Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Farrar

KEHOE, J. On September 8, 2008, appellee, Ms. Jocelyn Farrar, sued over thirty defendants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging, inter alia, negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability, for failing to warn her about the toxic fibers found in the defendants’ respective asbestos products. This appeal involves only one of the original defendants: appellant, Georgia-Pacific, LLC. Ms. Farrar’s complaint alleges that, decades ago, she was exposed to asbestos fibers from a Georgia-Pacific product found on the clothing of her grandfather, who worked at a construction site near Georgia-Pacific products that contained asbestos. Ms. Farrar has since devel ⁵²⁸ oped mesothelioma, a disease strongly linked to asbestos exposure.

On October 15, 2009, a jury trial commenced on the claims against Georgia-Pacific. The jury returned a general verdict finding that Ms. Farrar’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s product was a substantial factor in causing her injuries. A judgment was entered in favor of Ms. Farrar against Georgia-Pacific in the amount of $4,995,018.75. Georgia-Pacific noted this appeal on June 2, 2010 and presents the following questions to this Court: 1.

Did the circuit court err by failing to rule, as a matter of law, that Georgia-Pacific had no duty to warn a household resident of the risk of exposure to asbestos fibers carried home by a bystander who worked at a construction site where a Georgia-Pacific product allegedly was used by other workers? 2. Did the plaintiff introduce sufficient evidence of frequent, close, and regular exposure to asbestos from a Georgia-Pacific product to prove that it was a substantial contributing cause of her injuries? 3. Did the circuit court err by issuing a coercive Allen-type charge in response to an allegedly ambiguous verdict before determining whether the jury was deadlocked? We perceive no reversible error.

We will affirm the jury verdict in favor of Ms. Farrar. Factual and Procedural Background Ms. Farrar’s grandfather, Mr. Hentgen, worked as a union insulator using products containing asbestos in construction projects for almost fifty years, from 1925 into the 1970s. Ms. Farrar alleges that Mr. Hentgen was exposed to a toxic Georgia-Pacific product when he worked on the construction of the Forrestal Building in Washington, D.C. She further alleges that this toxic product contributed to her mesothelioma when she washed her grandfather’s work clothes that were covered in asbestos dust. The following testimony was adduced at trial to support Ms. Farrar’s case. ⁵²⁹ Evidence that Mr. Hentgen’s clothing contained asbestos from a Georgia-Pacific product Mr. Joseph Galvagna, who worked with Mr. Hentgen at the construction site of the Forrestal Building, testified to the following.

Mr. Galvagna worked at the Forrestal construction site for about six or seven months beginning in December of 1968. Messrs. Galvagna and Hentgen were employed by the same sub-contractor and the witness saw Mr. Hentgen at least a few times a day over this six or seven month time period. Mr. Hentgen was a mechanic at the job site.

He installed insulation on pipes, ducts, boilers and chillers. Mr. Galvagna was a first year apprentice at the job site. It was Mr. Galvagna’s job to make sure the mechanics had all of the material they needed, to clean up after them, and to move equipment for them. They worked eight hours a day, five days a week.

Many other types of tradesmen and craftsmen worked at the Forrestal construction site, including electricians, drywall workers, flooring workers, ceiling workers and steamfitters (the workers who installed the pipes that Mr. Hentgen insulated). At trial, Mr. Galvagna was specifically asked about the type of drywall work that was performed at the Forrestal Building. Mr. Galvagna explained that there was a “tremendous amount” of drywall work done at the Forrestal Building. Drywall work consisted of cutting pieces of drywall with a utility knife and fastening those pieces of drywall to wood or metal studs with a drill gun.

Workers then apply two or three coats of drywall cement between the sheets of drywall to fill in the seams between individual pieces. Subsequently, according to Mr. Galvagna, the workers waited for the cement to dry and sanded “the cement down so that when they painted it, you couldn’t see where they had made the joints.” Mr. Galvagna testified that sanding created “quite a bit of dust” that “would sometimes just fly around in the air.” He further testified that a clean up crew would clean up the dust with a broom and a shovel after the dust settled and “would stir it back up again.” According to Mr. Galvagna, much of ⁵³⁰ the drywall cement was packaged in five gallon Georgia-Pacific buckets. He knew the drywall was a Georgia-Pacific product because Georgia-Pacific “was written on both sides of the bucket in nice plain legible letters.” Mr. Galvagna recalled seeing hundreds of these Georgia-Pacific buckets at the Forrestal job site. He did not recall seeing warning labels on any of the buckets.

The Georgia-Pacific drywall product was called Ready-Mix. Ready-Mix was manufactured by Georgia-Pacific from 1968 to approximately 1977. The asbestos component of Ready-Mix was approximately 1.5 percent to 5 percent chrysotile asbestos. Georgia-Pacific indicated that Ready-Mix was normally applied as a taping, finishing, or texturing material over joints, fastener heads, corners, and entire areas of gypsum wallboard.

An asbestos-free formulation of Ready-Mix was introduced in 1976. There was no indication at trial that Mr. Hentgen ever personally used the Georgia-Pacific Ready-Mix product. Mr. Galvagna testified that Mr. Hentgen would sometimes work within four to five feet of the drywall workers. Over the course of the six or seven month time period that Mr. Galvagna worked at the Forrestal site, he estimated that Mr. Hentgen worked in the area of the drywall workers “about 50 to 75 percent of the time.” When Mr. Hentgen worked around the dust, Mr. Galvagna stated that the dust would settle on Mr. Hentgen’s clothing, hair, skin and shoes.

Mr. Galvagna testified that Mr. Hentgen did not shower or change his clothes upon leaving the work site. Mr. Galvagna also remembered seeing other asbestos-containing cement products at the job site. He saw JohnsManville 7M, Johns-Manville 352 and Eagle-Pitcher cement. These were the cement products used by insulators like Mr. Hentgen.

Mr. Hentgen also worked with pipe insulation. The pipe insulation consisted of a product called Kaylo, manufactured by Owens-Corning, and Thermobestos, manufactured by Johns-Manville. These products were used under the hangers that hold the piping in the air. ⁵³¹ Evidence that Ms. Farrar was exposed to a Georgia-Pacific asbestos-containing product Ms. Farrar attended high school from 1966 to 1970. During that time, she lived with her sister and her aunt at her grandparents’ house.

Ms. Farrar and her sister had various responsibilities around the house, including dusting, sweeping, vacuuming, mowing the lawn, weeding the garden, and as they got older, doing the household’s laundry. Ms. Farrar did the laundry at least once a week during the period her grandfather worked on the Forrestal Building. She not only washed her own clothes, but she cleaned the clothing of other family members as well. Ms. Farrar recalls that her grandfather’s work clothing was part of the laundry cycle every week.

She specifically remembers shaking her grandfather’s work clothes thoroughly because the dust particles attached to his clothing would stick to her navy blue clothing. She was also concerned about the dust from his clothing clogging the drain in the washing machine. After shaking out her grandfather’s work clothing, she remembers breathing in the dust that was removed from the clothing. She also remembers having to sweep up dust on the ground that resulted from shaking out her grandfather’s work clothes.

Ms. Farrar described the dust as whitish-grayish, loose and fluffy. Medical evidence of Arthur L. Frank, M.D. Dr. Frank was accepted by the court as an expert in the fields of internal medicine, occupational medicine, asbestos-related disease and mesothelioma. Dr. Frank testified that asbestos disease is dose related: “the likelihood of getting [the] disease increases with increasing amounts of exposure.” He relayed to the jury that, based on Ms. Farrar’s medical files and a “fiber burden” analysis that was conducted on the contents of her lungs, she was exposed to more than background levels of asbestos. He further relayed that “[pjeople have actually measured that exposures [to asbestos] in a household ... can be the same as workplace levels when people are working with asbestos.” Given the evidence presented by Ms. Farrar, Dr. Frank concluded that all of the ⁵³² exposures to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific products were contributing factors in the development of Ms. Farrar’s mesothelioma.

He also stated that all exposures to asbestos—not just exposures to Georgia-Pacific asbestos products—would have, in a cumulative fashion, contributed to the development of her disease. Medical evidence of John C. Maddox, M.D. Dr. Maddox was accepted by the trial court as an expert in the areas of anatomic pathology and the diagnosis and causation of mesothelioma. He testified that mesothelioma can be caused by brief, low-dose, intermittent exposures to asbestos. According to Dr. Maddox, visible asbestos dust is a high concentration of asbestos, requiring a concentration of five million particles of asbestos per cubic foot.

He stated that the primary way that asbestos is introduced into the home is on the work clothes of asbestos workers. Once in the home, the dust is not confined to the laundry room, but it migrates through the entire house. This dust can be present for weeks, months or even years. Dr. Maddox further testified that the risk of developing mesothelioma increases as the dose increases.

According to epidemiological studies, a small increase over background levels of asbestos starts to increase the risk of mesothelioma. In addition, in this case a fiber-burden study was conducted on tissue removed from Ms. Farrar’s lung. Dr. Maddox testified that the study showed that her exposure to chrysotile asbestos—the type of asbestos used in Georgia-Pacific’s product— “was medically significant for certain.” Dr. Maddox confirmed that the chrysotile asbestos fiber “contributed to her mesothelioma.” Dr. Maddox stated that Ms. Farrar’s exposures to the asbestos dust of Georgia-Pacific’s Ready-Mix product were above background levels and that Ms. Farrar’s exposure to Ready-Mix was a contributing factor in the development of her cancer. The Lawsuit On September 8, 2008, Ms. Farrar filed a short form complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The com ⁵³³ plaint set out claims for, inter alia, negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability, against numerous defendants. The complaint alleged that her mesothelioma was caused by the conduct of various defendants. On October 15, 2009, a jury trial commenced on claims against Georgia-Pacific and three absent cross-claim defendants. Georgia-Pacific argued that, as a matter of law, it did not owe a duty to warn household residents of workplace bystanders about asbestos exposure.

It subsequently moved for judgment on the issue but this motion was denied by the trial court. On October 30, 2009, after six hours of deliberations, the jury returned a general verdict finding that Ms. Farrar’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s product was a substantial factor in causing her injuries. The jury awarded $95,575 for past medical expenses; $75,000 for future medical expenses; $1,600,000 for future economic losses; and a verdict of “undetermined” for past and future non-economic losses. The court and counsel subsequently engaged in a discussion about the meaning of “undetermined” and conversed on how best to move forward to obtain a complete verdict.

The court decided to give the jury an Allen-type charge and dismissed the jury for further deliberations. After these further deliberations, the jury replaced “undetermined” with an award of $18,500,000 for past and future non-economic losses. Of the total award of $20,272,575, Georgia-Pacific’s proportionate share was $5,013768.75, due to jury findings that products of various cross-claim defendants were substantial factors in causing the alleged injuries and to reflect a payment to Ms. Farrar by the Manville Settlement Trust. After the trial court entered judgment against Georgia-Pacific in this amount, Georgia-Pacific moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for new trial or remittitur.

With Ms. Farrar’s consent, the trial court granted JNOV in part on May 4, 2010, reducing the verdict by $75,000 to $20,197,575 ($4,995,018.75 against Georgia-Pacific), but otherwise denied JNOV. On May 19, 2010, the trial court entered judgment in that amount and, on May 25, revised that ⁵³⁴ judgment with minor changes and entered a new judgment. Georgia-Pacific noted this appeal on June 2, 2010. Analysis Our analysis is divided into three parts.

In Part I, we consider whether the trial court erred in denying Georgia-Pacific’s motion for judgment on the question of whether Georgia-Pacific owed a legal duty to warn Ms. Farrar. Part II addresses whether Ms. Farrar presented sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing her mesothelioma. Finally, in Part III, we analyze whether the trial court erred in dismissing the jury for further deliberations after the jury returned an incomplete verdict sheet. I. The Duty to Warn Georgia-Pacific argues that “the trial court erroneously expanded the duty [to warn] beyond manageable bounds to an indeterminate class of persons ... [b]y extending the duty to the household member (Ms. Farrar) of a bystander (Mr. Hentgen) of product users (the drywallers).” Ms. Farrar contends that “[t]he trial court was legally correct in ... finding that the appellant owed a legal duty to the appellee” because she “was owed an individual duty to be warned of the latent dangers of asbestos exposure, which she experienced as a direct result of the use of [Georgia-Pacific’s] products in proximity to her grandfather.” At trial, Georgia-Pacific moved for judgment at the close of Ms. Farrar’s case arguing that it did not owe a duty to Ms. Farrar.

The trial court denied the motion. After the close of evidence, Georgia-Pacific again moved for judgment and the trial court again denied the motion. Finally, after a jury verdict in favor of Ms. Farrar, Georgia-Pacific moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the lack of duty and the trial court again denied this motion. “We review the grant of a motion for judgment under the same standard as we review grants of motions for ⁵³⁵ judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Orwick v. Moldawer, 150 Md.App. 528, 531 , 822 A.2d 506 (2003) (citations omitted). “We assume the truth of all credible evidence on the issue, and all fairly deducible inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.” Id. “Consequently, if there is any evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question, the case must be submitted to the jury for its consideration.” Id. at 532 , 822 A.2d 506 . We turn to the question of whether Georgia-Pacific owed a duty to Ms. Farrar to warn her of the latent dangers associated with its asbestos product. 1 The Court of Appeals recognized a framework for analyzing a manufacturer’s duty to warn in Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975).

In Moran , a products liability action against a cologne manufacturer alleging the negligent failure to warn of concealed dangers, the Court concluded that the manufacturer’s “failure to place a warning on its [cologne bottle] constituted actionable negligence.” Id. at 554 , 332 A.2d 11 . The Court stated the following regarding a manufacturer’s duty to warn: [I]n the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when the manufacturer’s product comes near to or in contact with the elements which are present normally in the environment where the product can reasonably be expected to be brought or used. Id. at 552 , 332 A.2d 11 . In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179 , 604 A.2d 445 (1992), the Court of Appeals applied the ⁵³⁶ Moran products liability framework in the context of an asbestos case.

With regard to the scope of potential plaintiffs, the Balbos Court stated: “[T]he pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual harm was of a particular kind which was expectable. Rather, the question is whether the actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been anticipated.” Balbos, 326 Md. at 196 , 604 A.2d 445 (quoting Moran, 273 Md. at 551 , 332 A.2d 11 ). Our Court applied this doctrine in yet another asbestos case in Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. 134, 191 , 692 A.2d 5 (1997), vac’d on other grounds sub nom., Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452 , 713 A.2d 962 (1998). In Grimshaw , we expressed that, in the context of a products liability action, “[o]ur ease law ... makes clear that manufacturers have a duty to warn all individuals in the foreseeable zone of danger.” Id.

(citing Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975)). “The duty of the manufacturer to warn of latent dangers inherent in its product goes beyond the precise use contemplated by the producer and extends to all those which are reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 192, 692 A.2d 5 (citing Moran, 273 Md. at 545 , 332 A.2d 11 ). In the Grimshaw case, four mesothelioma plaintiffs “all filed suits in the [Circuit Court for Baltimore City] against numerous defendants, alleging that he or she contracted asbestos-related mesothelioma from either workplace or household exposure to defendants’ products.” Id. at 144 , 692 A.2d 5 . One such plaintiff was Ethel Granski. The facts surrounding Granski’s exposure to asbestos are very similar to the facts of this case: Ethel Granski was born on August 23, 1948.

From 1953 to 1963, Gene Abrams, Ethel Granski’s stepfather, was either living with or married to Granski’s mother, Rose Abrams. During this period of ten years, Abrams worked at various places, including Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock, as an insulator, where, he claims, he was exposed to asbestos-containing products. When Granski was eight or nine, ⁵³⁷ she began washing Abrams’s work clothes, which allegedly were covered in asbestos dust when carried into their home. Granski became ill as a result of asbestos exposure and was diagnosed with mesothelioma in August 1993.

Granski was still living at the time of trial. Id. at 148 , 692 A.2d 5 . Like Ms. Farrar, Granski claimed that her mesothelioma resulted from exposure to asbestos dust that became airborne while washing a family member’s work clothes. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Granski against, inter alia, Owens-Corning, f/k/a Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (“OC”), who manufactured a hazardous asbestos-containing insulation product called Kaylo.

Id. at 145 , 692 A.2d 5 . On appeal, OC contended “that it is not liable for Granski’s household exposure to asbestos fibers because Granski’s injuries were not foreseeable and, therefore, it owed her no duty to warn.” Id. at 191 , 692 A.2d 5 . This Court disagreed. In an opinion written by Judge Arrie Davis, we stated: [I]n the case before us, the evidence supported the conclusion that OC could reasonably expect that workers would bring home work clothes covered in asbestos dust and thereby expose their families to harm.

This is so because OC knew or should have known that its asbestos-containing insulation product, Kaylo, was a hazardous product. Thus, OC could reasonably foresee that the use of its product, which results in asbestos dust becoming airborne and soiling insulators’ clothes, may result in workers wearing their asbestos-covered clothes home and exposing their households to harms associated with asbestos dust. It is not necessary that OC foresee the exact manner in which harm could occur, e.g., that a Kaylo insulator’s family member might be exposed to hazardous asbestos fibers when washing the worker’s clothing. The evidence presented, if believed, established that Gran-ski’s stepfather worked with the asbestos-containing insulation product manufactured by OC, under the trade name of Kaylo, between 1955 and 1961.

Granski lived with her stepfather between 1953 and 1963 and was responsible for ⁵³⁸ washing his work clothes. Granski testified that her stepfather’s clothes were very dirty and covered in a whitish-gray dust. Articles were introduced to prove that OC knew or should .have known of the hazards of airborne asbestos fibers released from Kaylo insulation. The fact that the ultimate harm suffered was not foreseeable does not preclude liability.

Moreover, Dr. Dement testified as an expert that known in the industry since 1930 is the fact that it is important for workers not to bring toxic substances home on their clothing and thereby expose their families to it. Dr. Dement stated that workers need to know that their clothes can become contaminated and expose their families. Asbestos fibers do not biodegrade and could cause continuous exposure of asbestos. Finally, Dr. Mark concluded that Gran-ski’s exposure to asbestos from her stepfather’s work clothes caused her malignant mesothelioma.

A jury, therefore, could reasonably conclude that Granski’s injuries were foreseeable and that OC had a duty to warn of household exposure. Id. at 193-94 , 692 A.2d 5 (citations omitted). The same evidence exists in this case. The evidence established that Ms. Farrar’s grandfather worked at a construction site surrounded by an asbestos-containing insulation product manufactured by Georgia-Pacific for about six to seven months.

Ms. Farrar lived with her grandfather during this period and was responsible for washing his work clothes. Ms. Farrar testified that her grandfather’s clothes were covered in a whitish-grayish dust. Articles were introduced to prove that Georgia-Pacific knew or should have known of the hazards of airborne asbestos fibers released from the Georgia-Pacific joint compound. “The fact that the ultimate harm suffered was not foreseeable does not preclude liability.” Id. at 193 , 692 A.2d 5 . The question of duty in this case is controlled by the principles set forth in Moran, Balbos and Grimshaw .

The Grimshaw case is especially on point because of its factual similarities to our case. These cases impose a duty on Geor ⁵³⁹ gia-Pacific to warn people like Ms. Farrar of its dangerous products. Georgia-Pacific argues that Grimshaw is inapposite and that Ms. Farrar’s claim of a duty fails to meet the Maryland standards as expressed in Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722 , 955 A.2d 769 (2008), Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407 , 879 A.2d 1088 (2005), Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606 , 865 A.2d 603 (2005) and Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md.App. 395 , 705 A.2d 58 (1998). We will address each of Georgia-Pacific’s contentions in turn.

Georgia-Pacific argues that Grimshaw is inapposite for a number of reasons. It contends that Grimshaw was a “direct” bystander case—in that the plaintiff was a family member of an asbestos worker who worked directly with the defendant’s asbestos-containing product—“and thus does not address the thrice-removed exposure at issue here.” We do not think the Grimshaw opinion is so limited; it is not clear from the opinion whether Granski’s stepfather, Abrams, was a direct user of OC’s asbestos product or not. In fact, the connection between Abrams and the OC asbestos product was more tenuous in Grimshaw . The relevant evidence in Grimshaw showed the following: Abrams explained that, during his furloughs with his employer C & O Railroad, he would work at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock.

Id. at 197 , 692 A.2d 5 . Abrams testified that he worked at the Shipyard off and on between 1955 and 1960 as an insulator, covering pipes and mixing mortar and asbestos. Id. He testified to this even though the Shipyard and the social security administration had no record of Abrams working at the Shipyard during this time.

Moreover, Abrams was unable to recall the names of the products or people that he worked with aboard the ship. Id. The connection between Abrams and OC Kaylo was established by two witnesses who worked on the same vessels at the same times as Abrams. The two witnesses testified that OC Kaylo was used and stored extensively on the relevant vessels.

Id. Notably absent from the testimony was a statement by anyone ⁵⁴⁰ that Abrams ever worked directly with the OC Kaylo product. Thus, we do not conclude that Grimshaw’s analysis is limited to “direct bystander” cases. Second, Georgia-Pacific argues that “Grimshaw ruled only that sufficient evidence existed to submit the issue to the jury; it did not examine whether a duty existed as a matter of law, as required here.” We read Grimshaw differently.

The Grimshaw Court specifically addressed the question of “whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn of the dangers of household exposure to asbestos.” Id. at 191 , 692 A.2d 5 . The Court concluded that “[o]ur case law ... makes clear that manufacturers have a duty to warn all individuals in the foreseeable zone of danger.” Id. (citing Moran, 273 Md. 538 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975)). The Court held that, as long as the jury finds the injuries to be foreseeable, OC had a duty to warn Granski of the dangers of household exposure to asbestos.

Id. at 194, 692 A.2d 5 . Finally, Georgia-Pacific argues that Grimshaw is inapposite because “Grimshaw’s analysis is directly at odds with subsequent decisions holding that a duty did not run to a spouse or household member despite the foreseeability of harm.” Specifically, Georgia-Pacific contends that “a steady wave of decisions, starting with Adams [and Dehri\ and culminating in Gourdine and Pharmacia, have found no duty in much less attenuated relationships than here.” According to Georgia-Pacific, “[ujnder now-settled law, a manufacturer does not owe a duty to warn” under the facts of this case, and “[p]er these decisions, the nexus between Ms. Farrar and Georgia-Pacific is far too attenuated to establish a duty.” We turn now to discuss the impact of Adams, Dehn, Pharmacia and Gourdine on a manufacturer’s duty to warn in an asbestos case. Georgia-Pacific first cites Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md.App. 395 , 705 A.2d 58 (1998). In Adams , the wife of an asbestos worker contracted asbestosis from washing her husband’s work clothing.

Id. at 410 , 705 A.2d 58 . The wife sued her husband’s employer, Bethlehem Steel, for its failure to warn of latent dangers in the workplace. Id. The wife ⁵⁴¹ challenged the trial court’s refusal to grant a jury instruction describing this duty to warn.

Id. We concluded that the jury instruction was properly refused because the wife was not an employee of Bethlehem Steel and “Bethlehem owed no duty to strangers based upon providing a safe workplace for employees.” Id. at 410-11 , 705 A.2d 58 . The Adams case is not fully on point because it involved the legal relationship between an employer and its employee. The scope of an employer’s liability to its employees is not the same as the scope of a manufacturer’s liability to a person who comes into contact with its product.

In the employer-employee context, an employer owes a duty to its employees to furnish a safe place to work. Lane v. Bethlehem, Steel Carp., 107 Md.App. 269, 277 , 667 A.2d 962 (1995). The liability depends on whether an employee suffers harm in an environment under the employer’s control. Id.

This is wholly different from a products liability claim. “ ‘[I]n the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual ...’” Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739 , 955 A.2d 769 (quoting Moran, 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d 11 ). Thus, the scope of the special legal relationship in a products liability case is not confined, as it is in the employer-employee context, to a previously contemplated, often contractual, relationship. The potential class of plaintiffs in a products liability context is more expansive than the potential class of plaintiffs in the employer-employee context. This is why the Adams Court concluded that an employer’s duty is limited to its employees and that an employee’s spouse, as a stranger to the employment relationship, was not owed a duty from her husband’s employer.

Georgia-Pacific next relies on Dehn v. Edgecombe. In Dehn , the Court of Appeals considered whether a physician owed a duty to a patient’s wife, who became pregnant following the patient’s failed vasectomy, when the wife was not the ⁵⁴² doctor’s patient and did not have any contact with the doctor. 384 Md. at 610-11 , 865 A.2d 603 . The Court concluded that, under the circumstances, the doctor did not owe a duty of care to the wife. The Court began its analysis by stating that: It is the general rule that recovery for malpractice against a physician is allowed only where there is a relationship between the doctor and patient.

This relationship may be established by contract, express or implied, although creation of the relationship does not require the formalities of a contract, and the fact that a physician does not deal directly with a patient does not necessarily preclude the existence of a physician-patient relationship. What is important, however, is that the relationship is a consensual one, and when no prior relationship exists, the physician must take some action to treat the person before the physician-patient relationship can be established. Id. at 620 , 865 A.2d 603 . The Court concluded that the wife did not have a physician-patient relationship with her husband’s doctor.

Id. at 626 , 865 A.2d 603 . The doctor in the case was not even the doctor who performed the vasectomy and, more importantly, the wife had never met the relevant doctor until the day of trial. Id. The Court held that “[a] duty of care to a non-patient is not one which Maryland law is prepared to recognize under these circumstances.” Id. at 627 , 865 A.2d 603 .

Dehn does not control our decision because liability turned on the existence of a doctor-patient relationship, and the wife in Dehn was a stranger to this relationship. The duty in Dehn , like the duty in Adams , was personal to the husband who was part of the special relationship. In our case, liability extends to those that are directly harmed by a defective product. Liability is not contingent on a prior existing relationship between the parties.

Georgia-Pacific also relies on Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., another employer-employee liability case. In Pharmacia, an employee of Pharmacia became infected with a strain of HIV while handling the virus as a lab technician at Pharmacia. 388 Md. at 410-11 , 879 A.2d 1088 . The employee’s wife ⁵⁴³ contracted the virus from her husband while engaging in sexual relations before the employee discovered that he had the virus. Id.

The wife filed suit against Pharmacia alleging negligence. The parties disputed whether Pharmacia owed the wife a duty of care. The Court held that Pharmacia “owed no tort duty to the spouse of its employee.” Id. at 423 , 879 A.2d 1088 . The Court reasoned that although “it should have been foreseeable to Pharmacia that Mr. Doe’s wife could contract the virus,” the Court “could not find any Maryland case holding that an employer has a duty to the spouse of an employee.” Id. at 416-17 , 879 A.2d 1088 .

The Court emphasized that there was “no assertion in the complaint that she was ever an employee of Pharmacia ... or that she had ever had any contact with Pharmacia.” Id. at 420 , 879 A.2d 1088 . Absent a special relationship with the employer, the Court stated that the wife’s theory of liability “would create an expansive new duty to an indeterminate class of people.” Id. Again, Pharmacia is not controlling. Pharmacia involved a negligence claim against an employer; it had nothing to do with a defective product.

In Pharmacia, the Court stressed that the wife was never an employee of Pharmacia nor did she ever have any contact with Pharmacia. Id. at 420 , 879 A.2d 1088 . Pharmacia was not liable because Maryland does not place a burden on employers to ensure the safety of those who do not work on the employer’s premises. In a products liability context, however, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable to those who fall within the foreseeable zone of danger.

Again, as stated supra, the class of potential plaintiffs in a products liability case is more expansive. Pharmacia is not persuasive to our analysis on this point. The case most in line with Georgia-Pacific’s position is Gourdine v. Crews. Unlike Adams, Dehn and Pharmacia, Gourdine is a products liability case.

Georgia-Pacific argues that Gourdine “is on all fours and is controlling authority” and “leaves no doubt that the Court of Appeals applies [cases like Adams and Pharmacia] in product liability cases.” 2 We do ⁵⁴⁴ not agree that the facts of Gourdine are “on all fours,” and thus, we reach a different result. Gourdine involved a driver of an automobile, Ms. Crews, who was a Type I diabetic taking a combination of insulin medications manufactured by Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”), while operating her car. 405 Md. at 726 , 955 A.2d 769 . The complaint alleged that Ms. Crews “suffered a hypoglycemic reaction and experienced a ‘blackout’ causing her to lose control of her vehicle” and strike the vehicle driven by Mr. Gourdine, causing his death. Id. at 726, 728 , 955 A.2d 769 .

The question before the Court of Appeals was whether Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine, the decedent. Id. at 726 , 955 A.2d 769 . The wife of Mr. Gourdine argued “that it was foreseeable for Lilly that Ms. Crews, allegedly suffering an adverse reaction to the medications, would cause injury and death to third persons while she was operating a motor vehicle, when she had not been adequately warned about the dangers that allegedly were associated with the specified medications, and that such foreseeability, thus, created a duty owed to Mr. Gourdine.” Id. The Court of Appeals concluded “that Lilly did not owe a duty to Mr. Gourdine.” Id. at 754 , 955 A.2d 769 .

After discussing Dehn and Pharmacia at length, Judge Lynne Battaglia, writing for the Court, stated: In the case sub judice, there was no direct connection between Lilly’s warnings, or the alleged lack thereof, and Mr. Gourdine’s injury. In fact, there was no contact between Lilly and Mr. Gourdine whatsoever. To impose the requested duty from Lilly to Mr. Gourdine would expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds, be ⁵⁴⁵ cause such duty could apply to all individuals who could have been affected by LMs.] Crews after her ingestion of the drugs. Essentially, Lilly would owe a duty to the world, an indeterminate class of people, for which we have resisted the establishment of duties of care.

Id. at 750 , 955 A.2d 769 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The analysis in this paragraph sets Gourdine apart from the facts of our case. First, the Court concluded that “there was no direct connection between Lilly’s warnings, or the alleged lack thereof, and Mr. Gourdine’s injury.” Id. at 750 , 955 A.2d 769 . The Court did not define what constitutes a “direct connection,” but it made clear that there must be some relationship between the faulty product, the potential set of warnings, and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.

Id. at 751-52 , 955 A.2d 769 . The Gourdine Court’s analysis of Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md.App. 304 , 537 A.2d 622 (1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185 , 562 A.2d 1246 (1989) is instructive on what can constitute a “direct connection.” In Valk Manufacturing, a dump truck with a snowplow hitch mounted on its front caused an automobile accident with the decedent.

The decedent’s widow and minor child filed suit against the manufacturer of the snowplow hitch alleging negligence and strict liability for “defective design.” Id. at 313 , 537 A.2d 622 . A jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,500,000 on the strict liability count, and our Court affirmed the award. Id. at 308, 323 , 537 A.2d 622 . We concluded “that bystanders, such as [the decedent] in this case, are protected under the doctrine of strict liability in tort.” Id. at 323 , 537 A.2d 622 .

In Gourdine , the Court of Appeals distinguished Valk Manufacturing from the facts of the case before it by explaining that in Valk Manufacturing, “the defective product was directly involved in the accident and caused the decedent’s injury.” Gourdine, 405 Md. at 751 , 955 A.2d 769 . Our case is distinguishable from Gourdine for the same reason. Assuming the truth of all credible evidence in the light most favor ⁵⁴⁶ able to Ms. Farrar, the defective product, Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos-containing Ready-Mix compound, was directly involved in causing Ms. Farrar’s injury. Unlike in Gourdine , where there was no direct connection between Lilly’s product and Mr. Gourdine, in our case, there was a direct connection, in the form of actual physical contact between the harmful dust that originated from Georgia-Pacific’s product and