Gephart v. Taylor

¹¹² Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, sustaining a demurrer, and dismissing the petition of the appellants, as receivers of the firm of Charles W. Lord & Co. The petition is filed on behalf of certain creditors, against the appellee, a former receiver of the firm, and seeks to enforce an alleged liability by him to the co-partnership firm of Charles W. Lord and 'Co. growing out of the administration of the receivership. The petition was filed on the 4th of December, 1913, in the equity cause of Lord v. Sprigg, in Circuit Court- No-. 2 of' Baltimore City, and the contentions of the appellants appear from the several averments of the -petition. The early proceedings in the case, are set out in the case of Diamond Match Company v. Taylor, 83 Md. 394 , and need not be more fully recited here.

The prayer of the petition is, first, that the application made by the receiver Taylon, on the 31st day of October, 1895, for a re-hearing in respect to the refusal of the Court to allow him more than 40 per cent, of the amount of claims of attaching creditors which he had paid as such receiver may be dismissed; second, that the Court shall determine the question of the first receiver’s (Taylor) liability for his commissions ; and third, that special counsel be designated by the Court to represent the receiver’s in these proceedings. To this petition, the appellee Taylor, demurred, and for cause of demurrer, assigned the following reasons: 1. ' That the receivers have not stated in their petition such a case as entitles them to any relief in equity against him. 2. That the claim against him sought to be established in this petition is barred because it did not accrue within twelve years before the petition was filed. 3. That the proeedings herein, as well as the petition of the receivers, show that he was discharged from all liability and responsibility herein. ¹¹³ 4.

Because it appears that he has been released from all claims and demands which could or might possibly be brought against him. 5. Because it appears that the petitioners, the receivers herein, are estopped from attempting to assert any claim or demand against him because of their laches. It appears, that on the 2nd day of June, 18y3, the partnership of C. W. Lord and Company was dissolved and that the appellee Winfield J. Taylor was on the same day appointed its receiver, with power to continue the business of the firm, until the further order of the Court. Subsequently on or about the 14th of January, 1895, a co-receiver was appointed, the property was ordered to be sold, and the assets were directed to he distributed among the creditors of the firm.

A number of auditors’ reports and accounts were mad© and stated in the cause wherein commissions were allowed the original receiver and wherein he was credited with the total sums paid by him in settlement of certain attachment suits. Some of these accounts were ratified and confirmed, and some of them were rejected, upon exceptions. The controversy between the different classes of the receivership creditors was settled by this Court, in Diamond Match Co. v. Taylor, 83 Md. supra. The questions now raised, as to whether the receiver, Taylor, should be allowed any' commissions, and whether he should he credited with the sums which he paid in excess of forty per cent, to the attaching creditors, were not determined, on the appeal in 83 Md., supra.

It was there held, that as the Court below had reserved these questions for future action, they were not properly before the Court, on that appeal. The same questions are now presented on this appeal, after a lapse of more than twenty years, from the date of the appointment of the original receiver, the appellee hero, and more than fifteen years after the release and discharge of the appellee, from the further execution of the receivership and the appointment of one of the appellants as receiver in his place and stead.