Giggndelle v. Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co.

Adkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The husband of tbe appellant, while, engaged in an extra hazardous employment, was killed on June 9, 1917, leaving the appellant and an infant child as his dependents, both of whom were solely dependent upon him for support. The State Industrial Accident Commission awarded compensation at the rate of $12.57 per week, payable to the widow ²⁶ and infant for a period of three hundred and thirty-eight and one-ninth weeks, beginning as of June 9th, 1917. The insurer was ordered to pay all the compensation to the widow, who was ordered to apply $3.57 of it to the use and benefit of the infant in such manner as to the mother should seem hest for the welfare of the child.

Later the insurer filed a petition alleging that the infant-died on October 30th, 1918, and that the widow remarried on December 11th, 1918, and that the amount required by the order of the Commission to he paid on behalf of the child had been paid up to the date of its death, and that the amount apportioned to the widow had been paid up to the date of her remarriage. The petition prayed for a modification of the order to- the effect that payments of compensation may be terminated as of the dates of the death of the child, and of the remarriage, of the widow, respectively. The Commission, Wagaman, Chairman, dissenting, ordered the compensation he terminated as prayed. From this order an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court for Allegany County, and the case was heard by the Court without a jury.

Two prayers were offered by the appellee, one on the theory that all compensation on behalf of the infant should cease as of the date of its death, and the other on the theory that all compensation, both on behalf of the infant and widow, should cease as of the date of the remarriage of the widow. The court refused the first and granted the second prayer, and ordered the insurer to pay the balance apportioned on behalf of the infant from, the date of its death to the date of the remarriage of the widow, all compensation to cease as of the latter date. The case comes up on an appeal by the claimant from this order, the insurer not appealing. The sole question to be decided is the proper construction of Section 43 of Article 101 of the Code, which is in part as follows: ²⁷ “In case of tbe remarriage of a dependent- widow of a deceased employee without