Gillespie v. State

RAKER, Judge. Thomas Edward Gillespie, petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County of threatening a State official in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol, 2001 Supp.) Article 27, § 561A. In this case we are asked to decide whether an assistant state’s attorney is a State official under the statute. 1 We shall hold that an assistant state’s attorney is not a State official, as defined by § 561A. Accordingly, we shall reverse. ²²¹ I. On March 12, 2001, petitioner appeared in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County for a bail review hearing on a pending violation of probation.

After the assistant state’s attorney for St. Mary’s County informed the court of petitioner’s criminal record, the court ordered him held without bond. While Corporal Donna Rustin, a correctional officer, was escorting petitioner to the holding area, petitioner stated, “I’m going to kill him.” When Corporal Rustin asked whether petitioner was referring to the judge, petitioner responded that he was referring to the assistant state’s attorney. Petitioner then stated, “When I get out I will kill him. He didn’t have to pull my record out and show the judge!” The State filed a statement of charges in the District Court of Maryland alleging that petitioner had threatened a State official in violation of Article 27, § 561A.

Petitioner was convicted in the District Court of Maryland and noted a timely appeal to the Circuit Court pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.) § 12-401(c)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. On November 27, 2001, the Circuit Court, sitting without a jury, found petitioner guilty of threatening a State official in violation of § 561A and sentenced him to a term of incarceration of one year, six months suspended, with six months probation upon release. We granted certiorari to answer the question of whether an assistant state’s attorney is a State official for purposes of § 561A. Gillespie v. State, 367 Md. 722 , 790 A.2d 673 (2002).

II

The question whether an assistant state’s attorney is a State official for the purposes of § 561A is one of statutory interpretation. We have often stated that the paramount rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Derry v. State, 358 Md. ²²² 325, 335 , 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000). The starting point in the first instance is the plain language of the statute.

See Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 606 , 728 A.2d 180, 184 (1999); Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). We view the words of a statute in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner in which they are most commonly understood. See Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295 , 783 A.2d 667 (2001). If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends and we need investigate no further, but simply apply the statute as it reads.

Id. at 301 , 783 A.2d at 670 . We neither add nor delete words to an unambiguous statute in an attempt to extend the statute’s meaning. Id. at 302 , 783 A.2d at 671 . We interpret statutes to give every word effect, avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or redundant.

See Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Department, 341 Md. 680, 691 , 672 A.2d 639, 644-45 (1996); N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992 & Supp.1995). This Court has also applied the principle of “inclusio unius est exclusion alterious, ” the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, to the interpretation of statutes. See Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 554 , 663 A.2d 1318, 1325 (1995).

III

Article 27, § 561A, the statute at issue in the case before us, provides as follows: “(a) Definitions.— (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) ‘Local official’ means an individual serving in a publicly elected office of a local government unit, as defined in § 10-101(d) of the State Government Article. (3) (i) ‘State official’ means a State official as defined in § 15-102 of the State Government Article. ²²³ (ii) ‘State official’ includes the Governor, Governor-elect, Lieutenant Governor, and Lieutenant Governor-elect. (4) ‘Threat’ includes: (i) A verbal threat; or (ii) A threat in any written form, whether or not the writing is signed, or if it is signed whether or not the writing is signed with a fictitious name or any other mark.

(b) Threats generally. — A person may not knowingly and willfully make a threat to take the life of, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm upon a State or local official. (c) Sending or delivering threats. — A person may not knowingly send, deliver, part with the possession of, or make for the purpose of sending or delivering a threat prohibited under subsection (b) of this section. (d) Penalty. — A person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon