Georges v. Duncan

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 14, 1970, the appellant-plaintiff, Constant J. Georges, was injured when his automobile was struck by another automobile driven by one of the appelleedefendants, Albert Duncan. A little over four months later, on June 22, 1970, Georges was involved in another automobile collision. On that latter occasion, his automobile was struck by a truck owned by the second appelleedefendant, Harry Fox, and driven by an employee of Mr. Fox.

Mr. Georges brought joint suit against both defendants, alleging that the bodily injury he sustained “is indivisible, and incapable of apportionment as to the amount” of injury. Mrs. Georges is made a plaintiff because of her derivative claim for damages for loss of consortium and damages for the destruction of her automobile in the collision with Duncan. Each defendant filed a demurrer on the ground that the two entirely separate causes of action ought not be joined in the same declaration. Both demurrers were sustained, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend their declaration.

Plaintiffs then filed the identical declaration, ²⁵⁸ the only change being the caption, “Amended Declaration.” Again the defendants filed demurrers. This time the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and directed the plaintiffs to file a separate declaration against each defendant. The plaintiffs rely upon Maryland Rule 313 d 1, which provides: “d. Multiple Joinder. 1.

Separate Claims — Common Question of Law or Fact. Separate claims involving different plaintiffs or defendants or both may be joined in one action whenever any substantial question of law or fact common to all the claims will arise in the action or for any other reason the claims may conveniently be disposed of in the same proceeding; the claims joined may be joint, several, or in the alternative, as to plaintiffs or defendants or both.” We hold that the action of Judge Anselm Sodaro in the Baltimore City Court in sustaining the demurrers of the defendants was proper. The fact that both injuries were to the same part of the plaintiff’s body, thereby complicating the problem of the medical experts and of the ultimate fact finders in making a proper apportionment, is not a “substantial