G. Edgar Harr Sons v. Newton

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises a narrow question as to the sufficiency of a notice of intention to file a mechanic’s lien. The suit was instituted as a special case by consent under Maryland Rule 329. Pursuant to Code (1957), Art. 63, sec. 29, a surety bond was substituted for the lien, and it was agreed that if the Court should find sufficient notice of intent to claim a lien, judgment might be entered against the surety, otherwise, that the lien claim should be dismissed.

It appears that the appellees, the Newtons, engaged Carrigan and Hester to erect a dwelling on their lot, which they acquired by deed dated July 30, 1957. The builders subcontracted with the appellant, Harr, for the drilling of a well and' installation of pumping equipment on the premises. Harr completed all this work on January 27, 1958. On March 18, 1958, Harr wrote the Newtons, stating “This is to give notice under the provision of Article 63, Section 11, of the Annotated Code of the Public General Daws of Maryland, that G. Edgar Harr Sons of Cockeysville, Md. intends to file a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $1,611.35, against the property being erected by Horace R. Hester, Andre H. Carrigan and Lutherville Real Estate Co. for Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. Newton on Chestnut Ridge Road near Falls Road known as Lot %6 in the Fallscroft Development, Baltimore County, Maryland, of which amount the sum of $1,052.75 represents drilling a water well and $558.60 represents installation of pumping equipment. “This notice is standard procedure and is made without prejudice with all our accounts which are nearly sixty days old.” This notice was followed by the filing of a mechanic’s lien claim on May 23, 1958, with a bill of particulars setting forth a sum representing the total footage of the drilling operation, at $2.75 per foot, and describing the type of pump, tank, pipes, ⁶²¹ valves and fittings, installed for a fixed sum, the total of the two sums being the amount claimed.

The Chancellor found that the notice of intention was insufficient and dismissed the lien claim and discharged the surety. Code (1957), Art. 63, sec. 11, provides: “If the contract for furnishing such work or materials, or both, shall have been made with any architect or builder or any other person except the owner of the lot on which the building may be erected, or his agent, the person so doing work or furnishing materials, or both, shall not be entitled to a lien unless, within ninety days after furnishing the same, he or his agent shall give notice in writing to such owner or agent, if resident within the city or county, of his intention to claim such lien.” The time specified in this section was enlarged from 60 to 90 days by Chapter 629, Acts of 1957, but evidently the appellant was not aware of the change. The statute does not require that the exact time when the work was performed or materials furnished, or both, be specified in the notice, so long as the notice is given “within ninety days after furnishing the same”. Thus, in Treusch v. Shryock, 51 Md. 162, 164, 171 , the claim for lumber furnished “within sixty days last past,” was held to be sufficient.

See also Parkway Estates v. Burnham, 210 Md. 64, 66 , and Mashkes v. Jakenjo, Inc., 220 Md. 457, 459 . While the notice in the instant case is not a model of clarity, we think it fairly indicates that it was