Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation

CATHELL, Judge. Giant Food, Inc., petitioner, appeals from a decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming an administrative ruling that certain of petitioner’s employees were entitled to unemployment benefits during a work stoppage caused by a strike from December 15, 1996 to January 18, 1997. We hold that the employees are not entitled to the unemployment benefits and shall reverse. I. Background Petitioner is a retail grocer which owns and operates two distribution and warehouse centers in Jessup, Maryland and Landover, Maryland.

It also owns and operates a beverage plant and ice cream plant in Jessup, a dairy in Landover, and a bakery in Silver Spring, Maryland. Respondent Teamsters Local 639 consists of the truckers who deliver products from those two distribution and warehouse centers to all of petitioner’s 174 stores in the Mid-Atlantic region. The strike at issue in this case began when the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and respondent Teamsters Local 639 expired and the local went on strike. The remaining union locals appearing as respondents in this case assisted in the strike either by actively refusing to cross ¹⁸⁴ picket lines or engaging in “sympathy strikes.” 1 As a result of the strike, petitioner’s warehouse and distribution centers ceased operations as did the various manufacturing plants.

Petitioner responded to the closings by having other wholesalers and suppliers ship products directly to its retail stores. The record also reflects that they overstocked products in anticipation of the strike. Petitioner estimates that it lost approximately four million dollars in profits from the closing of the plants. The 1,346 employees participating or assisting in the strike applied for unemployment benefits for the period during which they were out of work.

After a hearing, the Board of Appeals of the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (Board), also a respondent to this appeal, ruled that the employees were entitled to the benefits. On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court. See generally Giant v. Department of Labor, Licensing & Reg., 124 Md.App. 357 , 722 A.2d 398 (1999).

II

Standard of Review Our review of an agency’s decision “entails only an appraisal and evaluation of the agency’s fact-finding and not an independent decision on the evidence.” Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998); see Anderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & ¹⁸⁵ Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187, 212 , 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993). When the agency is acting in a fact-finding or quasi-judicial capacity, we review its decision to determine “whether the contested decision was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner.” Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224 , 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975); see Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 180, 148 , 680 A.2d 1040, 1049 (1996); Weiner v. Maryland Ins. Admin., 337 Md. 181, 190 , 652 A.2d 125, 129 (1995).

When dealing with factual issues, “[w]e are also obligated to ‘review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency,’ since their decisions are prima facie correct and cany with them the presumption of validity.” Catonsville Nursing Home, 349 Md. at 569 , 709 A.2d at 753 (quoting Anderson, 330 Md. at 213 , 623 A.2d at 210 ; Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 513 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (1978)). We have noted that our review of an administrative agency’s fact-finding decisions differs markedly from our review of the decision of a trial court: In the latter context the appellate court will search the record for evidence to support the judgment and will sustain the judgment for a reason plainly appearing on the record whether or not the reason was expressly relied upon by the trial court. However, in judicial review of agency action the court may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency. United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679 , 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984).

We have stated that, “[a] court’s role is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994), quoted in Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 352 Md. 530, 552-53 , 723 A.2d 440, 450 (1999); see also Prince George’s County v. Brown, 334 Md. 650, 658 , 640 A.2d 1142, 1146 (1994); Catons ¹⁸⁶ ville Nursing Home, 349 Md. at 569 , 709 A.2d at 753 (quoting Insurance Comm’r v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411 , 692 A.2d 474, 479 (1997)); People’s Counsel v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316 Md. 491, 497 , 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989). In the case sub judice, the factual determinations of the Board are generally not in contest. Thus, our review of the administrative agency’s decision below is strictly concerned with whether their decision was based on proper legal standards.

III

Analysis The issue before the Court, in general terms, is whether respondents were disqualified from receiving the requested unemployment benefits under Maryland Code (1991), section 8-1004 of the Labor and Employment Article. Section 8-1004 states: (a) Grounds for disqualification.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section: (1) an individual who otherwise is eligible to receive benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits for each week for which the Secretary finds that unemployment results from a stoppage of work, other than a lockout, that exists because of a labor dispute at the premises where the individual last was employed; and (2) if separate branches of work that usually are conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments on the same premises, each department shall be considered a separate premises for the purposes of this subsection. (b) Exception.—A disqualification under this section does not apply to an individual who satisfies the Secretary that the individual: (1) is not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute that caused the stoppage of work; and (2) does not belong to a class or grade of workers that, immediately before the stoppage, had any members: (i) employed at the premises; and ¹⁸⁷ (ii) participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute. [Emphasis added.] More specifically, the parties debate whether the “stoppage of work” required by subsection (a)(1) must be “at the premises where the individual last was employed.” The statute clearly requires there to be a “labor dispute” at the premises where the employees worked and there is no question in this case that there was a labor dispute at the various sites where petitioner’s employees struck. 2 Respondents, who interpret section 8-1004(a)(l) as not limiting the stoppage of work to each individual “premises” of petitioner’s business, argue that there was no work stoppage because petitioner’s business as a whole was not “substantially curtailed.” Petitioner argues that subsection (a)(1) does apply the “stoppage of work” ¹⁸⁸ language to each individual premises and thus, because its business was substantially curtailed at each of the distribution and warehouse centers and the manufacturing plants, those facilities experienced a work stoppage. The parties also debate the exact meaning of “premises” in their respective attempts to broaden Or limit the geographic scope of the statute.

Petitioner argues that premises refers to each individual unit of employment while respondents argue that it refers to petitioner’s facilities as a whole. A. Rules of Statutory Construction This Court has stated repeatedly that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought in the first instance in the actual language of the statute. Board of License Comm’rs v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122 , 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999); Anne Arundel County v. City of Annapolis, 352 Md. 117, 123 , 721 A.2d 217, 220 (1998); Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136 , 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958).

Furthermore, when the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Toye, 354 Md. at 122 , 729 A.2d at 410 ; Anne Arundel County, 352 Md. at 123 , 721 A.2d at 220 ; Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445 , 697 A.2d at 458 ; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968); see also Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98 , 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990) (“In construing a statute, we look first to its language, ... we assume that the words of the statute are intended to have their natural, ordinary and gener ¹⁸⁹ ally understood meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”). This Court in Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73-75 , 517 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1986) opined: In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention.

The primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself.... Of course, where statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation. That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context is well settled.... ... We ... recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment.... [T]he court ... may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. [Citations omitted.] Finally, in Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992), this Court opined, in reference to construing a statute: While the language of the statute is the primary source for determining legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.

The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within ¹⁹⁰ which statutory language appears. Construction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided. [Citations omitted.] B. Legislative History of Section 8-1004 Turning to the legislative history, section 8-1004 was transferred from Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Article 95A, section 6(e), in 1991 when the current Labor and Employment Article was adopted. 3 Prior to the transfer, section 6 read: An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (e) Stoppage of work because of labor disputes.—For any week with respect to which the Executive Director finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, other than a lockout, which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Executive Director that— (1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and (2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the pur ¹⁹¹ poses of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises. [Emphasis added.] The Legislature, in the transfer between Code volumes, replaced the words “factory, establishment, or other premises” with “premises.” The legislative history provides no express statement as to why that change was made. A report to the Legislature, in describing the transfer of former section 6 into subtitle 10 of the Labor & Employment Article, does not discuss former section 6(e) or current section 8-1004. See Department of Legislative Reference, Report on H.B. 1, at 32 (Jan. 14, 1991).

The report does indicate, however, that “the primary purposes of the [revision] are modernization and clarification, not policy-making. ... Every effort is made to ensure that a proposed revision conforms as nearly as possible to the intent of the General Assembly, and all these revisions are highlighted in the appropriate revisor’s notes.” Id. at 1. The revisor’s note accompanying section 8-1004 notes that “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 95A, § 6(e).” 4 (Emphasis added.) In addition, this Court “consistently has presumed that general recodifications of statutes, such as ... the Labor & Employment Article, are for the purpose of clarity only and not [for] substantive change, unless the language of the recodified statute unmistakably indicates the intention of the Legislature to modify the law.” DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 444 , 677 A.2d 73, 79 (1996); see also Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 257-58 , 455 A.2d 955, 962-63 (1983); In Re: Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576-77 , 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983); Bureau of Mines v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 155 , 321 A.2d 748, 754-55 (1974); Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 417 , 90 A.2d 686, 689 (1952). Thus, we interpret the term ¹⁹² “premises” in current section 8-1004 as the equivalent of its earlier limitation in section 6(e) to “the factory, establishment, or other premises” where the employees worked, i.e., the individual site of their employment.

This interpretation of “premises” complies with the plain and simple definition given to the word. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1136 (unabr. ed.1983), for instance, defines premises as: “a. a tract of land including its buildings, b. a building together with its grounds or other appurtenances, c. the property forming the subject of a conveyance or bequest.” In addition to our interpretation of Maryland legislative history, this Court has previously analyzed the English statute pertaining to labor dispute unemployment disqualifications to evaluate our own version of the same provision. Maryland’s unemployment insurance statutes were “passed by the General Assembly in 1936 to alleviate the consequences of widespread involuntary unemployment caused by the depression.” Employment Security Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 292 Md. 515, 517 , 438 A.2d 1356, 1358 (1982). Those provisions were patterned after portions of a federal Social Security Draft Bill pertaining to unemployment compensation.

Most of that statute, including the labor dispute disqualification, was derived from the English unemployment statutes. Id. at 521-22 , 438 A.2d at 1360 . This Court noted in Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Bd., 188 Md. 677, 687-88 , 53 A.2d 579, 583-84 (1947), that the history of the English version of the disqualification provision and its subsequent interpretation were relevant to the interpretation of Maryland’s similar statute: The exception in the English statutes (1920, 10 and 11, Geo. V, Chap. 30, 8-(1), 1935, 25 Geo.

V, Chap. 8, 26-(1)) is practically identical with our statute. It reads “An insured contributor who has lost employment by reason of a stoppage of work which was due to a trade dispute at the factory, workshop, or other premises at which he was employed shall be disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit so long as the stoppage of work continues, * * * ” A practically similar clause is in the 1946 Act. 9 and 10 Geo. ¹⁹³ VI, Chap. 67, 13—(1).... [I]t has been held that the contemporaneous construction of the copied statute is intended to be the construction of the copying act. Lavender v. Rosenheim, 110 Md. 150 , at page 156, 72 A. 669 , [671 (1909) ]; Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 174 Md. 639 , at page 658, 197 A. 292 , 1 A.2d 83 , [87 (1938) ]. [Emphasis added.] Thus, section 8-1004 as derived from the English Act originally limited the scope of the disqualification to the “factory, workshop or other premises” involved. See Unemployment Insurance Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 8, § 26(1) (Eng.).

A subsequent revision of the disqualification provision substituted “place of employment” for “factory, workshop or other premises.” National Insurance Act, 1965, ch. 51, § 22(1) (Eng.). The National Insurance Act defined place of employment in a separate subsection: “the expression ‘place of employment’ in relation to any person, means the factory, workshop, farm or other premises or place at which he was employed.... ” Id. § 22(6)(a). That definition remained virtually unaltered until 1995. See Social Security Contributions & Benefits Act, 1992, ch. 4, § 27(3)(a) (Eng.); Social Security Act, 1975, ch. 14, § 19(2)(a) (Eng.).

The English disqualification provision currently uses the term “place of work,” which “in relation to any person, means the premises or place at which he was employed.” Jobseekers Act, 1995, § 14(4) (Eng.). 5 The English disqualification statute, since its inception, has maintained a definition of place of employment or work limited to each individual site of employment, not the employer’s entire operations. We interpret the Maryland statute similarly. Finally, we note that under subsection (a)(2) of section 8-1004, “if separate branches of work that usually are conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments on the same premises, each department shall be considered a separate premises ¹⁹⁴ .... ” (Emphasis added). When we examine the plain meaning of the words of a statute, “[o]ur examination of such words is guided by the principle that we should read ‘pertinent parts of the legislative language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage.’ ” Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc., 334 Md. 480, 485 , 639 A.2d 701, 704 (1994) (quoting Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employment, 309 Md. 28, 40 , 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987)); see also Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 359 , 643 A.2d 906, 909-10 (1994) (“[A] statute must be construed as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”) (citing Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993); Maryland Port Admin. v. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60 , 492 A.2d 281, 289 (1985)).

Viewing section 8-1004 as a whole, to interpret the word “premises” in subsection (a)(1) as including all sites of an entire multi-site business would render subsection (a)(2) meaningless. Because subsection (a)(2) compares separate branches of work conducted within one premises to separate branches of work typically conducted in different premises, i.e., different work sites, and requires that the separate branches or departments within one facility be treated as individual premises, the Legislature clearly intended for “premises” generally to refer to each individual work site of an employer. We infer from subsection (a)(2) that the Legislature’s intent was to apply section 8-1004 to the smallest unit of employment discernable under the facts and circumstances of each case. Turning to the issue of whether the stoppage of work need only occur at an individual premises under the disqualification provision, we note that former section 6(e)(2) exempted from disqualification those who did not “belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute.... ” (Emphasis added.) Although this subsection is not directly applicable to the case at bar, we note that it applied only to those ¹⁹⁵ employed “at the premises at which the stoppage occurred],” prior to its 1991 recodification in section 8—1004(b)(2).

Recalling that section 8—1004(b)(2) was “derived without substantive change” from section 6(e)(2), the former language from that exception reflects inferentially that the General Assembly viewed a stoppage of work as occurring in an individual premises. Though this Court has never squarely addressed this issue, prior comments by this Court reflect that our original interpretation of the disqualification provision was that a stoppage of work need only occur within an individual premises to trigger a disqualification. As noted, supra, we utilized the subsequent interpretations of the English Unemployment Act of 1935 in Saunders to review the similar Maryland provision. Regarding the stoppage of work requirement, we noted the interpretation of that phrase by the English Umpires, administrative judges within the British Ministry of Labour: The English Umpires who administer the English statutes, have handed down a number of administrative decisions construing this clause.

These decisions are final because there is no provision for judicial review____ The English Umpires hold that stoppage of work refers primarily not to the cessation of an employee’s labor, but to a stoppage of work carried on at the premises, factory or workshop in consequence of the dispute. (Umpire’s Decisions, 609, 3809, 4850-1926.) Id. at 688 , 53 A.2d at 584 (emphasis added). Saunders also made similar interpretations of the work stoppage requirement in reviewing decisions by courts in two sister states. In interpreting an Oklahoma case, Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 193 Okla. 36 , 141 P.2d 69 (1943), we noted “the decision of the court ... only goes so far as to say that a ‘stoppage of work’ does not mean that a whole plant has to be shut down.” Saunders, 188 Md. at 685 , 53 A.2d at 582 (emphasis added).

Later, in reviewing Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122 , 2 N.W.2d 689 (1942), we noted that “[t]he court referred to the fact that the unemployment compensation law was a substantial reenactment of the English [Unemployment] ¹⁹⁶ Insurance Act and that the construction by the English officials administering that act ... is that ‘stoppage of work’ is a substantial curtailment of work in an establishment.... ” Saunders, 188 Md. at 685-86 , 53 A.2d at 583 (emphasis added). In Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Employment Security Board, 209 Md. 237 , 121 A.2d 198 (1956), we reviewed a case in which the claimants, though not striking, had not crossed the picket lines. We noted that before a special examiner, “it was stipulated by all the parties that beginning on June 2, 1952, there was a complete stoppage of work at the Sparrows Point plant of the Bethlehem Steel Company.” Id. at 241 , 121 A.2d at 200 . For this reason, we had concluded that “[i]t is undisputed that there was a stoppage of work at their place of employment due to a labor dispute between other parties, so that the proviso comes into play and the claimants must show affirmatively that they did not participate in the labor dispute.” Id. at 240 , 121 A.2d at 199-200 (emphasis added).

In MEMCO v. Maryland Employment Security Administration, 280 Md. 536 , 375 A.2d 1086 (1977), we were concerned with whether employees involved in a multi-employer labor dispute were disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. After labor contract negotiations failed, butchers at a number of grocery stores in the Washington area decided to strike against one of the employers (which,