Garrison v. United Rys. & Electric Co.

McSherry, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. There are two controlling questions arising on this record and they are presented by the prayers submitted at the conclusion of the evidence. The bill of exceptions brings up for review only the rulings on the prayers. The first question is this : Was the trial Court right in ruling that a transfer delivered to the appellant by the conductor of the appellee’s Lombard street line, was void after the expiration of the time limited on its face for its use ?

The Court below held that the ³⁵¹ transfer was void and accordingly granted the appellee’s second prayer and rejected the appellant’s first prayer. The second question is this: Was the conductor of the Wilkins avenue car upon which the appellant attempted to use the transfer, justified in ejecting the appellant when the latter refused to pay his fare and after the conductor had stopped the car in order to eject the appellant, though after the car had been stopped for that purpose a companion of the appellant offered to pay the fare? This question was answered by the trial Court in the affirmative by the granting of the defendant’s fifth prayer. Besides the two controlling questions just stated there are some subsidiary inquiries which will be considered later on.

First. It appears that the appellant with two friends boarded a car of the appellee at the corner of Lombard and Carey streets in Baltimore about three-forty or three-forty-five on the afternoon of March the sixth, 1901. They paid their fares and asked for transfers to the ^ilkins avenue line going south. The conductor gave the transfers as requested and punched the date, the hour three-fifty, and the transfer point, Gilmor and Lombard streets.

The transfers were limited as to the time within which they could be used and the time thus limited was indicated by the punch marks which the conductor made. It is alleged by the appellant, and for the purposes of this discussion it will be assumed to be true, that no car passed south on Wilkin’s avenue until after the time limited for the use of the transfer had expired. By the Act of Assembly of ipoo, chapter 313, the street car company of Baltimore City is required to issue transfers The first proviso in that enactment reads : “Provided, that such company shall give a free transfer, when the same shall be requested upon the payment of each cash fare, which transfer shall be good at all points of intersection of lines of said railway for a continuous ride.” The appellant and his friends boarded the first car going south on the Wilkin’s avenue line and presented the transfers. The time within which they could be used had then elapsed and the conductor refused to to take them.

He demanded the pay ³⁵² ment of the regular fare. This was refused and the car was stopped and the conductor went in search of a policeman. When the conductor returned with a policeman and re-entered the car he requested the appellant and his companions to get off the car. This they refused to do and one of them offered to pay the fare which the appellant alleges the conductor refused to receive.

According to the appellant’s testimony the conductor grabbed the appellant viciously by the shoulders and shoved him violently out of the door of the car and up against the heavy metal controller severely hurting his left arm. The fare was again tendered by the appellant’s companions and after much parley was accepted and the car was started and the appellant proceeded to his destination. The policeman flatly contradicted the statement of the appellant with respect to the alleged use of force. It has been insisted by the appellant against whom the jury rendered a verdict and against whom a judgment for costs was entered, that the appellee company has no authority to limit the time within which a transfer must be used.

We cannot accede to this contention. Whilst the Act of ipoo, ch. jij, • contains no specific provision declaring for what length of time the transfer shall be good, it is obvious that it does not contemplate that no reasonable regulation shall be made upon the subject. In the nature of