Gelblum v. Bloom

⁴⁰⁷ Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Sylvia Bloom, who is the Appellee here, owned an automobile which was involved in a collision while being driven by her husband Morton Bloom. Since this opinion makes reference to two law suits, we will distinguish between the Blooms by utilizing their praenomina. Morton filed suit against Emanuel Gelblum, G. I. Veterans Taxicab Company, Inc. and Milton Wasserman in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, claiming in Count I personal injuries and property damage to the vehicle.

Sylvia joined her husband in Count II of the Declaration claiming interference with their marital relationship. At the trial of that case, but before judgment or submission to the jury, Morton and Sylvia moved to dismiss Count II, and Morton moved to dismiss the property damage claim. 1 The motions to dismiss were granted by the court, after which Morton received a verdict in his favor in his bodily injury action. Sylvia then filed suit in the District Court against the same defendants to recover for damage to her automobile. That suit was removed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

Motions for summary judgment were filed by both appellants and appellee (Sylvia) following appellee’s demand for admissions which went unanswered. Appellants’ motion was denied and appellee’s motion was granted. Upon the entry of final judgment in favor of Sylvia in the amount of $996.26, appellants question the propriety of the granting of the summary judgment by Judge Joseph Howard. Appellants argue that because Sylvia was a party in the original suit against appellants here, “ . .. the plaintiffs (Sylvia’s] moment has passed; and the present suit is v[i]olative of the rule against splitting a cause of action.” Appellants rely upon two cases, Mildred Davis, Inc. v. ⁴⁰⁸ Hopkins, 224 Md. 626 and Carlin v. Fischer, 212 Md. 526 .

In Carlin, supra, at 532-533 , the rule relied upon by appellants and its raison d'etre are succinctly articulated: “It is well established that a single cause of action or an entire claim cannot be split up or divided and separate suits maintained for the various parts thereof. A judgment or decree in a suit for a part only of a single cause of action or entire claim permits res judicata to be successfully relied on if the remainder is sued on later. The rule is intended to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to avoid the vexation, costs and expenses incident to more than one suit on the same cause of action. Its bases are the maxims ‘that it is the interest of the State, there should be an end to litigation’ and that ‘no man should be twice sued for the same cause.’ Whitehurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 503, 513 ; 1 C.J.S., Actions, p. 1308; Rosenstein v. Hynson, 157 Md. 626 .” We note, however, that Carlin involved a contract action for legal services and commissions brought by a single claimant.

The court first decided that the alleged obligation was so indefinite that it was not binding and enforceable. To bolster its decision, the court noted that appellant there had sued for and recovered legal fees claimed from the same person for 1951, 1952 and 1953 and he could have at that time just as well sued for the fees now claimed from 1937 to 1950. His failure to do so was held to bar further recovery because “ ... even if the contract is divisible, all that is due under it, or by reason of its breach, at the time suit is brought, must then be sued for, or the right to so much as is due but not sued for will be lost.” Carlin, supra, 533 . This holding is a far cry from deciding that where two persons each have tort claims arising out of the same incident, one is banned from recovery through res judicata if the other chooses to sue first.

Mildred Davis, Inc., supra, is not apposite either and consequently of no help to us. There the plaintiff obtained ⁴⁰⁹ summary judgment as to part of its claim for goods sold with the remainder “to remain open until trial... Plaintiff then entered an order of dismissal of the entire case without prejudice and filed a second suit for the same articles. While characterizing the contention that either a party or his counsel can “dismiss” and so nullify a judgment of a court as “simply preposterous,” the court ruled that the dismissal of the balance of the claim was permitted and effectual under Md. Rule 541.

The court did not permit the second suit even as to the part of the claim not included in the summary judgment. Chief Judge Bruñe stated the court’s reasoning: “The plaintiff did not merely start that suit and then dismiss it before any judgment had been rendered therein, and file a new suit. On the contrary, the plaintiff had carried the first suit through to judgment as to a part of her claim, then dismissed it and several weeks later started its new suit