Geramifar v. Geramifar

WENNER, Judge. It may be said that cases involving the custody and support of children are among the most divisive, and this case is no exception. Appellant, Caroline Geramifar, appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that appellee, Gholam Geramifar, “does not have a legal duty to support the minor child, Ashkan Geramifar, bom on November 5, 1992,____” On appeal, appellant inquires whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellee has no legal duty to support Ashkan. We will respond in the affirmative, vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts Gholam and Caroline Geramifar were married in Rockville, Maryland, on 7 May 1976. Although they were interested in having children, they were unable to do so. Thus, they ⁴⁹⁸ traveled to the Republic of Iran, appellee’s native country, in an attempt to procure for adoption a child of Iranian heritage. They were successful.

In December of 1992, they obtained guardianship of an infant male named Ashkan. After participating in an Iranian proceeding enabling them to return to the United States with Ashkan, appellee returned to the Republic of Iran in August of 1993 to finalize Ashkan’s paperwork. An Iranian Court granted the parties guardianship of Ashkan in August 1993. 1 For reasons that are unclear, the parties separated on 20 December 1993. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking a limited divorce and custody of Ashkan.

Appellant responded with a counter-claim, seeking a limited divorce and custody of Ashkan, as well as other relief. A bitter custody dispute then ensued. Initially, the parties fought vigorously over custody of and visitation with Ashkan, resulting in a flurry of temporary orders. As the Geramifars had not begun adoption proceedings in the United States, their only relationship to Ashkan was the guardianship granted them by the Iranian court.

It appears that appellee was seeking custody of Ashkan so that the child would be raised in an Iranian household and taught to speak Farsi. 2 On the other hand, appellant was concerned that appellee would flee with Ashkan ⁴⁹⁹ to Iran. Accordingly, the court had directed that appellee’s visits with Ashkan be supervised. In addition, appellee was prohibited from leaving the United States with Ashkan. To appellant’s surprise, appellee abandoned his quest for custody of Ashkan on the eve of the custody hearing, and agreed that appellant should have custody of Ashkan, and that he would not visit him.

Appellee also waived his right to adopt Ashkan. Judge James S. McAuliffe, who was to preside over the custody hearing, signed an order memorializing the agreement and remanded the case to the Domestic Relations Master, to determine, among other things, child support. As the Master interpreted Judge McAuliffe’s order as not requiring child support from appellee, he recommended no child support. Appellant noted exceptions and the matter was held before Judge Leonard L. Ruben.

Concluding that appellee was presumptively required to contribute to Ashkan’s support, Judge Ruben remanded the case to the Master to determine the appropriate amount. Upon the Master recommending child support, both parties noted exceptions. According to appellee, he had no duty whatever to support Ashkan. According to appellant, the sum recommended by the Master was inadequate.

On this occasion, the matter was held before Judge William C. Miller. After considering the parties’ exceptions, Judge Miller concluded that appellee had no duty to support Ashkan, and this appeal followed. Equitable Adoption Maryland is among those jurisdictions recognizing equitable adoption, see Clayton v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs, 130 Md. 31 , 99 A. 949 (1917), which was aptly defined in McGarvey v. State: Equitable adoption is sometimes called “adoption by estoppel,” “virtual adoption,” or “de facto adoption.” By whatev ⁵⁰⁰ er name it is known, the doctrine in general involves the notion that if an individual who is legally competent to adopt a child enters into a contract to do so, and if the contract is supported by consideration in the form of part performance that falls short of completion of statutory adoption, then a court, applying equitable principles, may accord to the child the status of a formally adopted child for certain limited purposes. 311 Md. 233 -234, 533 A.2d 690 (1987). 3 Until now, however, the doctrine of equitable adoption has been employed in Maryland only to determine issues of inheritance. For example, the Court of Appeals said in McGarvey, supra, 311 Md. 233, 238 , 533 A.2d 690 , “... we are prepared to assume that Maryland does recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption----” Nonetheless, the McGarvey Court held that an equitably adopted child was not entitled to the status of a formally adopted child for purpose of favorable inheritance tax treatment.

Further, the Court of Appeals said in Board of Education v. Browning, 333 Md. 281 , 635 A.2d 373 (1994), “that an equitably adopted child may not inherit from her adoptive parent’s sibling.” Notably, Maryland has yet to determine whether the doctrine of equitable adoption is an appropriate vehicle for com ⁵⁰¹ pelling an adoptive parent to pay child support. 4 As Judge Miller acknowledged, however, “the instant case would seem to be a textbook example of an equitable adoption.” As we have said, the parties journeyed to the Republic of Iran for the purpose of obtaining guardianship of Ashkan for the purpose of adopting him in the United States. While in Iran, they visited the appropriate agency, acquired Ashkan, and followed the required procedures to obtain guardianship of Ashkan and returned to the United States. Following their initial visit, appellee returned to the Republic of Iran, completed the necessary paperwork, and returned with Ashkan to the United States. In order to obtain guardianship of Ashkan, the parties promised each other and the Republic of Iran that they would care for the child.

Thus, the parties entered into a contract to adopt Ashkan. In sum, we agree with Judge Miller’s observation that this case is a textbook example of equitable adoption. According to Judge Miller, “[tjhere was a contract between husband and wife to adopt and to care for and support this child.” However that may be, Judge Miller went on to conclude that “[t]his contract, however, like all other contracts, can be modified or terminated by the subsequent agreement of the parties.” Judge Miller further opined, “giving up his [appellee’s] adoptive, visitation and custodial rights ... is consideration for the termination of the earlier agreement....” Appellee “no longer has rights with respect to [Ashkan]. He no longer has duties with respect to [Ashkan].” We do not agree. ⁵⁰² The Subsequent Agreement As we said earlier, appellee abandoned his request for custody of and visitation with Ashkan, on the eve of the custody hearing.

As a result, the parties agreed that appellee would forego his rights to custody or visitation. 5 As we have also mentioned, Judge McAuliffe memorialized this agreement in a judgment terminating appellee’s quest for custody of and visitation with Ashkan, terminating all rights to Ashkan he may have had. Judge McAuliffe then remanded the case to the Master to determine, among other things, “support and maintenance of the minor child.... ” On remand, the Master concluded that Judge McAuliffe’s order terminated appellee’s adoptive rights,