Gleason v. Suskin

Henry, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, rendered in favor of the defendants, the appellees here, in a suit instituted against them by the appellant for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained hv her on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant. In the view which we take of this case,-it will only-he necessary for us to consider the action of the Court in granting the fifth prayer of the defendant, inasmuch as, in our opinion, such action was proper and is decisive of the case. The said prayer reads as follows “The Court instructs the jury that upon the plaintiff’s own evidence, her own want of ordinary care and caution directly contributing to the injuries ’which she received, and, therefore, the verdict of the jury must he for the defendant.” The testimony of the appellant herself showed that she was 35 years old and that she held the position of forelady, in the overall factory of the defendants in the City of Baltimore, ¹³⁹ having been so employed for about six months prior to the date of the accident, but having had an experience of fifteen years in other factories in which shafting and other machinery was used.

In this factory were about thirty other female employees, it being the duty of the appellant to instruct them and to superintend their work. The sewing machines were arranged in two parallel rows on the floor of the factory, with an aisle between them, and were operated by steam power transmitted by shafting which ran under the centre of the tables at a height of eight inches from the floor. This shafting was boxed for the safety of the employees, in order to prevent their skirts and clothing from catching in it. On Monday, December 2nd, 1901, when the appellant came as usual to her work, she observed that one end of the shaft, which projected beyond the table and which was properly covered on the Eriday previous when the employees quit work, had been uncovered for the purpose of making an extension to connect with a button machine, about thirty-five inches distant from the end of the table.

This extension of the shaft was made by an iron coupling, fastened with a set screw, that projected about one-half inch beyond the surface. She was aware that the object of boxing the shaft was to prevent catching the clothing of the employees, though she. had no knowledge of machinery. On the day in question, in the afternoon, she left her desk, about twenty-two feet away, and went down the aisle for the purpose of giving instructions to the young woman who operated the machine at the end of the table next to the uncovered shafting. In doing this, without thinking about the danger, she took a position in the narrow space about thirty-five by sixteen and a half inches, between the new button machine, the end of the table, and the shafting, facing the employee, and with her back turned towards the shafting.

She stated on cross-examination, in reply to a question as to how near her clothing was to the shafting, that “it wasn’t near it, it was a good distance from it; I don’t know exactly how far it was.” Shortly after putting herself in this position, her skirts were caught by the shafting, pull ¹⁴⁰ ing her under it, with the result that her leg was broken and her body otherwise mangled. Two expert witnesses, produced by the plaintiff, testified that shafting made as that above described had a power of suction that would draw around it a light fabric that came as close as one-half inch to it, and, if such fabric were frayed, this latent power might operate at a greater distance than one-half inch. No notice was given to the appellant by her employers of any danger from this uncovered shafting. While we do not mean to reflect in the slightest degree upon her veracity, yet the statement of the plaintiff as to her proximity to the shafting must necessarily be taken in connection with the physical facts of the case.

It must be remembered, in the first place, that her back was turned to the danger, and, therefore, she was unable to speak with accuracy, and as the space in which she stood,- as above stated, was only about thirty-five by sixteen and one-half inches, the latter being the distance from the edge of the table to the shaft, it will bo irresistibly forced upon the mind that the “good distance” spoken of by plaintiff must necessarily have been a very small space. Furthermore, if we are to believe the testimony of the expert witnesses, her dress must have been as near as one-half inch to the shaft, otherwise the accident could not have occurred, for it is only over such space that the latent power of suction can operate, unless the fabric attracted be frayed, in which event it might attract for a greater distance; but there is no evidence whatever in the case that her dress was frayed. We can avoid, and properly so, in our opinion, some of the difficulties presented in the argument by not