Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case arose because of the refusal by the City Council of Ocean City, Maryland, to authorize, pursuant to a referendum petition, a referendum on a recently enacted comprehensive rezoning ordinance. The issues concern the appealability of the circuit court decision, as well as the duties and responsibilities of Ocean City officials with regard to the City’s registered voter list and the procedure for determining the validity of referendum petitions. I. The Mayor and City Council of Ocean City enacted a comprehensive rezoning ordinance on January 19, 1993.

Shortly thereafter, a group of local citizens, led by the petitioner Vincent Gisriel, filed a petition pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Art. 23A, § 2(b)(30), and the Ocean City Charter, to bring the zoning ordinance to referendum. 1 The Ocean City Solicitor approved the form of the ⁴⁸¹ referendum petition, and the petition was then forwarded to the Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections (the Board) for a determination of whether Gisriel had obtained a sufficient number of signatures to place the zoning ordinance before the electorate. Gisriel’s petition contained 1,013 signatures. Section C-411 of the Ocean City Charter sets forth the general procedures for petitioning an ordinance to referendum. 2 The specific dispute in this case is over § Call’s requirement that a referendum petition contain the signatures of at least “20% of the qualified voters” of Ocean City. Upon learning that the Board’s standard practice for determining whether referendum petitions met this requirement was to ⁴⁸² compare the names on a submitted petition with the City’s list of registered voters as of the date the petition was filed, Gisriel notified the Board that, in his view, the' list of registered voters contained the names of several unqualified voters.

After comparing the names on the petition with the registered voter list, and after checking the status of persons asserted by Gisriel to be unqualified voters, the Board recommended to the City Council that Gisriel’s petition be denied because it did not contain the names of at least 20% of the City’s qualified voters. 3 According to the Board, the number of registered voters in Ocean City was 4,903 as of February 16,1993, the date that the referendum petition was filed. The Board struck 66 of the 1,013 signatures on the submitted petition because they were duplicative, were the names of non-registered voters, or were otherwise “rejected signatures.” The remaining 947 signatures constituted only 19.31% of the 4,903 registered voters in Ocean City, a figure less than the 20% threshold requirement. 4 Following an initial decision by the City Council that the number of valid signatures was insufficient, Gisriel, pursuant to § C-505 of the Charter, requested an opportunity to be heard before the Council in order to present evidence contradicting the Board’s findings. At a regularly scheduled Council meeting, Gisriel explained to the Council that the Ocean City voter registration list used by the Board is based on two voter registration rolls, the Worcester County “Universal List” and the Ocean City “Mu ⁴⁸³ nicipal Only” or “Supplemental List.” 5 Gisriel alleged, and produced evidence designed to support his allegation, that the voter registration list contained the names of 294 individuals who failed to meet the requirements for qualified voters under the provisions of the Charter. 6 Gisriel maintained that if the Board had removed the names of these allegedly unqualified voters from the list of registered voters, so that the list contained only the names of the City’s registered and qualified voters, the number of signatures submitted on his referendum petition would have exceeded 20% of the City’s qualified voters, requiring the City Council to place the ordinance on the ballot for consideration by the Ocean City electorate. 7 ⁴⁸⁴ Despite Gisriel’s submission, the Council voted to reaffirm its initial decision upholding the recommendation of the Board. Thereafter, Gisriel instituted the present action in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, naming the City, the Board and the Council as defendants. 8 After a hearing, the circuit court issued an opinion and order.

As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the City’s contention that a comprehensive rezoning ordinance was not subject to referendum under the state statute, Art. 23A, § 2(b)(30). Addressing the merits of Gisriel’s suit, the circuit court noted that there was a difference between a “qualified voter” and a “registered voter” as those terms were used in the Ocean City Charter, and the court concluded that the Board’s and Council’s “refusal to strike the unqualified but registered voters from the voter roll as of the date the Petition was timely delivered ... [was] erroneous as a matter of law....” The circuit court ordered the Board to “cull [the City’s registered] voter roll of unqualified ... voters” prior to determining the percentage of qualified voters who had signed the petition. The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed. Ocean City Board v. Gisriel, 102 Md.App. 136 , 648 A.2d 1091 (1994).

After raising sua sponte the question of whether it had jurisdiction, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The intermediate appellate court held that, absent fraud or misconduct by election officials, the list of registered voters is presumed to be the list of all qualified voters at any given point in time, so long as there are appropriate remedies ⁴⁸⁵ available periodically to purge the list of unqualified voters. The Court of Special Appeals further held that the procedures enumerated in Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl.Vol.), Art. 33, § 3-16, were applicable to municipal elections and provided the mechanism for correcting errors in voting registration lists. Gisriel then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the defendants were entitled to use the list of registered voters for the purpose of checking the petition, and arguing that the circuit court’s decision was correct.

This Court granted the petition, and we directed the parties to address an additional issue, namely whether the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the defendants’ appeal. We shall first address this jurisdictional issue.

II

A. It is an often stated principle of Maryland law that appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is determined entirely by statute, and that, therefore, a right of appeal must be legislatively granted. See, e.g., Maryland-Nat’l v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 7 , 633 A.2d 855, 857 (1993) (“ ‘The right to take an appeal is entirely statutory, and no person or agency may prosecute an appeal unless the right is given by statute,’ ” quoting Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 309 , 242 A.2d 506 (1968)); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 261 , 482 A.2d 908, 910 (1984); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 147 , 422 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980); Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 422 , 404 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1979); Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146 , 400 A.2d 1130, 1132 , (1979); Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500 , 331 A.2d 55, 64 (1975).

Consequently, resolution of the jurisdictional issue depends upon an examination of the relevant provisions of the Maryland Code and of Ocean City’s legislative enactments. Section C-505 of the Ocean City Charter grants a right to appeal actions or decisions of the Board to the City Council, ⁴⁸⁶ and it provides for judicial review in the circuit court of the Council’s decision. Section C-505, however, does not provide a right, of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Furthermore, no other provision of the Ocean City Charter or the Ocean City ordinances authorize an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals under the circumstances here.

Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 12-801 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which is the general statute authorizing appeals from the circuit courts, provides that “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” Section 12-301 goes on specifically to grant a right of appeal “from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.” 9 Section 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, however, limits § 12-301’s broad grant of the right to appeal, providing as follows: “(a) Unless a right of appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body.” The Court of Special Appeals’ decision concerning its jurisdiction in the present case was based on that Court’s interpretation and application of § 12-302(a). Therefore, we shall briefly review the historical background of § 12-302(a)’s limitation on the right of appeal. ⁴⁸⁷ B. The first general appeals statute enacted by the General Assembly after the Revolution was Ch. 87 of the Acts of 1785, § 6, which granted the “full power and right to appeal” to “any party or parties aggrieved by any judgment or determination of any county court in any civil suit or action, or any prosecution.... ” Despite the broad language of the 1785 statute, as well as subsequent broadly worded general appeals statutes, this Court construed the 1785 statute, and its successor statutes, to be inapplicable in a case where a county court, or later a circuit court, exercised a special limited statutory jurisdiction rather than its ordinary common law-type jurisdiction, and acted within that special limited statutory jurisdiction. When a county court or a circuit court was exercising a special limited statutory jurisdiction, and not a common law-type of jurisdiction, this Court regularly held that the general appeals statutes did not authorize an appeal, and that an appeal could be taken only if authorized by a specific statute relating to the particular type of statutory jurisdiction being exercised. See Wil. & Susq.

R.R. Co. v. Condon, 8 G. & J. 443, 448, 449 (1837), where the principle was initially adopted and discussed. This rule of construction was subsequently applied by this Court in a variety of contexts, including judgments of county courts or circuit courts reviewing decisions by justices of the peace, Herzberg v. Adams, 39 Md. 309, 312 (1874); Hough v. Kelsey & Gray, 19 Md. 451, 455-456 (1863); State v. Mister, 5 Md. 11, 15 (1853); Crockett v. Parke, 7 Gill. 237, 240 (1848); judgments of the Baltimore City Court reviewing judgments of People’s Court of Baltimore City, Montgomery Ward v. Herrmann, 190 Md. 405, 408-411 , 58 A.2d 677, 678-680 (1948); judgments of county and circuit courts reviewing decisions of local government officials, Co. Commrs. Harford Co. v. Jay, 122 Md. 324, 327 , 89 A. 715, 717 (1914); Stephens v. M. & C. of Crisfield, 122 Md. 190, 192-193 , 89 A. 429, 429-430 (1914); Webster v. Cockey, 9 Gill. 92, 93-95 (1850); circuit court judgments reviewing certain decisions of orphans’ courts, Lammott v. Maulsby, 8 Md. 5, 8-9 (1855); and circuit court judgments in actions for judicial review of ⁴⁸⁸ administrative agency decisions, Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 460-461 , 165 A.2d 464, 466 (1960); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 406-407 , 76 A.2d 736, 738 (1950). See also Sugar v. North Balto.

M.P. Church, 164 Md. 487, 498-500 , 165 A. 703, 707-708 (1933) (collecting several other types of circuit court decisions rendered pursuant to special statutory jurisdiction); Savage Man. Co. v. Owings, 3 Gill. 497, 498-499 (1846). The rule precluding, under the general appeals statute, appeals from circuit court judgments in cases of special limited statutory jurisdiction, persisted despite several recodifications of the general appeals statutes by the Legislature containing no mention of the rule. Furthermore, in later years, the rule was frequently applied to limit appeals from circuit court judgments reviewing decisions of administrative agencies.

See, e.g., Pr. Geo’s Co. v. American Federation, 289 Md. 388, 397-400, 406 , 424 A.2d 770, 774-776, 779 (1981); Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile, 260 Md. 458, 461 , 272 A.2d 628, 630 (1971) (“ ‘The rule is that where an inferior court exercises a special limited jurisdiction which is conferred by statute, no appeal from its decision in such cases lies to this [Cjourt unless expressly given by the statute’”); Md. Pharmacy Board v. Peco, 234 Md. 200, 202 , 198 A.2d 273, 274 (1964) (“the provisions of [the general appeal statute] do not apply to cases where the trial court exercises a special or limited jurisdiction conferred by statute”); Hart v. Comm. of Motor Vehicles, 226 Md. 584, 587 , 174 A.2d 725, 726 (1961); Simpler v. State, Use of Boyd, supra, 223 Md. at 460-461 , 165 A.2d at 466 ; Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 580-581 , 102 A.2d 248, 251 (1954); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at 406-407 , 76 A.2d at 738 ; Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Board, 33 Md.App. 681, 685-686 , 366 A.2d 756, 759 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 727 (1977); Prince George’s County v. Fahey, 28 Md.App. 312, 315-316 , 345 A.2d 102, 104-105 (1975). In 1973, the General Assembly recodified the appeals statutes in its enactment of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code, which became effective on January 1, ⁴⁸⁹ 1974. 10 With its enactment of § 12-301, the Legislature retained the broad, general grant of the right to appeal.

In addition, § 12-301 partially abrogated the above-discussed rule by expressly stating that the right of appeal existed “from a final judgment by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction” unless expressly denied by law. Thus the Legislature abolished a large part of the doctrine disallowing appeals from circuit court judgments entered pursuant to the exercise of special limited statutory jurisdiction. 11 The Legislature, however, expressly retained a portion of the doctrine by its enactment of § 12-302(a), which makes § 12-301 inapplicable to appeals from final judgments of circuit courts reviewing decisions of the District Court, administrative agencies, or local legislative bodies. Nevertheless, judgments of the circuit courts reviewing decisions of the District Court are generally subject to further discretionary appellate review by petitions for writs of certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals. See §§ 12-305 and 12-307(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Moreover, appeals to the Court of Special Appeals from judgments of the circuit courts reviewing decisions of most state administrative agencies are generally authorized by the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-223(b) of the State Government Article. Consequently, the viability of the nonappealability principle adopted in Wil. & Susq. R.R. Co. v. Condon, supra, 8 G. & J. at 448-449 , and partially embodied in § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, is today largely limited to circuit court judgments in cases involving statutory judicial review of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial decisions by local government administrative agencies ⁴⁹⁰ and legislative bodies. 12 C. In holding that § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not preclude an appeal of the circuit court’s judgment in this case, the Court of Special Appeals pointed to the language of § 12-302(a) which states that “§ 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered ... in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of ... an administrative agency, or a local legislative body.” (Emphasis added). The Court of Special Appeals, construing this language in its most literal sense, held that § 12-302(a) is applicable only when the court below is exercising “appellate” jurisdiction rather than “original” jurisdiction.

The Court of Special Appeals thus explained ( 102 Md.App. at 147 , 648 A.2d at 1095-1096 ): “The issue, therefore, is whether the circuit court, in the case sub judice, exercised original or appellate jurisdiction when it reviewed the City Council’s decision to affirm the Board’s denial of appellee’s petition.” Next, the Court of Special Appeals, citing and quoting from Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 43, 47 , 343 A.2d 521, 525, 527 (1975), reiterated the principle of Maryland constitutional law that circuit court review of decisions by administrative agencies or local government bodies constitutes an exercise of original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction. 102 Md.App. at 147-149 , 648 A.2d at 1096-1097 . Since, under the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation, § 12-302(a)’s limita ⁴⁹¹ tion on the right to appeal from circuit court judgments is applicable only when a circuit court is technically exercising appellate jurisdiction, and since the circuit court’s review of the City Council’s decision in the present case was an exercise of original jurisdiction, § 12-302(a)’s limitation on the right to appeal was held to be inapplicable in the present case. For this reason, the Court of Special Appeals held that it had jurisdiction under § 12-301 to entertain the appeal. Although we shall hold, on entirely different grounds, that the Court of Special Appeals did have jurisdiction over this appeal, we flatly reject that court’s interpretation of § 12-302(a). 13 As indicated by the Court of Special Appeals, whenever a circuit court directly reviews the action, or inaction, of any administrative agency, governmental body, or official in the executive or legislative branches of government, including local government, the court is exercising original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction.

Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra, 276 Md. at 43 , 343 A.2d at 525 (“[T]he exercise of appellate jurisdiction requires a prior action by some judicial authority, or the prior exercise of judicial power.... [R]e-view of the decisions of an administrative agency is an exercise of original jurisdiction and not of appellate jurisdiction”). See Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596 , 604-605 n. 5, 612 A.2d 241 , 245 n. 5 (1992); In re Petition for Writ of ⁴⁹² Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 294 , 539 A.2d 664, 671 (1988); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467 , 385 A.2d 80, 84 (1978). In a technical, constitutional meaning of the term, a circuit court never exercises “appellate jurisdiction” when it directly reviews the decision of an administrative agency or a local government body. Consequently, under the holding of the Court of Special Appeals, the language in § 12-302(a) relating to administrative agencies and local legislative bodies could never be given any effect.

If § 12-302(a) is applicable only when a court is exercising “appellate jurisdiction” in a technical, constitutional sense, and if a court never exercises such appellate jurisdiction when directly reviewing the action of an administrative agency or local legislative body, then the statutory language has utterly no effect. The Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation represents a striking violation of the principle that a court should not “interpret a statutory scheme so as to render any part of it meaningless or nugatory.” Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180 , 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996). See, e.g., C & P Telephone v. Director of Finance, 343 Md. 567, 579-580 , 683 A.2d 512, 517-518 (1996); DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins, 342 Md. 432, 445 , 677 A.2d 73, 79 (1996) (“We will not read the statute to render subsection (c) unnecessary, as one of our cardinal rules ... is not to find any [statutory] word, clause, sentence, or phrase ... superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory”); Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank, 341 Md. 650, 660 , 672 A.2d 625, 629-630 (1996) (“such an interpretation would contravene the basic rule ... that a statute should be construed so that no word is rendered superfluous or meaningless”); State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 134 , 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (“We seek to read statutes ‘so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory’ ”); In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 394 , 658 A.2d 696, 700 (1995). A broader construction of the phrase “appellate jurisdiction” in § 12-302(a), so as to include ordinary statutory judicial review of adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies and local legislative bodies, would be in accord with the history ⁴⁹³ of § 12-302(a) and "with the normal usage of the language when § 12-302(a) was enacted.

The history of § 12-302(a), discussed earlier, discloses that the statute represents a partial codification of the principle that the general appeals statute does not authorize an appeal from a circuit court’s judgment when that court is exercising a special limited statutory jurisdiction as opposed to a more traditional common law-type of jurisdiction. As previously pointed out, this principle was regularly applied to statutory actions for judicial review of administrative agency and local government decisions. See, e.g., Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile, supra, 260 Md. at 460-461 , 272 A.2d at 630 ; Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Steward, supra, 203 Md. at 580-581 , 102 A.2d at 251 ; Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at 406-407 , 76 A.2d at 738 .

Although the statutory judicial review actions in those cases were clearly original actions under the teaching of Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra, 276 Md. at 43-47 , 343 A.2d at 525-527 , nevertheless § 12-302(a) was intended to embody the holdings of Urbana, Steward, Johnson, and similar cases. See Pr. Geo’s Co. v. American Federation, supra, 289 Md. at 398-400, 424 A.2d at 775-776 ; Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Bd., supra, 33 Md.App. at 685-686 , 366 A.2d at 759 . Consequently, the history of § 12-302(a) indicates that the statute is applicable to statutory judicial review actions even though such actions technically do not represent exercises of a circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction.

Section 12-302(a) was enacted by the General Assembly in 1973, and the opinion in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra, was rendered two years later in 1975. Prior to the opinion in the Shell Oil case, and at the time § 12-302(a) was enacted, statutory circuit court actions for judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies or local legislative bodies were regularly called “appeals” and treated as if they fell within the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts. See, e.g., Criminal Inj. Comp.

Bd. v. Gould, supra, 273 Md. 486 , 331 A.2d 55 (using, throughout the opinion, the terms “appeal” and “appellate” jurisdiction interchangeably with the term “judicial re ⁴⁹⁴ view”); Public Serv. Comm’n v. Balto. Gas & El., 273 Md. 357, 359 , 329 A.2d 691, 693 (1974) (“The Company appealed [from the Commission] to the Circuit Court for Calvert County”); St. Comm’n on Human Rel. v. Malakoff, 273 Md. 214, 217 , 329 A.2d 8, 11 (1974) (“appellees sought redress from the adverse [administrative] decision by appealing to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County”); 14 Board of Appeals v. Marina Apts., 272 Md. 691, 695 , 326 A.2d 734, 736 (1974) (“Marina promptly appealed this Board action to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 128 , 314 A.2d 113, 115 (1974) (“Rogers appealed the administrative decision to the Circuit Court”); Lucky Stores v. Bd. of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 522 , 312 A.2d 758, 763 (1973) (referring to the circuit court case as being “on appeal ” from the Board of Appeals); Valenzia v. Zoning Board, 270 Md. 478, 482 , 312 A.2d 277, 279 (1973) (zoning case constituted an “appeal to the Circuit Court for Howard County”); American Oil Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 270 Md. 301, 302 , 310 A.2d 796, 796-797 (1973) (“The Circuit Court ... on appeal passed an order ... affirming the Board”); Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile, supra, 260 Md. at 460 , 272 A.2d at 630 (involved an “initial appeal to the circuit court” purportedly under a local ordinance stating that an “ ‘[ajppeal from the action of the Board of County Commissioners may be presented to the Circuit Court’ ”); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 196 Md. at 407 , 76 A.2d at 738 (“we specifically hold that no right of appeal exists to review a decision of the Circuit Court sitting as an appellate court in a zoning case, unless the Legislature has authorized an appeal”). (Emphasis added). 15 ⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, both before and after the time § 12-302(a) was enacted, numerous statutes, both state and local, referred to administrative judicial review actions in the circuit courts as “appeals.” See, e.g., Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 10(d) (stating that a particular type of order by the State Human Relations Commission “is a final order appealable to the circuit court”); Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 48A, § 40 (referring in several instances to “appeals ” from orders of the Insurance Commissioner to the courts, providing for a “notice of appeal,” and stating that the Insurance Commissioner shall be an “appellee” in the circuit court proceedings); Code (1988, 1996 Supp.), § 13-532(a)(2) of the Tax-General Article (stating that, in a tax case, “[a]ny party to the ... proceeding, including a governmental unit, may appeal a final order ... to the circuit court”).

(Emphasis added). The Maryland Rules in 1973, and continuously until July 1, 1993, when the correct terminology was adopted, referred to circuit court actions reviewing administrative decisions as “appeals” and treated them as appeals. See Ch. 1100, Subtitle B, of the former Rules. In fact, the very provision of the Ocean City Charter invoked by Gisriel in the case at bar, § C505 of the Charter, states that a decision of the City Council “may be appealed to the circuit court....” (Emphasis added).

Therefore, when § 12-302(a) was enacted, a reference to circuit court review of administrative agency and local government decisions as an exercise of “appellate jurisdiction” was consistent with the normal usage of the language at the time. It is much more likely that the Legislature, in § 12-302(a), intended to refer to ordinary statutory judicial review actions instead of to exercises of appellate jurisdiction in a technical, constitutional sense. We fully agree with Chief Judge Wilner’s comment for the Court of Special Appeals in Department v. Harmans, 98 Md.App. 535 , 542 n. 2, 633 A.2d 939 , 943 n. 2 (1993): ⁴⁹⁶ “In a technical, but to some extent jurisprudential, sense, a court does not exercise ‘appellate jurisdiction’ when reviewing the decision of an administrative agency or legislative body. * * * “It has long been common, however, to treat these kinds of actions as being in the nature of appeals and to refer to them as ‘administrative appeals.’ “We have no doubt that, in crafting § 12-302(a) as it did, the Legislature had in mind actions of this type, to review the decisions of administrative and local legislative bodies, and so we shall construe the term ‘appellate jurisdiction’ in the manner the Legislature intended, rather than in its more narrow, but more appropriate, manner.” Accordingly we hold that, when a circuit court proceeding in substance constitutes ordinary judicial review of an adjudicatory decision by an administrative agency or local legislative body, pursuant to a statute, ordinance, or charter provision, and the circuit court renders a final judgment within its jurisdiction, § 12-302(a) is applicable, and an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals is not authorized by § 12-301. See Pr.

Geo’s Co. v. American Federation, supra, 289 Md. at 397-400, 424 A.2d at 774-776 . D. While disagreeing with the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of § 12-302(a), we do agree with that court’s decision that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. For reasons entirely different from those set forth by the Court of Special Appeals, we believe that § 12-302(a) is inapplicable to this case. Although Gisriel did cite § C-505 of the Ocean City Charter in his circuit court complaint, the nature of his action was not a statutory judicial review action unknown to the common law ⁴⁹⁷ at the time when the principle embodied in § 12-302(a) was first adopted by this Court in Wil. & Susq.

R.R. v. Condon, supra, 8 G. & J. at 448-449 , and Savage Man. Co. v. Owings, supra, 3 Gill. at 498-499. Instead, Gisriel’s action in substance was a traditional common law mandamus action, and the circuit court’s judgment in substance resembled the type of order rendered in a mandamus proceeding. This Court recently reviewed the nature of a traditional common law mandamus action in Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145-148 , 680 A.2d 1040, 1047-1049 (1996).

There, Judge Bell for the Court explained (343 Md. at 145, 680 A.2d at 1047): “[T]he common law writ of mandamus ... ‘is an original action, as distinguished from an appeal,’ ... [and] is ... ‘an extraordinary remedy[,]’ Ipes v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Baltimore, 224 Md. 180, 183 , 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961), ‘that ... will not lie if [there is] any other adequate and convenient remedy[.]’.... [It is] generally used ‘to compel inferior tribunals, public officials or administrative agencies to perform their function, or perform some particular duty imposed upon them which ... is imperative and to the performance of which ... the [applicant] has a clear legal right.’ Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 514 , 331 A.2d 55, 72 (1975).... [It] does not lie where the action to be reviewed is discretionary or depends on personal judgment.” See, e.g., Board v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 46-47 , 562 A.2d 700, 706 (1989); George’s Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Comm’rs of Allegany Co., 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883) (“Its [mandamus’s] office ... is to compel ... public officers to perform their functions, or some particular duty imposed upon them”). Turning to the present case, Gisriel argued, and the circuit court agreed, that the Board had a non-discretionary duty to delete from the Ocean City registered voter list the names of unqualified voters before determining the percentage of voters ⁴⁹⁸ who had signed the petition. The circuit court’s order concluded as follows: “The Court finds that Ocean City must cull its voter roll of unqualified but registered voters before it can determine the percentage of voters who signed Gisriel’s petition. The Court finds, given the facts of this case, that the date the Town must use to purge its voters roll is February 16, 1993. “For the foregoing reasons, it is, ... by the Circuit Court for Worcester County, Maryland, ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Maryland, for REMAND to the Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.” If Gisriel’s and the circuit court’s view of the applicable law is correct, whenever a referendum petition is filed, and it is claimed that certain names on the registered voter list represent unqualified voters, the Board must determine whether or not such registered voters are unqualified, and delete the names of those found to be unqualified before deciding whether the petition contains the requisite percentage of signatures.

Under the circuit court’s holding, this is a ministerial duty imposed as a matter of law. It is the type of duty which, under the above-cited'cases, is an appropriate subject for a common law mandamus action. Any issues requiring the resolution of disputed facts would not arise until the Board begins to perform this duty. A subsequent judicial review of the manner in which the Board