Gassinger v. Thillman

Urner J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The decisive inquiry in this case is whether a power of testamentary disposition reserved in certain deeds was exercised by the grantor’s previously executed will, which became operative at his death. The will was made on August 14th, 1925. After bequeathing $1,000 for religious objects, $500 to a grandson, and $1,000 for the benefit of a granddaughter and her children, the testator, Bernard Thillman, devised and bequeathed all the residue of the estate to his wife, Louisa Thillman, absolutely.

The deeds were executed on August 21st, 1925, and were recorded a few days later. Each of the deeds, of which there were five, conveyed leasehold properties of the grantor, in Baltimore, to his wife for and during the term of her natural life, with specified remainders, subject to the reservation of a life estate in the grantor, with full power of disposition as to the entire title. It has been recently decided by this court that such a grant is valid and effective. Beranek v. Caccimaici, 157 Md. 144 , 145 A. 369 .

The remainders under the various deeds were conveyed, respectively, to a son, daughter, or grandchild of the grantor, for whom no provision was made in his will. The power of disposition reserved to the grantor is defined in the habendum of each deed to be the “full power of sale and disposal in any manner whatsoever, including the power to lease, sublease, mortgage, convey or encumber in any manner, or sell or dispose of by deed, will or otherwise, the said power of sale and disposal being hereby intended to operate not only upon the life estate of the said Bernard Thillman but also upon the life estate of Louisa Thillman and also upon the remainder. * * *” A codicil to the grantor’s will ■was executed on December 24th, 1925. It made a change in the executorship, but reaffirmed the will in other respects. ¹⁹⁶ The testator died, on September 21st, 1928, having survived his wife for a brief period. It is provided by article 93, section 339, of the Code: “Every devise and bequest purporting to be of all real and personal property belonging to the testator shall be construed to include also all property over which he has a general power of appointment, unless the contrary intention shall appear in the will or codicil containing such devise or bequest.” The appellants unsuccessfully contended in the lower court that, by force of the quoted statutory provision, the properties described in the deeds referred to became vested upon his death in his