Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin

⁶⁴ GREENE, J. In this case we must interpret Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-904(g)(2) and 5-113(b) to determine whether the “discovery rule” applies to toll the limitations period for filing wrongful death and survival actions relating to an occupational disease. In the present case, both the wrongful death and survival actions were filed more than three years after the injured person’s death. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City determined that both actions were barred by the statute of limitations and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, however, the intermediate appellate court concluded that although the survival action was barred, the wrongful death action was not barred by limitations. For reasons to be explained in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. BACKGROUND On May 25, 1997, Robert L. Benjamin, Sr. (Mr. Benjamin) died of mesothelioma, a type of cancer in which a high percentage of cases are caused by asbestos exposure. On March 20, 2003, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Mrs. Elsie Benjamin (“Mrs. Benjamin”), as personal representative of the estate of the decedent, Mr. Benjamin, filed a survival action against various defendants, including Georgia Pacific Corporation (“GP”) and Union Carbide Corporation (“UC”).

In the same complaint, Mrs. Benjamin and Mr. Benjamin’s two surviving children, Robert L. Benjamin, II, and Carol Jeffers (collectively “the Benjamins”), filed a wrongful death action against the same defendants. Both UC and GP moved for summary judgment on the ground that both actions were barred by limitations. As to both motions, the trial court granted summary judgment. On June 21, 2004, only Mrs. Benjamin, in her individual capacity and as personal representative for Mr. Benjamin, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

On May 3, 2005, the Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion, in which it affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s judg ⁶⁵ ment. In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the intermediate appellate court held that Mrs. Benjamin’s survival action was haired by limitations. The court reversed as to the wrongful death action. It held that, as to that action, the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute inquiry notice.

We granted the petition for certiorari filed by GP, UC, and Mrs. Benjamin. Georgia-Pacific v. Benjamin, 388 Md. 404 , 879 A.2d 1086 (2005). 1 ⁶⁶ We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that application of the judicially developed discovery rule is consistent with the language contained in § 3-904(g)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Specifically, in cases involving workplace exposure to toxic substances, like asbestos, a claimant, including a wrongful death claimant, is on inquiry notice of the causation element of a cause of action to recover injuries resulting from an “occupational disease,” e.g., mesothelioma when the claimant has knowledge that (1) the person whose injury forms the basis for the claim has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, and (2) the injured person was exposed to asbestos in the workplace. Further, we hold that in a survival action, if the decedent’s knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the discovery rule, the decedent’s knowledge is enough to trigger the running of the limitations period for the survival action.

FACTS We adopt, in large part, the facts as set forth by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion: In the complaint and in answers to interrogatories, [the respondents][ 2 ] assert[ ] that the decedent was employed as a laborer and carpenter while (1) in the United States Navy from 1943 to 1945, (2) work[ed] for the L.H. Benjamin Co. from 1946 to 1961, and (3) work[ed] for the R.L. Benjamin Lumber Co. from 1961 to 1971. According to [the respondents], the decedent was exposed to asbestos containing products at various times throughout his employment, including while working for the Benjamin companies, which stocked and sold several products containing asbestos. The ⁶⁷ decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma in early 1997, and he died on May 25, 1997. Benjamin v. Union Carbide, 162 Md.App. 178 , 180, 873 A.2d 463, 467 (2005).

Mr. Benjamin’s death certifícate indicated that the cause of death was “cancer (metastatic mesothelioma).” The respondents testified, as revealed in the affidavits and deposition testimony filed in these proceedings, that they discovered the nexus between asbestos exposure and cancer in late 2001 to early 2002, after the decedent’s daughter, Carol Jeffers, read an article that stated that a high percentage of mesothelioma cases were caused by asbestos exposure. In Benjamin, the Court of Special Appeals summarized the evidence, as stated in pertinent part: Summary of medical reports, depositions, and affidavits A medical report, dated January 27, 1997, indicates that the decedent was referred to Dr. M. Jesada because of an abnormal chest x-ray and CAT scan. The report states that the decedent had periodic chest x-rays prior to December 1996, which were normal. As a result of a fall in November 1996, the decedent had various tests.

The test included a chest X-ray, which was abnormal, and which was followed by a CAT scan, which was abnormal. According to the report, the decedent advised the physician that he had a history of asbestos exposure. Dr. Jesada’s impression was possible mesothelioma, and a biopsy was recommended. Records from Harford Memorial Hospital reveal that the decedent was admitted on February 7, 1997, for a biopsy.

An oncology report dated February 28, 1997, by Dr. Promila Suri, reflects a diagnosis of probable mesothelioma. The report indicates that the decedent stated that he had a history of exposure to asbestos in the workplace. A report dated March 4, 1997, by Dr. Viroon Donavanik, indicates that the decedent was admitted to the Medical Center of Delaware on March 4. The report contains a confirmation of a diagnosis of mesothelioma and a recom ⁶⁸ mendation that decedent be treated with radiation and chemotherapy.

The report again reveals that the decedent disclosed a history of asbestos exposure while working in a machine shop. The report further noted that decedent worked in the roofing and siding business. [Mrs. Benjamin], in her affidavit, stated that she routinely attended medical appointments with the decedent in the spring of 1997, and that neither she nor the decedent was informed of the causal connection between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma. [Mrs. Benjamin] stated that she first learned of the connection ... [as late as] 2002, when her daughter read an advertisement which referenced the connection and told [Mrs. Benjamin] about it. [Mrs. Benjamin] testified that she never made any inquiries about the cause of mesothelioma prior to that time. At the first motions hearing held on November 25, 2003, the court denied [these] motion[s] [by GP and UC and the other defendants] for summary judgment without prejudice, stating: “Well ... I think the motion may be premature.

And the reason I say that is that Mrs. Benjamin has not been deposed, and I gathered that from reading the papers, and I think that that ought to be done, because I don’t want to make a decision in this case based upon an affidavit.” Following the hearing, [Mrs. Benjamin] was deposed on December 23, 2003. The pertinent testimony is as follows: Q. Do you remember your husband telling Dr. Jesada that he had some exposure to asbestos in the past? A. No. Q. And you can’t pinpoint one way or the other whether you were with your husband on January 27th, 1997 for that exam? A. I can’t remember the date. * * * * Q. I’m going to show you a report from Dr. Suri dated February 28th, 1997.

Do you recall whether you were with ⁶⁹ your husband on February 28th, 1997 when he went to see Dr. Suri? A. I was with him almost every time — as far as I know, every time he saw her. Q. Fm going to show you the report, but there’s some reference in the report to your husband being exposed to asbestos when he was a carpenter. Do you remember at any time when you went to see Dr. Suri your husband ever making any mention of the fact that he had been exposed to asbestos while he was working as a carpenter?

A. I do not remember. * * * * Q. Did there come a time when your husband, as a result of his cancer, went to the Medical Center of Delaware? A. That’s where he got the radiation treatments. * * * * Q. Did you accompany him to the Medical Center of Delaware— A. Yes, I did. Q. —for his radiation? A. Yes.

Q. And there was one time when you didn’t go because of the ice? A. He went, but I didn’t drive him. Q. Do you know whether you accompanied him on March 4, 1997? A. I don’t know.

Q. I’m going to show you a report dated March 4, 1997 from Viroon Donavanik. $ Q. Do you know whether you accompanied your husband on that date to the medical center? A. I don’t know. ⁷⁰ Q. And the report, and I’ve highlighted it, again makes reference to his being exposed to asbestos. Do you know whether during a visit to the Medical Center of Delaware your husband ever told the doctors there that he had been exposed to asbestos? A. I don’t know. * * * * Q. Do you remember [the decedent] mentioning to the people at Union Hospital anything about asbestos exposure?

A. No. Q. Now, you mentioned that you think you were present when Dr. Jesada told your husband that he had lung cancer, correct? A. I was. Q. Did your husband ask what caused his lung cancer? A. No. * H* H* H* Q. And you don’t recall your husband ever asking Dr. Jesada, hey, what could have caused this cancer?

A. No, I don’t. Q. Did you and your husband ever discuss as between the two of you what possibly could have caused his cancer? A. No. * * ❖ * Q. When you accompanied your husband to see Dr. Suri, do you remember you or your husband ever asking Dr. Suri what may have caused his cancer? A. Well, it was discussed.

Q. Tell me what was discussed with Dr. Suri regarding the cause of his cancer. A. I remember her saying she had only had one other case of this type of cancer, it was a woman and she died. Now, ⁷¹ that’s what I remember of that conversation. We were pretty much upset.

Q. Sure. Any other discussions that you can recall with Dr. Suri by either you or your husband regarding the cause of your husband’s cancer? A. No, I don’t remember. Q. When did you become aware of the name of the cancer that your husband had?

A. Well, I saw it on the death certifícate and that might be when. * * * * Q. Did you have any discussions with any family members as to what may have caused his cancer ... any discussions as to what could have caused it? A. No. * * ❖ * Q. Did you ever, subsequent to your husband’s death and prior to coming to this law firm, ever ask to see any of your husband’s medical records? A. No. Q. Did you have in your possession prior to coming to this office any of your husband’s medical records? A. After he died, the VA Hospital, one of my neighbors worked in the X-ray department and he brought the X-rays home and said destroy them.

I thought that was unusual, but I did it. * * * * Q. Other than those X-rays, did you ever have any other medical records relating to your husband’s cancer? A. None. ⁷² Significantly, not only is there no evidence that [the Benjamins] had express knowledge[ 3 ] of a causal connection between mesothelioma and asbestos, there is no evidence that [the Benjamins] had express knowledge that the decedent had been exposed to asbestos during his lifetime or at any time prior to 2002 [or early 2002], Robert L. Benjamin, II, testified [at the] deposition that he had no knowledge of the connection between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma until advised by his sister at “the end of 2001, early 2002.” He also testified that he knew the decedent had cancer before death but he did not know it was mesothelioma until his sister told him in late 2001. There is no evidence that Robert L. Benjamin, II had actual knowledge of the decedent’s exposure to asbestos prior to late 2001. There is no evidence that Carol Jeffers had knowledge, until late in the year of 2001, that the decedent was exposed to asbestos or that his cancerous condition was caused by such exposure.

According to [the respondents], this litigation occurred after Carol Jeffers read an article in late 2001 or early 2002 about mesothelioma, told her family, and they contacted counsel. [The Benjamins] also filed [the] affidavit [of] John E. Newhagen, Ph.D., dated December 10, 2003____Dr. Newhagen opined that it would be unlikely for an average consumer to have actual knowledge of the relationship between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma prior to 1997.... * * * * We see no need to summarize the affidavit ... because [the respondents] d[id] not argue [that before 1997] ... [a] relationship between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma was not knowable, if a reasonable investigation had been conducted. [Mrs. Benjamines sole argument [on appeal] is ⁷³ that neither she, the other beneficiaries, nor the decedent had sufficient actual knowledge to place them on inquiry notice so as to charge them with the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would have revealed. Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 180-186 , 878 A.2d at 467-70. After the deposition of Mrs. Benjamin, petitioners moved for summary judgment, contending that the action was barred by limitations, and the trial court granted the motion.

The court held that respondents were on inquiry notice in 1997 when Mr. Benjamin was diagnosed with mesothelioma and was aware of his exposure to asbestos. Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations period expired as to both the wrongful death and survival actions in 2000, three years after Mr. Benjamin’s death. Thereafter, on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part and reversed in part. STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment if the motion and the response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Md. Rule 2-501; Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 504 , 801 A.2d 148, 152 (2002). If a motion for summary judgment relates to an issue involving the discovery rule and “there is any genuine dispute of material fact as to when the [claimants] possessed that degree of knowledge [of the circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the claimants to undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge of the alleged cause of action], the issue is one for the trier of fact to resolve.” Bank of New York v. Sheff 382 Md. 235, 244 , 854 A.2d 1269, 1275 (2004) (citing O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 301-02 , 503 A.2d 1313, 1323-24 (1986)). Conversely, “[i]f there is no such genuine dispute ... and the question of whether the [claimants] were on inquiry notice more than three years before ⁷⁴ their suit was filed can be determined as a matter of law, summary judgment on that issue is ... appropriate.” Id. Further, [i]n reviewing the grant of summary judgment, this Court must consider the facts reflected in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, the [claimants].

Even if it appears that the relevant facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is improper. This Court has noted that the purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried. Summary judgment unquestionably is an important device, within our court system, for streamlining litigation and ensuring the application of limited judicial resources to potentially meritorious claims. Additionally, it saves the parties expense and the delays of protracted and non-meritorious litigation.

Nonetheless, dismissal of the case deprives the parties of a trial and the opportunity to develop their claims and present them to a jury. This Court has therefore been careful to restrict application of summary judgment to cases that present no material facts that may reasonably be said to be disputed. Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533-34 , 836 A.2d 655, 669-70 (2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). THE DISCOVERY RULE We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the “[q]uestion in this case is when [did the Benjamins’] causes of action against the manufacturers of asbestos containing products accrue [ ].” Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 191-92 , 873 A.2d at 474 .

In order to answer that question, we begin by stating the general rule that a cause of action is said to accrue at the ⁷⁵ time of the wrong. In Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334 , 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994), this Court pointed out that [historically, the general rule in Maryland was that a cause of action accrued on the date the wrong was committed. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 139 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 182 , 100 A. 83 (1917). Whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrong was not considered in determining accrual.

This “date of the wrong” rule did not differentiate between the plaintiff who was “blamelessly ignorant” of his potential claim and the plaintiff who had “slumbered on his rights,” Harig [v. Johns-Manville Products, 284 Md. 70 ,] 83, 394 A.2d 299 , [306 (1978) ]. It wrought harsh consequences in cases where plaintiffs’ claims were barred, not only before they were able to perceive any harm, but before it was possible for them to learn that the negligence had taken place, such as in situations involving professional services where the plaintiff was not qualified to ascertain the injury. Waldman, supra, 241 Md. at 140 , 215 A.2d 825 , quoting Developments in the Law, Statute of Limitations, 63 Harv. L.Rev. 1177, 1201 (1950).

In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, because of the “unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on rights not reasonably possible to ascertain, this Court adopted what is known as the discovery rule, which now applies generally in all civil actions, and which provides that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff in fact knows or reasonably should know of the wrong.” Id. (citation omitted). Our first recognition of the discovery rule was in the early 1900s in a medical malpractice case. Hahn, 130 Md. at 187 , 100 A. at 86 (recognizing that the cause of action, although barred in that case, did not accrue until an injury was discoverable).

See Harig, 284 Md. at 83 , 394 A.2d at 306 (“In situations involving the latent development of disease, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues [under the discovery rule] when he ascertains, or through the exercise of reasonable care and ⁷⁶ diligence should have ascertained, the nature and cause of his injury.”). Thus, the discovery rule was adopted to resolve unfairness and injustice. Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665 , 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983). The rule requires that the plaintiff must have notice of a claim to start the running of limitations.

We defined such notice in Poffenberger as “express cognition or awareness implied from ‘knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry [thus charging the individual] with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.’ ” 290 Md. [631], 637, 431 A.2d 677 [, 681 (1981) ]. Hecht, 333 Md. at 336 , 635 A.2d at 400 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). The discovery rule has been extended to cases of “latent development of disease” because [l]ike the victim of undiscoverable malpractice a person incurring disease years after exposure cannot have known of the existence of the tort until some injury manifests itself. In neither case can the tort victim be charged with slumbering on his rights, for there was no notice of the existence of a cause of action.

This feature distinguishes these situations from ordinary tort cases, which require no exception to the general rule that knowledge of the wrong is immaterial, because usually some harm will be apparent to a reasonably diligent plaintiff. Harig, 284 Md. at 80 , 394 A.2d at 305 (citations omitted). Those who suffer injury due to occupational disease or their beneficiaries “may, in appropriate circumstances, be ‘blamelessly ignorant’ of the fact that a tort has occurred and thus, ought not be charged with slumbering on rights they were unable to ascertain.” Id. at 83 , 394 A.2d at 306 . ⁷⁷ ANALYSIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION 4 Petitioners argue that under § 3-904(g)(2)(ii) of the wrongful death statute, the three-year limitations period is triggered when death is discovered and not when the claimant discovers that the underlying cause of decedent’s death was an occupational disease, i.e., asbestos exposure. See infra 394 Md. at 81-82, 904 A.2d at 524.

The petitioners maintain that the triggering event was ultimately Mr. Benjamin’s death. Further, they contend that it is immaterial that the Benjamins did not become aware, until 2001, that prior asbestos exposure caused the mesothelioma. The premise for this argument is that Mr. Benjamin died in 1997 as a result of cancer, and his death was the event that triggered the running of the limitations period. In addition, UC maintains that in Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 57 , 626 A.2d 353, 355 (1993), this Court held that under the wrongful death statute an action commences on the date of the injured person’s death.

Therefore, the discovery rule does not apply. 5 Alternatively, UC argues that even if the ⁷⁸ discovery rule applies, the family was on notice when Mr. Benjamin died of mesothelioma in 1997, and should have investigated further at that time. The Benjamins assert that the Court of Special Appeals did not err when it held that there was no evidence in the record that the beneficiaries had any express knowledge, prior to late 2001, that Mr. Benjamin’s death was linked to an occupational disease. Therefore, because summary judgment was inappropriate, their claims, although filed more than three years after Mr. Benjamin’s death, should not be time barred. In addition, we note that a question of whether the beneficiaries had any knowledge as to the nature of the mesothelioma, other than that it was a form of cancer, is a question for the trier of fact and not for the court to decide on summary judgment.

The trial court held that the Benjamins were on notice when Mr. Benjamin was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Further, the trial court found that the Benjamins were aware of Mr. Benjamin’s exposure to asbestos when he relayed that information to his doctors during the course of his medical diagnosis and treatment. The only reference, however, to the family’s alleged communication with Mr. Benjamin’s doctors was contained in a footnote in the trial court’s memorandum opinion which indicated that Mrs. Benjamin accompanied her husband on doctor and hospital visits. Neither the son nor the daughter were mentioned in the opinion.

Additionally, Mrs. Benjamin testified that either she was never told or did not recall any discussions with the doctors about Mr. Benjamin’s previous asbestos exposure or the link between the mesothelioma and that exposure. ⁷⁹ The intermediate appellate court held that in a wrongful death action, “[i]f the decedent does not have knowledge sufficient to satisfy the discovery rule, the [beneficiaries are] the determinative parties].... [T]he cause of action does not accrue until the beneficiaries are on inquiry notice.” Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 201 , 873 A.2d at 479 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the fact that Mrs. Benjamin accompanied her husband to appointments was not sufficient evidence to show that she was on inquiry notice as a matter of law. Id. at 205, 873 A.2d at 481-82 . Further, the evidence was insufficient to show that the respondents were on inquiry notice regarding the asbestos exposure, although they were aware of the mesothelioma.

Id. The intermediate appellate court held that “[t]he direct evidence of express knowledge in the case before us is that [Mrs. Benjamin] and the other beneficiaries knew only that the cause of death was mesothelioma, prior to late 2001[, and] ... the non-moving party ... gets the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id. A wrongful death action is designed to compensate the family of a decedent who died due to the “wrongful act, 6 neglect, or default on another person.” 7 Binnix v. JohnsManville Products Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1180, 1182 (D.Md.1984) ⁸⁰ (quoting Stewart v. United Electric Light and Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 343 , 65 A. 49, 53 (1906)). See also Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 82 , 698 A.2d 1097, 1102 (1997).

There are two relevant inquiries necessary to determine the commencement date for a cause of action for wrongful death under § 3-904(g): (1) did the cause of action commence at the time of the decedent’s death; or (2) did the cause of action commence when the beneficiaries became aware of the causal link between the decedent’s illness and his exposure to a toxic substance? In answering these questions and determining when the cause of action arose, we must interpret the language of the wrongful death statute. Md.Code (1974, 2002 RepLVol.), § 3-904(g) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We stated in Walton v. Mariner Health, 391 Md. 643, 664 , 894 A.2d 584, 596 (2006) that: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legslative intent.

O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744 , 580 A.2d 188, 191 (1990) (citations omitted). We may consider the general purpose and aim of a statute in an effort to discern legslative intent. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). Our long-standing rule is that if the language used in the statute is clear, unambiguous, and consistent with its objective, the words will be accorded their ordinary meaning.

Ayres v. Townsend, 324 Md. 666, 672 , 598 A.2d 470, 473 (1991) (citations omitted); see G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 755 , 521 A.2d 1225, 1230 (1987). In contrast, if the statutory language is ambiguous, we have maintained, that [i]n determining the meaning of a statute, we consider the statute’s structure, including the title, and how the statute relates to other laws. Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525-26 , 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). We look first to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the Legslature.

If the ⁸¹ plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we analyze the case law, legislative history, and statutory function. Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591 , 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005) (citing Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004)). Stouffer v. Pearson, 390 Md. 36, 46-7 , 887 A.2d 623, 629 (2005). We may review the relationship of new amendments to any earlier statutory language and other materials to ascertain legislative purpose or goal.

Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 539 , 546 A.2d 465, 468 (1988). In an attempt to determine legislative intent, it is well settled that preambles to a statute may be considered. McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 343 , 469 A.2d 1256, 1268 (1984) (noting that a preamble to a statute may be considered in determining legislative intent). See Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 583 , 357 A.2d 360, 367-68 (1976) (“The recitals set forth by the legislature in a preamble may be resorted to as an aid in construction of a statute.”) (abrogated on other grounds by Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 602 , 602 A.2d 701 (1992)).

But see Comptroller of the Treasury v. Glenn L Martin Co., 216 Md. 235, 249 , 140 A.2d 288, 295 (1958) (“Preambles are not operative parts of the statute.”); Gibson v. State, 204 Md. 423, 432 , 104 A.2d 800, 805 (1954). Before the 1986 revision, the wrongful death statute required that a wrongful death action must “be filed within three years after the death of the injured person.” Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 3-904(g) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In May 1986, the General Assembly of Maryland, by way of Senate Bill 864, approved a revision to § 3-904(g) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The statute, as revised, provides: § 3-904 Action for wrongful death.

(g) Action to commence within three years; deaths caused by occupational disease. — (1) Except as provided ⁸² in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an action under this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person. (2) (i) In this paragraph “occupational disease” means a disease caused by exposure to any toxic substance in the person’s workplace and contracted by a person in the course of the person’s employment. (ii) If an occupational disease was the cause of a person’s death, an action shall be filed: (1) Within 10 years of the time of death; 8 or (2) Within 3 years of the date when the cause of death was discovered, whichever is the shorter. Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-904(g) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

See also 1986 Md. Laws, Chap. 374. Before we determine whether the discovery rule applies, we must first determine whether 3-904(g)(2) is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action or a statute of limitations, per se. Condition Precedent or Statute of Limitations Historically, we have construed the limitation period prescribed in § 3-904(g) as a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action, rather than as a statute of limitations. See Waddell, supra, 331 Md. at 57 , 626 A.2d at 355 (cases cited therein).

In Waddell , we held that the limitations period prescribed in § 3-904(g) is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action. Id. In Waddell , an adult filed a wrongful death action approximately seventeen years after her father died from injuries sustained when his car collided with a tractor trailer. Id. at 54 , 626 A.2d at 354 .

At the time of her father’s death, the daughter was a minor. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful death claim because it was filed more than three years after the decedent’s death. ⁸³ The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Id.

On appeal the daughter argued, among other things, that the 1971 changes to § 3 — 904(g)(1), amending the statute from a two year limitations period to three years, changed the time period of the statute from a condition precedent to a statute of limitations. We disagreed and explained: In [State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477 , 129 A. 793 (1925),] the issue was whether the requirement in the wrongful death statute then in effect, Maryland Code (1912) Art. 67 § 2, requiring “that every such action shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after the death of the deceased person,” is “a condition essential to the right to maintain the action given by the statute, or merely a limitation of the remedy which must be pleaded to defeat the action.” Id. at 58, 626 A.2d at 356 (quoting Parks, 148 Md. 477 -78, 129 A. at 793 (noting that in 1925, a claimant had twelve months to bring a wrongful death action — today, a claimant has ten years, or three years from the date cause of death is discovered)). Further, we explained that the wrongful death [statute] create[s] a new legal liability, with the right to suit for its enforcement, provided the suit is brought within [the statutory time prescribed], and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone.

It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all.. .. Time has been made of the essence of the right and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right. Id. at 59, 626 A.2d at 356 (alterations in original) (alterations added).

In 1985, in Trimper, we held that the unambiguous language of the wrongful death statute leaves “no room for judicial interpretation ... of the discovery rule.” Trimper, supra at n. 7 at 17, 305 Md. at 36 , 501 A.2d at 449. The three- ⁸⁴ year period after the date of death for filing a wrongful death claim stood as an objectively determinable event or starting point. Id. at 34, 501 A.2d at 448. In addition, the wrongful death statute “created a new liability not existing at common law....

The period of limitations is part of the substantive right of action.” Id. at 35, 501 A.2d at 449 (citations omitted). Further, this Court has held that [a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied. This requirement of strict or substantial compliance with a condition precedent is of course subject to abrogation by the General Assembly. Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28 , 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005).

The statute of hmitations, however, is different. 9 Judge Cole writing for this Court in Pennwalt stated: Statutes of hmitations have existed in Maryland and in other common law jurisdictions for hundreds of years. See Ferguson, The Statutes of Limitation Saving Statutes, 12- 14 (1978). The statutes were enacted in an effort to balance the competing interests of potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and the public. The statutory period provided by a statute of hmitations represents a compromise of these interests and “reflects a pohcy decision regarding what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary dihgence to pursue his claim.” Goldstein v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684 , 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1979).

By creating a