Gilmer v. State

Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, Judge. I dissent. The Majority opinion errs when it declares ambiguous the use of “dismissal” in § 6-218(b)(2) based only on consideration of that word in isolation. Though it pays lip service to considering the need to “construe the statute as a whole” (Maj. op. at 663, 887 A.2d at 553), the Majority opinion thereafter confines its analysis to (b)(2) and fails to give meaningful consideration to the place “dismissal” occupies within the complete structure of the Legislature’s scheme in the larger statutory sub-section of which (b)(2) is but a part.

See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 387 Md. 1, 11-12, 874 A.2d 439, 446 (2005) (“the commonsensical approach to interpreting statutes includes a review of the general statutory scheme in which the statute in question is found,” citing to Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137-38 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994)); Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, 322 Md. 689, 697-99 , 589 A.2d 944, 947-48 (1991) (stating that we do not read statutory language “in insolation or out of context [but construe it] in light of the Legislature’s general purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole.”). When considered in the clear hierarchy established within the totality of § 6-218(b), the claimed ambiguity in (b)(2) disappears. Section 6-218(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article provides in relevant part: § 6-218. Credit against sentence for time * * * * * (b) (1) A defendant who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit against and a reduction of the term of a definite or life sentence, or the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time ⁶⁷⁹ spent in the custody of a correctional facility, hospital, facility for persons with mental disorders, or other unit because of: (i) The charge for which the sentence is imposed; or (ii) The conduct on Which the charge is based.

(2) If a defendant is in custody because of a charge that results in a dismissal or acquittal, the time that would have been accredited if a sentence had been imposed shall be credited against any sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or commitment was filed during that custody. (3) In a, case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the sentencing court may apply credit against a sentence for time spent in custody for another charge or crime. (Emphasis added). It is clear to me from this language that the Legislature intended that trial judges are obliged to grant credit against time served where the relevant charge was disposed of by literal dismissal or acquittal only.

In all other cases and by whatever the descriptive name given for the particular disposition, other than by dismissal or acquittal, discretion was granted to judges whether to grant such credit. The only situation in which an ambiguity in the intent of the Legislature might arise would be where a trial court labels a disposition, other than dismissal or acquittal, with a description that constitutes a novelty or gibberish not previously recognized by statute, rule, or common law. Then, and only then, would