Gebhart v. Hill

Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant (complainant below) filed a bill of complaint against appellee (defendant below) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in Equity, in which he sought a decree declaring the act of the General Assembly of Maryland passed in 1947, and known as Chapter 13 of the Acts of that year, to be unconstitutional, in that it contravened certain sections of the Constitution of ¹³⁸ this State, and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Appellee, by his guardian ad litem, answered the bill, denying that said act violated either the constitution of this State or the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Copies of the proceedings were served on the Attorney General, and that officer adopted the answer of the appellee to the bill of complaint.

The cause proceeded before the chancellor, and after arguments of counsel, and due consideration, the chancellor below, by his decree, denied the relief prayed in the bill and dismissed the same. The appellant appealed from the decree to this court. The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Chapter 268, Public 346, 78th Congress, Second Session, 38 U. S. C. A., sec. 693 et seq., conferred certain benefits to veterans of World War II. Among its provisions the United States government guaranteed mortgages, as provided in the act, executed by veterans in order to enable them to buy a home. .This act. applies to all veterans, whether over or under the age of 21 years.

Section 2A of Chapter 13 of the Acts of 1947 of the General Assembly of Maryland is as follows: “Any war veteran eligible for the benefits of the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, and amendments thereto, who is under twenty-one years of age, may, for the purpose of obtaining the benefits of said Act, mortgage real estate owned by him, buy real estate and execute a mortgage to cover the purchase money, or execute a deed for the sale of real estate so purchased, or execute notes or make such other agreements and do such other things as may be necessary to obtain the benefits of the said Serviceman’s Readjustment Act, and amendments thereto, in the same manner and with the same effect as though twenty-one years of age. The minor husband or wife of any said war veteran may join in any such deed or mortgage for the purpose of releasing rights of dower ¹³⁹ and other rights in the same manner and with the same effect as though twenty-one years of age.” • On March 14, 1947, by an agreement duly signed and sealed by the parties, Jerome J. Gebhart (appellant) agreed to sell, and Richard P. Hill (appellee) agreed to buy certain property known as 2603 Yorkway, Dundalk, Baltimore County, Maryland, subject to an annual ground rent of $120. The only question raised as to the legal sufficiency of this contract, is the age of Hill. He is a' World War II veteran and is entitled to the benefits of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.

He is under 21 years of age. No question is raised as to the constitutionality of the Federal act, but the appellant asserts that the Maryland act is unconstitutional and void. He contends that said act is bad because it confers special privileges on the veterans under 21 years of age, and violates that portion of Section 2 of Article 16 of the Maryland Constitution, which is as follows: “* '* * that no measure * * * granting any franchise or special privilege * * * shall be enacted as an emergency law.” The argument is, that the Maryland act confers a “special privilege” on the veterans of World War II, and hence could not be passed by the Legislature as an emergency law. If this act does not confer a “special privilege,” it would be free from this constitutional objection. “The Legislature alone has the power to determine whether such an emergency as is contemplated by that section of the Constitution exists (Culp v. Commissioners of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 623 , 141 A. 410 ), and its determination of that question is not judicially reviewable.” Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 686 , 192 A. 531, 539 .

A law does not confer a “special privilege” simply because it applies to a given class' of citizens.' It may well be that a law applicable to all the citizens of the State might work a hardship or injustice to a given class of citizens. The term “special privilege” is not to ¹⁴⁰ be construed so rigidly as to result in injustice to a given class. If such were the case, the Legislature would be without authority to deal.justly in enacting laws