GINGELL, T/A ROCKVILLE CRANE RENTAL COMPANY v. Backus

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On December 20, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee, James K. Backus, a 61-year old laborer, with a fourth-grade education, sustained severe injuries to his foot and ankle, while employed by Mr. William Seltzer on construction work in Montgomery County, Maryland. The injury occurred when a bucket of cement, which was being hoisted from the ground to one of the upper floors of the building under construction, fell from a crane hook onto some steel beams lying on the ground, the steel beams in turn striking the right ankle and foot of the plaintiff. At the time of the accident, the crane was being operated by an employee of Eugene B. Gingell, trading as Rock-ville Crane Rental Company, the appellant.

The appellee was taken to Suburban Hospital where he remained until his discharge on December 30, 1962. Appellee’s doctor estimated that he sustained a 25% permanent-partial disability of the right foot and ankle. While in the hospital, he was visited by his employer at which time he filled out “compensation papers” which he delivered ⁸⁶ to the employer. The National Union Fire Insurance Company, an intervening plaintiff, which is the workmen’s compensation insurance carrier for the employer, has paid on behalf of the appellee $677.60 in medical expenses, $1,385.14 in temporary total disability benefits and $1,962.26 in permanent disability benefits.

On the morning of January 3, 1963, several days after the plaintiff had returned home from the hospital, he received a telephone call from a man who identified himself a? Mr. Delaney, an insurance man, who indicated that he wanted to come to his home and discuss the accident with him. There is a conflict between the testimony of the plaintiff and Delaney, as to whether or not Delaney designated whom he was representing. Delaney testified that he stated that he was representing the Rockville Crane Rental Company.

The plaintiff testified that Delaney’s only identification as to his mission, was that “he had come to pay my bills, my hospital bills and insurance.” At the time of Delaney’s visit the plaintiff had no knowledge as to what his hospital or doctors’ bills might be; how much his loss of earnings might amount to; or what the medical progr nosis might be as to permanent disability, if any. Delaney called the hospital from the plaintiff’s home and obtained the information on the hospital bill; he endeavored to estimate the doctors’ bills; and took a guess at the loss of wages. The latter was computed on the premise that the cast on the plaintiff’s leg was due to be removed in about six weeks, and that thereafter he should be able to return to work. After discussing the accident in general terms with the plaintiff, Delaney, with the plaintiff’s concurrence, set up a voice recording machine and proceeded to record the question and answer dialogue between himself and the plaintiff.

The recorded statement was introduced in evidence and heard by the jury. The plaintiff had a friend who roomed with him named Mr. Gaiters sitting in the kitchen, where, with the door ajar, lv* was in a position to overhear the conversation between the plaintiff and Delaney. Before the interview was over, Gaiters came into the same room and sat with the plaintiff and Delaney. Gaiters also witnessed the release.

At the time of the ⁸⁷ trial, Gaiters was out of the State and apparently unavailable as a witness. While Delaney was writing out the drafts he “handed the blank copy of the release to Mr. Backus to read.” Delaney called his supervisor and received approval of the settlement. He then filled in the figures in the release and the name of the defendant and instructed the plaintiff to sign it, which the plaintiff did. Delaney left the checks with the plaintiff. “One check covered the Suburban Hospital bill, and the other was for his loss of wages, and Dr. Radice’s bill; and then I think I threw in two hundred or three hundred extra.” The release had printed on its face, in type larger than the print composing the body of the release, “CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING.” The plaintiff testified in response to the question: “Did you read the paper?

A. I sketched over it. My eye sigiit is not too good, and I did not have no glasses. Q. You didn’t actually read it, then, is that right? A. I looked at it and went on signing it, and he took it.

On June 11, 1964, the plaintiff filed a declaration bringing suit against the defendant for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the negligent operation of the crane by defendant’s employee, as a result of which the plaintiff was permanently injured. On July 17, 1964, the defendant filed a copy of the release, which had been obtained by Mr. Delaney, as a defense in bar of the plaintiff’s suit, and reqrtested summary judgment on behalf of the defendant which was denied. The case was tried before a jury on October 20, 1965. At the close of the case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis of the legal effect of the release and the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff which was also denied by the court.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellee in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000); after judgment was rendered on the verdict, the appellant took this appeal. The sole question before this Court is: Should the trial court have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to produce legally sufficient evidence that the release was void because it was procured by fraud, duress or imposition amounting to fraud ? ⁸⁸ The Court is of the opinion that the trial court was in error in refusing to grant the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. We believe that the release dated January 3, 1963 and executed by Backus, the plaintiff (appellee), in favor of the defendant (appellant) for a consideration of $1,133.23 was a valid instrument which carried the full force and legal effect of releasing the appellant from liability. The result reached by this Court in this case is not a happy one.

The respective bargaining abilities of the plaintiff and the insurance adjuster, representing the defendant, were disproportionate—the advantages cast by experience and expertise being in favor of the defendant. However, this dominance of knowledge and of bargaining position does not per se spell out fraud, misrepresentation, duress or non-disclosure. Cf. Merit Music Service, Inc. v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213 , 225 A. 2d 470, 475-76 (1967).

Nor do the facts in this case raise these vices to a level sufficient to vitiate the legal effect of the release. The general principle of law applicable to the case at bar is set forth in Spitze v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 75 Md. 162 , 23 A. 307 (1892). This was an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries received while the plaintiff was in the service of the defendant Railroad Company. This occurred before the advent of Workmen’s Compensation Laws, at a time when the employee could successfully maintain an action against the employer upon proof of negligence.

The plaintiff, after receiving a total of $94.50 in benefits, had executed releases in favor of the Railroad Company. In the trial of the personal injury case the releases were pleaded as a defense in bar of recovery. The plaintiff, endeavoring to set aside the releases, contended that he could not read English and that the releases had not been read to him. He also alleged that a supervisor iiad offered him another position with the Railroad at the same wage he was receiving prior to the injury.

The plaintiff further contended that he made no inquiry of the person who brought the releases to him as to what the papers were, nor did he inform him that he could not read English and that he signed the papers as requested without knowledge of what they contained. The evidence showed that he had been a resident of this country for 24 years. This Court, in affirming the action of the lower ⁸⁹ court in upholding the releases as a valid defense, speaking through Judge McSherry, said at pp. 170-71: “There is no pretense that they concealed anything from him which they were bound to communicate, or that they practised any imposition or deception upon him.