Fuller v. State

³⁷⁵ BATTAGLIA, Judge. The ease sub judice presents this Court with the task of determining whether an order denying an inmate commitment to a drug treatment program pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article 1 is appealable. Because we hold that ³⁷⁷ it is not, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. Introduction In 1978 and 1979, the Petitioner, Gerald Davis Fuller, was indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree rape, and robbery with a deadly weapon charges.

On July 12, 1979, a jury found Fuller guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for the balance of his natural life, with credit for time served. Later that year, Fuller pled guilty to first-degree rape and robbery with a deadly weapon, and was ³⁷⁸ sentenced to imprisonment for the balance of his natural life, concurrent with the sentence he was then serving. Fuller remains incarcerated. Two years ago, Fuller, acting pro se, pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article, filed a Petition for Commitment to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in which he alleged that he had an untreated 38-year history of alcohol and drug abuse, and that he was both an alcoholic and a heroin user “in a system which is infested with alcohol and drugs.” Fuller contended that throughout his 27-year incarceration, he had demonstrated a need for, and requested but received, only limited and inadequate care, supervision, and treatment for his substance abuse addictions and that this failure had impeded his complete rehabilitation.

On March 15, 2005, Judge Clifton J. Gordy of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the petition. 2 Fuller noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting three questions for review. 3 Fuller contended, in addition to arguing that the judge abused his discretion by denying Fuller’s petition and erred by not articulating his reasoning, that the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under either the final judgment rule or the collateral order doctrine. In a reported opinion, Chief Judge Joseph F. ³⁷⁹ Murphy, writing for the court, held that the denial of Fuller’s petition was not appealable and dismissed his appeal. Fuller v. State, 169 Md.App. 303 , 900 A.2d 311 (2006). In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that nothing in Section 8-507, or its legislative history, reflected that a direct appeal would lie from the denial of a petition for commitment under Section 8-507.

Id. at 308-09 , 900 A.2d at 314 . Further, the court remarked that the denial of Section 8-507 petitions are similar to the denial of Rule 4-345 4 motions for modification of a sentence, and cited Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464 , 206 A.2d 812 (1965), for the proposition that no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion for modification of a sentence. The court also explicitly addressed the collateral order doctrine, deeming it “inapplicable to the case at bar because this Court no longer has jurisdiction to review the final judgments of conviction to which the order at issue is allegedly ‘collateral’.” Fuller, 169 Md.App. at 310-11 , 900 A.2d at 315-16 . We granted Fuller’s petition for writ of certiorari, which presented the following question for our review: ³⁸⁰ Is a denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article an appealable order?

Fuller v. State, 394 Md. 478 , 906 A.2d 942 (2006). We shall hold that the denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article is not an appealable order.

II

Discussion Fuller contends that the Circuit Court’s Order denying his petition for commitment under Section 8-507 is appealable as a final judgment under Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 5 because the denial resolved the issue contained in the petition and left no further action for the circuit court to take. Alternatively, Fuller argues that the order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it conclusively determined an important issue, otherwise unreviewable, which is completely separate from the merits of the underlying action. Fuller also analogizes the denial of his petition to the denial of a motion for modification of a sentence under Rule 4-345(e), 6 contending that our decisions in State v. ³⁸¹ Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 , 742 A.2d 508 (1999), and Herrera v. State, 357 Md. 186 , 742 A.2d 517 (1999), lead to the conclusion that an appeal of the denial of a motion to modify a sentence is appealable. Further, Fuller suggests that the rationale for refusing to allow appellate review of the denial of a motion for modification—because the decision is discretionary—was obviated by this Court in Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17 , 785 A.2d 756 (2001).

He also contends that the appeal of the denial of his petition is not barred by the Post Conviction Procedure Act. 7 ³⁸² The State, conversely, argues that the Circuit Court’s Order denying Fuller’s petition for commitment under Section 8-507 is not appealable. The State contends that the denial of Fuller’s petition did not constitute a final judgment because it did not determine and conclude Fuller’s rights or deny him the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights. The State also argues that the collateral order doctrine is inapplicable because the denial of Fuller’s petition did not resolve an important issue and that the issue was not completely separate from the merits of the underlying action. Additionally, the State maintains that the denial of Fuller’s Section 8-507 petition is akin to the denial of a motion for modification, but that our decisions in Kanaras and Herrera did not alter the general rule that a sentence not alleged to be illegal is generally not appealable, citing Costello v. State, 237 Md. at 464 , 206 A.2d at 812 , and Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99 , 175 A.2d 775 (1961), as viable.

The State also argues that the Post Conviction Procedure Act precludes Fuller’s appeal of the denial of his petition. In Maryland, the right to seek appellate review is statutory; the Legislature can provide for, or preclude, the right of appeal. See Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court ... unless ... the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.”); State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 596 , 870 A.2d 196, 205 (2005), quoting State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 77 , 785 A.2d 1275, 1284 (2001) (“[Questions of appealability have today become entirely governed by statutes.”); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 147 , 422 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980) (“We begin our consideration by recognizing that any right of appeal, in either a civil or criminal case, must find its source in an act of the legislature.”).

The statutory provision at issue, Section 8-507 of the ³⁸³ Health-General Article, does not include any provision regarding appealability. An appeal, ordinarily, must await the entry of a final judgment. See Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), Section 12-302 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article.

To be a final judgment, the decision “must be so final as to determine and conclude rights involved, or deny the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 , 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983); Gittings v. State, 33 Md. 458 (1871). One exception to the final judgment rule is the collateral order doctrine, that “applies to a ‘narrow class of orders, referred to as collateral orders, which are offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued and which are immediately appealable as “final judgments” without regard to the posture of the case’.” Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 266-67 , 747 A.2d 1199, 1203 (2000) (citations omitted). The case sub judice raises the issue of whether the denial of a petition under Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article is appealable. Fuller and the State both assert that the denial of his Section 8-507 petition for commitment to a drug treatment program is analogous to the denial of a motion for modification under Rule 4-345(e).

While Fuller contends that the denial of a motion for modification is appealable, the State argues that the denial of a motion to modify is not directly appealable when the motion does not challenge the legality of the sentence. Both Fuller and the State cite to our opinions in State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. at 170, 742 A.2d at 508 , and Herrera v. State, 357 Md. at 186, 742 A.2d at 517 . In Kanaras, we had the occasion to explore the interaction between the Post Conviction Procedure Act and the appealability of the denial of a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a). Judge John C. Eldridge, writing for this Court, elucidated that the appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence was not precluded by the Post Conviction Procedure Act, explicitly ³⁸⁴ overruling Wilson, 227 Md. at 99 , 175 A.2d at 776 , which had held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence under former Maryland Rule 744(a), 8 the precursor to Rule 4-345(a), is a statutory remedy within the meaning of the Act, and thus the denial of such motion is not appealable, 9 and reconciling Costello, 237 Md. at 469-70 , 206 A.2d at 815 , which cited Wilson for the proposition that “the Post Conviction Procedure Act provides that no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion by the trial court for modification or reduction of the sentence”: The Court in Costello , however, did more than “indicate” its views on the merits.

It discussed in detail the merits, held that the trial judge had not erred in imposing sentence, and concluded: “We have considered all of the appellant’s contentions, and find no violation of any of his constitutional or legal rights.” More significantly, instead of dismissing the appeal as was done in Brady and Wilson , the Court in Costello “affirmed” the trial court’s judgment. Interestingly, the judge who had authored the Brady opinion for the ³⁸⁵ Court dissented in Costello , not on the ground that the appeal should have been dismissed, but on the ground that the appellant had been illegally sentenced and that, therefore, the judgment below should be reversed. Kanaras, 357 Md. at 177 , 742 A.2d at 513 . In our determination that an appeal from the denial of a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence was not precluded by the Post Conviction Procedure Act, we stated that our rule-making authority did not render the Maryland Rules equivalent to a statute enacted by the General Assembly, that a Rule 4-345(a) motion was not an independent separate cause of action, and that a motion to correct an illegal sentence does not necessarily challenge the validity of incarceration: The reason for the non-appealability holdings ... was the view that a motion to correct an illegal sentence, authorized by Rule 4-345(a), is a “statutory remed[y] ... for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentence of ... imprisonment” within the meaning of subsection (e) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Art. 27, § 645A(e).

As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Valentine [v. State], 305 Md. [108] at 123, 501 A.2d [847] at 854, however, “a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a ‘statutory’ remedy. Statutes are enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland. The Maryland Rules are adopted by the Court of Appeals. As the Wilson court noted, the Maryland Constitution does provide that rules adopted by the Court ‘shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.’ Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 18(a).

Nonetheless, the fact that the Maryland Rules have the force of law does not mean that a rule is a statute.” Furthermore, the language of the Post Conviction Procedure Act obviously refers to separate common law or statutory causes of action, such as habeas corpus or coram nobis actions which are separate civil actions. It is doubtful that this Court’s rule-making authority would extend to the ³⁸⁶ creation o f a separate cause of action. In any event, there is no indication in the language or history of Rule 4-345 that the court intended to create a separate cause of action. While a motion under Rule 4-345 may be made at any time, it is part of the same criminal proceeding and not a wholly independent action.

The Rule simply grants the trial court limited continuing authority in the criminal case to revise the sentence. In addition, subsection (e) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act refers to habeas corpus, coram nobis, or statutory actions “for challenging the validity of incarceration----” A motion under Rule 4-345(a), however, is not specifically or exclusively designed to challenge the “validity” of incarceration. There may be illegalities in a sentence which have nothing to do with the validity of the incarceration. Consequently, we hold that the language of the Post Conviction Procedure Act does not preclude an appeal from a circuit court’s ruling under Rule 4-345.

Kanaras, 357 Md. at 182-84 , 742 A.2d at 515-16 (citations omitted). Section 7-107 of the Post Conviction Procedure Act precludes appeals in cases “in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of death or imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ of coram nobis or by invoking a common law or statutory remedy other than this title.” Maryland Code (2001), Section 7-107 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Although the State asserts that Fuller is challenging the validity of his incarceration, we agree with Fuller that he is not challenging the validity of his incarceration but rather asking to serve part of his sentence in a Department of Health and Mental Hygiene facility where he would receive better drug treatment. In Herrera , decided the same day as Kanaras, we exercised appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a motion for modification of a sentence, under former Rule 4-345(b).

Herrera’s motion for modification, however, had challenged the legality of his sentence, and upon this premise we applied ³⁸⁷ Kanaras to permit an appeal, stating that “[u]nder our holding[ ] in ... State v. Kanaras, supra, there was no illegality or infirmity in Herrera’s sentence which required the Circuit Court to grant relief under Rule 4-345.” Herrera, 357 Md. at 189 , 742 A.2d at 519 (emphasis added). Therefore, under our jurisprudence the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, in the form of a motion for modification, is appeal-able. Fuller equates the denial of a petition for commitment under Section 8-507 to the denial of a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, and argues that we should sua sponte exercise appellate jurisdiction, relying upon Kanaras, 357 Md. at 170 , 742 A.2d at 508 .

Here, however, there is no appellate jurisdiction. Fuller’s Section 8-507 petition is not akin to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, because it constitutes a statutory cause of action that is separate from his conviction. 10 See Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170 , 182 n. 6, 840 A.2d 715 , 722 n. 6 (2004) (“We observe that ... motions to correct an illegal sentence occur as ‘part of the same criminal proceeding and not a wholly independent action’ .... ”), citing Kanaras, 357 Md. at 183 , 742 A.2d at 516 . Fuller, nonetheless, asserts that the denial of his Section 8-507 petition could be analogized to the denial of a motion for modification under Rule 4-345(e), and contends that such orders are appealable under our opinions in Kanaras, Herrera, and Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423 , 701 A.2d 419 (1997). Conversely, the State argues that because our holdings in Kanaras and Herrera did not overrule Costello , the principal we iterated therein—“no direct appeal lies from the denial of a motion by the trial court for modification or reduction of the ³⁸⁸ sentence”—remains authoritative.

Costello, 237 Md. at 469-70 , 206 A.2d at 815 , citing Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277 , 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964). We disagree with both Fuller and the State. We disagree with the State’s rationale relying upon Costello and Gleaton , that a decision left to the discretion of the trial court judge is not reviewable on appeal, because that justification was obviated in Merritt, 367 Md. at 17 , 785 A.2d at 756 , in which we examined the appealability of the denial of a motion for a new trial. Judge Eldridge, again writing for this Court, stated: Initially, we flatly reject the State’s argument ... that the denial of a motion for new trial is absolutely unreviewable on appeal except for the situation where the trial judge has failed to exercise any discretion.... [T]he Maryland case law governing appellate review of rulings on motions for new trials has changed and evolved over the years.

Moreover, language from older cases has sometimes been carelessly repeated in more recent cases without taking into consideration the changes in the law. The State’s argument in the case at bar, however, represents an effort to change the present law, to adopt a rule from the past, and to require that our most recent eases on the subject be overruled. This we decline to do. The early opinions of this Court clearly took the position that a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial was not subject to appellate review under any circumstances.... * * * [T]he principle that rulings on motions for new trial were unreviewable on appeal appears to have been simply an application of the more general rule, adhered to by appellate courts at an earlier time, that any trial court ruling on a discretionary matter was insulated from appellate review.

Id. at 24-25 , 785 A.2d at 760-61 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, we have alluded to the possibility that the denial of a motion for modification may be appealable under the final judgment rule in dicta in Greco, 347 Md. at 423 , 701 A.2d at 419 . The issue presented in Greco was whether the ³⁸⁹ trial court had jurisdiction to consider a motion for modification more than ninety days after conviction, but within ninety days of the granting of a previous motion for modification. We answered the question affirmatively, rejecting the rationale that trial judges need to be “protected] ... from continual and repeated requests to modify sentences.” Id. at 436 , 701 A.2d at 425 .

We further remarked, though, “[i]f the motion is denied, the defendant is finished—he or she may not file another motion for reconsideration.” Id. (emphasis added). The denial of a Section 8-507 petition for commitment, however, is not analogous to the denial of a motion for modification. Unlike a motion for modification, a petition for commitment does not affect the length of a sentence, only where a portion of it is to be served.

It also initiates a statutory cause of action separate from the conviction, and may be filed repeatedly “at any other time the defendant voluntarily agrees to participate in treatment.” These two characteristics render the Section 8-507 petition more akin to habeas corpus actions, which came into being statutorily in Maryland in 1809. The original habeas corpus statute, 11 derived from the English common law, In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 607 , (1880), was ³⁹⁰ similarly silent as to the appealability of denials of petitions for relief, as is Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article. In addressing the appealability of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute, this Court had held that there was no right to appeal its denial. Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500 (1866); In re Coston, 23 Md. 271 (1865); Bell v. State, 4 Md. (Gill) 301 (1846).

In Coston, In re Coston, and Bell, we opined that the denial of a habeas corpus petition was not appealable because the decision was left to the discretion of the trial judge—a rationale we later rejected in Merritt— and because a denial was not a final judgment in as much as the petitioner had the ability to repeatedly apply for a writ of habeas corpus. In In re Coston, we stated: Among the reasons assigned for this conclusion are, that the writ of habeas corpus, is a proceeding summary in its character, addressed to the discretion of the Judge or tribunal, to whom the application is made, so far as the discharge of the party is concerned; a proceeding where, in ³⁹¹ many cases, the evidence upon which the judgment is founded cannot be presented to the appellate court, and is not final and conclusive upon the party applying for the writ, as he may prefer a similar application to any other Judge or court of the State. 23 Md. at 272 (emphasis added). See also Bell, 4 Md. (Gill) at 304 (remarking that the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition did not have any of the characteristics of an appealable final judgment because it “is not final and conclusive upon the party applying for the writ; as he may prefer a similar application, to any other Judge or Court of the State”). Later, in Coston, 25 Md. at 500 , we commented that the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not a final judgment because it does not “deprive the petitioner of the right of petitioning again”: Although the petition should be released by the order of the Judge or court to whom he made application, if that order is subject to revision and reversal by an appellate court, the final judgment, to be of any avail, must deprive the petitioner of the right of petitioning again; whereas, the right of petitioning for a habeas corpus, is unlimited in its nature, and the application may be renewed toties quoties,[ 12 ] as long as the petitioner is confined, and a Judge or court can be found to whom he may address his prayer for relief.

Id. at 506 (emphasis added). In 1945, however, the General Assembly provided an aggrieved party with the statutory right to appeal the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or from a “final order of the Court” in habeas corpus proceedings: The aggrieved applicant may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the refusal to issue a writ or from a final order remanding him or dismissing the proceedings; and the Attorney General or the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City or the County in which such application was presented may appeal on behalf of the State. ³⁹² 1945 Maryland Laws, Chapter 702; Maryland Code (1945), Article 42, Section 3C. 13 This statutory enactment, providing a petitioner the ability to seek appellate review of a denial of a petition for habeas corpus, was analyzed by then-retired former Chief Judge Charles Marke 11 in Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and by Appeal, in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, when he stated: The Act of 1945 provided that the “aggrieved” applicant might appeal to the Court of Appeals from refusal to issue the writ or from a final order remanding him or dismissing the proceedings and that the Attorney General or the State’s Attorney might appeal on behalf of the state. The general right of appeal under the Act of 1945 was equally applicable to the petitioner and the state. However, the nature of habeas corpus procedure makes it, in operation, one-sided against the prosecutors.

Before 1945, the petitioner in effect had the right of 36 appeals by applications to every other judge in the state. One judge might set at naught the judgment of 36 other judges by releasing on habeas corpus a prisoner whom the other judges would not release. The petitioner still has 36 such appeals besides an appeal to the Court of Appeals. ❖ * * The result[] and the evident purpose[] of the Act[] of ... 1945 [has] been to put an end to long-standing abuse of the writ and to preserve the writ for its historical objects as a bulwark of liberty. This has been done by ... giving a general right of appeal, thus substituting