a proportional share of the funding budgeted by a local school board for those specified services, including transportation, must be included in the funds provided to a charter school to the extent that students at the charter school are “eligible” to receive those services. See City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 366 , 929 A.2d 113 (noting that the State Board had concluded in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings that the “commensurate” funding provided to a charter school “must include Title I and special education funds, to the extent that students in the charter schools are eligible for those services,” and holding that the State Board was “clearly entitled” to draw that conclusion under its authority to “explain the true intent and meaning” of ED § 9-109). The Local Board contends that by stating in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings that charter school students must be “eligible” for a service in order for the charter school to be entitled to a proportionate per-pupil share of the funds expended for that service, the State Board meant that a charter school must actually provide the same services budget ³⁸⁶ ed for and provided by a local school board in order to be entitled to a proportionate per-pupil share of funding for that service. But that interpretation is entirely contrary to the overall approach the State Board endorsed in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings.

In the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, the State Board specified that the commensurate funding was to be calculated on a per-pupil basis. Id, at 336-87, 929 A.2d 113 . That calculation begins with a local school system’s total annual operating budget, including all federal, State, and local funding, except for appropriations for adult education and debt servicing. Id.

That figure is then divided by enrollment to reach an average per-pupil figure. Id. at 337 , 929 A.2d 113 . A local county board may then deduct two percent from the per-pupil figure to account for central office administrative costs. Id.

Finally, the average per-pupil figure is multiplied “by the student enrollment of the charter school to determine the total funding amount for the charter school.” Id. Thus, the State Board explicitly rejected a “mirror image” approach under which a charter school would have to design its budget to mirror each category of funding employed by the local county board, and then receive a proportionate share of funding or services in that category. See City Neighbors, MSBE Op. No. 06-17, Ex. 2b (noting that “the calculation of average cost does not mean that the funding mix of each fund source to the [local school board] must be duplicated at the Charter School level,” and that “there is reason neither to assume nor expect that the [local school board] would create a mirror image of itself within the Charter School”).

Instead, a charter school receives a lump sum cash disbursement that reflects the average costs expended on students in traditional public schools, multiplied by the enrollment of the charter school. The approach affords charter schools a high degree of flexibility in how they choose to spend that lump sum to provide their preferred educational programs and services. Furthermore, in contrast to the Local Board’s position, the City Neighbors declaratory rulings clearly indicate that the ³⁸⁷ State Board had a much narrower intent in stating that students at a charter school must be “eligible” for transportation or one of the other specified services in order for the charter school to be entitled to a proportional, per-pupil share of funds budgeted for that service. The State Board noted that charter schools “would have to make budgetary allocations in light of the students’ eligibility requirements” under federal or state law “and in doing so must comply with all applicable Federal and State requirements.” City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 337 , 929 A.2d 113 (emphasis added).

Specifically, the State Board “recognized the prospect that not every student attending a charter school would be entitled to Title I or special education funds or services and, indeed, that in some charter schools none of the students might be eligible, that funding restrictions applicable to those programs would require the public charter schools to adjust their budgets ‘to be in compliance with programmatic laws and regulations.’ ” Id. at 338 , 929 A.2d 113 (emphasis added). An attached guidance document further specified that “[t]he actual funding sources that would be provided to [a charter] school would be dependent upon the specific school’s eligibility for those restricted funds.” City Neighbors , MSBE Op. No. 05-17, Ex. 2b (emphasis added). The City Neighbors declaratory rulings thus merely acknowledged that some specific services provided by local school boards, particularly Title I and special education services, may have detailed eligibility requirements under federal or state law or regulations.

For funding associated with those services, the State Board determined that a charter school must meet those federal or state eligibility requirements, or else forfeit the proportional share of the local school board’s spending on those services to which it would otherwise be entitled under the per-pupil allocation formula. Although not specifically detailed in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, there are no such detailed federal or state eligibility requirements or programmatic restrictions that apply to either local school boards or individual schools with respect to student transportation funds. Funding for public ³⁸⁸ school transportation in Maryland is paid for through a combination of state and local county government funding. Section 5-205 of the Education Article provides that “[t]he State shall distribute grants as provided under this section to the [local school] boards to provide transportation services for public school students and disabled children for whom transportation is to be provided under § 8-410 of [the Education Article].” The statute provides a “base grant” amount and a statutory formula that allows for an increase in the base amount within certain limits each year.

ED § 5-205(b)-(c). The statute also includes a separate disabled student transportation grant. ED § 5—205(d). Local county governments may also provide additional transportation funding. 22 For the funding that it provides, the General Assembly imposes certain purely budgetary restrictions on local school boards.

Section 5-205(a) also requires that “Appropriations for student transportation shall be budgeted in a separate budget category,” and that “[a] [local school] board may not transfer State revenues from the student transportation category to any other category as a result of this section.” The funds provided by the State also may not “be paid to or claimed by any subdivision,” or “reverted to any subdivision.” Id. However, the General Assembly has not imposed detailed programmatic restrictions on how those funds must be used. Indeed, with the exception of certain disabled students, local school boards are not required by law to provide transportation services to individual public school students. Section 4-120(b) of the Education Article provides that “each [local school] board shall arrange for the transportation of students to and from consolidated schools” (emphasis added). 23 However, requiring a local school board to “arrange” for ³⁸⁹ transportation of students is distinct from requiring that a local school board “provide” such transportation.

A local school board may “arrange” for transportation to be provided by others, such as a student’s parents, without needing to directly provide transportation services through a school bus service or other means. The fact that the General Assembly has recognized this distinction is easily seen in § 8-410(a) of the Education Article, which provides that “[e]ach local school system shall provide or arrange for the transportation during the regular school year of each child with a disability who is in a placement approved in conformity with this subtitle and applicable regulations of the State Board” (emphasis added). As a local school board must either provide or arrange transportation for qualified special education students, it must provide transportation if an arrangement is not reached with the child’s parents or others that they will transport the child. Other statutes also reinforce that a local school board is not required by state law to provide transportation to any particular public school student, aside from those disabled students covered under ED § 8-410(a).

Section 7—801(b)(1) of the Education Article states that “[a]t its own expense, a county governing body may provide transportation for public school students in addition to the transportation provided by the State” (emphasis added). And, § 7-805(a) of the Education Article states that “[a] school bus may be used to transport any student who lives within the mileage limit, if a mileage limit has been established by a local board of education” (emphasis added). Local school board policies regarding transportation similarly reflect that they are not required to provide transportation to and from school for any given student. For example, the Local Board’s “transportation of students” policy states that transportation is not the responsibility of the Local Board, but rather “a partnership between the home and the school.” Board of Education of Frederick County, Maryland, Policy 441.1(A).

Furthermore, the policy provides that, generally, “elementary students are not eligible for school bus transportation to school unless the most practical, direct walking route ³⁹⁰ is longer than 1¼ miles,” and “middle and high school students are not eligible for school bus transportation to school unless the most practical, direct walking route is longer than 1¾ miles .” Id at 441.2(A)-(B). As transportation funding is not restricted under state law, under the formula set forth in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, funds for transportation services must be included in the formula for calculating a charter school’s per-pupil funding allocation. And because there are no eligibility requirements in federal or state law that mandate that students attending public schools must receive those services, aside from the requirement that qualified special education students must be provided with transportation, a charter school does not have to provide transportation services or take any other actions in order to qualify for its proportional share of the average per-pupil transportation funding spent on its general student population for those students other than disabled students who qualify for transportation under ED § 8-410). The City Neighbors declaratory rulings did state one important exception under which transportation services could nonetheless be deducted from a charter school’s per-pupil funding allocation.

The State Board determined that “[f]or the special services that must be provided to eligible students, the charter school could elect either to provide the services directly or have them provided by the school system, but if it opted for the latter, it would be required to reimburse the school system for the proportionate cost of those services.” City Neighbors, 400 Md. at 337-38 , 929 A.2d 113 . As noted previously, transportation is not a service that must be provided to general education students. But, for disabled students who are entitled to transportation pursuant to ED § 8-410, a charter school must elect to actually provide transportation services to disabled students in order to receive its proportional share of county funding for the transportation of disabled students. In contrast, if the charter school elects to have transportation for ³⁹¹ special education students provided by the local school board, it must reimburse the cost of those services.

Similarly, the State Board also determined that a charter school would be required to reimburse a local county board for “‘regular services and supplies that the charter school requests the local school system to provide.’” Id. at 338, 929 A.2d 113 . Thus, if a charter school requests that the local board provide transportation to all of its students, and the local school board agrees to provide that service, the charter school must reimburse transportation funding to the local school board. The “guidance documents” attached to the City Neighbors declaratory rulings provide further support that, under the approach endorsed by the State Board in that case, a charter school is generally entitled to transportation funds unless it requests that a local school board provide transportation. One of those documents, Exhibit 4, “Charter Schools and Special Education,” states the following regarding transportation: As a part of the contract agreement between the [local school system] and Charter School, transportation should be addressed for all students including students with disabilities attending the charter schools.

This may include the Charter School returning to the [local school system] the portion of funds provided for transportation or the Charter School providing the transportation service for the student. ... City Neighbors , MSBE Op. No. 05-17, ex. 4. The exhibit reflects that the State Board expected that local school boards and charter schools would state how transportation services would be provided to children attending a charter school in the school’s charter agreement.

If a local school board agreed to a charter school’s request that it provide transportation, and that agreement was memorialized in the charter agreement, the charter would be required to “return[ ] to the [local school system] the portion of funds.” Alternatively, the charter agreement could contain an agreement that the charter school would provide transportation, in which case—by operation of ³⁹² the charter agreement and not by state law—the charter school would be required to provide those services. In summary, pursuant to the precedent stated in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, when calculating a charter school’s per-pupil allocation of commensurate funds, a local school board generally must include in that calculation funds budgeted for any of the services expressly identified in the declaratory rulings—including funds for transportation services. However, a local school board is not required to include funds for services that have detailed eligibility requirements under state and federal law when the charter school does not meet those eligibility requirements. For transportation, there are no such eligibility requirements for general education students, and a local school board must therefore include the funds budgeted for that service when calculating a charter school’s per-pupil allocation, regardless of whether a charter school provides transportation services to its general student population.

For special education students, a charter school must actually provide transportation for special education students in order to qualify for a proportional share of the local school board budget for those services. Finally, a charter school may elect, but is not required, to request that a local school board provide transportation for some or all of its students. If a local school board agrees to provide transportation, the charter school must reimburse the local school board for the cost of those services. The State Board’s Decision in the Instant Case Is Not Consistent with the City Neighbors Declaratory Rulings The State Board’s decision in this appeal is plainly contrary to its own precedent in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings.

In this case, the State Board determined that “a charter school is not automatically entitled to funds for services it does not provide” and that “if [Frederick Classical] received funds for services [that] it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds.” However, under the City Neighbors declaratory rul ³⁹³ ings, a charter school is automatically entitled to a proportional share of all of the federal, state, and local funds that the local school board expends on elementary, middle, and secondary students, including funding for transportation and the other specified services, unless the charter school fails to meet specific eligibility requirements for a service or elects to have the local board provide the service. 24 Under state and federal law, there are no specific eligibility requirements that require Frederick Classical to provide transportation services to its students, aside from special education students. And, Frederick Classical had not requested that the Local Board provide transportation to general education students. Thus, Frederick Classical does not need to actually provide transportation in order to be entitled to a proportional share of transportation funding budgeted for the general student population in its per-pupil allocation. Consequently, under the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, Frederick Classical was entitled to transportation funds, and the State Board erred in affirming the Local Board’s decision denying those funds.

Nor does it appear that the exclusion of transportation funds while calculating Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation was the only substantial deviation from the City Neighbors declaratory rulings formula by the Local Board. The Local Board’s chart describing its calculation of the 2014 Fiscal Year allocation to Frederick Classical shows that it withheld $1655.64 in per-pupil funds and provided that amount in “in-kind” services. The Local Board listed several services as “in-kind services” that a charter school may well desire that a local school board provide, including: special education services; non-public placement for disabled students; a pupil personnel worker; the CASS program; a school therapist; student health, including health room technicians and workers; ³⁹⁴ and, food services. However, it is not clear from the record if Frederick Classical did in fact desire any of those services, or whether the Local Board intended to actually provide any of those services to Frederick Classical.

And, the Local Board listed several services as “in-kind services” that appear to be purely administrative costs for the Local Board with no direct benefit to Frederick Classical, including the costs of employing a superintendent, a deputy superintendent, a Chief Operating Officer, other mid-level management, and the Local Board members; and the costs for the Human Resources, Legal, Communication Services, Budget, Finance, Purchasing, Technology Services, and Curriculum Instruction, Assessment & Innovation departments. But, as the State Board made explicitly clear in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, all such “in-kind services” should be provided only if explicitly requested by a charter school. And, the overall deduction for all central administrative costs should be capped at two percent of a charter school’s funding allocation. As we recognized in our own City Neighbors opinion, those limitations were both critical to the formula’s approach of ensuring that a charter school was provided with a proportional share of funding in the form it could actually use to implement its programs—cash.

In City Neighbors , we stated that in-kind services should not be “forced on [] charter schools at the whim of [local school] boards.” 400 Md. at 356 , 929 A.2d 113 , And, as to the two percent cap, we similarly stated that “the [State] Board was simply unwilling to allow the [local school] boards to deduct amounts for the entire range of administrative expenses they choose to incur.” Id. We further noted that implicit in the two percent cap, the State Board had determined that “charter schools, being somewhat autonomous, would not need and should not be subject to the full range of control exercised by the central administration over the regular public schools, and that they therefore should not be charged with a share of that total expense,” Id. at 356-57 , 929 A.2d 113 , ³⁹⁵ Frederick Classical did not raise a dispute regarding the provision of in-kind services in its appeal to the State Board from the Local Board’s funding allocation, and in-kind services were tangential to the State Board’s decision below. Consequently, the issue whether the in-kind services in Frederick Classical’s funding allocation were proper under the City Neighbors declaratory rulings is not before us in this appeal. However, to the extent that the State Board chooses to adhere to the formula and approach set forth in its City Neighbors declaratory rulings in the future, it should closely review local school board allocations to charter schools to determine whether withholdings for “in-kind” services are solely for those services that the charter school has, in fact, requested that the local school board provide and that the local school board is in fact providing those services to the charter school.

A local school board should not be permitted to flout the standards set by the State Board as to how funding is calculated for a charter school, and lower that school’s per-pupil allocation, simply by declaring that it has “provided” a charter school with “services” that provide no direct benefit to students and that the charter school neither needs nor desires. The State Board’s Decision in the Instant Case Is Not Consistent with Its Ruling in Monocacy We must also consider whether the State Board changed its position on the funding of public charter schools in Monocacy, and if that case supports the State Board’s decision to reject Frederick Classical’s appeal. In Monocacy, the State Board considered whether a formula used by the Frederick County Board of Education, the same Local Board in this case, to calculate the per-pupil allocation for a charter school, MMCI, was consistent with ED § 9-109 and the commensurate funding requirement. The Local Board’s formula had three steps: First, [the Local Board] subtracted from the total budget all restricted budget amounts targeted for specific programs and services.

That resulted in the “unrestricted budget.” Second, it adjusted the total unrestricted budget proportionally [by] subtracting the value of the services it provided in- ³⁹⁶ kind and directly to MMCI. It divided that amount by the number of students enrolled.... Finally, the local board would add on to that per[-]pupil amount any restricted funds for which charter school or its students were eligible. Monocacy, MSBE Op.

No. 06-17 at 3. In the instant appeal, the Local Board applied the same three-step approach to calculate Frederick Classical’s 2014 Fiscal year per-pupil allocation. See supra Part 1, 18-21. However, the State Board in Monocacy did not endorse or approve the Local Board’s formula.

Indeed, in Monocacy the State Board explicitly stated that the Local Board’s formula was “not consistent with the State Board’s formula” set forth in its City Neighbors ¡declaratory rulings. Id. at 4. And, the State Board reaffirmed the importance of the City Neighbors formula, explaining that it “results in a bottom line amount of money that this Board considers [to be] proportionate/commensurate funding.” Id. at 5. Although the State Board did not entirely rule out a local school board’s use of a different approach, it stated that if a local school board uses a different formula it must result in the same “bottom line amount of money” so that the State Board could “conclude that the school system was providing proportionate/commensurate funds to the charter school.” Id.

In Monocacy, the State Board began its analysis by calculating MMCI’s per-pupil allocation using the same approach as the City Neighbors declaratory rulings. After it credited the Local Board for the provision of in-kind services to MMCI, and subtracted out funds to which MMCI was not entitled, 25 it ³⁹⁷ determined that the Local Board’s allocation was $12 less than the correct figure reached under its own formula. Therefore, it directed that “[the Local Board] must provide an additional $12.00 per pupil to MMCI” in order to ensure that MMCI received commensurate funding. Id. at 12.

Thus, Monocaey both applied and, in effect, fully upheld the formula adopted in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, permitting a local school board to use its own approach only so long as that local school board ultimately adjusted its own per-pupil allocation figure to be dollar-for-dollar exactly the same as that reached under the State Board formula. 26 Although Monocaey was consistent with the State Board’s precedent in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings—under which, as we have explained, transportation funding for general education students must be included in a charter school’s funding allocation—the State Board and Court of Special Appeals below, and the Local Board on appeal, have all misinterpreted Monocaey as standing for a broader proposition that a local school board may exclude transportation services from a charter school’s allocation. In denying relief to Frederick Classical in its initial appeal from the Local Board, the State Board indicated that it viewed Monocaey as supporting its determination, stating that “[a]s we noted in Monocaey, if [a charter school] received funds for services it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its ³⁹⁸ commensurate share of county funds.” Frederick Classical, MSBE Op. No. 14-21 at 4. However, Frederick Classical is correct that Monocacy does not support that statement.

MMCI, the charter school at issue in Monocacy, agreed in its charter agreement that it would undertake the responsibility of providing transportation to all of its students, except special education students or those who live along an established bus route. Monocacy, MSBE Op. No. 06-17 at 8. Thus, the issue of whether it was appropriate to exclude transportation funding to a charter school that did not provide transportation or other services was not raised in Monocacy, and the State Board did not discuss that issue.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the State Board’s statement that “if [a charter school] received funds for services it did not provide, it would be receiving more than its commensurate share of county funds” was supported by Mo-nocacy, citing to a statement in Monocacy that “if MMCI were entitled to the full per[-]pupil amount” that it had claimed, “MMCI would receive an amount greater than an ‘equal’ amount of funds.” Frederick Classical Charter School, Inc., 227 Md.App. at 467 , 134 A.3d 376 (quoting Monocacy, MSBE Op. No. 06-17 at 9). However, in the section of Monocacy relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals, the State Board was discussing MMCI’s contention that it was entitled to a per-pupil allocation calculated by dividing the Local Board’s total operating budget by total enrollment, with no exclusions or deductions of any kind. Monocacy, MSBE Op.

No, 06-17 at 9. But, as the State Board noted in that case, MMCI was in fact receiving certain in-kind services from the State Board. Id. Thus, in the statement relied upon by the intermediate appellate court, the State Board in Monocacy was merely clarifying that if a charter school received both funding that a local school board allocated to a certain service and the service itself for free from the local school board, it would be receiving more than a commensurate or roughly equal share of funds.

In such circumstances, the State Board in Monocacy determined that “if MMCI accepts in-kind services from [the ³⁹⁹ Local Board] it would have to buy back those services.” Id. That determination, which is entirely consistent with the State Board’s precedent in the City Neighbors declaratory rulings, does not support the State Board’s ruling in the instant case, as Frederick Classical was not seeking or being offered any transportation services for its general student population from the Local Board. Finally, the Local Board suggests that Monocacy supports the State Board’s decision to affirm its exclusion of transportation funding from Frederick Classical’s per-pupil allocation because the State Board in Monocacy affirmed its exclusion of $420 in per-pupil transportation funding when calculating MMCI’s per-pupil allocation. The Local Board views the Mo-nocacy ruling as a broadly applicable one that transportation funds may be excluded when calculating a charter school’s per-pupil allocation, and contends that it “was not based on any agreement by [MMCI] that it would waive, forfeit, or forego transportation funding.” But, the State Board was clear that its exclusion of transportation funds in Monocacy was based solely on a clause in the charter agreement between MMCI and the Local Board, which stated that “transportation shall be the responsibility of MMCI except for students who live along [an] established [bus] route and for special education students.” Id. at 8.

The State Board interpreted that provision to mean that “MMCI essentially has agreed that it is not entitled to tire transportation dollars contained in [the Local Board’s] Total Operating Budget.” 27 Id. at 9. Thus, contrary to the Local Board’s view, ⁴⁰⁰ the State Board’s ruling in Monocacy that transportation funds may be excluded was based on a contractual agreement, which the State Board interpreted to mean that the charter school had agreed to forego transportation funds. Thus, Monocacy stands for, at most, the proposition that a charter agreement between a charter school and a local school board may operate to waive or forego transportation funds to