Friends of Frederick County v. Town of New Market

KEHOE, J. In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County, the Honorable Theresa M. Adams, presiding, erred when it concluded that the comprehensive plan 1 for ¹⁸⁸ the Town of New Market complies with state law. The appellants are Friends of Frederick County, a non-profit community advocacy association, the Audubon Society of Central Maryland, Inc., and a number of individuals asserting either taxpayer or aggrieved party standing. 2 The appellee is the Town. Appellants present one issue which we have reworded: Does the Town’s Comprehensive Plan comply with the requirements of Title 3 of Division I of the Land Use Article? The circuit court answered “yes” to this question.

We believe that the court was correct and will affirm its judgment. Background The Town is a municipal corporation located in Frederick County. In 2005, the Town, through its town council, adopted a comprehensive plan (the “Plan”). On November 17, 2010, the Town amended the Plan by adding a water resources element and a municipal growth element (the “MGE”).

Of particular relevance to the present appeal, the MGE proposed the annexation of various tracts of land adjacent to the present Town boundaries (the “Annexation Areas”). The Annexation Areas are currently zoned for agricultural uses or other low-intensity uses by the Frederick County Zoning Ordinance. The MGE proposes that, upon annexation, the Town will change the zoning classifications to permit higher-density residential and mixed commercial and industrial uses. {E. 182-83.} On October 12, 2011, the Town further amended the Plan by adopting three documents as part thereof: a 2011 Supplement, together with two addenda that we will refer to as the “2011 Supplement Documents.” In sum, as of 2011, the Town’s Plan consisted of: (1) the 2005 comprehensive plan ¹⁸⁹ document; (2) the 2010 MGE; (3) the 2010 Water Resources Element; and (4) the 2011 Supplement Documents. (Although we may refer to these components individually in this opinion, we will refer to them, as a whole, as the “Plan.”) The appellants do not agree with the proposal in the MGE that the Town annex and rezone the Annexation Areas.

On February 14, 2011, that is, prior to the Town’s adoption of the 2011 Supplement Documents, appellants filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County contending that the town council failed to comply with various provisions of what was then Md. Ann.Code (2012) Article 66B 3 when it adopted the MGE in 2010. Appellants requested that the circuit court: (i) declare the Plan, specifically its MGE component, invalid; (ii) declare any zoning or annexation completed while the invalid MGE was in force void and invalid; and (iii) enjoin the Town from taking any zoning or annexation actions until the Town had a proper Plan in place. On May 11, 2012, that is, after the Town adopted the 2011 Supplement Documents, appellants filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, appellants again contended that the Plan, as adopted, was invalid because the Plan failed to comply with the then-existing state law requirements in several respects.

(These contentions are essentially the same as some of those raised by appellants in this court, and will be discussed later in this opinion.) ¹⁹⁰ In response, the Town filed a motion for summary judgment. The Town argued that its Plan satisfied the applicable legal requirements. In support of its argument, the Town attached a copy of the Plan, color-coded to indicate which sections of the Plan addressed the subject matter deficiencies complained of by appellants. Appellants opposed the motion for summary judgment.

They argued that the Plan’s alleged compliance with the statutory requirements was a matter of form rather than substance. They also asserted that the Plan was substantively so inadequate that it thwarted the intent of the Code’s requirements. 4 {E. 436-37.} Appellants also alleged that there were “numerous material facts in genuine dispute” dealing with whether the Town complied with the Code. {E. 436.} To support these contentions, appellants submitted affidavits from three experienced and qualified experts: Joseph R. Davis, a land use planner; Michael Siegel, an expert in the fields of local and regional fiscal planning and forecasting; and Jawahar Mehra, a traffic engineer. Messrs. Davis and Siegel opined that the Plan failed to satisfy specific requirements of the Land Use Article.

For example, Mr. Davis stated in his affidavit that the Plan’s forecasts for new road construction failed to take into account the development of the “Delaplaine” and the “Ganley” farms, which are part of the Annexation Area; that the Plan’s calculations of the traffic capacities of existing roadways was inaccurate and flawed; and that the Plan failed to provide cost estimates for the construction of new roads, even though such costs can be calculated. ¹⁹¹ Mr. Siegel opined that the methodology used by the Town to calculate its foreseeable population growth was flawed; that the Plan failed to take into account the fiscal impact of maintaining, as opposed to building, new roads; and that the Plan failed to consider additional public safety expenses that would be required as a result of the development contemplated by the Plan. For his part, Mr. Mehra concluded that the Plan’s transportation element was deficient because (1) it relied upon erroneous data as to the capacities of existing roads; (2) it failed to consider the effect of the new development proposed by the Plan upon existing roadways; and (3) it did not contain cost estimates for new road construction even though such information is required by what is now LU § 3—105(b)(3) 5 and is available—in approximate terms—from the Maryland Department of Transportation. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment. In a written opinion, the court concluded that the case did not present contested issues of material fact but that the dispositive issue was one of law, namely, whether the Plan, as written, complied with the applicable requirements set out in the Land Use Article.

The court concluded that the statutes in question were unambiguous and that the Plan satisfied them. Relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the court concluded that the relevant provisions of the Land Use Article required the Plan to enunciate “policy conclusions, and not the underlying facts and studies used to reach those conclusions.” The court concluded its analysis by stating: Maryland courts are without authority to interfere with any exercise of the legislative prerogative within constitutional limits. S. Easton Neighborhood Ass’n v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468 [ 876 A.2d 58 ] (2005) (quoting Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379 [ 45 A.2d 73 ] (1945)). It is inevitable that when a municipality proposes annexations or zoning ¹⁹² reclassifications, there will likely be affected parties who object to the action.

However, this Court does not retain the authority to supplant the policy decisions of the legislature and local municipalities when those municipalities have fully complied with state law. Any judicial substitution of zoning plans based on preference or opinion, even those of three experts supplied by the Plaintiffs, would be an impermissible infringement on the legislative function. It is true that the Smart Growth policies enacted by the Maryland legislature in recent years have created new burdens for municipal bodies in zoning action and land administration. However, this Court has reviewed the Plan and its amendments and determined that [the Town] has fully complied with the requirements set forth under the relevant zoning statutes under the Land Use Article.

There are no remaining material factual disputes, and the Town’s motion for summary judgment is granted. {E. 4546.} Appellants timely appealed. {E. 9.} Analysis I. We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. See Murray v. TransCare Maryland, 203 Md.App. 172, 198-99 , 37 A.3d 987 (2012), aff'd 431 Md. 225 , 64 A.3d 887 (2013). In undertaking this exercise, we independently review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to decide whether there are issues of material fact. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 714 , 922 A.2d 538 (2007).

We view the dispositive issue in this case to be one of statutory construction. As the Court of Appeals explained in Stickley v. State Farm Fire, 431 Md. 347, 358-59 , 65 A.3d 141 (2013): The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, ¹⁹³ and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. In construing the plain language, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.

Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.... It is also clear that we avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. We analyze the contested provisions of Maryland’s Insurance Article in the context of the statutory scheme and construe the plain language so that the various sections of the article do not conflict with one another.... In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.

As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Finally, appellants are challenging the validity of a legislative act of the Town Council. The decision by the Town Council to approve the Plan carries with it a strong presumption of validity.

See, e.g., Anderson House v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 723 , 939 A.2d 116 (2008); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns, 372 Md. 514, 535 , 814 A.2d 469 (2002). Overcoming this presumption is not impossible but it is very difficult. A party seeking to do so: carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and affirmative evidence, that [the ordinance] is invalid. Even where reasonable doubt exists, the [ordinance must be sustained.

In other words, the legislature is presumed to have acted within its police powers so that if any state of ¹⁹⁴ facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the ordinance], the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the [ordinance] must be assumed. Anderson House, 402 Md. at 724 , 939 A.2d 116 (citations and footnote omitted).

II

In order to place appellants’ contentions in context, we begin with an overview of the relevant statutory scheme, which is now found in Titles 1 and 3 of the Land Use Article. A. The Visions Preliminarily, all comprehensive planning efforts in Maryland are required to “implement” twelve principles or “visions” articulated in LU § 1-201 6 for land use and community ¹⁹⁵ planning in this State. In a nutshell, the visions reflect a legislative awareness that (1) past development in Maryland has too often been haphazard, economically wasteful, and needlessly harmful to environmental and natural resources; and (2) that previous efforts at community planning in Maryland have too often been inadequate, poorly coordinated with planning efforts by neighboring jurisdictions, or simply nonexistent. Section 1-201 requires planning commissions to “implement the ... visions through the comprehensive plan.” B. The Elements Section 3-101 of the Land Use Article requires municipal corporations to enact, adopt, amend, and execute a comprehensive plan, unless the municipal corporation elects to participate in the county plan. 7 LU § 3-102 describes “elements,” ¹⁹⁶ i.e., specific topics relevant to sound planning, that each plan must contain, as well as other elements that a plan may contain. 8 Sections 3-103 through 3-113 describe in greater detail the elements identified in LU § 3-102, and identify specific topics that each of the mandatory elements must address.

Particularly relevant to the issues before us are (1) the development regulations element (§ 3-103); 9 the trans ¹⁹⁷ portation element (§ 3-105); 10 and the municipal growth element (§ 3-112). 11 Finally, LU § 3-204 12 requires plans to ¹⁹⁸ “include” the elements and the visions that we have previously described.

III

To this court, appellants present a multi-step argument as to why the circuit court’s judgment was in error. First, appellants contend that Maryland case law “establish[es] that comprehensive plans are more than mere guides consisting only of policy statements.” Second, appellants argue that state law has transformed comprehensive plans into regulatory devices. Third, based upon these premises, appellants assert that the “language and purpose of the relevant statutory provisions require that comprehensive plans contain substantive factual determinations, not merely policy statements.” Finally, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because the affidavits of their experts demonstrate that there are disputes of fact as to the sufficiency of the Plan. ¹⁹⁹ We do not agree with appellants. It is not necessary for us to decide whether decisions by this Court or the Court of Appeals have had the effect changing the essential nature of comprehensive plans from advisory to regulatory.

This is because we conclude that legislation enacted in response to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Trail v. Terrapin Run, 403 Md. 523, 574 , 943 A.2d 1192 (2008), rendered some aspects of comprehensive plans regulatory, instead of advisory, in nature. However, we find no basis in either case law or any relevant statute to support appellants’ contentions that comprehensive plans must include data to support a plan’s goals, policies and recommendations. Our conclusions render irrelevant appellants’ contentions that New Market’s Plan is deficient because it does not contain specific categories of information. A. Comprehensive Plans: Advisory or Regulatory?

As a general rule, comprehensive plans “ ‘which are the result of work done by planning commissions and adopted by ultimate zoning bodies, are advisory in nature and have no force of law absent statutes or local ordinances linking planning and zoning. Where the latter exists, however, they serve to elevate the status of comprehensive plans to the level of true regulatory devices.’ ” HNS Dev. v. Baltimore County, 425 Md. 436, 457-58 , 42 A.3d 12 (2012) (quoting Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns, 372 Md. 514, 530 , 814 A.2d 469 (2002)). Whether a plan is a guide or a regulatory device is generally a matter of statutory interpretation, to which the canons of statutory construction apply. Maryland-Nat.

Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 101 , 985 A.2d 1160 (2009); Richmarr Holly Hills v. American PCS, 117 Md.App. 607, 636 , 701 A.2d 879 (1997). For a considerable period, there was uncertainty as to whether statutory requirements that local government land use actions be “consistent” "with a comprehensive plan rendered the plan “a true regulatory device.” In Trail v. Terrapin Run, 403 Md. at 574 , 943 A.2d 1192 , and in the context of ²⁰⁰ a special exception proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that the term did not have that effect. The reaction of the General Assembly was swift and decisive. In the next legislative session, the legislature passed the “Smart, Green, and Growing—Smart and Sustainable Growth Act of 2009,” enacted as Chapter 181 of the 2009 Laws of Maryland. 13 For the purposes of our analysis, and among other things, Chapter 181 added what is now codified as Title 1, Subtitle 3 of the Land Use Article, 14 and amended what is now LU § 3-303. 15 One effect of LU §§ 1-302 and 1-303 is ²⁰¹ that a special exception application must “further, and not be contrary to” provisions of the application comprehensive plan regarding matters such as the timing of future development, the pattern of future development, land uses, and development densities.

Additionally, LU §§ 1-302 and 3-303, when read together, require that zoning regulations, subdivision regulations and similar statutes must “further, and not be contrary to” provisions of the jurisdiction’s comprehensive plan that implement the visions set out in LU § 1-201 as well as the elements of the plan addressing development regulations and sensitive areas. Further elaboration on this point is not necessary for us to conclude that, with respect to significant aspects of local government land use regulation, comprehensive plans have indeed been “ ‘elevate[d] ... to the level of true regulatory devices.’ ” HNS Dev., 425 Md. at 457-58 , 42 A.3d 12 . At this point, however, our analysis parts company with appellants’ contentions. B. Are Comprehensive Plans Required to Contain Data-based Determinations?

In support of their contention that “both the language and the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions compel the conclusion that the Plan is to contain factually-based substantive determinations,” appellants rely primarily upon LU § 3-112, 16 which sets out the matters that must be ad ²⁰² dressed in a comprehensive plan’s municipal growth element, and LU § 1-201, 17 which articulates the visions that a local planning commission “shall implement ... through the comprehensive plan[.]” We do not believe that the text of either statute, considered either in isolation or in the context of the larger statutory scheme, supports appellants’ contentions. First, § 3-112 requires a plan’s municipal growth element to “include” matters such as the “capacity of lands available for development, redevelopment, and in-fill,” § 3—112(a)(1)(iii), and “the land area needed to satisfy demand for development at densities consistent with long-term development policy,” § 3—112(a)(2). Section 1-201 requires commissions to “implement” the visions through the comprehensive plan. The Land Use Article does not contain definitions of either “include” or “implement.” “Include” is defined as “[t]o contain as a part of something.” B. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed., 2009). “Implement” is defined as “to carry into effect: to fulfill; to accomplish!)]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) at 1134.

The dictionary definitions of neither “include” nor “implement” support appellants’ contention that the statutes in question require a local planning commission to include detailed factual analyses as part of the plan. Recourse solely to a dictionary is not the only way, nor indeed usually the best way, by which a court can discern legislative intent. 18 For that reason, courts do not normally view statutory language in isolation but rather consider it “within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. ²⁰³ 207, 213, 77 A.3d 1049 (2013) (citation omitted). When we look at the terms “include” and “implement” in the context of the larger statutory scheme, we conclude that neither term has the meaning that appellants suggest. In this larger context, LU § 3-201 19 is relevant.

Section 3-201 (a) requires planning commissions to prepare comprehensive plans “by carefully and comprehensively surveying and studying” present and future conditions within the ²⁰⁴ jurisdiction and the relationship of the jurisdiction to neighboring jurisdictions. This is the only provision in the Land Use Article that addresses the means by which plans should be prepared. That a plan must be based upon careful and comprehensive study does not mandate use of particular methodologies or analytical techniques. Similarly, LU § 3-202(b)(1) provides that the elements of a plan “may be expressed in words, graphics, or any other appropriate form.” This language falls far short of a requirement that a plan must contain data-based analyses to support the plans’ conclusions and recommendations.

We conclude that the relevant statutory provisions do not support appellants’ contentions that the Land Use Article requires planning commissions to use specific analytical techniques much less that plans, in their final approved and adopted forms, must contain discussions of such data. Appellants’ contention that decisions by Maryland’s appellate courts support their position is equally unavailing. Appellants concede, as they must, that the Town’s planning commission acted in a quasi-legislative role in preparing the Plan and that the town council exercised its legislative authority when it approved the Plan. See Anderson House, v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 723 , 939 A.2d 116 (2008) (“Comprehensive rezoning is a vital legislative function, and in making zoning decisions during the comprehensive rezoning process, the [zoning authority] is exercising what has been described as its ‘plenary1 legislative power.” (quoting Stump v. Grand Lodge of Ancient, Accepted and Free Masons, 45 Md.App. 263, 269 , 412 A.2d 1305 (1980) (bracketed material added by Anderson House))); County Comm’rs v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233, 249 , 401 A.2d 666 (1979) (Adoption of a county comprehensive plan was “pursuant to legislative authority” vested in the county commissioners.). ²⁰⁵ Because the planning commission and the town council were acting, respectively, in quasi-legislative and legislative capacities, neither body was obligated to create a record to provide a basis for its decision.

See Union Investors v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 585, 588-89 , 224 A.2d 453 (1966) (A county council is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before acting in a legislative capacity.); Lewis v. Gansler, 204 Md. App. 454, 481-82 , 42 A.3d 63 (2012) (The Critical Area Commission is “under no obligation to create a record to support its decision” when discharging a quasi-legislative function.); 1000 Friends of Maryland v. Ehrlich, 170 Md.App. 538, 550 , 907 A.2d 865 (2006) (The Board of Public Works is not required to make findings of fact before rendering a decision in a quasi-legislative proceeding.). If the planning commission and the town council were not obligated to create an evidentia-ry record to support their decisions to adopt the Plan, then a fortiori, the text of the Plan itself need not contain such information. 20 Conclusion The proper judicial inquiry in this case is limited to whether the Plan satisfies the specific requirements of the Land Use Article with regard to the Plan’s substantive content. The circuit court addressed this issue, in meticulous detail, in its opinion and concluded that the Plan complied with every relevant standard contained in the Land Use Article. As we have mentioned, our review of the circuit court’s judgment is de novo.

But that does not necessarily mean we must “indulg[e] [in] the conceit that we could somehow say it better” than did the circuit court. Sturdivant v. Maryland ²⁰⁶ Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 436 Md. 584, 588 , 84 A.3d 83 (2014). In lieu of attempting to gild the lily, we adopt the relevant portion of Judge Adams’s well-reasoned and well-researched opinion as our own and attach it as an appendix hereto. 21 THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. APPELLANTS TO PAY COSTS.

Appendix—Excerpt from Opinion of the Circuit Court for Frederick County Hi * H< * * # The Court has thoroughly reviewed the Town’s Plan and the MGE, and determined that they do conform to the statutory requirements. The Municipal Growth Element—§ 3-112(a) This Court finds that the MGE does comply with the requirements of the Maryland Land Code Statute, § 3-112(a). The MGE is an extensive and comprehensive discussion of all of the factors enumerated in § 3-112; it clearly, specifically, and substantially discusses or explains every element. The MGE contains multiple supporting tables, charts, maps and analyses.

The Court also notes that the MGE would have complied with the former language of 66B § 3.05(a)(4)(x), which states that the MGE shall “include consideration.” The Plaintiffs argue that the information supplied in the MGE is insufficient, and have attached the affidavits of experts who provide their opinions regarding how the MGE’s conclusions should comply with the statute. The Plaintiffs’ argument that these affidavits demonstrate a factual dispute over statutory compliance, rather than a legal dispute, is specious. It is not within the authority of this court to determine the merits of the various conclusions reached in the ²⁰⁷ plan, but simply whether the Town’s MGE complies with the statutory language by including every element. This Court finds that the MGE fully complies with the requirement elements set forth in § 3-112(a), and will provide the following examples of the MGE’s satisfaction of those elements. [LU §] 3-112 (a)(1) The Municipal Corporation’s: (i) future municipal growth areas outside the existing corporate limits (ii) past growth patterns (iii) capacity of land areas available for development, redevelopment, and in-fill Section III, paragraph C, from page 14 through 18 of the MGE discusses extensively the intended future growth areas outside existing New Market limits.

Past Growth Patterns are addressed by Table 1 and 2 on page 6 and 7 of the MGE, along with accompanying analysis, discussing population change since 1930. Section II, Paragraph B on page 7, discusses changes in land use pursuant to historical growth. Table 3 on page 11 of the MGE addresses the capacity of municipal land available for development, redevelopment and in-fill. [LU §] 3-112 (a)(2): the land area needed to satisfy demand for development at densities consistent with long-term development policy This element is clearly addressed in Table 4 on page 15 entitled “Land Needs.” The Table displays the Town’s estimates of land needed to keep up with population growth estimates. [LU §] 3-112 (a)(3): the relationship of the long-term development policy to a vision of the municipal corporation’s future character This element is addressed by Section VII: “Relationship of New Market’s Long Term Development Policy to the Vision of its Future Character.” This extensive section explains at page 33-34 that, among other things, that the Master Plan will ²⁰⁸ be re-evaluated every five years, and that a Development Master Plan -will be required for every development, in order to achieve a unified scheme of development for an entire parcel, consistent with the provisions of the Town’s plan. [LU §] 3-112 (a)(4): rural buffers and transition areas The Town addresses this element throughout the MGE. Specifically, the MGE states on page five, regarding its own Visions, “Responsible changes in land use patterns will result in health, safety, and environmental protection and enhancement, especially when streams and their buffers are restored, forested areas are connected, and other sensitive areas are maintained or restored to their natural state.” [LU §] 3-112 (a)(5): protection of sensitive areas that could be impacted by development planned within the proposed municipal growth area The Town has given significant consideration to the protection of sensitive areas. 5 Section V of the MGE beginning on page 29, entitled “Protection of Sensitive Areas In and Near New Market” consists of paragraphs (A) through (E) which list both general plans and specific initiatives to enforce protection of sensitive areas from planned potential development in compliance with § 3-112(5).

Paragraph (A) is dedicated to discussion of protection of the Town’s natural water supply. Paragraph (B) explains that the Town will continue to implement zoning practices “which protect and enhance the environment.” These practices in- ²⁰⁹ elude, among other things, directing development activity away from 100 year annual and historic floodplains, preventing construction of large contiguous paved areas unless adequate measures are ensured to reduce runoff; encouraging disposal of storm water on the development site rather than directing it to draining courses, and limiting development in designated aquifer recharge areas. Paragraph (C) explains the steps that will be taken to address open space issues. Paragraph (D) explains: “The Town has adopted and will maintain standards for development on or near wetlands and floodplains, so as to protect these critical resources.” These standards include a prohibition of development within a 100-year flood plain, and a 25-foot building setback in areas adjacent to these floodplains.

The MGE explains in paragraph (E) that “New Market will establish a Conservation Committee whose primary function will be to advise the Planning and Zoning Commission.” According to the MGE, this Committee will also function to oversee, review and coordinate various conservation practices, among other things. [LU §] 3-112(a)(6) population growth projections Population growth projections are clearly expressed in Table I and Table 2 on pages 6-7 of the MGE, which display estimated projections of the New Market population through 2030. [LU .§] 3-112 (a)(7) public services and infrastructure needed to accommodate growth within the proposed municipal growth areas, including those necessary for: (i) libraries (ii) recreation (iii) water and sewage facilities (iv) public safety, including emergency medical response (v) stormwater management systems sufficient to ensure water quality both inside and outside the proposed municipal growth area ²¹⁰ (iv) public schools sufficient to accommodate student population consistent with State rated capacity standards established by the Interagency Committee on School Construction i. This element is discussed within section IV of the MGE, which begins on page 18. The town explains on page 22 that it does not have a library, and that according to data from the American Library Association it is currently not large enough to require a public library. ii. Recreation is discussed in detail on pages 26-27 of the MGE.

The Plan provides Table 11 to demonstrate additional contributions to lands for parks based on County standards. iii. Water and sewage are discussed on page 28 of the MGE. iv. Paragraph D of Section IV addresses public safety on page 28-29, and explains that fire and emergency medical protection are provided by volunteers and no less than two full time County Fire and Rescue Service employees. v. Article IV, Section F, points out on page 26 that Frederick County now plans, reviews and inspects stormwater systems for the Town, and that the Town has adopted test Maryland Department of the Environment regulations governing stormwater. vi. Paragraph B, beginning on page 20 to page 22, is dedicated to discussion of public schools.

It discusses the current and projected capacities for its public schools, pursuant to projected growth and acquisitions. On page 28 the MGE proposes redistricting of the schools to resolve issues of overcrowding. [LU §] 3-112 (a)(8) any burden on services and infrastructure for which the municipal corporation would be responsible for development in areas near to and outside of the proposed municipal growth area The Town fulfills this element in Section IV, paragraph H on page 27 of the MGE, where it states, “No burdens on New ²¹¹ Market-provided services and infrastructure lying outside the preferred Annexation Area can be identified at this time.” 6 [LU §] 3-112 (a)(9) anticipated financing mechanisms to support necessary public services and infrastructure Section YI of the MGE on page 32, entitled “Financing Infrastructure Expansion,” discusses the Town’s plans for financing expansion, complying with § 3-112(a)(9). This section proposes, in part, that development of necessary infrastructure will be funded by private developers, and not by public funds. [LU §] 3-112 (b) Technical assistance.—On request of a municipal corporation, the Department of Planning shall provide technical assistance for the purposes of developing the municipal growth element of the comprehensive plan The Maryland Department of Planning, as evident by their comments to the Town of New Market published in the 2010 and 2011 supplements, has communicated consistently with the Town and provided extensive input regarding the Plan and MGE. The Plaintiffs also allege that the Town’s Plan fails to comply with § 3.05(a)(4)(iii)(¿) & (2).

This section has now been codified at Md. Land Use Code Ann. § 3-105. The relevant language alleged by defendants now states: (b) Required contents.—The transportation element shall: (1) propose, on a schedule that extends as far into the future as is reasonable, the most appropriate and desirable patterns for: (i) the general location, character, and extent of channels, routes, and terminals for transportation facilities; and ²¹² (ii) the circulation of Individuals and goods; (2) provide for bicycle and pedestrian access and trav-elways; and (3) include an estimate of the use of any proposed improvement. The MGE and the Plan address every one of these elements in detail. The transportation explanation Section IV, paragraph A beginning on page 18 of the MGE, is devoted to discussing improvements to New Market’s transportation system, supported by traffic studies.

This Section discusses the most appropriate and desirable patterns, and the Plan discusses estimates of this proposed improvement. Pedestrian and bicycle friendly design is certainly provided for.