Giant of Maryland, LLC v. Taylor

³⁵⁸ EYLER, DEBORAH S., J. Giant of Maryland, LLC (“Giant”), and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (“Travelers”), the appellants, challenge a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered on a supersedeas bond (“the Bond”) in favor of Julia Taylor, the appellee. We shall reverse the judgment. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On February 27, 2004, Taylor sued Giant, her then employer, under Md.Code (1957, 2003 RepLVol.), Article 49B (now codified at Title 20 of the State Government Article), alleging racial and gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination, all in violation of certain provisions of the Prince George’s County Code. Taylor’s claims were tried to a jury in January 2007.

On January 18, 2007, the jury returned a special verdict finding in Taylor’s favor on the gender discrimination and retaliation claims, and against her on the racial discrimination claim. It awarded her $644,750 in compensatory damages. Judgment was entered by the court in that amount (“the Merits Judgment”). Taylor filed a motion for prevailing party attorneys’ fees, pursuant to section 42(c) of Article 49B.

Before the motion was ruled upon, Giant noted a timely appeal from the Merits Judgment (“the Merits Appeal”). Thereafter, the circuit court held a hearing, found that Taylor was a prevailing party, and, on July 26, 2007, entered an order awarding her $544,925 in prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs, which it reduced to a judgment in her favor (“the Fee Judgment”). On August 8, 2007, in anticipation of noting an appeal from the Fee Judgment, Giant filed a motion for approval of the Bond in the amount of $626,633.75. 1 As relevant here, the Bond states: WHEREAS, GIANT [ ] has appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of the State of MARYLAND from a judgment ³⁵⁹ entered on July 26, 2007 in the CIRCUIT COURT in and for PRINCE GEORGE’S county. NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that if GIANT[ ] shall diligently prosecute its appeal to a decision, and shall promptly perform and satisfy the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, this obligation will be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.

(Emphasis in original.) On August 29, 2007, 34 days after entry of the Fee Judgment, Giant noted an appeal (“the Fee Appeal”). Taylor moved to dismiss the Fee Appeal as untimely. The Merits Appeal and the Fee Appeal were docketed separately in this Court. On September 30, 2009, this Court filed a reported opinion in the Merits Appeal, reversing the Merits Judgment on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict.

Giant of Md., LLC v. Taylor, 188 Md.App. 1 , 981 A.2d 1 (2009) (“Taylor I ”). Then, on November 2, 2009, we filed an unreported opinion in the Fee Appeal vacating the Fee Judgment. Giant of Md., LLC v. Taylor, Slip Op., No. 1356, Sept. Term 2007 (filed Nov. 2, 2009). We denied Taylor’s motion to dismiss the Fee Appeal, concluding that, because the Fee Judgment did not satisfy the separate document requirement of Rule 2-601(a), the Fee Appeal actually had been filed too early, not too late, and, in any event, we had jurisdiction over the Fee Appeal by virtue of our jurisdiction over the related Merits Appeal.

We did not address Giant’s contentions of error, all of which concerned the amount of the Fee Judgment. Instead, we held that because Taylor had lost her status as a prevailing party, due to our reversal of the Merits Judgment, she no longer was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in both appeals and consolidated them for decision. On December 6, 2011, it filed its opinion in the consolidated appeals.

Taylor v. Giant of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 628 , 33 A.3d 445 (2011) (“Taylor II”). In the Merits Appeal, the Court reversed this Court’s decision, ³⁶⁰ holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict. It remanded the Merits Appeal to this Court to address Giant’s remaining contentions of error. In the Fee Appeal, the Court held that this Court lacked jurisdiction: Finally, we address Ms. Taylor’s challenge to the Court of Special Appeals’s reversal of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her, which was brought to us by a second petition for certiorari.

She argues that the intermediate appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Giant’s untimely filed appeal, which was filed more than 30 days after the trial court issued and entered its order granting her motion for attorney’s fees, and thus was untimely filed under Rule 8-602. We agree, for it is axiomatic that “a party in the trial court must file a timely notice of appeal, from an appealable judgment, in order to confer upon an appellate court subject matter jurisdiction over that party’s appeal.” Taylor II, at 665, 33 A.3d 445 (footnote and citation omitted). On April 8, 2013, in accordance with the Court of Appeals opinion, this Court entered an order dismissing the Fee Appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Our mandate issued on May 8, 2013.

Two days later, in the circuit court, Taylor filed a “Motion for Judgment on Bond” pursuant to Rules 1-402, 1-404, and 1-405. She argued that because the Fee Appeal was dismissed there was “no longer any basis for the continued existence of a stay of [the Fee Judgment].” She asked the court to “enter an Order directing the Clerk of the Court to enter Judgment against the Bond and release the Bond in the amount of $626,633.75 issued by Travelers [ ].” Giant opposed the motion, arguing that Taylor’s status as a prevailing party, vel non, remained in limbo because the Merits Appeal had not yet been decided on remand to this Court. According to Giant, if this Court again were to reverse the Merits Judgment, Taylor would not be a prevailing party and therefore would not be entitled to collect on the Bond. On that basis, it ³⁶¹ urged the circuit court to deny Taylor’s motion for judgment on the Bond.

On August 8, 2013, the circuit court entered an order holding Taylor’s motion for judgment on the Bond “in abeyance pending disposition [of the Merits Appeal in this Court].” Thereafter, Taylor filed a “Motion to Alter and [sic] Amend the Court’s Judgment Entered on August 8, 2013.” In it, she suggested that the circuit court had misapprehended the procedural posture of the case. She argued that there was no reason for the court to await the resolution of the Merits Appeal before granting judgment on the Bond because she had a right to execute on the Bond arising solely from the Fee Judgment, which was left standing after the Fee Appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Giant opposed the motion to alter or amend, maintaining that the court properly was holding the motion for judgment on the Bond in abeyance pending the resolution of the Merits Appeal. On October 8, 2013, this Court issued an unreported opinion reversing the Merits Judgment.

Giant of Md., LLC v. Taylor, Slip Op., No. 223, Sept. Term 2007 (filed Oct. 8, 2013) {“Taylor- III ”). We held that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain handwritten notes by Taylor purporting to memorialize the substance of a conversation she had had with a Giant employee during a meeting to discuss her discrimination charges; and that the error had prejudiced Giant. We remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings, i.e., a new trial, unless the parties resolve their disputes by settlement. On October 16, 2013, Taylor filed a “supplemental” to her motion to alter or amend the August 8, 2013 Order.

She informed the circuit court that this Court had “disposed of’ the Merits Appeal, attaching a copy of our unreported opinion. She argued that all appellate proceedings had been concluded and therefore the court should “vacate” its order holding the motion for judgment on the Bond in abeyance and/or grant her judgment on the Bond. ³⁶² Five days later, on October 21, 2013, the circuit court signed an order granting Taylor’s motion to alter or amend the August 8, 2013 Order, terminating the stay imposed by that order, granting Taylor’s motion for judgment on the Bond, and directing the clerk of court to enter judgment against Travelers on the Bond in the amount of $626,633.75 (“the Bond Order”). That order was entered on October 24, 2013. Also on October 24, 2013, Giant filed a response to Taylor’s “supplemental,” in which it argued that the reversal of the Merits Judgment meant that Taylor was not entitled to enforce the Fee Judgment, as she was not a prevailing party, and on that basis her motion for the judgment on the Bond should be denied.

The following day, Giant moved to stay and to alter or amend the Bond Order. It reiterated its position that Taylor was not a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees, and therefore the court had erred in issuing the Bond Order. It also argued that the court had erred by granting Taylor’s motion to alter or amend without first holding a hearing, as required by Rule 2-311(e). It requested a hearing on its motions.

On November 1, 2013, Giant filed a notice of appeal from the Bond Order; and on November 4, 2013, it filed a motion for approval of a new supersedeas bond. On November 25, 2013, the court held a hearing and denied all of Giant’s post-Bond Order motions. The court signed an order to that effect on December 3, 2013. Within 30 days, Giant and Travelers filed notices of appeal.

The court’s order was not entered until January 13, 2014, however. Thereafter, Giant and Travelers each filed supplemental notices of appeal. 2 ³⁶³ In the meantime, Taylor moved for reconsideration of our opinion in Taylor III. On September 11, 2014, this Court filed an amended opinion in Taylor III, which addressed the issues Taylor raised on motion for reconsideration but did not change the holding or outcome of the appeal. On October 1, 2014, Taylor filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

That petition was denied on December 22, 2014. So the posture of Taylor III remains that the Merits Judgment has been reversed and the case has been remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for further proceedings. In this appeal, Giant presents two questions for review and Travelers presents three questions for review. We have combined, reordered, and rephrased the questions as follows: I. Did the circuit court err by granting judgment on the Bond in favor of Taylor even though she had not prevailed on any of her claims at that time, and still has not prevailed on any of her claims?

II

Did the circuit court err by granting judgment on the Bond without first holding a hearing and giving notice to Travelers? Taylor has moved to dismiss the appeal. We shall include additional facts in our discussion of the issues. MOTION TO DISMISS Taylor has moved to dismiss this appeal as moot and as barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

She maintains that the issues Giant and Travelers are pursuing on appeal were considered and decided (and rejected) in the Fee Appeal. Giant and Travelers respond that the central issue in this appeal was neither considered nor ³⁶⁴ decided by this Court or the Court of Appeals in the Fee Appeal. That central issue is whether a party who prevailed at trial and was awarded prevailing party attorneys’ fees as a result, but who is no longer a prevailing party because her victory at trial was reversed on appeal, nevertheless may collect on the award of prevailing party attorneys’ fees. In the Fee Appeal, Giant challenged the amount of the Fee Judgment on several grounds, including that it was excessive and was not supported by competent evidence of the reasonableness of her counsel’s hourly rate and of the fees she was claiming as they related to the work performed.

Giant did not contend in the Fee Appeal that Taylor was not a prevailing party and therefore was not entitled to an award of fees. (Indeed, she was a prevailing party when the Fee Judgment was granted.) Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals reached any of the issues that Giant raised in the Fee Appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that this Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the Fee Appeal, and directed us to dismiss the appeal, which we did. On November 6, 2013, after we filed our opinion in Taylor III, reversing the Merits Judgment, and after the Bond Order was entered, we entered an Order addressing a motion Giant previously had filed to recover bond premiums.

That motion had been held in abeyance, pending the outcome of Taylor II in the Court of Appeals. In the Merits Appeal, we continued to hold the motion in abeyance, because Taylor was planning to file a petition for certiorari from our decision in Taylor III. In the Fee Appeal, we denied the motion, explaining that the appeal had been “fully and finally decided” and the Fee Judgment is “not subject to any further appeal.” Therefore, “no matter the ultimate outcome of the [Merits Appeal], Taylor’s award of fees and costs cannot be challenged on appeal.” Giant filed a “motion for clarification” of the November 6, 2013 Order. On August 25, 2014, we denied the motion for clarification, explaining that our November 6, 2013 Order did not need any clarification: ³⁶⁵ It plainly states what is evident from the procedural posture and resolution of the appeals in this case.

A judgment was entered against Giant for fees. Giant challenged the judgment on appeal. Its challenge was not timely, however, and therefore, as the Court of Appeals held, this Court lacked jurisdiction to take any action with respect to that judgment. Taylor now argues that our April 8, 2013 Order dismissing the Fee Appeal, coupled with our November 6, 2013 and August 25, 2014 Orders, make pellucid that this Court already has decided and rejected the arguments Giant now raises on appeal, and that the Fee Judgment is not subject to any further challenge and therefore may be enforced through the Bond.

Taylor maintains that this is the case even though she is not presently a prevailing party, and even if she never again becomes a prevailing party. The doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, “bars the relitigation of a claim if there is a final judgment in a previous litigation where the parties, the subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical as to issues actually litigated and as to those which could have or should have been raised in the previous litigation.” R & D 2001, LLC v. Rice, 402 Md. 648, 663 , 938 A.2d 839 (2008) (quoting Board of Ed. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005)). The related doctrine of collateral estoppel “looks to issues of fact or law that were actually decided in an earlier action, whether or not on the same claim.” Id. As we have explained, although this Court’s opinion vacating the Fee Judgment in the Fee Appeal was premised on Taylor’s no longer being a prevailing party, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the notice of appeal from the Fee Judgment was not timely and therefore this Court lacked jurisdiction over the Fee Appeal.

The Court of Appeals decision did not address this Court’s holding that Taylor no longer was entitled to an award of fees. (Indeed, given that Taylor was a prevailing party when Giant noted its untimely Fee Appeal, the issue of her entitlement to attorneys’ fees, ³⁶⁶ should the Merits Judgment be reversed, was not one that “could or should have been raised” by Giant in its Fee Appeal.) The holding of the Court of Appeals in the Fee Appeal was that this Court did not have jurisdiction to decide any issue related to the Fee Judgment, because we lacked jurisdiction. This Court also did not decide the issue now before us when we entered our order denying Giant’s motion to recover its bond premiums in the Fee Appeal or when we denied Giant’s motion for clarification of that order. Those orders were directed only to the issue of Giant’s entitlement to recover premiums paid on the Bond in a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

As we explained, because the Fee Appeal had been dismissed, Giant could not file a new appeal challenging the amount of the Fee Judgment. We did not determine, nor could we at that stage of the proceedings, whether Taylor ultimately would be entitled to enforce the Fee Judgment against Giant if she did not ultimately prevail on any of her claims. Because the effect of a reversal of the Merits Judgment on Taylor’s entitlement to the Fee Judgment has not been previously litigated or decided, this appeal is not barred. The appeal also is not subject to dismissal for mootness. “A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case comes before the Court or when there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could grant.” Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 219 , 935 A.2d 731 (2007).

There plainly is a live controversy over Taylor’s right to execute against the Bond. There also is a remedy this Court could grant, which is to reverse the Bond Order. For these reasons, Taylor’s motion to dismiss is denied. DISCUSSION I. Giant contends the circuit court erred by granting judgment in favor of Taylor on the Bond because Taylor is not now and “may never be” a prevailing party.

It asserts that ³⁶⁷ our decision in Taylor III deprived Taylor of prevailing party status. The effect of that decision was to nullify the Merits Judgment and render the Fee Judgment that was conditioned upon it unenforceable. Giant maintains that the only circumstance under which Taylor could execute on the Bond would be if the Merits Judgment is revived by the Court of Appeals. Giant made that argument when the petition for certiorari was pending in Taylor III.

That petition has since been denied, and therefore the Merits Judgment cannot and will not be revived. The case is being remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. If there is a retrial and Taylor prevails, she will be a prevailing party and the court may award her prevailing party attorneys’ fees. Obviously, if she does not prevail, she will not be a prevailing party and will not be entitled to such fees.

Travelers makes the related argument that because of the reversal of the Merits Judgment, Giant, its principal, has no liability to Taylor, the obligee. Travelers maintains that because it is a condition of the Bond that Giant be obligated to satisfy the Fee Judgment,