General Motors Corp. v. Schmitz

²³² RAKER, Judge. Respondent, Joseph Schmitz, Jr., filed suit in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Carroll County, against Petitioners, JBA Chevrolet (hereinafter JBA) and General Motors Corporation (hereinafter GM), pursuant to Maryland’s Automobile Warranty Enforcement Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2000 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) §§ 14-1501 — 14-1504 of the Commercial Law Article (commonly known as the “lemon law”) 1 and for breach of implied warranty under the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 2-814 of the Commercial Law Article. The District Court denied Respondent’s claim for breach of warranty, but found for Respondent on his lemon law claim and entered judgment against Petitioners in the amount of $20,000.00, ordered Petitioners to accept return of Respondent’s vehicle, and awarded attorney’s fees and court costs to Respondent.

Petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court for Carroll County, and that court affirmed. We granted GM’s and JBA’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider whether the District Court of Maryland has jurisdiction over lemon law actions and whether Respondent provided sufficient notice of his vehicle’s defects to GM in order to bring suit under the lemon law. We shall hold that, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 4-401(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the District Court had jurisdiction in this action. We shall also hold that the statutory requirement that the consumer provide written notice to the manufacturer of a vehicle’s defects by certified mail pursuant to § 14-1502(b)(l) as a condition precedent to bringing suit is dependent upon the manufacturer’s conformity with the conspicuous disclosure requirements of the same section.

Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ²³³ On September 21, 1996, Respondent purchased a 1997 Chevrolet Astro van from JBA. Upon delivery of the van, Respondent noticed that it would pull to the right upon braking. In an attempt to repair the problem, Respondent brought the van back to JBA on October 11, 1996, December 19, 1996, January 30, 1997, May 16, 1997, July 1, 1997, and July 2,1997. After the sixth unsuccessful repair attempt, Respondent demanded a replacement vehicle from JBA.

In response to his demand, JBA referred him to a GM Zone representative. The GM Zone representative referred him to another GM dealership, Westminster Motors (hereinafter Westminster) in Westminster, Maryland, where Respondent took the Astro van on July 29, 1997. After attempting to service the vehicle for two weeks, Westminster contacted Respondent and advised him that they were unable to correct the problem, despite having done everything that GM technicians and engineers had recommended. Respondent then filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau.

The following day, Respondent received a telephone call from a GM representative. She advised Respondent that GM engineers had determined that there was nothing wrong with the van and that the problem that he had identified was an “operational characteristic” of the vehicle. Respondent initiated the instant lemon law complaint in the District Court. As previously indicated, the court found in favor of Respondent.

GM appealed to the Circuit Court for Carroll County. After hearing oral argument, that court affirmed. When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court reviews the case on both the law and the evidence, and it will not set aside the judgment of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous. See Maryland Rule 8-131(c); Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407, 433 , 425 A.2d 197, 209-10 (1981); Kowell Ford, Inc. v. Doolan, 283 Md. 579, 581 , 391 A.2d 840, 841 (1978). “The appellate court must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the ²³⁴ prevailing party and if substantial evidence was presented to support the trial court’s determination, it is not clearly erroneous and cannot be disturbed.” Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392 , 347 A.2d 834, 835-36 (1975).

See Murphy v. 24th St. Cadillac, 353 Md. 480, 497 , 727 A.2d 915, 923 (1999). Petitioners contend that the District Court lacks general equity jurisdiction, that the remedies available under § 14-1502 are purely equitable in nature, and that, therefore, the District Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear lemon law cases. Respondent argues that the District Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts to entertain lemon law actions, subject to the jurisdictional limits on monetary damages set forth by statute. Petitioners are correct that the District Court does not have general equitable jurisdiction.

See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107 , 448 A.2d 332 (1982). The jurisdiction of the District Court is entirely statutory. The civil jurisdiction of the District Court is established by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) §§ 4 401 — 4-405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The District Court has concurrent jurisdiction with trial courts of general jurisdiction, at the election of the plaintiff, over civil actions in contract and tort if the amount in controversy is between $2500.00 and $25,000.00, exclusive of interest, costs, and recoverable attorney’s fees.

See Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 4-401(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 4-402(d)(l)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Before the circuit court, GM argued that the remedies of rescission and specific performance under the lemon law are * equitable remedies, thus divesting the District Court of jurisdiction because the District Court does not have general equitable powers. The circuit court rejected GM’s argument, ruling that [t]he instant case contains neither an affirmative order of recission [sic] nor was it brought as an action in equity. Indeed, the Plaintiffs complaint arises from a statutory ²³⁵ authority that seeks damages.

One needs look no further than the Plaintiffs complaint to see that the Plaintiff filed suit seeking $20,000.00 as damages. The court concluded that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs damages were in excess of $2500 and less than $25,000, the District Court and circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction. Accordingly, it held that the District Court had jurisdiction over this action. We agree.

A plain reading of Petitioner’s complaint in the District Court clearly demonstrates that he sought only monetary damages as a remedy, not the equitable remedy of specific performance. 2 ²³⁶ Petitioners argue that Respondent failed to comply with the notice requirement contained in § 14-1502(b)(l) and that such notice is a condition precedent to bringing suit, which precludes his right to recover under the statute. Respondent argues that, because he gave actual notice to Petitioners of his vehicle’s defect, given Petitioners’ active participation in the unsuccessful attempts to repair the vehicle, such notice is sufficient to comply with the statutory notice requirement of § 14-1502. Section 14-1502(b) provides, in relevant part: Correction of defects. — (1) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable warranties during the warranty period, the consumer shall, during such period, report the nonconformity, defect, or condition by giving written notice to the manufacturer or factory branch by certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice of this procedure shall be conspicuously disclosed to the consumer in writing at the time of sale or delivery of the motor vehicle.

(2) The consumer shall provide an opportunity for the manufacturer or factory branch, or its agent to cure the nonconformity, defect, or condition. On its face, the statute provides no indication of the consequences of a consumer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement. It also does not indicate whether actual notice can be sufficient in lieu of notification by certified mail, a question that this Court declined to decide in Murphy. See Murphy, 353 Md. at 505 n. 6, 727 A.2d at 927 n. 6.

Because we hold, infra, that Petitioners are not entitled