Garrity v. Injured Workers' Insurance Fund

HOTTEN, J. Appellant, Scott Garrity, a part-time bailiff at the District Court for Baltimore City, was involved in an automobile accident as he returned to the courthouse. Appellant submitted a claim to the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”), which concluded appellant’s injury arose out of and was in the course of his employment. Appellees, the District Court of Maryland and Injured Workers’ Insurance Fund, filed a petition for judicial review. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed and remanded the decision.

Appellant noted an appeal, and in his own words, presents the following question: 1. Did the trial judge err in its reversal of the Commission’s finding that the Appellant had suffered a compen-sable injury arising out of and in the course of employment? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND On June 8, 2006, appellant arrived at the District Court for Baltimore City, Hargrove Courthouse, and realized that he was wearing a Christmas tie.

Appellant did not believe the tie was appropriate because, according to him, a bailiff was supposed to wear a blue blazer, a pair of gray slacks, a dress shirt, and a light or dark blue tie. Appellant, thus, decided that he would call his son and ask him to bring a different tie. Before he called his son, appellant spilled coffee on his shirt and tie. Because appellant was assigned to courtroom five, and there were two bailiffs assigned to that courtroom, he decided that he would drive home and change.

According to ²⁹⁰ appellant, in courtroom five, “one bailiff would take over the complete courtroom ...” if the other needed to run an errand. Accordingly, appellant asked Duane Gamble, the other bailiff assigned to courtroom five, to cover him. Steve Colburn, the Lead Bailiff at the Hargrove Courthouse, indicated that it was customary for one bailiff to cover another if he or she needed to use the bathroom, or if the court needed a bailiff to make a copy of a document, when two bailiffs were assigned to courtroom five. However, Mr. Col-burn noted that it was not customary for a bailiff to leave the courthouse, without seeking permission, when assigned to courtroom five.

Moreover, Mr. Colb-urn provided that he “liked” to know the whereabouts of a bailiff in case he needed them in a different location. Larry Johnston, the supervising bailiff for the District Court for Baltimore City, noted that a bailiff was permitted to cover another if he or she needed to use the restroom when two bailiffs were assigned to courtroom five. 1 However, he indicated that if a bailiff left the courthouse, he or she “should” advise their supervisor. Furthermore, Mr. Johnston provided that he was unaware of any “custom” in which bailiffs were permitted to leave the courthouse and cover for each other without notifying a supervisor. Nevertheless, on June 8, 2006, appellant left the courthouse around 8:55 a.m. without notifying a supervisor.

At or around 9:05 a.m., appellant arrived at his house and changed his shirt and tie. As appellant drove back to the courthouse, he was struck by a truck head-on. Appellant suffered serious injuries and spent approximately one month in the hospital. Appellant thereafter filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Commission.

The Commission held a hearing and concluded that appellant’s injury arose out of and was in the course of his employment. Appellees filed a petition for judicial review. During the bench trial, appellant argued that his injuries were compensable despite the fact that he was driving to ²⁹¹ work. Appellant asserted that his claim was compensable under the special mission and dual purpose exceptions to the “going and coming rule,” because the “Apparel and Appearance Guidelines” required him to change his shirt and tie, and bailiffs in courtroom five regularly covered for each other.

Appellant also asserted that the personal comfort exception to the “going and coming rule” made his claim compensable because: (1) the decision to go home and change benefitted him and the District Court; (2) bailiffs regularly covered for each other in courtroom five when errands needed to be run; (3) the trip was permissible because appellant was changing his attire to be appropriately dressed; and (4) appellant was attending to a reasonable comfort at the time of the injury. Appellees countered that the special mission and dual purpose exceptions were not applicable because appellant was not authorized to make the trip home. Appellees then asserted the personal comfort exception was not applicable because the exception concerned sanctioned coffee breaks. The circuit court reversed and remanded the case to the Commission.

In reversing, the court concluded that appellant did not receive permission to leave the courthouse. The court further held that the Commission “did not correctly construe the established law” because appellant was driving to work and the exceptions to the “going and coming rule” were not applicable. Appellant thereafter noted an appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW When a party appeals a decision from the Commission, a circuit court “essentially” conducts a de novo trial.

Granite State Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 191 Md.App. 548, 557 , 992 A.2d 528 (2010) (citing Barnes v. Children’s Hosp., 109 Md.App. 543, 553 , 675 A.2d 558 (1996)). In those situations, we review a court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Md. Rule 8-131(c); see Granite State Ins.

Co., 191 Md.App. at 557-58 , 992 A.2d 528 . Moreover, we recognize that the “the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct----” Md.Code (2008), § 9-745(b)(l) of the Labor & Employment Article (“L.E.”); accord Granite State ²⁹² Ins. Co., 191 Md.App. at 558 , 992 A.2d 528 ; Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 553 , 675 A.2d 558 . However, “ ‘[o]ur function is not to determine whether we might have reached a different conclusion’ on the evidence.” Id.

(citing Mercedes-Benz v. Garten, 94 Md.App. 547, 556 , 618 A.2d 233 (1993)). “Rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assume the truth of the evidence presented, and give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.” Granite State Ins. Co., 191 Md.App. at 558 , 992 A.2d 528 . Accordingly, we shall not set aside findings if there is competent evidence to support them. Id.

As a corollary, we note that the clearly erroneous standard “ ‘does not apply to a trial court’s determinations of legal questions or conclusions based on findings of fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990)). In Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 553-54 , 675 A.2d 558 , we elaborated on the issue: The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, which entitles covered employees to compensation for accidental personal injuries that arise “out of and in the course of employment,” L.E. § § 9-101(b), 9-501(a), is a remedial statute. Its provisions are liberally construed in favor of the employee.

Lovellette v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282 , 465 A.2d 1141 (1983); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Hempfield, 206 Md. 589, 594 , 112 A.2d 488 (1955); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 69 Md.App. 722, 731 , 519 A.2d 790 (1987). Thus, any ambiguity in the law is resolved in favor of the claimant. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Cline v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 13 Md.App. 337, 344 , 283 A.2d 188 (1971), aff'd, 266 Md. 42 , 291 A.2d 464 (1972). The doctrine of liberal construction does not mean, however, that coverage may be granted beyond that which is authorized by the provisions of the Act.

Tortuga, Inc. v. Wolfensberger, 97 Md.App. 79, 83 , 627 A.2d 56 , cert. denied, 332 Md. 703 , 632 A.2d 1209 (1993). ²⁹³ DISCUSSION A compensable “accidental personal injury” occurs when an “injury ... arises out of and in the course of employment....” L.E. § 9-101(b). An injury is considered to arise “out of employment if it results from the nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment.” Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 554 , 675 A.2d 558 (citing Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 455 , 385 A.2d 1179 (1978); CAM Constr. Co. v. Beccio, 92 Md.App. 452, 460 , 608 A.2d 1264 (1992)). “An injury arises in the course of employment “when it occurs during the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incident thereto.”” Id. at 555 , 675 A.2d 558 (quoting Huffman v. Koppers Co., 94 Md.App. 180, 185 , 616 A.2d 451 (1992) (quoting Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 466 , 90 A.2d 180 (1952))). Ordinarily, an employee that suffers an injury going to or returning from their place of work is not considered to be acting in the course of their employment.

See Director of Finance for the City of Baltimore v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 359 , 311 A.2d 412 (1973); Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 194 , 167 A. 51 (1933); Barnes, 109 Md.App. at 555 , 675 A.2d 558 ; Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md.App. 494, 497 , 551 A.2d 135 (1989); Coats & Clark’s Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md.App. 10, 13 , 383 A.2d 67 (1978). Appellant acknowledges that he was returning to work, but asserts that the injury is compensable because of: (1) the special mission exception; (2) the dual purpose doctrine exception; and (3) the personal comfort exception. I. A special mission occurs when “an employee is acting in the course of employment when traveling on a special mission or errand at the request of the employer and in the furtherance of the employer’s business, even if the journey is one that is to or from the workplace.” Barnes , 109 Md.App. ²⁹⁴ at 555-56, 675 A.2d 558 (citing Huffman, 94 Md.App. at 187 , 616 A.2d 451 ; Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., MARYLAND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION HANDBOOK § 6.7-2 at 113 (2nd ed.1993); Elmer H. Blair, BLAIR’S REFERENCE GUIDE TO WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 9:17 at 9-65; 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers’ Compensation § 301 (1992)). Put another way, “[a] special errand or special mission is a trip undertaken by the employee at the direction or request of an employer for the purpose of helping the employer’s business.” Coats & Clark’s Sales Corp., 39 Md.App. at 13 , 383 A.2d 67 (footnote omitted).

The special mission exception was initially recognized in Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, supra, 165 Md. at 191 , 167 A. 51 . There, the claimant, who was employed by Reisinger-Siehler for fifty-two years, worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and was subject to being called at any time to attend to the employer’s store. Id. at 192-93 , 167 A. 51 . On June 22, 1932, the claimant returned to the employer’s store around 11:00 p.m.—12:00 a.m. to attend to an issue.

Id. at 193 , 167 A. 51 . After addressing the issue, the claimant proceeded home and was struck by an automobile. Id. The claimant applied to the State Industrial Accident Commission and was awarded compensation.

Id. Reisinger-Siehler appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which affirmed the decision. Id. at 193-94 , 167 A. 51 . On appeal, the Court of Appeals recognized that when an employee is injured going or coming to work, he or she is excluded from workers’ compensation benefits.

Id. at 194 , 167 A. 51 . In recognizing there were exceptions to the rule, the Court articulated: Whether a case falls without the rule depends upon the terms of the agreement by which the claimant is employed. If the agreement of employment is made to cover the time of his going to and returning from his place of work, then the case falls within the exception to the rule. Such an agreement, however, need not be an express agreement.

It may be implied from the nature and character of the work and employment. The question, therefore, whether a case ²⁹⁵ is an exception to the general rule, depends upon its own particular facts. The record does not disclose any express agreement between [the claimant] and his employer relative to the duties that he was to perform, or the remuneration he was to receive. Under his regular employment, his duties were to remain at the store during the day; but, in addition to this, he was, as we have said, when at home, subject to further duties when called upon.

The times when these duties were to be performed were uncertain, as he was to go to the store only when unusual conditions existed there. What he was to do and the length of time he was to remain there were equally uncertain. It was possible that when called from his home and possibly from his bed, at night, the work he found necessary to be done upon reaching the store would require his presence for but a few minutes, and it could hardly be said that this employment, for which he was to be remunerated, would cover only the period for which he was actually at work in or about the store. The work that he was called upon to do under these circumstances differs greatly from the regular employment of one employed at regular hours at a given place, and who at the expiration of the period of his work is free to serve himself as he pleases.

There was, we think, an implied agreement, from the nature and character of the employment of the claimant in the performance of the additional duties, that his employment was not to be restricted to the time in which he was at work at the store on such occasions. It was in the nature of an errand or mission on behalf of his employer, and when so treated his employment commenced at the time when he left his home to go to the store, and ended when he returned to his home. Id. at 198-99 , 167 A. 51 . Appellant asserts that the “Policy on Appropriate Attire and ²⁹⁶ Appearance” (“the Policy”), 2 which provides that all judiciary employees shall “present an appropriate and professional image at work[,]” in effect, “mandated” that he change his shirt and tie once he spilled coffee on them.

Appellant, moreover, contends that he was “vested with express authority and discretion[ ]” to drive home and change because the judiciary depends on the “appropriate discretion” of its employees in interpreting and applying the Policy. In light of appellant’s contentions, we note that the special mission exception ordinarily is recognized when an employee is acting in accordance with a specific request from an employer, and that did not occur in the case sub judice. In Director of Finance for the City of Baltimore v. Alford, supra, 270 Md. at 356 , 311 A.2d 412 , the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City issued a five-day alert that provided that police officers, whether on duty or off, needed to be available. The claimant was scheduled to report at 11:30 p.m.; however, around 9:00 p.m., he was notified that he needed to come in as soon as possible.

Id. at 356-57 , 311 A.2d 412 . As he drove to the police station, the claimant was struck in the rear of his vehicle. Id. at 357 , 311 A.2d 412 . The Court of Appeals concluded that the special mission exception was applicable because the claimant was on his way to an emergency, he was ²⁹⁷ obligated to report as soon as possible, and failure to do so could have resulted in discipline.

Id. at 364 , 311 A.2d 412 . In Coats & Clark’s Sales Corp. v. Stewart, supra, 39 Md.App. at 11 , 383 A.2d 67 , the decedent and his wife were supposed to attend a dinner party to honor two employees, where the decedent was supposed to present a watch to one of the honored employees. Prior to going to the party, the decedent and his wife intended on picking up groceries because there was no food for the babysitter or their child. Id. at 12 , 383 A.2d 67 .

Unfortunately, the decedent and his wife were involved in an accident before arriving at the store. Id. at 11-12 , 383 A.2d 67 . On appeal, we concluded that the trip to the grocery store was a special mission because babysitting services, which presumably involved acquiring food for the babysitter, would not have been necessary had the decedent not been required to attend an employer sponsored party that spouses were expected to attend. Id. at 17 , 383 A.2d 67 .

In the case sub judice, nobody instructed