Fuller v. Republican Central Committee

BARBERA, C.J. We granted certiorari in this case to consider the respective roles of the Governor and a party central committee in filling a vacancy created by the departure of a sitting member of the General Assembly. Those roles are spelled out in Section 13(a)(1) of Article III of the Maryland Constitution (“Section 13”). This subsection provides in pertinent part that, in the case of a vacancy, the Governor shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy from a person whose name shall be submitted to him in writing, within thirty days after the occurrence of the vacancy, by the Central Committee of the political party, if any, with which the Delegate or Senator, so vacating, had been affiliated, ... and it shall be the duty of the Governor to make said appointment within fifteen days after the submission thereof to him. Md. Const, art.

III, § 13(a)(1). The dispute in the present case centers on the proper construction of the text of this subsection. Petitioners Kathy Fuller (“Fuller”), Melissa Caudell (“Caudell”), and Amy Gilford (“Gilford”) are registered Republican voters and duly elected members of the Respondent, Republican Central Committee of Carroll County, Maryland (“Central Committee” or “Committee”). Petitioners filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County a complaint for mandamus, declara ⁶¹⁸ tory judgment, and injunctive relief against the Central Committee, seeking to enjoin the Committee from submitting more than one name to Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr. to fill a vacancy in the House of Delegates.

Petitioners later filed an amended complaint along with a motion for a temporary restraining order, which the court denied after a hearing. From that order and the order denying them injunctive relief, Petitioners noted an appeal, then sought certiorari. We granted the writ and, upon motion of Petitioners, we issued a temporary restraining order pending final disposition of the appeal. On March 2, 2015, we heard arguments in the case.

That same day, we entered a per curiam order affirming the judgment of the circuit court and lifting the temporary restraining order. We here explain the reasons for that order. I. Maryland law provides that “[e]ach political party shall have a State central committee that: (1) is the governing body of the political party; and (2) may be composed of the members of the central committees of the counties during their terms in office.” Md.Code Ann., Elec. Law § 4-201 (2002, 2010 Repl.

Vol.); see also Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697 , 725 n. 14, 862 A.2d 1 (2004). Members of the county central committees are elected by the party at a primary election. Elec. Law § 4-202(a).

Central committees are not public bodies, and the members of those committees are not public officers, but rather, party officers. Capron v. Mandel, 250 Md. 255, 260 , 241 A.2d 892 (1968); Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 113 , 371 A.2d 1094 (1977) (stating that, “although membership on a political committee is governed by statute, it is not a public office”). Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, political parties have the right of free association, giving them the right to determine their own rules and internal operating procedures. Eu v. San Francisco Cnty.

Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 , 109 S.Ct. 1013 , 103 L.Ed.2d 271 ⁶¹⁹ (1989) (“Freedom of association also encompasses a political party’s decisions about the identity of, and the process for electing, its leaders.”); Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121 , 101 S.Ct. 1010 , 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981) (holding that the state cannot dictate the process of selecting delegates to the Democratic National Convention). In Maryland, a political party’s State central committee “shall determine its own rules of procedure,” so long as those rules do not conflict with the Election Law Article of the Code.

Elec. Law § 4-201(c). The Election Law Article further provides that “each political party shall adopt and be governed by a constitution and all bylaws and rules adopted in accordance with the constitution,” id. § 4-204(a), and a county central committee, “[i]n accordance with the constitution and bylaws of a principal political party ... shall adopt a constitution, bylaws, and rules,” id. § 4-204(c). The origin of the present legal dispute can be traced back to December 10, 2014, when the Chairman of the Central Committee received notification that Joseph M. Getty, the incumbent Senator for District 5, 1 would be resigning from the Senate in order to accept a position in the administration of Governor-Elect Hogan.

Pursuant to Section 13, the Governor has the duty to appoint a successor “from a person whose name shall be submitted to him in writing ... by the Central Committee of the political party” of the vacating legislator. In anticipation of Senator Getty’s upcoming resignation, the Central Committee undertook to perform its role in the selection process. In December 2014, the Central Committee published a document entitled “Carroll County Republican Central Committee Process for Vacancy.” The document provided that “[o]nly one candidate will be selected, upon receiving votes of the [Committee] and forwarded to the Governor for appointment.” The Committee published instructions for applicants for the Senate vacancy, which likewise provided that only one ⁶²⁰ candidate would be selected. The Committee received applications from 14 interested persons and interviewed five of those applicants.

On January 9, 2015, the Central Committee, by majority vote, selected Robin Bartlett Frazier (“Frazier”) to submit to the Governor to fill the anticipated Senate vacancy. Soon thereafter, David Jones, Chairman of the Central Committee, signed a letter addressed to Governor Hogan post-dated January 22, 2015, evidently intending to submit Frazier’s name to fill the anticipated vacancy. On January 22, 2015, the Central Committee met in a public meeting. As of that date, Chairman Jones had not mailed the letter or otherwise formally submitted Frazier’s name to the Governor.

Following the public meeting, five members of the Committee (not including any of the three Petitioners or Central Committee member James Reter (“Reter”)) met privately with members of Governor Hogan’s staff. Petitioners allege, based upon their belief, that the Governor’s staff asked the Central Committee members attending the private meeting to submit three names for potential appointment to the District 5 Senate vacancy. Petitioners further allege that the Committee members present during that meeting with the Governor’s staff submitted to the Governor a list of three names for potential appointment to fill the vacancy: Frazier; Delegate Justin Ready, who represented District 5 in the House of Delegates; and Dave Wallace. The next day, Petitioner Fuller delivered to the Governor’s appointments office the letter previously signed by Chairman Jones submitting only Frazier’s name to Governor Hogan.

On February 2, 2015, Petitioners filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County a complaint for declaratory judgment as well as injunctive and mandamus relief, naming as defendants the Central Committee, Delegate Ready, and Dave Wallace. Specifically, Petitioners sought a declaration that Section 13 prohibited the Central Committee from submitting to the Governor more than one name for appointment to fill the vacancy; an injunction to preclude all defendants from pursuing the Committee’s recommendation of three names; and issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the Committee to ⁶²¹ comply with Section 13, as Petitioners alleged that constitutional provision must be construed. Petitioners accompanied their complaint with a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Later that day, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order, at which counsel for Delegate Ready advised the court that Governor Hogan had issued a commission appointing Delegate Ready to the vacant Senate seat.

The court denied the motion. That same evening, Delegate Ready resigned his seat as a delegate and immediately thereafter took the oath of office as Senator for District 5. Senator Ready’s resignation from the House of Delegates created a new vacancy to be filled. Pursuant to Section 13, the Central Committee had 30 days from February 2, 2015, to make a recommendation to the Governor.

On February 4, 2015, the Governor’s Secretary of Appointments, James Fielder, sent a letter to Chairman Jones asking him to “submit your recommended multiple candidates” for appointment. On February 9, 2015, the Central Committee announced that it was accepting applications to fill the vacancy. The next day, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed Dave Wallace as a defendant. Petitioners also filed an amended complaint for mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief, together with a second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Committee “from sending to the Governor of Maryland the name of more than one person for appointment to the single vacancy” created by Senator Ready’s resignation.

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order, and denied the motion in a memorandum opinion and order. The court rejected Petitioners’ argument that, under Maryland Rule 15-504(a), 2 they were not ⁶²² required to establish a likelihood of success on the merits in order to prevail on the motion. The circuit court, citing Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 534 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006), reasoned that a plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order must satisfy the four-factor standard applicable whenever a plaintiff seeks interlocutory injunctive relief: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the “balance of convenience” determined by whether greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest. Applying that standard, the court did not find “that immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will result if the temporary restraining order is not granted,” nor did it find “that there is a likelihood that [Petitioners] will succeed on the merits.” As to the latter, the court rejected Petitioners’ contention that Section 13 has a “clear and unambiguous” meaning entitling them to relief.

The court reasoned that Section 13 is susceptible of more than one interpretation, at least one of which is that a local central committee is not constrained to submit the name of only one person to the Governor to fill a vacancy in the legislature, and another of which is that the Governor has discretion to appoint a person from among multiple names submitted by the local central committee. Petitioners voluntarily dismissed Senator Ready as a defendant in the action, noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and filed a motion in the circuit court for an injunction pending appeal. The circuit court denied the motion for an injunction pending appeal the following day. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners sought, and on February 20, 2015, we issued, a writ of certiorari prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.

Two questions are presented: ⁶²³ Does Article 3, Section 13 of the Constitution of Maryland prohibit a party central committee from submitting more than one name to the Governor to fill a single vacancy in the General Assembly? Is a temporary restraining order followed by a writ of mandamus appropriate relief to prevent a party central committee from violating Article 3, Section 13 of the Constitution of Maryland, and were Petitioners entitled to a temporary restraining order? Accompanying the petition was Petitioners’ Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, seeking to enjoin the Central Committee from submitting multiple names to the Governor to fill the existing vacancy pending this Court’s resolution of the matter. We issued a temporary restraining order pending final disposition of the appeal.

II

The Central Committee argues that Petitioners “presente] a non-justiciable political question that is incapable of resolution through judicially-created or enforced standards.” According to the Committee, because it has a role in the process of filling a legislative vacancy, but no duty to submit a nominee to the Governor, this Court cannot fashion the requested relief of a writ of mandamus requiring the Committee to submit only one name to the Governor. This Court has said that, [i]n deciding whether a claim is justiciable, the court must determine, first, “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution,” and, second, whether the structure of government “renders the issue presented a ‘political question’ — that is, a question which is not justiciable in federal [or State] court because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.” Estate of Burris v. State, 360 Md. 721, 744-45 , 759 A.2d 802 (2000) (second alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 , 89 S.Ct. 1944 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)); see also Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302 , 324- ⁶²⁴ 25, 978 A.2d 687 (2009); Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 293 , 518 A.2d 1057 (1987). The first element of the justiciability doctrine requires the court to decide “whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Burris, 360 Md. at 745 , 759 A.2d 802 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The second element involves whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 518-19 , 89 S.Ct. 1944 ; Smigiel, 410 Md. at 325 , 978 A.2d 687 ; Burris, 360 Md. at 745 , 759 A.2d 802 (quoting Lamb, 308 Md. at 293-94 , 518 A.2d 1057 ). The Central Committee argues that Petitioners’ complaint fails both elements of the justiciability doctrine. In connection with the first element, the Committee, relying upon what it argues is the proper interpretation of Section 13, characterizes as “identifiable but erroneous” Petitioners’ claim that Section 13 prohibits the Central Committee from submitting more than one name to the Governor. The Central Committee adds that, even if Petitioners were correct in that interpretation of Section 13, this Court is unable, through a writ of mandamus, to “mold enforceable judicial relief that requires the Central Committee to submit one name to the Governor.” In connec ⁶²⁵ tion with the second element, the Central Committee, again resorting to the merits of its argument that its function in the Section 13 appointment process is discretionary, argues that Petitioners’ question is a “political question,” because the Committee, “[i]n performing that [discretionary] function ... operates pursuant to its own internal procedures and processes for considering and selecting suitable candidates to fill vacancies.” We noted at the outset of this opinion that members of a party central committee are not public officers, but rather, party officers who can determine their committee’s constitution, bylaws, and rules of procedure consistent with the party’s State central committee.

The question before us does not implicate any of those privileges and procedures. Moreover, although this Court generally does “not decide election contests or interfere in political controversies,” the general rule of judicial non-interference in election-related controversies is “not inflexible and lately has been considerably relaxed.” Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591, 594 , 185 A.2d 368 (1962). Valle , not unlike the present case, involved the question whether a central committee exceeded its authority under this State’s statutory or constitutional requirements. See id. at 592 , 185 A.2d 368 .

In Valle , we upheld the lower court’s ruling that the complainants were entitled to litigate whether a local central committee, rather than a State central committee, was authorized to nominate an officer to a state-wide office. Id. at 594 , 185 A.2d 368 . We noted a distinction between “interferences by the courts with the political conduct of elections, and taking jurisdiction of a question whether persons assuming to avail themselves of the election machinery set up for private initiative are persons entitled under the law to do so.” Id. at 595 , 185 A.2d 368 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 144 , 49 A.2d 75 (1946), a mandamus action, we decided that administrative or official decisions and actions concerning the elective process, if arbitrary or capricious, are subject to judicial review. ⁶²⁶ And, in Dorf, 280 Md. at 110-11 , 371 A.2d 1094 , we held that the courts have jurisdiction to resolve a challenge to the validity of the selection of a central committee on the ground that one of the committee’s members was not a resident.

More recently, in Hall v. Prince George’s County Democratic Central Committee, 431 Md. 108, 130-31 , 64 A.3d 210 (2013), although we had before us a challenge to the justiciability of the legal issues presented to us in that case, we did not hesitate to review the question whether a central committee had the legal authority to rescind its nomination to the Governor prior to the expiration of the 15-day constitutional requirement for the Governor to act on the nomination. In the present case, the Central Committee concedes that this Court has jurisdiction to review situations “where affirmative acts by a party exceed the limits of its power.” This is exactly what Petitioners allege here: that the Central Committee exceeded its authority under Section 13 by submitting three names to the Governor to fill a single vacancy. The Central Committee further argues that this Court does not possess the authority to issue a writ of mandamus in this case because the Central Committee “exercises discretion in performance of its function.” For that proposition, the Central Committee relies upon the settled principle that “a writ of mandamus will not lie if the petitioner’s right is unclear or issues only at the discretion of a decision maker[,] ... ‘or if there be any ordinary adequate legal remedy to which the party applying could have recourse, [the] writ will not be granted.’ ” Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 223 , 844 A.2d 412 (2004) (quoting City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones, 364 Md. 663, 673 , 774 A.2d 1167 (2001)). This argument likewise assumes the Committee’s proposed answer to the question before us.

Each of the Central Committee’s arguments for why the question is non-justiciable is grounded in the Committee’s interpretation of the text and underlying purpose of Section 13, which, as noted, is precisely the question presented to us for decision: Whether that constitutional provision requires the Central Committee to submit only one name to the ⁶²⁷ Governor or, instead, the Committee has the discretion to submit multiple names to fill a vacancy. Resolution of that question requires that we do no more than interpret Section 13 in order to identify the respective roles and obligations of the Governor and Central Committee. In short, the question before us is one that self-evidently “admits of judicial resolution.” See, e.g., State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder, 435 Md. 30, 62 , 76 A.3d 1110 (2013) (construing Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution to hold that voters turning 18 on the date of the general election could vote in the preceding non-partisan primary elections); Nader for President v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 681, 708 , 926 A.2d 199 (2007) (holding unconstitutional, pursuant to the Court’s interpretation of Article I of the Maryland Constitution, a statutory provision